




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TERENTIUS O'DONNELL, S.T.D.

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
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THE CHURCH IN 1907

THE year 1907 has not been a remarkable one in the political history of the world. Royal visitors and the Hague Conference have been at work preparing for the inauguration of the era of universal peace, and it would seem as if the diplomacy of the one were about as useful as the conferences of the other. Each of the great European Powers would like to see its neighbours relieved from the intolerable strain of military taxation, caused by the support and expansion of the army and navy, and would even consent to the establishment of a court of arbitration the decrees of which should bind all its competitors ; but as no leading State would consent to accept such beneficent proposals for its own people, the old maxim holds good that the best way to maintain peace is to be prepared for war. Hence the building of armaments goes on apace to the neglect of social and educational reforms.

It is not, however, with international politics we wish to deal at present, but with the affairs of the Catholic Church. For her the year that is past has been a troubled one, it is true, but not a disastrous one. It has had its quota of conflicts with outside authorities, and its bickerings from within, but the net result is that she to-day stands in an infinitely more secure position than she did twelve months ago. We are not of those who believe that the Church is at its best when it is undisturbed by the efforts of open or secret foes ; we remember the solemn warning of Christ about the

contradictions which awaited the efforts of His successors, and with the sound of our Saviour's words ringing in our ears we feel convinced that every new phase of the struggle only helps the better to bring to light the super-human element in the Church's constitution, and to prepare the way for more unexpected victories in the new lines of human thought and social organization.

Last year we mentioned that the movements within the Church itself were a greater source of anxiety to the Pope and his advisers than the conflicts with the Governments of Spain, France, or Italy. The truth of this statement has been proved by the rapid march of events in regard to the new school of Theology during the year 1907. There was the accustomed heated controversy in many of the leading French Catholic magazines, unintelligible to the multitudes, but fraught with serious danger to the whole Christian system. For years a body of scholars in France, influenced by the teachings of the German philosophers, and anxious to put an end to the apparent conflict between science and religion, has been at work devising a system of defence which would put faith and its subject-matter beyond the pale of scientific investigation. In imitation of Kant's *Pure Reason*, they have rejected all intellectual basis for Christian belief, and in imitation of his *Practical Reason*, they gave us back what they took away, in the voice of conscience produced in the individual by the divinity existing within him. They have thus succeeded in making their faith unassailable, but when they stopped to survey their defences they have found that their fortifications enclose not Christianity as it is embodied in the Scriptures, explained by the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers, crystallized in the definitions of the Councils or in the infallible utterances of the Sovereign Pontiff, but an indescribable hybrid—a cross between Agnosticism, Pantheism, Rationalism, and natural religion, a vague sentimentalism which under some aspects would do credit to the Welsh Revivalists or the Enniskillen Dippers.

But the movement was not confined to France. In

Italy the publication of the review, *Il Rinnovamento*, and the foundation by Fogazzaro out of the profits of *Il Santo* of a scientific-religious academy at Milan, were conclusive evidences that the new Theology had inoculated some of the more ardent Italian spirits. The subject-matter of the first of the Milanese lectures, namely, 'The biological origin of the religious sentiment,' is a sufficient indication of the tendencies of the school. Then, there was the so-called address to the Pope from a number of anonymous clergymen, the League of Münster to demand the suppression of the Index, the ugly controversy about the Schöll monument at Würzburgh, the bitter articles of 'Cisalpine' in the *Guardian*, and equally bitter articles in other reviews, but especially in the *Edinburgh* and in the *North American Quarterly*. It is not, however, to be assumed that all these incidents were indicative of a very widespread adherence to the lines of thought condemned in the recent Encyclicals on 'Modernism,' or that the numerous articles and pamphlets must have presupposed a large group of able scholars. Very often the same writer appeared either anonymously or over a *nom-de-plume* in several reviews, and thus although the real supporters were few, the activity of the individuals of the group made up for the want of numbers.

In face of the universal feeling of unrest caused by such publications it would have been manifestly impossible for the Holy Father to have remained silent. Unless the Supreme Pontiff were to calmly stand by while the truths and foundations of the Christian teaching were being rudely swept aside, nobody can be surprised at the definiteness and vigour of the Papal pronouncements. In the *Lamentabili sane exitu*, published in July, the Encyclical letter, *Pascendi Gregis*, of September, and in the still more recent Motu Proprio, *Praestantia Scripturae Sacrae*, Pius X has shown to the world the position of the Catholic Church in face of the Modernist movement.

Since the publication of the Syllabus and the condemnation of 'Modernism,' a wild cry has been raised in many quarters about the mad reactionary policy of Pius X and his Jesuitical advisers, the utter irreconcilability of the

teaching of Catholic dogma with the conclusions of science, the suppression of all freedom of thought among Catholic scholars, the condemnation of everything and of everybody favoured by the late Pontiff, Leo XIII. The cry has been taken up with special vigour in these countries. Father Tyrrell, who can, it appears, write plainly when he wishes, contributed a couple of letters to *The Times* which should open the eyes of those who have been bewitched by his shifty and unintelligible mysticism. He wonders how any Government could dream of establishing a University for Catholics in Ireland after such a sweeping condemnation of science and scientists as is contained in the Encyclical. Mr. Moore, M.P., and several of his supporters were not slow to seize upon such an excellent rallying cry, while even his Lordship, the Protestant Bishop of Meath, has not been ashamed to lend his support to the popular misconception prevalent amongst his co-religionists about the aim and object of the Papal Encyclical.

Now, in answer to all such objections we would ask the learned Bishop or any of his supporters to point out a single doctrine condemned by the Pope which he or any person calling himself a Christian would undertake to defend. Is he prepared, for instance, to uphold the view that human reason cannot lead us to a knowledge of the existence of God ? that the founder of the Christian religion was a mere peasant reformer who suffered for His views and was thrown into the common pit to rot ? that the whole Christian teaching is only the evolution of the religious consciousness of the man Christ, as Buddhism or Mohammedanism represents that of Buddha or Mohammed ? that the Scriptures, the New Testament as well as the Old, are of no value except to awaken in mankind the feeling or sentiment of religion ? that the Church, its teaching power, its jurisdiction, its hierarchy are the work of men ages after Christ had disappeared from the world ? If he and his friends are prepared to accept these views then is he justified in joining in the cry against the Papal Encyclical, but if not, they ought in very gratitude come forward and boldly proclaim their admiration for the courage and ability

with which the Sovereign Pontiff has expounded the basis and the principles of Christianity in the face of the threatening forces of religious rationalism.

Since the publication of the Encyclical most of the journals and reviews which were supposed to favour the views of the 'New School' have expressed their adhesion to the Papal teaching, and their repudiation of the doctrines repudiated by the Pope. A counter manifesto indeed was published by a few anonymous clerics in Italy, and Father Tyrrell undertook to lecture the Head of the Catholic Church on the errors of his ways. The situation would be amusing, if it were not serious, and in many ways pathetic. Now that the Encyclical has been published and its teachings accepted, there should be a truce to the controversy. It should not be forgotten that whatever about a few individuals, many of the sympathisers of the Modernist movement never for a moment dreamt of breaking with the Catholic Church, or of overturning its teaching. They were deceived. Their aims were good, their loyalty unquestionable, their faith sound, their zeal pardonable if misdirected; and therefore it were well, when the Catholic principles have been so clearly stated and accepted, that an end should be put to the controversy and an amnesty declared. Submission is always repugnant to human nature. Let it not be made more difficult by personal recriminations.

In Italy the year has been a peculiarly trying one for the Church. For some time, in fact since the election of Pius X, the relations between the Holy See and the Quirinal have been considerably improved. Both parties felt that in face of the forces of republicanism, socialism, and revolution a union of all the friends of religion and order was necessary and imperative. Hence the Pope, without withdrawing the *Non expedit* has rather favoured the policy of permitting the Catholic party to take part in the parliamentary and municipal elections. Fearing the triumph of such a combination, the Socialists and Radicals, urged on by the success of the anti-religious war in France, have joined hands and formed a coalition *bloc*. The military honours paid to Cardinal Lorenzelli, and the appearance of the Government

warships at the religious ceremonies at Paola, excited the Socialist-Radical party to frenzy ; and hence the attacks upon clerical students, priests, monasteries, and even on the Cardinal Secretary of State, the manifestations around the statue of Giordano Bruno and of Garibaldi.

The Pope in face of such unrest has felt it necessary to suspend all the pilgrimages which had been arranged in honour of his sacerdotal jubilee. This step was specially necessary since nowhere more than in Rome itself have the party of irreligion gained such a foothold. The newspapers, with the exception of the *Osservatore Romano* and the *Corriere d'Italia*, have all been captured by the anti-religious party. The *Asino*, the *Avanti*, the *Patria*, the *Popolo*, and the *Giornale d'Italia* have all joined in the campaign against the Pope and the monastic establishments ; and the only wonder is how any self-respecting government could stand idly by and allow such caricatures of the Pope and of everything held sacred by Christians to be published without a word of protest.

In most of the municipal elections the Radical-Socialist-Republican *bloc* has been successful, and even in Rome itself, where the two parties were equal at the first time of the ballot, and where on the second election the Catholics abstained from voting, the Municipal Council has passed completely into the hands of the *bloc*, and Nathan, an English Jew, has been elected Mayor of Rome. The religious education in the schools, so far protected by the Government, is now left to the option of the local authorities, and with the present constitution of many of the Municipal Councils, it will be strange indeed if in many districts it is not eliminated from the programme.

In France, though it is hard to arrive at any clear understanding of the progress of events, there are many developments which give cause for satisfaction. The French ' National Church,' founded by M. des Houx, of which we heard so much during the closing months of last year, has proved a source of infinite amusement to friend and foe. The *Associations Cultuelles* were to be pushed forward in spite of the condemnation of the Holy See and the French

Episcopate. There was no doubt that a few of the French Bishops would declare in their favour, and that the majority of the priests would prefer the 'National Church' and their salaries to Rome and beggary. This was the idea, but how has it succeeded?

Not a single one of the French Bishops showed the slightest anxiety to break with the Holy See, and out of the vast body of the French clergy not more than two dozen, and these for the most part already suspended, could be tempted from their allegiance. In want of a suitable head for the Church the arrival in Paris of M. Vilatte, the Catholic-Anglican-Methodist-Russian-Jansenist-Portuguese schismatic Bishop proved convenient, and he was promptly installed head of the 'National Church.' He was well known in Paris before this—for himself, unfortunately, too well—and one of his lady creditors brought him into court for a trifling debt of a few thousands, which in his spiritual zeal he had forgotten. A decree was granted, an execution levied, and his pastoral crozier and mitre passed into the bailiff's hands. M. Vilatte departed once more for America, and M. des Houx is still on the look-out for a suitable head for his new 'Church.' We could suggest a few excellent candidates, but it would be invidious to mention names.

The great difficulty between the Bishops and the Government during the year 1907 has been the question of the possession of the churches. On the failure to establish the *Associations Cultuelles* the churches passed into the hands of the Communes, and the Government would have promptly closed them against the clergy did not they fear a popular revolution.

The priests, in spite of the law, continued their ministrations, and M. Briand, in order to legalise their resistance, offered to sanction their action, if they would only make a notification of their intention to hold religious meetings to the local government authorities. This notification, on the command of the Pope, they refused to make. Then, negotiations were entered into between the Government and the Bishops to arrange a form of lease which would secure the churches for religious services. Several forms

were drawn up and rejected, and finally on the refusal of M. Briand to accept a lease which would guarantee the churches to the successors of the present lessees, and which would safeguard the rights of the Bishop, the negotiations were broken off ; and, as a result, the churches are open, the priests are allowed to exercise their sacred functions, but they have no legal rights to the use of the churches, and their presence in them is only tolerated.

The confiscation of the ecclesiastical property goes on apace, and to prevent the descendants of the men who bequeathed immense sums to the churches for 'foundation Masses' from asserting their rights in the law courts, as many of them had already done with success, a new law, whereby only the relatives in the direct line can institute such proceedings, has been carefully prepared. Not even the diocesan funds for the support of the old and infirm priests has been spared in the new confiscation.

A Bill has been drafted on education which goes far to abolish the few remnants of the 1850 and 1875 laws in favour of the free schools. Formerly only the regular clergy were excluded from teaching in secondary schools. For the future no clergyman can be recognized as the head of an educational establishment, though priests may still occupy a subordinate position if they have passed certain qualifying examinations prescribed for such teachers. Many friends of the Government express disapproval of this step on the ground that it does not go far enough, and exclude the clergy altogether from secondary education.

On the other hand if the Separation Law has brought poverty to the French Church, it brought also a measure of freedom for ecclesiastics which has been long unknown in France. The Bishops may now meet in National and Provincial Councils, and they have availed themselves of this liberty to come together and to deliberate in common about the measures to be taken for the education of ecclesiastical students and the support of the clergy. Though the *Grands Séminaires* have been seized by the Government, arrangements have been made by which their work can still be continued in new establishments in

accordance with the Law of 1875 ; while the *Petits Séminaires* or preparatory schools will be carried on in accordance with the laws for ordinary secondary schools.

Measures have been taken to accustom the people to voluntary contributions for the support of the clergy and the churches. In a country where there exists a great deal of religious indifference and where the peasantry have not been under the necessity of supporting their clergy, this is not a matter that can be quickly settled. Some of the parishes are rich, and can easily raise the required sum, while in others, if left to themselves, the maintenance of the curé is an utter impossibility. Hence the resolution has been taken to raise a general diocesan fund, the proceeds of which will be administered for the advantage of all the parishes. In this way the priests in the poorer parishes will be assisted for the present in the hope that better days may come. Pius X has left the direction of these measures to the Bishops of France. He insists on one thing, and on one thing alone, namely, that the ministrations of religion are to be free of charge, in the sense that nobody will be denied the benefits of religion because he has not paid his contribution.

The Church of France has come through a crisis well calculated to try her fidelity to the Holy See. It has served only to prove to the world how closely the Bishops of France are united to the Supreme Head of the Catholic Church, and how loyally the clergy have stood by their Bishops. They have endured the loss of their property, their annuities, their residences, rather than move an inch from the line of policy traced out for them by Pius X. When we think of the days of the French Revolution, and when we compare the conduct of the Constitutional Bishops and the Constitutional Clergy with that of their successors to-day, we are encouraged in our belief that better days are in store for the French Church. When *The Times* editor is preparing his next article on the miserable squabbles in the Anglican Church between the Privy Council, the bishops, and the clergy about the cut of their vestments, the use of incense, or prayers for the dead, he might do

well to cast his glance across the Channel, and draw a little inspiration from the conduct of the clergy whom his Paris correspondent has been attacking during the last ten years.

In Spain we were threatened last year with a repetition of the French anti-clerical campaign. But the Spaniards were not prepared for such a movement. The people rose in revolt against the Law of Civil Marriage and the Suppression of the Monasteries. The Liberal Ministry was dissolved, Señor Maura and the Conservatives returned to office, the Law of Associations, modelled on that of M. Waldeck-Rousseau in France, was dropped, and the Romanones edict relating to civil marriage was cancelled by the King. The elections since that time have given the Conservative party a complete victory. In the Senatorial elections held during the year, the figures for the leading parties were: Conservatives 113, Liberals 28, Republicans 7, and Carlists 5. These go to show that the great religious demonstrations held at Pampeluna, Barcelona, Bilbao, and San Sebastian during the spring, together with the protests delivered by the Archbishop of Toledo in the name of his episcopal brethren, were not mere empty show, but the correct expression of the wishes of the nation.

Last year has been a busy though successful one for the Catholics of Germany. It has tested their organization but only to prove its strength. Count Bülow has long been tired of the Centre party. He was forced to depend upon it for the work of government, but in his heart he detested the party and its principles. In his anxiety to find a weak spot in its armour, he madly clutched at the opportunity offered by the opposition of the Centre to vote the monies necessary for the African war. The party adopted this attitude, not through want of loyalty or of desire to help German colonization, but on account of the scandals that had come to light in connexion with the war and the administration of the colony. The Chancellor raised the cry that the Centre was disloyal to the Empire, and called upon the German people to unite their efforts to crush the enemies of the Fatherland—the Centre and the Socialists.

It was undoubtedly a critical moment for the leaders of the party. The cry of disloyalty might be refuted but it could not be recalled. It raised up in the minds of many the old idea that the Catholics of Germany were endeavouring to form a state within the State. To make matters worse a group of Catholics, University professors and *literati*, were base enough to issue an appeal to their fellow-religionists against the party that had done so much for Catholicism within the Empire.

But these efforts at poisoning the wells and creating distrust and disunion were alike fruitless. The Centre party instead of losing actually gained four seats, and with its 105 members, is not only the largest party in the Reichstag, but actually counts nearly as many as the combined forces of the Conservatives and National Liberals. The Poles, too, the allies of the Centre, at least in all religious questions, gained four, and are now represented by twenty Deputies; while on the other hand the Socialist party lost thirty-six, and can muster only forty-three in the present Reichstag. In Bavaria, owing to local politics, and the special bitterness of Bavarian Liberalism, the Centre organization decided to support the Socialists against the Liberals. This caused a little dissension among the Catholics themselves, but fortunately the incident was allowed to pass without any serious division.

If the Chancellor had counted upon such a majority as would free him from the need of the Centre support, the results of the elections must have given him a disagreeable surprise. He may, indeed, in his colonial and navy vote, by careful manœuvring, carry with him the whole Chamber except the Centre, Poles, Socialists, and Guelphs, but how long can he rely upon such a coalition? Besides, in matters of social reform the Conservatives and Liberals are so hopelessly divided that the Chancellor will be forced to rely upon the Centre party to carry the measures which are urgently required.

The German Catholic Congress met this year at Würzburgh, the city of St. Killian. For many reasons the assembly was looked forward to with considerable anxiety

by both friends and foes alike. The manifesto against the Index emanating from Westphalia, the bitter controversy raised by the condemnation of the Schöll monument, the difficulties between some of the Bavarian Bishops and the Centre administration during the elections, had led many people to believe that the Congress was certain to be the scene of controversy and mayhap dissension. But all such forecasts were completely falsified. Never before has a more successful Congress been held ; the speakers were hopeful, firm, yet tolerant ; and even the most hostile of the German Press had to admit their admiration of the policy and the programme of the Catholic Union.

In Austria the great event of the year was the election to be held under the new Franchise Law. The Emperor Francis Joseph had made up his mind to grant universal suffrage in Austria. In the circumstances of the Empire such a law could do very little harm, and it might be expected to do some good. Still it was a leap in the dark the result of which no man could well foretell. From the election returns, on account of the diverse groups into which the Deputies are divided, very little information can be derived. One thing, however, is certain, and that is, that the old Jewish-Liberal party which had controlled Vienna for years, and which had initiated all the legislation hostile to the Church, has been almost completely annihilated. The Christian Democrats, whose leader is Dr. Lueger, the great Catholic leader, and now Mayor of Vienna, is the largest group in the Assembly, and has succeeded in having one of its number elected President.

This grant of universal suffrage in Austria will prove exceedingly uncomfortable for the Winkerle-Kossuth-Apponyi Cabinet in Hungary. These are the leaders of the Maygar or dominant party in the kingdom of St. Stephen, but though they have the power in their hands they do not represent the majority of the population. Their opponents, the Croats, and the other races which form the Kingdom of Hungary, are demanding universal suffrage ; and remembering the insatiable demands of the Maygar leaders for the concession of all the reforms granted

in Austria, the Emperor insists that universal suffrage be also introduced into Hungary. It is rather an amusing spectacle to see the man who was supposed to be an enemy to constitutional government forcing a measure of freedom upon the leaders who have been all along proclaiming themselves the champions of freedom.

The Catholic League of Austria has held its Congress only a few weeks ago. Although formed only a short time, it has caught the spirit of German Catholicity, and has already more than justified its existence. The Divorce Law has been put aside, the campaign against religious instruction in the schools has been met by a vigorous counter-campaign; and in their last assembly a lead was given by Dr. Lueger in the direction where reform is most urgently required, namely, in the management of the Austrian Universities. The Catholics have a stiff fight before them in this field, but knowing their efforts and their success in the past we are not without hopes that their fight will not be in vain.

The Education question has been the burning one in England during the year 1907. The Government abandoned the Education Bill of Mr. Birrell, only to prepare the way, as the Prime Minister declared, for reforms that will be more radical. In the meantime, and until such a measure is matured, the new Minister of Education, Mr. McKenna, tried his hand at a little scheme which would saddle the supporters of denominationalism with the support of the religious teaching. The local authorities were to pay the teachers the full salaries as at present, but in case of denominational schools the managers should be obliged to refund to them one-fifth of the salaries paid to the teachers. This was supposed to represent the proper proportion for the time given to religious instruction. If the managers were unable or unwilling to satisfy this demand within six months, then the school was struck off the rates and all the teachers' salaries automatically stopped. This was an ingenious scheme, perfectly in harmony with the dictates of the Nonconformist conscience, but the unmistakable attitude of the Irish Parliamentary party

and of the English Catholics and Anglicans intimidated the Cabinet, and this too, like its predecessor, was recalled for repairs.

Defeated in the hope of getting an Education Bill on the Statute Book, Mr. M'Kenna has undertaken to do by Board regulations what he could not get done by Parliament. He insists that the denominational training colleges built without any Government support, should admit all students who present themselves for admittance without any inquiries about their religion, and without insisting upon attendance at any religious service—and this, too, not merely in the case of day scholars, but also of residential pupils. Besides, in the case of secondary schools, though built by religious bodies, the new regulations required that there should be no tests for the teachers employed, and no general religious instruction. Unless these instructions be followed, the Government grant for successful pupils will be considerably reduced.

These regulations, also, are in perfect harmony with the Nonconformist conscience. This body, though numbering many wealthy supporters, has never spent a penny on providing schools, primary or secondary. They have had the Government establishments built out of the public taxes and Catholics and Anglicans, anxious for the faith of their children, have spared no expense to erect schools where their religious teaching might be secure. Yet, the Nonconformists are not content. They insist upon getting possession of the institutions built by the hard-earned pennies of the Catholic workingmen, and when the latter bring the case before the leader of the Liberal party, they are assured that a little mixture in their schools would only help to improve them. The next day, facing his Nonconformists friends, he assures them that the regulations would have been more drastic if he had a free hand. Verily, this is Liberalism with a vengeance.

In Ireland, too, during the year that is past, we have had some experience of the value of Liberal professions. We were assured that once Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman took office we were certain to get if not a full, at least an

acceptable measure of autonomy. The country was silent in its expectation of reform. The only anxiety seemed to be where the Irish Parliament would meet, whether in College Green or the Custom House. The Stock of the Bank of Ireland fell in expectation of the blow.

Yet, when the much boasted measure was introduced it was found that the proposed Council could neither initiate legislation nor impose taxation. The most important elements of the executive government—the courts, and the police—were beyond its jurisdiction; the nominated members (24 out of 101), and the malcontents, who are a flourishing tribe in Ireland, could control the action of the Council, while as if to make security doubly secure, the Lord Lieutenant might, by a stroke of his pen, annul everything that had been done, and act as if there was no representative body in Ireland.

Nothing could set in a better light the utter want of principle and backbone of the present Government than the Irish Councils Bill. The representatives at the National Convention may well be justified for having refused even to consider the proposal. Yet on the whole it is a pity that a Convention was summoned at that particular juncture. If it had been delayed until the Bill had been fully discussed in Parliament, and till the country had completely grasped the meaning of every clause, the result might have been different. At any rate, even if we had rejected it, we could have been sure that we had fully understood the responsibility which we were undertaking.

On the Irish University question the attitude of the Government has been even more indefensible. Mr. Bryce, when he had already his appointment as American Ambassador in his pocket, called together a few of his Catholic and Presbyterian friends, and entrusted them with the secret of a great plan which he had developed for the settlement of the University question. Dublin University was to be made a reality. Trinity College, a new college for Catholics in Dublin, Cork, and Belfast Queen's Colleges, were to be grouped together in the new University. The Government had resolved to carry this proposal, and nothing could deter them from their purpose.

In spite of all our disappointments many people were tricked by the apparent honesty of the Bryce scheme. The Catholics and Presbyterians expressed their satisfaction. But Trinity College rose in arms. Resolutions, addresses, speeches, letters, pamphlets, were hurled against the Government proposals, and with success. Trinity College was powerful enough to force the strongest Government of modern times to throw overboard what had been proposed by its Irish representative, and accepted by the Irish nation.

No wonder if, in face of such treachery, many people should declare that there was no hope of a remedy from the Liberal party, and that we must depend upon ourselves for redress. Yet our present amiable Chief Secretary was good enough to undertake to spend his autumn vacation in Ireland, and examine once again the possibility of providing the higher education we demand. He assures us in the beginning that our educational notions are all wrong, but that this will not prevent him from endeavouring to meet our wishes. He has even gone so far as to take the public into his confidence, and to announce that he has discovered the secret which has escaped all his predecessors. He will carry a University Bill in the next session of Parliament, or he will—get another post in the Cabinet.

Let those who can be comforted by this assurance derive the full measure of satisfaction. For ourselves we have but little hope. When we look around us and see the attitude of the different parties in the fight, the apathy of the majority, the want of correspondence between the speeches and the actions of others, the honeyed words and courtly cringing of those who put their own interests before the interests of the nation, the abject silence with which we permit Trinity College to rule the whole education of the country, we have little hope that the University question is nearing a solution.

JAMES MACAFFREY.

A PRIMARY CIVIC DUTY

IT is not a little surprising how sparingly our ordinary text-books of Moral Theology deal with the virtue of legal justice. They admit or at least clearly imply its importance, for they invariably raise the question whether every sin is a violation of legal justice, as well as of the particular virtue to which it is immediately opposed. Farther than this, however, they rarely go.

The explanation of such a method of treatment seems to me to be found in the social conditions that prevailed when the classics of Theology were written. The practical obligations arising from legal justice could, at that time, be very easily described in general terms. The rulers were simply bound to enact equitable laws and the subjects to observe these laws in a proper spirit. These principles, specific enough for the age in which they were written, were merely repeated by later theologians, when social relations had lost much of their ancient simplicity.

It is a long cry from the veritable monarchical governments of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to the democratic spirit that obtains in European countries to-day. The voice of the people has now to be listened to; and it is no longer even the will, but the mandate of the people that is spoken of. Thus we have all come to share the responsibility for the laws and government of the country. To-day the masses play—or are supposed to play, and may actually play—an important part in the public administration. Still many appear not to realize their influence, or their obligation to use that influence to some purpose.

The lower classes of workmen have not yet come to exercise that power in public matters that their numbers might seem to entitle them to. As a rule, they are too ignorant to take an intelligent interest in public questions at all, or too poor to concern themselves about anything,

beyond what will minister to the immediate wants of themselves and their families. But their season of power will come ; already it is beginning to appear, according as one or other of the great political parties finds it to its advantage to remind them of it.

Not quite so intelligible nor excusable is the position of educated men, who profess to hold themselves aloof from public interests, and live practically, as if they were under a sixteenth-century despotism, simply trying to make the best of what others—the government—will do for them, as if the government were something altogether removed from themselves—something which they could not hope to influence. Politics of all kinds—national and municipal—they ostentatiously hold in abhorrence. Politicians, they will tell you, are a venal and corrupt tribe, with which they could not mix without defiling their fair fame. They are fully satisfied that no one will have anything to do with politics that has not some axe to grind—some stroke of business to effect for himself or his friends. And so drawing their double mantle of probity and respectability tightly around them, they protect themselves from the contaminating influence of vulgar politics.

Others again are too indifferent to affairs of public interest to take active part in them. Without actually reviling politics or politicians, they are well content to let others see to them, and devote their entire attention to private business or domestic concerns.

Now there is no excuse for the two latter classes. The plea that politics are corrupt, sunken to too low a level to claim the serious attention of honest, intelligent men, is simply an excuse for the arrogance that makes these people regard themselves as so much superior to their fellows, or for the laziness and cowardice that prevent so many from taking their proper place in the community—the place their talents and social standing require of them. There is no reason, surely, in the nature of things, why politics should be corrupt, or politicians dishonest. Politics will be precisely what politicians make them ; and politicians, in turn, will be the class of men that obtain

the confidence of the public with whom their words have weight. Of course, according as thoughtful and unselfish men hold aloof, political influence gets into the hands of worthless, self-seeking demagogues. Naturally we should expect trusted politicians to be the reflex of the people that trust them. It would appear impossible that immoral or atheistic politicians should flourish in moral, Christian communities; if they do, we may be sure it is because something has gone wrong, because some have failed to do their duty. On this point I shall have occasion to speak at greater length in another connexion.

Man is by nature a social being. He may not, even if he could, live a solitary unit, not affected by nor affecting others. He might, indeed, if left to himself, manage to subsist; possibly, he might attain to the knowledge of a few elementary truths, and realize a few principles of morality; but he could never develop, as he ought, and perfect the faculties of mind and body that have been bestowed on him. It is only in community that he can lead the life his Creator intended him to lead even in this world. Hence society is necessary for us all. It is the element in which the seeds of human intelligence—so feeble and so little sufficient for themselves that some have really doubted whether they would exist at all in a state of complete solitude—develop and are perfected until they reach their consummation in the most perfect citizen of the most perfect state. As to how far that perfect state or perfect citizen will ever be realized, we may all very well have our own opinions. At least it is certain that community life makes for the realization of such an ideal, and will be successful to the extent to which the mutual relations of its members are wisely determined and conscientiously observed.

As members, then, of society—that, in some form, is absolutely necessary for us, and that, if perfectly constituted, might elevate our lives into an altogether different sphere—we are all bound to aim at that society's perfection; to foster whatever makes for its improvement,

as well as to prevent anything that should tend to injure it. And this is the object of legal justice ; for legal justice is the virtue that inclines the individuals of a community to promote the common good. Now the most important element in the constitution of community life is its authority ; since community life, of any kind worthy of the name, is impossible without authority ; and since, moreover, it is by the nature of its authority, the manner in which that authority is exercised, and the respect shown to it, that a society's success or failure will ever be measured. And herein we find the justification of theologians, in determining the obligations arising from legal justice for the ruler to consist in the equitable enactment and administration of laws, and for the subject in submission to legitimate authority and in obedience to just laws. With the subject's obligations we are not now concerned ; the ruler's, strange as it may appear, have a practical bearing for us all, which it may be worth while considering at greater length.

If the entire government of a nation were vested simply in one individual ; if, for instance, an absolute monarch had complete control of the laws, if he were free to make what laws he would, and able to determine the manner in which these laws should be administered, would it not be his obvious duty to provide that that nation should be equitably governed ? Would he not be bound to study the needs of the people, to seek out abuses, and to provide remedies as far as he could ? And if all this were too much for him, would he not be bound to associate with himself prudent advisers and able assistants ? If, instead of being vested solely in one, the supreme sovereign power were shared by a dozen hereditary rulers, the only difference would be that the obligations, in the first instance confined to one, would now be extended to twelve. Each would be bound to do his own share to secure good equitable government.

Similarly, if instead of a definite number of hereditary rulers, a particular section of the community, e.g., landed proprietors, lawyers, or members of any other

profession, were endowed with supreme ruling authority, every individual of that class would be responsible for the government. The ruling section of the community might be too large to admit of all taking an active part in the actual government, and an agreement might be entered into by virtue of which the authority would be exercised by a select few, in the name of the whole class. Even in such a case, the others would not be entirely freed from responsibility. The government would be still carried on in their name, and its enactments would be morally regarded as the acts of the entire body, i.e., unless they validly renounced all right both to participate in the government themselves and to have any voice in the selection of their representatives.

This responsibility does not imply that every individual of the ruling body should be condemned for every mistake or fault of government, as if he had entire control. It implies merely that each is guilty, as far as he has conducted positively towards the evil, by actually conducting to have the vicious measure carried, or negatively by remaining passive, when he might reasonably be expected to oppose it. Every individual of this governing class would be clearly bound to make some effort to understand public questions and everything that might have an important bearing on them. How much, in particular cases, this duty would embrace would depend on a variety of circumstances, principally on the intelligence, social position and opportunities of the individual concerned.

Finally, when the governing power is extended still farther, even so far as to be shared in by every member of the community, it still carries its concomitant obligations.

Taking it then, as certain, that citizens are morally bound to endeavour to promote the good government of the state, whenever, and so far as, the means of doing so are placed in their hands, I think there can be no doubt about the general principle of our practical obligations and responsibility in this respect. Every person entitled to a vote is, by that very fact, bound to use it for the

benefit of the entire community. And even more, by it he becomes responsible for the official acts of the legislative and administrative bodies, that he and others like him have selected to act in their name. The practical government of the country at present is carried on by elective bodies.¹ Without raising the question of the origin of the authority by which elected legislators act, there can be no doubt about the one pertinent fact, that, in its exercise, it is dependent on the people. All that Members of Parliament do officially, whether directly or indirectly, is done in the name of the people that select them. Local affairs, too, are administered by elected representatives of the people, by aldermen, councillors, guardians and similar bodies; the people, accordingly, are responsible for the manner in which these offices are discharged.

If, therefore, Members of Parliament are guilty of unjust legislation, or if they make unfair appointments to government boards, the whole thing is done in the name of the people whom they represent. It is the public, it is every one of us that have votes, that have placed them in that position, to act in our name. Their injustice, their corruption, is truly the injustice and corruption of the community. If a sovereign were to appoint a courtier to carry on the government of his state without inquiring into his qualifications for such a position, beyond noticing that he was affable and high-spirited, should we not justly say that all the blunders such a deputy fell into, and all the crimes he committed in the exercise of his office, were to be attributed to the sovereign?

So, likewise, if people are content to be guided in their selection of parliamentary representatives, merely because

¹ I have not thought it necessary to dwell on the power of hereditary bodies such as the House of Lords, that seems independent of the will of the people. For whatever that power may be in theory, in practice it cannot long hold out against the wishes of the people. The Lords themselves always profess that they interpret the real wishes of the people; and whatever we may think of the sincerity of that profession, we may be certain they would not attempt to oppose anything the people clearly showed themselves anxious for; and if they did, they should very soon be forced to yield, or go.

a certain candidate is eloquent, or popular, or because he makes fair promises, must not they be adjudged guilty of the crimes he commits in his representative capacity? And not only the public generally, but every individual of it in particular, is guilty of the crimes of its official representatives, according to the nature of the responsibility I have already explained, i.e., according as each has conducted positively to have unworthy or dishonest representatives selected, or failed to make a reasonable effort to prevent it. Viewed in this light, and I cannot see that it is not the true light, many of us that have been accustomed to pride ourselves, on our indifference to political questions, and from our lofty pinnacle to look down with contempt on the vulgar squabbles of politicians, and with horror on their dishonesty, may begin to feel disquieting doubts about the nobility of the part we have been taking —may, in fact, see reasons for turning our condemnation of politicians back upon ourselves. For, surely, if anyone is ever guilty of culpable negligence in this matter, it is these revilers of politicians who, with nothing better than a word of lordly indifference, or hopeless criticism, look on passively when candidates whom they profess to believe unworthy of confidence seek election and win.

And if all this is true of our obligations in what may be called national politics, and of our responsibility for the laws passed by our parliamentary representatives, as well as for the working of all administrative boards subject to them, equally true, and much more evident, is it of our obligations in municipal politics, and of our responsibility for the acts of our representatives on local boards, boards of guardians, county councils, etc. We constantly hear complaints of the manner in which the affairs of these boards are administered. Members are often said to be more influenced by considerations for the interests of themselves and their friends than for those of the public whom they represent. And not unfrequently do we hear suggestions of even grosser practices of corruption. I do not mean to imply that public boards in Ireland are worse, in this respect, than similar bodies in other countries.

On the contrary, as far as it is possible to compare them at all, they appear better and purer.

But taking into account the method in which the members of these boards are selected, it would be too much to expect from human nature that abuses should not prevail here as elsewhere. It is quite intelligible that there should be grounds for complaint from time to time. Even the most carefully selected representatives will sometimes prove unworthy of the trust reposed in them. But there is, in the nature of things, no reason for the prevalence of these complaints, no explanation of the chronic dissatisfaction of the people with their representatives. The retort seems evident: It is the people themselves that select their representatives; if, therefore, they are unsatisfactory, why select them? Does it not sound almost paradoxical that the public freely, with their eyes open, depute men to act in their name, and if the complaints we hear be justifiable, to mismanage their affairs, sometimes even to cheat and rob them. In sober earnest, if there are robberies committed in these matters at all, the people are robbing themselves through their representatives. And a particularly sad feature of the case, as far as the people are concerned, and that which is most responsible for most of the complaints, is that, while they are robbed truly enough, they never receive the spoils, which are manipulated by the representatives in their private capacity.

It is strange enough that a moral community should elect immoral representatives for their public offices, but immensely stranger that any sane community, whether moral or immoral, should elect representatives that will cheat them. Or is it that a sufficient number of men of upright character cannot be found in every community with intelligence enough to fill its various representative offices? If that were so, the case would be intelligible, but the evil simply incurable. But it is not so. In fact, what would particularly strike a stranger unacquainted with the existing system, and what would particularly strike ourselves, if we were not so accustomed to the

phenomenon, is the contrast between private integrity and public corruption.¹

Nor is there any reason for supposing that the dishonest individuals of the community have any special aptitude for public administration. We should naturally expect that public boards would reflect the morality of the community. In fact we should not be surprised to find a loftier standard in them, inasmuch as the most upright men should be most likely to be entrusted with important public interests. Lower we could never anticipate. And yet, if we can judge by what we hear and read, it is the lower that obtains in practice.

I consider it more advisable to reserve, for another article, the consideration of the causes that have led to this anomalous condition of things—that people condemn so emphatically the acts for which they are themselves responsible. It is sufficient for our present purpose to have established the existence of the responsibility—that according to the present conditions of society we are all, in a greater or less degree, responsible for public enactments and administration. As has been said, this responsibility does not affect all to precisely the same extent, but varies according to the wealth, talents and social influence of each individual. Everyone should, at least, realize, as far as he can, the meaning of his vote—that by giving it in favour of any candidate he is thereby, and to that extent, making himself responsible for the public acts of that candidate, in case he becomes elected. The least any citizen is bound to do is to promote, by his suffrage, pure and advantageous administration, as he understands it, and as far as he can do so without seriously interfering with his private concerns. He does not escape this responsibility by abstaining from voting altogether, for by allowing others to determine what he might have a share in determining himself, and what he is under an obligation to take a part in determining, he

¹ I use the word corruption absolutely; I have no intention of implying that our public boards could be called corrupt, in the sense that they would compare unfavourably with those of other countries.

makes himself responsible for the effects of this act of the others, to the extent to which his reasonable activity might have affected the issue. It is only when a healthy public spirit has been developed amongst the masses, when the people generally have learned to take an enlightened view of their civic responsibility, that it will be at all possible to purify public administration of the vices that appear inherent in the present system. Long ago the importance of this truth was recognized in Athens, the mother of democracies. One of the Solonian laws pronounced that any citizen who, in times of sedition—the only political crisis then considered of any importance—joined neither party should be disfranchised.

But all cannot satisfy themselves that they have discharged all their obligations merely by having recorded their votes, even when they are certain that they have used them to the best advantage. Some will be bound to greater activity, to influence others in support of important interests, or to oppose the promoters of mischievous schemes. Not unfrequently, moreover, certain persons will find it their duty to allow themselves to be put forward as candidates for public positions, and to do their utmost to secure election. It is not easy to determine accurately how far any particular individual may be bound to exert himself in any cause, or when he should seek civic honours himself. But the general principle is incontrovertible ; it follows immediately from the fact that all are bound to promote the community's interests, and are responsible, according to the extent of each one's influence, for the proper management of public affairs. As long as we live in the community at all we cannot shake off this obligation and this responsibility. No doubt it may sometimes be an act of virtue to fly civic honours, even for persons who live in society, just as it may be an act of virtue for certain individuals to fly society altogether. But as in normal circumstances men are bound to live social lives, so likewise are they bound to take the place in society their talents and opportunities demand of them.

The advantages that accrue to the individuals themselves, and to society at large, from a small number leading lives of solitude, as well as the comparatively little danger there is that so many will ever be induced to seek the hermit's cell, as to disturb the normal conditions of human existence, justify the Church in giving her sanction and patronage to this form of self-discipline ; but, as a rule, there are no similar advantages to be derived from men living in society, and holding aloof in public matters, and a little knowledge of the world would convince us that this practice may easily become a serious hindrance to society's welfare. Ordinarily the motives that induce men to keep out of public life are not motives of virtue—rather they are suggested by laziness or selfishness—they are not prepared to face the strife of public life, or to grapple with its difficulties, or they are afraid lest their private interests may suffer any ill consequences. In this respect, too, there is sore need of more public spirit.

I remarked that, at first sight, it seems strange that public administration should not reflect the morality of the individual members of the community. But when we come to reflect on the matter, we shall see that this is not so very surprising at all, in the circumstances that prevail at present. For it is not the whole community, but only so much of it as interests and exerts itself in public life, that can be expected to have its characteristics impressed on the policy of its representatives. Even though the vast majority of a community are just and conscientious, still if they stand apart, and allow political influence of all kinds to get into the hands of a minority that are unjust and unscrupulous, the representatives of that community will, almost of necessity, be corrupt. If eighty per cent. of a nation are practising Christians, and if at the same time they are content to leave politics altogether to the twenty per cent. who are agnostics, naturally the government of that nation will not be Christian but infidel. This is only what we should expect *a priori*, and it is confirmed to some extent by our

experience of what happens in our own country, and even much more by what we learn of other lands.

These considerations are practical for priests, perhaps more than for any other class of the community. As guardians of morality they are bound to instruct their flocks in reference to this important duty, to explain to them what is their obligation, and to point out as far as they can how that obligation may be fulfilled. But more than this, by becoming ministers of the Gospel they do not cease to be children of the State, nor lose any of their civil rights and responsibilities. As free citizens they are bound to interest themselves in public questions, in proportion to their intelligence, education and social influence, and as far as they can without detriment to the special duties of their state. Nor can they conscientiously submit to any civil disabilities, no matter on what plausible pretexts these may be suggested.

At present politics may be used to advance almost every interest, and the children of the world, wise in their generation, are not slow to perceive the fact and take advantage of it. Socialists and even anarchists are striving to affect every department of public legislation. The capitalists and the labourers, the producers, the importers and the consumers are perfectly alive to the importance of cultivating political influence. Trades Unions as well as the various benevolent and charitable associations have all their active political organizations. Any interest in fine that has not its avowed supporters is not likely to get much consideration. Any class should think well before it consents to lose any part of its legitimate political influence. Things may appear to be going on very well, and certain parties may not feel called on to interfere in the direction of public events; but suddenly, and when they are altogether unprepared, they may find some interest attacked or some valued principle set at nought. Then perhaps it will be too late for them to take action. Had they been taking part regularly in public life they might have prevented the crisis from ever arising, or have been able to cope with it when it appeared; but

as it is their influence must count for very little. They cannot summon up effective political power at a moment's notice, for the public policy is ever the result of forces that have been long active. If they can make any show of fight at all, it will be at a tremendous disadvantage ; unpractised themselves they shall have to contend with seasoned veterans ; they will have to introduce new ideas into politics, and to challenge much that from having been long accepted without question will have passed into first principles.

It is a curious phenomenon, and one too that is deeply significant of the spirit that is abroad in modern politics, that while every other principle and ideal can be advocated without a protest from anybody, the mere mention of the word religion is met with a howl of angry protest, as if that alone had no right to look for consideration in the social organization. Medical men and others interested in the matters of public health are heard ; and even when their views do not prevail, no one denies them the right to raise their voices in favour of any scheme of hygienic reformation. Tender-hearted persons have done much to affect the laws in reference to the treatment of irrational animals ; and even when they have been unsuccessful in their efforts, it has never been said that they were not within their right in proclaiming and urging their opinions. Religion alone is tabooed. Its demands are not only opposed, but denounced as if it were an insult to mention them. It would seem to be almost a first principle in some minds that religion alone of all ideals that actuate men's lives should be excluded from influencing public policies.

The socialist can go to any extreme he wishes in defence and support of his ideals—ideals that are believed by the vast majority of the country to be impractical and often positively vicious ; but the practical believer in Christianity cannot raise his voice in favour of the ideals of a system that has been handed down to him through so many centuries, and that has left its impress on every phase of the country's life, but he is supposed to be

touching on topics with which the nation as such has no concern.

It is said that, by persistently repeating any statement, we ultimately convince ourselves and others that it is true. A certain class of politicians have kept so long proclaiming that religion has no place in politics that they seem to have convinced themselves that such is really the case ; moreover, their attitude has had a considerable effect even on those who are least likely to agree with them. We cannot fail being struck by the half apologetic tone with which religious ideals are championed in the political arena. There surely is no valid reason why this should be the case. Religious ideas have just as much right as any others to make themselves felt in the public life of the nation. All who have the interests of religion at heart should feel called on to defend its ideals, but especially ministers of religion should recognize it as their duty to safeguard them.

It is to this same spirit that we are to attribute the objections, we frequently hear raised, against clerical influence. Clerical influence as such ought not be one whit more objectionable than any other. The priest ought surely be just as free to speak and act as the doctor or the lawyer. In influencing others he is only doing what every member of the community is trying to do, and what everyone is bound to try to do to a certain extent. He may, indeed, be able to do this more effectively than others, but if he is, it is because the people generally have greater confidence in his judgment and sincerity. Some people may think that confidence misplaced ; if they do, they are perfectly justified in trying to destroy it. But while it exists, they cannot complain of the people for being influenced by it, nor of the priest for availing of it, as long as he is convinced that it is not misplaced.

A priest, it is true, may be guilty of undue influence ; perhaps from the position he holds he is more exposed to it than most others. That, however, is a matter between each priest and the public, and if a priest is detected using undue influence, he should be dealt with

just as anybody else would be if convicted of a similar offence. But clerics should never be deterred from taking their legitimate place in public life by any bogus alarms about clerical dictation or undue interference, that are so assiduously circulated by certain politicians who would find it to their advantage to have clerical influence diminished or destroyed.

J. KELLEHER.

SOURCES OF IRISH HISTORY

FOREIGN AUTHORS (CONTINUED)

In my former article which appeared in the April number of the I. E. RECORD I laboured to show the opinions of the Greeks and Romans with regard to the Celts and to Ireland in particular. I purpose here to add some further remarks of the same writers, calling attention particularly to the admission of the unflattering Poseidonius, as quoted by Strabo, that 'he had no definite knowledge about Ireland,' and that his 'authorities were not reliable.' I would refer the reader to Keating's *Óionbhollac* for a refutation of some statements made by these foreign uninformed writers.

Iverni is presumably the original form from which comes Hibernia, Erin, etc. The still older root, according to Rhys, Windisch and Holder is Puerii-o, Greek *πλειρα*, 'rich land.'

Strabo, 5, 8, p. 115: *Oι γὰρ νῦν ἴστοροῦντες περαιτέρω τῆς Ἰέρνης οὐδὲν ἔχουσι λέγειν, ἢ προς ἄρκτον πρόκειται τῆς Βρεττανικῆς πλησίον, ἀγριῶν τελέως ἀνθρώπων καὶ κακῶς οἰκούντων διὰ ψῦχος, ὥστε ἐνταῦθα νομίζω τὸ πέρας εἶναι θετέον.*

Ibid., 4, 5, 4, p. 201 (from Poseidonios): *περὶ ἦς ('Ιέρνη) οὐδὲν ἔχομεν λέγειν σαφὲς πλὴν ὅτι ἀγρεώτεροι τῶν Βρεταννῶν ὑπάρχουσιν οἱ κατοικοῦντες αὐτήν, ἀνθρωποφάγοι τε ὅντες καὶ πολυφάγοι, τούς τε πατέρας τελευτήσαντας κατεσθίειν ἐν καλῷ τιθέμενοι, καὶ φανερῶς μίσγεσθαι ταῖς τε ἀλλαις γυναιξὶ καὶ μητράσι καὶ ἀδελφαῖς. καὶ ταῦτα δ' οὕτω λέγομεν ὡς οὐκ ἔχοντες ἀξιοπίστους μάρτυρας.*

Mela, 3, 6, 53: *Super Britanniam Juverna est paene pars spatio, sed utrimque aequali tractu litorum oblonga, caeli ad maturanda semina iniqui, verum adeo luxuriosa herbis non laetis modo, sed etiam dulcibus,¹ ut se exigua parte diei pecora im-*

¹ Compare conjectural form of root of 'Erin' as given above.

pleant, et nisi pabulo prohibeantur, divitiis pasta dissiliant. Cultores eius inconditi sunt et omnium virtutum ignari (magis) quam aliae gentes, pietatis admodum expertes.

Tacitus, *Agric.*, 24: Eamque partem Britanniae quae Hiberniam aspicit copiis instruxit, in spem magis quam ob formidinem, si quidem Hibernia medio inter Britanniam atque Hispaniam sita et Gallico quoque mari opportuna valentissimam imperii partem magnis in vicem usibus miscuerit. Spatium eius, si Britanniae comparetur augustius, nostri maris insulas superat. Solum caelumque et ingenia cultusque hominum haud multum a Britannia differunt: interiora parum, melius aditus per commercia et negotiatores cogniti. Agricola expulsum seditione domestica unum ex regulis gentis exceperat ac specie amicitiae in occasionem retinebat. Saepe ex eo audivi legione una et modicis auxiliis debellari obtinerique Hiberniam posse; idque etiam adversus Britanniam profuturum, si Romana ubique arma et velut e conspectu libertas tolleretur.

Solinus (A.D. 238), 22, 2: (Hibernia) inhumana incolarum ritu aspero, alias ita pabulosa, ut pecua, nisi interdum a pastibus arceantur, ad periculum agat satias. (3) Illic nullus anguis, avis rara, gens inhospita et bellicosa. Sanguine interemptorum hausto prius victores vultus suos oblinunt. Fas ac nefas eodem loco ducunt. Apis nusquam.¹

Claudianus, de IV. consul. Honor. 8, 33:

Scottorum tumulos flevit glacialis Hiverne
(cod., hibernes, hibernae, hyberne).

Ibid., de cons. Stilich, 2, 251 sq.:

Totam cum Scottus Iuernan
movit et infesto spumavit remige Tethys.

Orosius, 1, 2, 81: Huius (Hiberniae) partes priores intentae Cantabrico Oceano Brigantiam Galliae civitatem ab Africo sibi in circium occurrentem spatiose intervallo procul spectant, ab eo praecipue promunturio, ubi Scenae fluminis ostium est et Velabri Lucenique consistunt. Haec propior Britanniae spatio terrarum angustior, sed caeli solique temperie magis utilis, a Scottorum gentibus colitur.

Gildas, in his *De excidio et conquestu Britanniae*, 21, p. 36, 16 M.: Revertuntur ergo impudentes grassatores Hiberni domos, post non longum temporis reversuri.

Stephanus of Byzantium: 'Ιέρνη, νῆσος ἐν τῷ πέρατι πρὸς

¹ See *Vionþollac*, IV. Comyn's smaller edition.

δυσμαῖς. τὸ ἐθνικὸν Ἰερναῖος ὡς Λερναῖος . . . Ἰουερνίαν νῆσος Πρετανικὴ τῶν δύο ἐλάσσων. τὸ ἐθνικὸν Ἰουερνιάτης. Ἰουέρνη, πόλις ἐν τῷ Πρετανικῷ. τὸ ἐθνικὸν Ἰούερνοι.

Martyrolog. Hieronym. xvi. Kal. Ap. : Hibernia Scotiae depositio Sancti Patricii episcopi.

Isidorus, 14, 6, 6 : Scottia eadem et Hibernia proxima Britanniae insula, spatio terrarum angustior, sed situ fecundior; haec ab Africo in Boream porrigitur, cuius partes priores Hiberniam et Cantabricum Oceanum extendunt. Unde et Hibernia dicta.

Ravenna Cosmography, 5, 32, p. 439, 17 : Est insula maxima, quae dicitur Ibernia, quae, ut dictum est, et Scotia appellatur.

Columba,¹ Epist. I. (A.D. 595-600), ² *M. G.*, Epist. III., p. 157 : Nostris magistris et Hibernicis antiquis philosophis et sapientissimis componendi calculi computariis.

Ibid., II. (A.D. 603-604), p. 164 : Unius enim sumus corporis commembra, sive Galli, sive Britanni, sive Iberi, sive quaeque gentes.

Ibid., V. (A.D. 612-615), p. 171 : Toti Iberi, ultimi habitatores mundi.

Aldhelm, *Epistula ad Eahfridum*, p. 91, Giles : Ex Hiberniae brumosis circionum insulae climatibus.

Baeda, h. e. I, 1 : Et cum plurimam insulae partem incipientes ab Austro possedissent, contigit gentem Pictorum de Scythia, ut perhibent,² longis navibus non multis Oceanum ingressam circumagente flatu ventorum, extra fines omnes Britanniae Hiberniam pervenisse, eiusque septentrionales oras intrasse, atque inventa ibi gente Scottorum, sibi quoque in partibus illius sedes petisse, nec impetrare potuisse. Est autem Hibernia insula omnium post Britanniam maxima, ad occidentem quidem Britanniae sita; sed sicut contra Aquilonem ea brevior, ita in meridiem se trans illius fines plurimum protendens, usque contra Hispaniae septentrionalia, quamvis magno aequore interiacente pervenit. Ad hanc ergo usque pervenientes navigio Picti, ut diximus, petierunt in ea sibi quoque sedes et habita-

¹ Columbanus lived 545-615.

² Baeda (A.D. 673-735) may be referring in these words 'as they relate,' to some statement of Gildas (A.D. 516 ?-570 ?). The latter perhaps drew from some native Irish book now lost, the *Cuilmenn* possibly. See below on 'The Lost Books.'

tionem donari. Respondebant Scotti, quia non ambos eos caperet insula 'sed possumus,' inquiunt, 'salubre vobis dare consilium quid agere valeatis. Novimus insulam aliam esse non procul a nostra contra ortum solis quam saepe lucidioribus diebus de longe aspicere solemus. Hanc adire si vultis, habitabilem vobis tacere valetis: vel, si qui restiterit, nobis auxiliariis utimini. Itaque petentes Britanniam Picti, habitare per septentrionales insulae partes cooperunt, nam Austrina Brettones occupaverant. Cumque uxores Picti non habentes peterent a Scottis, ea solum condicione dare consenserunt, ut ubi res perveniret in dubium, magis de feminea regum prosapia quam de masculina regem sibi eligerent; quod usque hodie apud Pictos constat esse servatum. Procedente autem tempore Britannia post Brettones et Pictos tertiam Scottorum nationem in Pictorum parte recepit; qui duce Reuda de Hibernia progressi, vel amicitia vel gladio sibimet inter eos sedes quas hactenus habent vindicarunt: a quo videlicet duce usque hodie Dalreudini vocantur, nam lingua eorum *daal* 'partem' significat. Hibernia autem et latitudine sui status et salubritate ac serenitate aerum multum Britanniae praestat, ita ut raro ibi nix plus quam triduana remaneat: nemo propter hiemem aut fena secet aestate aut stabula fabricet iumentis: nullum ibi reptile videri soleat, nullus vivere serpens valeat, nam saepe illo de Britannia adlati serpentes, mox ut proximante terris navigio, odore aeris illius ad tacti fuerint, intereunt: quin potius omnia pene quae de eadem insula sunt, contra venenum valent. Denique vidimus, quibusdam a serpente percussis, rasa folia codicum qui de Hibernia fuerant, et ipsam rasuram aquae immissam ac potui datam, talibus protinus totam vim veneni grassantis, totum inflati corporis absumsisse ac sedasse tumorem. Dives lactis et mellis insula nec vinearum expers, piscium volucrumque, sed et cervorum caprearumque venatuque insignis. Haec autem proprie patria Scottorum est; ab hac egressi, ut diximus, tertiam in Brettonia Brettonibus et Pictis gentem addiderunt.

Ibid., 2, 4: Scottorum qui Hiberniam insulam Britanniae proximam incolunt.

Ibid., 3, 4: Fecerat . . . monasterium nobile in Hibernia quod a copia roborum Dearmach lingua Scottorum, hoc est campus roborum cognominatur.

Ibid., 5, 19: Britanniae et Hibernia insulae quae ab Anglorum et Brettonum necnon Scottorum et Pictorum gentibus incoluntur.

Ibid., *Historia Britt.*, 13: Novissime autem Scotti venerunt a partibus Hispaniae ad Hiberniam. . . . Secundus venit ad Hiberniam Nimeth filius quidam Agnominis qui fertur navigasse super

mare annum et dimidium et postea tenuit portum in Hibernia fractis navibus eius et mansit ibidem per multos annos. Et de familia illius ciulae, quae relicta est propter fractionem, tota Hibernia impleta est usque in hodiernum diem.

Ibid., 15: Ex postea venerunt ad Hiberniam post mille et duos annos postquam mersi sunt Aegyptii in rubrum mare. . . . Scotti autem in quarta (aetate) obtinuerunt Hiberniam.

The word *Picti* from root 'quik,' *cíct* .i. *ȝebiðað* (Corm.) .i. *ȝeibíre*, 'carver,' .i. *ƿinðaðiðe*, 'engraver' (Holder).

Ammianus, 26, 4, 5 (A.D. 365) : Pecti Saxonesque et Scotti Attacotti Britannos aerumnis vexavere continuis.

Ibid., 27, 8, 5 (A.D. 368) : Illud tamen sufficiet dici, quod eo tempore Picti in duas gentes divisi, Dicalydonas et Veturiones, itidemque Attacotti bellicosa hominum natio et Scotti per diversa vagantes multa populabantur.

Baeda, h. e. 1, 1 (Quinque gentium linguis) : Anglorum vide-
licet, Brettonum, Scottorum, Pictorum et Latinorum.

Ibid., 3, 6 : (Oswald) omnes nationes et provincias Brittaniae quae in IIII. linguas id est Brettonum, Pictorum, Scottorum et Anglorum divisa est.

NATIVE SOURCES—THE ANCIENT ANNALS

The most ancient of our existing Irish Annals were composed in the eleventh century. The oldest MS. of Irish epic dates from the twelfth century.

At what period in Irish history written records began to be kept it is perhaps impossible to determine at present with precision. However, the national traditions assign a very remote antiquity and a high degree of cultivation to the civilization of our pagan ancestors. Without granting to such traditions a greater degree of credibility than they are strictly entitled to, it must, I think, be admitted that the immense quantity of historical, legendary and genealogical matter relating to the pagan age of ancient Erinn, and which we can trace to the very oldest written documents of which we yet retain any account, could only have been transmitted to our times by some form of written record.²

¹ Todd, *Lect.* vol. iii., p. 251. Codex Palatino-Vaticanus 830, from *Book of Ballymote*, p. 9, 305 B.C.

² O'Curry, *MSS. Materials*, p. 4.

THE LOST BOOKS

1. 'The *Cuilmenn*': The Filés of Erinn were now called together by Senchan Torpest, to know if they remembered the *Táin Bó Cuailgne* in full; and they said that they knew of it but fragments only. Senchan then spoke to his pupils to know which of them would go into the countries of Letha to learn the *Táin*, which the Sai had taken 'eastwards' after the Cuilmenn. Ernidé, the grandson of Ninidé and Muirgen, Senchan's own son, set out together East.¹

Ómuimcli is a man who has a perfect knowledge of wisdom from the greatest book, which is called *Cuilmenn*, to the smallest book, which is called *Oeic mBíleisí* [that is the 'Ten Commandments,' a name given to the Pentateuch], in which is well arranged the good testament which God made unto Moses.²

2. 'The Saltair of Tara.'

Temair choicest of hills
 For (possession of) which Erinn is now devastated,
 The noble city of Cormac son of Art,
 Who was the son of great Conn of the Hundred Battles;
 Cormac the prudent and good.
 Was a sage, a filé, a prince:
 Was a righteous judge of the Féné men,
 Was a good friend and companion.
 Cormac gained fifty battles;
 He compiled the Saltair of Temair.
 In that Saltair is contained
 The best summary of history;
 It is that Saltair which assigns
 Seven chief kings to Erinn of harbours;
 They consisted of the five kings of the provinces,—
 The monarch of Erinn and his Deputy.
 In it are written on either side,
 What each provincial king is entitled to,
 What the king of Temair in the east is entitled to
 From the king of each great musical province.
 The synchronisms and chronology of all,
 The kings with each other all;
 The boundaries of each brave province,
 From a centred up to a great chieftaincy.³

¹ Ll. fol. 183a, O'Curry, *MSS. Materials*, p. 8.

² O'Curry, *MSS. Materials*, p. 9 (H. 5-30, T.C.D.)

³ H. 33, T.C.D., O'Curry, *MSS. Materials*, p. 10; *Cuan Ó Loéáin* cct.

A noble work was performed by Cormac at that time, namely, the compilation of Cormac's *Saltair*, which was composed by him and the Seanchaidhe (or historians) of Erinn, including Fintan, son of Bochra, and Fithil, the poet and judge. And their synchronisms and genealogies, the succession of their kings and monarchs, their battles, their contests, and their antiquities, from the world's beginning down to that time were written; and this is the *Saltair* of Temair, which is the origin and fountain of the historians of Erinn from that period down to this time. This is taken from the Book of the Uachongbhail.¹

Dr. Petrie in his remarks on the *Saltair* or *Psalter* of Tara,² observes that 'the very title given to this work is sufficient to excite well-founded suspicion of its antiquity.'³

The *Saltair* of Tara (so-called) may have perished before the twelfth or thirteenth century.⁴

And it is because of its having been written in poetic metre, that the chief book which was in the custody of the Ollam of the kings of Erinn was called the *Saltair* of Temair; and the Chronicle of holy Cormac Mac Cuillenan, 'Saltair of Cashel'; and the Chronicle of Aengus Céile De, 'Saltair na Rann'; because a *Salm* and a *Poem* are the same, and therefore a *Salterium* and a *Τύπανον* are the same.⁵

3. 'The Book of the Uachongbhail,' referred to in *B.B.* fol. 145a.a, and *Y.B.L.* col. 882. 'The O'Clerys mention that they had access to it when compiling their Book of the Invasions of Erinn (1630 or 1631).'⁶

Keating in the second book of his History mentions it among the very ancient books or transcripts of very ancient books which were still extant in his own time, and of which he had made use. It was probably of the age of the *Book of Leinster* and was kept at Kildare in 1626.⁷

4. 'Cin Τύπανον Σνεάκτα.' (Cin=a stave of five sheets

¹ O'Curry, *MSS. Materials*, p. 11; *B.B.*, fol. 145a.a.; *Y.B.L.*, col. 889.

² *Transactions*, R.I.A., vol. xviii., p. 45.

³ O'Curry, *MSS. Materials*, p. 11.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 12.

⁵ Keating, *Τύπανον Πολλακ*; O'Curry, p. 12.

⁶ O'Curry, *MSS. Materials*, p. 13.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 13.

of vellum); Θρομ-Σνεάcta in Monaghan. Quoted in *Book of Ballymote* (fol. 12a) in support of ancient legend of antediluvian lady bānba coming to Erin. Other books call her Cēsair. Referred to in *Book of Lecan* (fol. 211b): 'From the Cin of Drom Snechta is (taken) this little (bit) as far as Cesair.' In same *Book of Lecan* (fol. 77b, col. 2) occur the words, summing up the genealogies of some Connaught families:—

We have collected now the genealogy of the Ui Diarmada out of the Chronicles of the Gaedhil, and out of Cormac's Saltair at Cashel, and out of the Book of Dundaleathglas (Downpatrick), and out of the Books of Flann Mainistrech, and out of the Cin of Drom Snechta, and out of the annals and historical books (of Erin), until we have brought it all together here.

The same (fol. 123a) says, after giving the genealogies of the ancient Rudrician race of Ulster, in the ordinary way in which they are found in other books of the same and of an earlier period: 'The Cin of Drom Snechta says that it is as follows it ought to be.'

The *Leabhar na hUidre* (fol. 67a) quotes a short account of the destruction of bānba Θρομ-Σνεάcta, and the death of Conaire Mor from the Cin Θρομα Σνεάcta; also at folio 8ob an account of the birth of Cuchullain from the same book. Keating¹ in his History says: 'We will set down here the branching off of the race of Magog, the son of Japhet, according to the *Book of Invasions*, which was called the Cin of Drom Snechta, and it was before the coming of Patrick to Ireland the author of that book existed.'

In the lower margin of (fol. 230b) *Book of Leinster*, O'Curry found what he reads as follows: '(Ernin son of ?) Duach (that is), son of the King of Connaught, an Ollamh and a prophet and a professor in history, and a professor in wisdom, it was he that collected the genealogies and histories of the men of Erinn in one book, that is the Cin Θρομα Σνεάcta.'

The Duach here referred to was the son of Brian, son

¹ See Irish Texts Soc. edition, p. 226.

of the monarch Eochaíd Muighmheadhoin, who died A.D. 365. This Eochaíd was the father of **Máel Móis** nGiallae.

Keating says¹: 'Fenius Farsaidh sets up schools to teach the several languages, on the plains of Seanar, in the city which the Cin Droma Snechta calls Gothona, as the poet says,' etc.

Book of Leinster (fol. 149b) says:—

From the Cin of Drom Snechta this below. Historians say that there were exiles of Hebrew women in Erinn at the coming of the sons of Milesius, who had been driven by a sea tempest into the ocean by the Tirréen Sea. They were in Erin before the sons of Milesius. They said, however, to the sons of Milesius, that they preferred their own country, and that they would not abandon it without receiving dowry for alliance with them. It is from this circumstance that it is the men that purchase wives in Erinn for ever; whilst it is the husbands that are purchased by the wives throughout the world beside.²

5. 'Book of St. Mochta,' a disciple of St. Patrick. Quoted in *Annals of Ulster* at A.D. 527.

6. 'Book of Cuanu,' quoted frequently in *Annals of Ulster* from 468 to 610.

The death of Cuanu, a scribe of Treoit (now Trevit, in Meath) is recorded in *Annals of Ulster*, 738. Perhaps he was the author.

7. 'The Book of Dubhdaleith,' quoted in *Annals of Ulster*, 962 and 1021. Dubhdaleith, Bishop of Armagh, 1049-1064.

8. 'Saltair of Cashel,' by Cormac Mac Cuillenan, King of Munster and Archbishop of Cashel, killed at battle of Bealachmughna, A.D. 907.

A copy of portion of it made by Seaan Ua Clerigh for Mac Richard Butler in A.D. 1454.³ Frequently referred to in *Books of Ballymote, Lecan*, and elsewhere.

Cormac's Glossary is supposed to have been compiled from the interlined gloss to the 'Saltair.' Hence O'Curry

¹ See Irish Texts Soc. edition, p. 226.

² Found also at greater length in *Book of Lecan*, fol. 181b.

³ Bodleian Lib., Laud. 610.

says that we may well feel that its loss (that is, of the 'Saltair') is the greatest we have suffered, so numerous are the references and citations of history, law, romance, druidism, mythology, and other subjects in which this glossary abounds.

9. *Leabhar Buiré Sláine.*
10. *The original Leabhar na hUisíre.*
11. 'The Books of Eocairó *ua flannagáin.*'
12. 'The Book eaten by the poor people in the desert' !
13. 'Book of Inír an Dúin.'
14. 'The Short Book of Monasterboice.'
15. 'The Books of flann Mainistreac.'
16. 'The Book of flann of Dungemón.'
17. 'The Book of Dún vá-Leatglar.'
18. 'The Book of Doyre.'
19. 'The Book of Saball Páorais' (Saul).
20. *Leabhar vub Molaga.*
21. *Leabhar Buiré Moling.*
22. *Leabhar Buiré Mic Murcada.*
23. *Leabhar Ruad Mic Aodhagáin.*
24. *Leabhar Bheac Mic Aodhagáin.*
25. *Leabhar Fada Leitghlinne.*
26. 'The Books of O'Scoba of Cluain Mic Noir.'
27. *Duil Órioma Ceata.*
28. *Leabhar Cluana Sora.*
29. *Leabhar Áriua Macá,* quoted by Keating, 'but evidently not the same as our Book of Armagh.'¹

Keating refers to the following books as being extant in his own time, 1630 :—

'Book of Armagh,' not like ours; 'Saltair of Cashel'; 'Book of Uachonghbháil'; 'Book of Cluain Eirínech'; 'Book of Gleann vá Locta'; 'Yellow Book of St. Moling'; 'Black Book of St. Molaga'; 'Red Book of Mac Aedhagan'; 'Speckled Book of Mac Aedhagan.'

¹ O'Curry.

Prefixed to the *Leabhar Gabala*¹ is a list of books used in the compilation of *Leabhar Gabala* :—

‘Book of *baile Uí Mhaolchonaire*,’ Bally Mulconrey, which had been copied by Maurice O’Maelchonaire (died 1543) out of the *Leabhar na hUisce*, written at Clonmacnoise in time of St. Ciaran.

‘Book of *baile Uí Chleirigh*,’ written in the time of *Maelrechlaín Mór*, who became *Ard Rí* in A.D. 979.

‘Book of *Muinter Dubhgenáin* of *Seancuad* in *Tír Oilill*, Tirrill, Sligo, also called ‘*Leabhar Glinn na Loche*.’

The Four Masters in the compilation of their great work used the following :—

‘The Book of *Cluain Mac Noi*’ down to A.D. 1225.

‘The Book of the Island of the Saints in Loch Ree,’ down to 1225.

‘The Book of *Seanadh Mac Magnusa*’ or *Annals of Ulster*, down to 1632.

‘The Book of *Muinter Maoilchonaire*’ to 1505.

‘The Book of *Muinter Dubhgenáin*,’ of *Cill Ronain*, from A.D. 900 to 1563.

‘The Historical Book of *Leacán Mic Phírbirí*.’

A fragment of Cucoigchriche O’Clery’s Book,’ from 1281 to 1537.

‘Book of *Maoilín Óg Mac Óiliúin* of Thomond, from 1588 to 1602.

TOMAS UA NUALLAIN.

¹ O’Clery, 1630.

THE CONTINUITY THEORY

THE effort to show that the present Church of England is the same in doctrine and jurisdiction with the Pre-reformation National Church might be thought to be an invention of the present 'High Church' days but that, in 1560, we find the so-called Archbishop Parker publishing a work entitled *A testimonie of Antiquitie shewing the ancient faith in the Church of England touching the Sacrament of the Body and Blood of the Lord now publicly preached and also received in the Saxons' time above six hundred years ago*. It is of a piece with the whole policy of the reformers who claimed to be doing no more than reinstating the doctrines of the ancient Church, and to be setting back the encroachments on their independence and the assumption of authority by Rome. The Tractarian and Oxford movement, no doubt, systematized the theory more theologically, but Soames even before that had done sufficient to call forth a refutation from the pen of Dr. Lingard in his *Anglo-Saxon Church*.

The period over which the alleged encroachments and abuses are supposed to range in this country are from the Conquest till the Reformation, and that with the advent of Lanfranc came the new theological school.¹ So from the eleventh century back is the time to which this controversy is confined, resolving itself into two periods, that of the Anglo-Saxon the other of the British—affecting two questions, viz., doctrine and jurisdiction, but principally the latter in order to establish the independence of the Church in this country from the supremacy of Rome. To go far enough back and cut clear from the claim of Rome some of the patrons of this theory assert that Rome was not the foundress of the Church here, but, if not St. Paul, at least one of the early disciples.

The authorities advanced for this theory, according to

¹ Soames' *History*, p. 226.

Dr. Lingard, are Gildas, the British writer of the sixth century, and two Greek writers earlier in time than Gildas—Eusebius, Bishop of Cæsarea, fourth century; Theoderet, Bishop of Cyrus, fifth century. Gildas is giving the history of his country under Roman rule and compresses the history of the first three centuries into one page. The word *interea* then occurs, marking the transition from the slavish condition of the Britons of these three centuries to the persecution of the British Christians at the beginning of the fourth century. He had before that distinctly called the Britons idolators, and now when about to mention the persecution is obliged to recall the introduction of Christianity amongst them. Now the whole proof from Gildas rests on the vague term *interea*—no definite period is named. What are we to answer but that surely had he known at what time or by whom it was introduced he would have mentioned it, and that all that can be legitimately deduced from the word *interea* is at some time or other, for his words are as applicable to any year before the fourth century as to the year our opponents wish to put it.

Eusebius, who is the next authority, seems to be dealing in rhetoric rather than in history. He in his *Evangelical Demonstration* is proving the truth of Christianity by the way in which it spread. After saying some of the twelve Apostles and the seventy disciples went to Rome others to Scythia, he adds, 'others have passed over the ocean to those called the British Isles.' If we take him literally—by confining the conversion of the Gentiles to the twelve Apostles and seventy disciples—then St. Paul had no share in the work. Yet history and Scripture testify 'he laboured more abundantly than all.' But the same author, in his *Ecclesiastical History*,¹ directly contradicts his being taken literally, for he states where, on tradition, Thomas, Andrew, John and Peter preached, but of the others nothing. From which we are justified in arguing that he knew nothing of the others; that, therefore, in the other work he was dealing in rhetoric,

but when it is a question of stubborn history he knows nothing on the point.

Theoderet, the third witness, is a similar instance. In his *Ελληνικων Θεραπευτικη Πα Θημετων* he says our 'fishermen . . . brought the law of the Gospel to all men and persuaded not the Romans only . . . but . . . Britons and Cimbrians.' But he could not be taken literally, for not only does he exclude the seventy of Eusebius, but himself says afterwards the law of the Gospel was established among Persians and 'other barbarous nations' after the Apostles were dead ; and amongst the barbarous nations of that time may with safety be counted the Britons.

Other authorities, such as Pope Clement in his epistle to Corinth, are quoted because of a phrase 'uttermost west,' but it is as vague and inconclusive as Gildas' *interea*. Thus is dismissed all respectable authority for an apostolically-founded British Church.

The next and earliest record of a British Church is the one in Bede's *History*¹ :—

anno ab incarnatione domini centesimo quinquagesimo sexto Marcus Antonius Verus decimus quartus ab Augusto regnum cum Aureliano commodo fratre suscepit. Quorum temporibus cum Eleutherius vir sanctus pontificati Romanae ecclesiae praeesset misit ad eum Lucius Brittanorum rex epistolam obsecrans ut per ejus mandatum Christianus efficeretur. Et mox effectum piae, postulationis consecutus est susceptamque fidem Britanni usque in tempore Diocletiani principis inviolatam integrumque quieta pace servabant.

Doubt seems to have fallen on this statement of Bede concerning Lucius. But why ? Lingard² tells us that

there is a letter among the laws of Edward the Confessor supposed to be written by Eleutherius to Lucius from which it has sometimes been suggested that Bede was mistaken that the Britons had long been Christians, and that the message to the Pope was for instruction in Roman jurisprudence. But the letter is manifestly spurious, and its very text, supposing it were genuine, intimates that it is an answer to a second message.

¹ Bk. i. chap. iv.

² *Anglo-Saxon Church*, vol. i., p. 3, note 2.

The national tradition of the Welsh people is so decisive in attributing the origin of its faith to Rome, that this tradition, as found in the Myvyrian archæology of Wales, names the four missionaries Elvan, Fagan Medwin, and Damian, who were sent to announce the faith, and Mr. Rees¹ informs us that in 'the neighbourhood of Llandaff are four churches called after the names of Llearwig or Lucius, Dyfan, Ffagan, and Medwy.' We know not the time when they were founded, but their existence seems to confirm the old tradition that Lucius reigned in that part of the country.² Is it not what one would have expected, that the Britons would have held their first founders in veneration and be likely to perpetuate their names by calling their churches after them? Turning to the question whether the ancient British Church acknowledged the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiffs over it, we have a strong *prima facie* argument that it did from the circumstances of its position.

It would have been strange [says Mr. Mathews in his Catholic Truth Society pamphlet on *Continuity Reconsidered*] had they not acknowledged the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiffs, seeing their country was a part of the Roman empire for no less than 400 years, and that they, during that period, became imbued with the Roman civilization, and everything else was Roman. That the Christians, as might have been expected, derived their Christianity also from the imperial city is evident from the mere fact that their liturgy, their form of worship, was distinctly Roman.

If we take from the introduction of Christianity to about the year 347, we find no direct evidence from any source whatever to say whether the ancient British Church was dependent or independent of Rome. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that Christianity existed here on the same footing as elsewhere in the Empire, and therefore if Papal Supremacy admitted or rejected elsewhere admitted or rejected here.

However, when we come to the fourth century we

¹ *Welsh Saints*, p. 84.

² Lingard's *Anglo-Saxon Church*, vol. i., p. 4.

find councils being held in three of which British bishops sat as colleagues of the bishops from other parts of Christendom, v.g., the Council of Arles, 314; Sardica, 347; and Remini, 350. From this we can arrive at two most certain conclusions. 1. That the British Church was an integral part of the universal Church, and must have agreed in doctrine and jurisdiction with other Christian Churches; 2. That the acts and declarations of these councils were the acts and declarations of the British bishops, and therefore the expressions of belief and practice of the British Church.

Now from one of these councils we have an evidence directly bearing on the present question. The Council of Sardica sent a messenger to Pope Julius to give an account of their doings, who 'though absent in person had been present with them in spirit,' and a letter common to the whole of the members of that council assigns the reason, his being the successor of St. Peter who was the head. 'It will be seen to be best and proper if the bishops from each particular province make reference to their head, that is to the seat of Peter the Apostle.'¹ Does not this leave us certain that the British bishops looked upon the Pope as their head because he was the successor of St. Peter?

Still another witness to the fact we find in Prosper of Gaul. It is in connexion with the application of the British to the Bishops of Gaul for help in the Pelagian heresy. A petition, by the way, advanced to prove the independence from Rome. To that petition, as we know, Germanus of Auxere and Lupus of Troyes responded. But as to its proving the independence from Rome quite the opposite. What are the facts? Prosper of Gaul, secretary to Pope Celestine, thereby having the means of possessing correct information, tells us the mission was derived from Rome. In 429 Celestine, on the application of Palladius, sent Germanus in his own place (that is as legate): 'Ad actionem Palladii diaconi Papa Celestinus Germanum

¹ Labbe, Conc. ii., 690. Venet. 1728. Lingard's *Anglo-Saxon Church*, note F, vol. i.

Antissiodorensen episcopum vice sua mittit ut deturbatis haereticis Britannos ad Catholicam Fidem diriget.'¹

From the end of the fourth century till one hundred and fifty years afterwards, no writer except Gildas mentions the British Church, and then it is to complain of the clergy refusing to submit to the authority of their fellows, appealing to someone beyond the seas whom they cannot reach before travelling spacious regions—a description which fits in only with Rome and the Bishop of Rome.

Six centuries have been searched without a single writer being found to uphold the independence of the British Church. On the contrary every evidence is for the other side. Here we finish with the British period alone. There now enters the Anglo-Saxon Church ; Augustine with his monks having arrived.

The place from which Augustine was sent, as well as the prime-mover of his mission, cannot be questioned. But now it is asked, did not Gregory send Augustine as any other bishop might send missionaries, but without claiming authority over him ? In his eleventh epistle we find Gregory writing to Augustine :—

Since the new Church of the English has been brought to the grace of the Almighty God, we grant to you the use of the pallium to be worn only during the solemnities of the Mass, so that you ordain twelve bishops in several places who shall be subject to your jurisdiction. . . . We wish you to send a bishop to the city of York. . . . He shall consecrate twelve bishops and enjoy the honours of a metropolitan, and to him, too, if we live, we propose to give the pallium by the help of the Lord. We wish him, however, to be subject to the jurisdiction of your fraternity.

Now here is a clear defining what is to be the constitution of Augustine's new Church, and as one who understands the significance of the pallium, the giving of jurisdiction. Does this look like the action of one who did not keep the hand of authority over his missioner ? Nay, Augustine's very consecration as bishop was not without the permission

¹ *Chronicles*, ad ann. 429 vel 433.

of Rome, for Gregory in his letter to the Patriarch of Alexandria says it was done *data a me licentia*.

But more. Rome having held authority over the Church in this island, we see Rome taking it for granted that it has authority over not only Augustine, but the bishops who were there before, and presuming to exercise its rights by subjecting those same bishops and that same Church to its representative Augustine. So Bede¹ tells us Gregory wrote to Augustine: 'Moreover your brotherhood will have subject to you all the Bishops of Britain by authority of our God and Lord Jesus Christ, that from your instruction they may learn to believe correctly and from your example to live religiously.' Again, St. Gregory writes an answer to a question from Augustine respecting the Gallic bishops: 'Over the Bishops of Gaul we grant you no authority, for from ancient times of my predecessors Arles has received the pallium whom we should not deprive of his acknowledged authority.'² And in Bede:³ 'But we commit all the Bishops of Britain to your brotherhood that the unlearned may be taught, the weak may be strengthened by your counsels, and the obdurate corrected by your authority.'

Do not these pronouncements and directions lead one to believe that they proceeded from one who regarded it as his duty, says Lingard, to watch over all bishops in Gaul as well as Britain, who never for a moment anticipated objection from the British bishops when he delegated his authority to Augustine, whom he regarded as his representative in this island as the Bishop of Arles was in Gaul? And as to the assertion that Gregory repudiated all claim to jurisdiction over the Church of the English in his indignant rejection of the title 'universal bishop,' all we can say is that if he repudiated it in words his acts belie his words, for it is in these very letters to Augustine, in which he so energetically exercises his authority as universal bishop, that he prefaces them with *servus servorum*; that Bede⁴ did not know that he had given up his universal

¹ *History*, i., c. 29. ² Ep. xi. ³ *Hist.* i., c. 27. ⁴ *Ibid.* ii., c. 1.

authority, for speaking of Gregory he writes : 'We may and ought rightly to call him an apostle because whereas he exercised his pontificate over all the world and was placed over all the Churches,' clearly implying that if he was *servus servorum* he was regarded by intelligent men such as Bede as universal bishop. But in the very letter to John, the Patriarch of Constantinople, in which he rejects the title of universal bishop, he asserts the supremacy jurisdiction. 'Who doubts,' he writes, referring to the See of Constantinople, 'that it is subject to the Apostolic See,' and again, 'when bishops commit a fault I know not what bishop is not subject to it' [that is to the See of Rome].¹ That there could be any doubt about the character in which St. Augustine appeared to the British, history therefore, does not allow. Hence the effort to make the ancient British Church appear to repudiate the Pope's authority in St. Augustine, and Augustine to be imposing something new they had never known before. Of this latter we have seen evidence already.

'But did not the Britons at the conference at Austcliffe reject the papal authority, and maintain their own independence?' asks Lingard.² 'So it is, indeed, asserted,' he continues, 'by modern writers but not in the narrative of Bede, the only real authority which we possess. There we meet with no mention of these subjects, with no hint that they were even taken into consideration.' As for the answer, designated by Lingard³ 'supposed,' of the Abbot Dinooth, we have only to say that though it has found place in the English Councils by Spellman and Wilkins 'it betrays its real origin by the modernism of its language, that of the fifteenth century, and by its anachorism respecting the see of Caerlion. The forgery was detected by Tuper-ville,⁴ and notwithstanding the advocacy of Stillingfleet, is now generally admitted.' Why, then, the British bishops' refusal to communicate with Augustine if they did not

¹ *Catholic Belief*, p. 112.

² *Anglo-Saxon Church*, vol. i., p. 380.

³ *Ibid.* vol. i., note, p. 171.

⁴ *Manual*, p. 460.

reject the authority he represented? Because he came before them as the friend of their hated foes. It was racial hatred. The language of Gildas, the British historian, in his history shows it when referring to the Saxons as 'nefandi nominis Saxones, ferocissimi praedones, sacrilegi, Deo hominibusque invisi.' And we have Bede¹ for authority: 'Quippe cum usque hodie moris sit Brittonum fidem religionemque Anglorum pro nihilo habere neque in aliquo eis magis communicare quam cum paganis.' They looked upon Saxon Christians as no better than pagans, and treated them as aliens from Christianity. The conversation and reason muttered by the seven British bishops when they met Augustine, as supplied to us by Bede in that same chapter, afford extra proof for this view. 'But they,' he says, 'muttering to each other, "He did not rise to us. How, then, will he trample us under foot if we begin to submit to him now?"' answered that they would do none of these things nor have him for archbishop. It was not the authority he represented that they rejected, for there is no mention of it, but the man, his manner, and the unfortunate circumstance 'he did not rise.' Moreover, they were committed by the advice of the sage old monk whom they consulted to submit and accept Augustine's terms should he have risen at their entrance. Can we believe that if submission to Augustine had been a surrender of the spiritual independence of their Church they would have risked it on so uncertain a contingency? The very fact that one of the conditions of Augustine's 'cheerfully putting up with other differences' put forward by him, viz., 'to preach' with him 'the word of God to the Angles' was hardly a likely proposition from a papal missioner if they acknowledged no allegiance to Rome.

One of the questions raised by Augustine in his conference, and in which he sought to induce the Britons to conform to the practice obtaining in the rest of the Church, was the method of calculating and time of keeping Easter. The method and time obtaining amongst the Britons, so

¹ Bk. ii., c. 20.

it is alleged, was Eastern in contrast to the Western or Roman rite, and from this circumstance that they disagreed with Rome when Augustine arrived in celebrating Easter is made to prove that their fathers did ; that they always did, and that they received their faith from missionaries sent not from Rome, but from some Asiatic Church. Now, as a matter of fact, if one may be allowed to put it so, it was Rome who had changed ; the British had not. The method of computation used at first by Rome was, if you like, Eastern, and later on she modernized her system. A statement of the facts explains it. The Council of Nice desired to reduce all the Churches to uniformity in the celebration of Easter. But since the fixing of the time depended on astronomical calculation, it was decided that the Patriarch of Alexandria should annually consult the philosophers of Egypt, being nearest to them. He was to inform the Roman Pontiff what the result of their researches were, and the Roman Pontiff, in return, was to notify the more distant Churches. The Roman and Alexandrian methods of computation did not agree, one following a cycle of nineteen years the other one of eighty-four years. Much disputing occurred till the Roman, in the sixth century, adopted a new cycle composed by Dionysius Exiguus, and which in every important point agreed with the Egyptian mode of calculation.

‘ The error of the British Christians arose from the old and incorrect cycles and computations of their fathers, and from their ignorance of the more correct formulæ adopted by the rest of Christendom.’¹ The reasons for their obstinacy was their seclusion from commerce with other nations and their clinging to national custom. Bede² tells us British and Scots were so harassed by Saxons and out of touch with the Continent that they adhered to the old method, ‘ Utpote quibus longe extra orbem positus nemo Synodalia Paschalis observantiae decreta porrexerat.’ So it amounted to this they were observing a peculiar rite all their own. It was no more

¹ Lingard’s *Anglo-Saxon Church*, vol. i., p. 52, note 1.

² Bk. iii., c. 4.

Eastern than was that observed by Rome prior to the adoption of the Dionysian newly-composed cycle. Hence Augustine, when he met the seven British bishops at Austcliffe, said¹: 'In many things you are contrary to our custom, or rather to the custom of the universal Church.' And if this practice prove they were independent of Rome it proves they were independent of general councils of the universal Church, and hence proves too much. It was not a question of doctrine but of practice, and therefore the Church could and had changed. Hence the Britons agreed with neither the Eastern nor Western method in the seventh century, and if they agreed with Eastern before so did Rome.

Augustine had carried out the constitution of the new hierarchy. A bishopric, with Paulinus as occupant, had been established at York. With varied vicissitudes that Church had come down to the time of Wilfrid. He was the first to appeal from his metropolitan, Theodore, to the higher authority of Rome. It is well to remember that Theodore was a Greek monk, consecrated in Rome, chosen and sent by Pope Vitalian 'episcopum quem petierant a Romano pontifice,'² of which the Pope in his letter reminds the two kings, Northumbria and Kent, 'secundum vestrorum scriptorum tenorem.'³ And Pope Agatho confirmed to him and his successors the authority which he possessed,⁴ thus proving him to hold authority from Rome as vicar of the Apostolic See in this country.

Wilfrid is chosen Bishop of Northumbria, 664, but the see of Canterbury, being vacant, repairs to Gaul for consecration. On his return he finds Chad in possession of the northern diocese, the fickle king having transferred his favour from Wilfrid. Three years and Theodore arrives, condemns Chad, re-instates Wilfrid. Some years and again the royal favour turns from Wilfrid, and, whether Theodore is a tool in its hands or not, certain it is the metropolitan, without Wilfrid's knowledge, without the

¹ Bede, Bk. ii., c. 2.

² Bk. iv., c. 1.

³ Bk. iii., c. 29.

⁴ Lingard's *Anglo-Saxon Church*, vol. i., p. 78.

co-operation of any bishop, consecrates three new prelates, divides the diocese between them, then having Wilfrid ejected not from part only, but the whole of his diocese, without any legal process or charge against him. His remonstrances at the royal court received with derision, he appeals from the judgment of the metropolitan to the superior authority of the Bishop of Rome. Arrived, Agatho (Pope) and council of fifty hear, judge, and give an instrument to Wilfrid, accompanied with penalty of suspension against clergy, excommunication for laymen, who oppose it, empowering Wilfrid to select, in conjunction with other bishops, prelates from his own diocese to assist him in government of it. Egfrid (king, on Wilfrid's return) commits him to prison. Nine months' threats and promises to extort confession that the papal decision was a fabrication, or purchased by presents, failing,¹ Wilfrid set at large on condition he never sets foot in king's territories again. This his first dispute.

Second: Egfrid dies; new king; Wilfrid returns. On presuming to take over Ripon manors order from king to resign. Threats follow. Wilfrid flies to Mercia. The then archbishop, Brethwald (702), invites him to meet a council, asks him to abide on oath by decree of metropolitan. Wilfrid refuses to be deprived of right of appeal. Nothing can move him from this answer. Appeals again to Rome. John VI acquits him of every accusation, but gives no definite sentence; orders metropolitan to convolve council; Bosra of York, John of Hexham, to make terms reasonable for Wilfrid, agreeable to synod, or to plead their cause personally in Rome. King Aelfrid inflexible; dies. Archbishop convenes council at Nedd, in Yorkshire; arrangement come to. Second dispute ended.

Now, first of all Agatho gave a judgment. It is maintained he did not. But do canonists, if only advising, excommunicate who do not agree with them? Why, moreover, the effort of King Egfrid to induce Wilfrid to deny papal instrument, or to show it to be invalid, a fabrication, or obtained by presents. Only proves he recognized autho-

¹ Lingard, vol. i., p. 137, quoting from Eddius, C. 33-35.

rity behind it, and if true he was undone. Further, king tried to intercept him ; sent message to Gallic king to apprehend Wilfrid and place him in custody. Wilfrid went by Friesland, defeating their plot. Why fear his going to Rome if Rome's authority not recognized ? They apprehended another bishop, whom they mistook for Wilfrid, who was likewise appealing against Theodore to Rome, showing Wilfrid was not the only believer in supreme authority of Rome. Again Wilfrid decided to appeal to Rome on the advice of bishops who were present in Northumbria 'cum consilio co-episcoporum suorum,' a circumstance not to be forgotten.¹ When Wilfrid arrived in Rome he found Coenwald, a monk, and others, sent by Theodore to gain the ear of the Pontiff and justify the archbishop's conduct. 'Praesentibus ejus contrariis qui a Theodoro venerandae memoriae archiepiscopo ex hac apostolica sede mandato . . . ad eum accusandum hoc prius convenerant.'² Do we journey at inconvenience to justify ourselves at the court of an authority we do not recognize ? But Theodore before his death writes to the king in favour of the exiled bishop. In one of these letters he asks it, as a last request, and urges it in obedience to the Pontiff, 'Id circo ego Theodorus humilis episcopus decrepita aetate hoc tuae beatitudini suggero quae apostolica hoc sicut scis commendat auctoritas.'³

In the second dispute it was just the same : The Archbishop Brethwald sent an Anglo-Saxon deacon to Rome as his representative. He obeys the Pope's orders in calling a council, and Eddius tells us⁴ the terms of the papal decree agreed to. Hexham and Ripon gave all that Wilfrid demanded. If Wilfrid recognized the supreme jurisdiction of Rome, so did the others ; he from hope of redress, they from fear of censure. Certainly they did not think they were an independent Church from Rome.

We now turn to the Eucharistic doctrine as shown in the

¹ Eddius, c. 24.

² Ep. Joannis Pap. apud Eddium.

³ Epist. Theod. apud Wick., p. 64 ; Lingard's note H, vol. i., p. 396, *Anglo-Saxon Church*.

⁴ Eddius, p. 49-79.

homilies of Aelfric. In that, on the words of our Lord in the 6th chapter of St. John, Lingard tells us we have a fair sample. Now in this homily Aelfric undoubtedly has before his mind, and takes for granted that in the 'housel' is the Body of Christ, for he says, 'some men inquire how the bread . . . may be changed to Christ's Body.' He does not deny Christ's Body to be there, but distinguishes—(1) 'Some things said by token, some by reality . . . that Christ is called bread by token ;' (2) by pointing out that the bread and wine 'present one thing to men's senses outwardly and call up another thing to the minds of believers inwardly.' He is evidently distinguishing between what it is and the manner in which it exists. The preceding sentence sounds strange. 'Why, then, is the holy housel called Christ's Body or His Blood if it be not truly that which it is called ?'

But notice how he keeps on calling it 'Christ's Body and Blood.' Very differently from Parker and the reformers, who dare not speak of it as Christ's Body and Blood, but simply eat bread and drink wine commemorative of Christ's Body and Blood.' 'Outwardly,' and these are Aelfric's words, 'they are seen bread and wine in appearance and taste, yet after the hallowing they are in sooth [note the emphasis in those words], through ghostly mystery, Christ's Body and His Blood.' The 'through ghostly mystery' is no more than we say to-day that the 'modus existendi' is not after the mode in which bodies exist. 'Much difference is there,' he continues, 'between the invisible power of the holy housel and the visible appearance of its own kind. In kind it is corruptible bread and corruptible wine, and, according to the power of the Divine word, it is in sooth Christ's Body and His Blood. Not, however, in bodily guise, but after a ghostly manner.' What is this 'not in bodily guise but after a ghostly manner' but our distinction that Christ's Body is not in the Host after the state of our bodies, but as a glorified and spiritualized body, 'a ghostly manner.' 'Therefore,' he goes on, 'we are to understand nothing after a bodily but everything is to be understood after a ghostly manner. Therefore the holy housel is called the mystery

because one thing is seen and another understood.' Here is your 'Praestet fides supplementum sensuum defectui' of St. Thomas: 'Many receive that Holy Body, yet it is whole in every particle by ghostly mystery.' Is not this what we teach from the Catechism, that Christ is received whole and entire under the least particle? 'In sooth,' he adds again, 'it is Christ's Body and Blood, not after a bodily but after a ghostly manner. Nor are you to inquire how it is made so, but to hold in your belief that it is made so.' No less than three times in this short extract has he asserted 'It is in sooth Christ's Body and Blood,' and he finishes up by re-asserting they are not to inquire how it is. Note, too, that he contemplates a change—transubstantiation. 'Outwardly they are seen bread and wine in appearance and taste; yet after the hallowing they are in sooth, through ghostly mystery, Christ's Body and His Blood.' The doctrine he is supposed to teach is that the bread and wine are not really changed, but are still bread and wine, figures of that Body and Blood, the only change or conversion being spiritual or applying to spiritual receiving alone.¹ He neither denies a change nor the Real Presence, but, on the contrary, affirms both.

But even granting Aelfric teaches all our opponents wish, what right have they to make him the sole testimony of what the Anglo-Saxon Church believed?

It is manifestly incumbent on those who attribute so much authority to the language of Aelfric to show that the doctrine which they persuade themselves that they find in his homily agrees with the theological writings and documents of the four preceding centuries. . . . It was not the doctrine of those who wrote before him. . . . And I make this assertion [says Lingard] with the greater confidence, not only because I have made the inquiry myself, but also because it is now 300 years since Archbishop Parker and his followers were charged to produce the testimony of any other native writer in support of the supposed doctrine of Aelfric, and yet, as far as I can learn, no man of the present day has responded to the call. Undoubtedly they would have done so had it been in their power.²

¹ *Anglo-Saxon Church*, vol. ii., note R.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii., pp. 440-1.

To find the doctrine on this head of the national Church of the Anglo-Saxons we ought to go, not to an isolated writer, as Aelfric, but to the sacramentaries and official pontificals of the bishops of that Church. Two there are, one belonging to Egbert, Archbishop of York, who reigned at the beginning of the eighth century, another to Robert, Archbishop of Canterbury, in the reign of Edward the Confessor. Two others in Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. From the first two copious extracts have been made by Martene, a Maurish monk.¹ In one of these we find (1) Anglo-Saxon bishops blessing corporals, praying 'they are for the service of the altar that the Body and Blood of Christ may be consecrated upon them and also be covered up or wrapped up in them ;' (2) over the vessel in which the Holy Eucharist is to be preserved 'may (it) become, through the grace of the Holy Spirit, a new sepulchre for the Body of Christ,' calling the pyx for carrying it to the sick 'the bearer of our Lord Jesus Christ'; (3) at the consecration of the altar that 'on that altar His (God's) sacred power may turn the elements selected for the sacrifice into the Body and Blood of the Redeemer, and by invisible change transform them into the Sacrifice of the Lamb ;' (4) in the ordination of a priest, 'Do Thou, O Lord, pour the gift of Thy blessing on this Thy servant, whom we now consecrate to the honour of the priesthood . . . and may for the worship of Thy people transform, by an immaculate benediction, the bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Thy Son.'

Now here is the Church ordaining what is to be done in her public offices, conscious, we may be sure, that what she by practice taught would be in consequence believed, yet the Body and Blood of Christ, without distinction, are there understood to be upon the corporal, to be covered with it, to be kept and placed after the Mass in a new sepulchre, that later they may be taken out and carried to the sick—all without any receiving having yet taken place. The prayer in consecrating the altar clearly leaves us to understand

¹ *Pont. Egb. apud Martene*, ii., 255-353; Lingard's *Anglo-Saxon Church*, vol. ii., note R.

that the Eucharistic elements, lying on the altar, were substantially changed into the Body and Blood of Christ whilst the prayer at ordination presumes the change is effected on the altar. Here are the hall-marked liturgical forms of the Anglo-Saxon bishops.

Turn to a second source—acknowledged Anglo-Saxon writers. First Bede's *Homilies*, iv., 'Celebrating the solemnity of the Mass,' he says, 'we immolate anew to God for the benefit of our salvation that most sacred Body of that precious Blood of the Lamb with which we have been redeemed from sin,' 'Christ¹ washes us from our sin in His Blood daily when the memory of His blessed Passion is renewed on the altar; when the creatures of bread and wine are made to pass, by an inexplicable hallowing of the Spirit, into the Sacrament of Christ's Body and Blood.' There certainly is no figurative communion there, but a sacrifice, and that not a typical but a real one.

Secondly, Alcuin—a man who, if any, after Bede, has a right to be heard—writing to Paulinus, Patriarch of Aquileia, says²: 'I have inscribed the name of my Paulinus on my heart from which it shall never be effaced. Do you on your part never forget the name of your Albinus in your holy prayers, but lay it up in some corner of your memory to bring it forth when you consecrate the bread and wine into the substance of the Body and Blood of Christ.'³ No mistaking his meaning!

The third witness—Werefrið, Bishop of Worcester, an Anglo-Saxon native literary assistant to King Alfred. The work from which the following extract is taken is in Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, and is a translation made by Werefrið for the use of the Anglo-Saxon Church. Though a translation he would surely never have intended it for his countrymen did it contain a doctrine contrary to that held by the Church to which he belonged.

Therefore [he says] ought we to offer up to God the daily sacrifice of His Body and Blood. . . . Truly His Body is there

¹ xxxvii.

² Lingard, note R.

³ *Oper. Alc.*, tom i., p. 49, ep. 36.

eaten, His Flesh is there dealed out for the salvation of the people, and His Blood is poured out, not indeed into the hands of unbelievers, but into the mouths of believers. Truly then . . . let us consider in what wise this sacrifice is done for us and for our redemption, a sacrifice which ever representeth the Passion of the only-begotten Son of God.

Here are Bede, Alcuin, Werenfrith, on the one hand, truly representative of the theological school of ancient England. Aelfric, on the other hand, whose language is strange, but perfectly interpretable in the Catholic sense. In addition there are the pontifical and official liturgical forms. If Aelfric is with them well and good, if against them, which is to stand ? Aelfric, a writer, certainly no bishop, certainly no more entitled to speak than others, strange and out of harmony with all writers before and after him ; or Bede, Alcuin, Werenfrith and the liturgical form ? Which must give way ? Transubstantiation, therefore, and the Real Presence were just as much taught in this land hundreds of years ago as to-day by us. And so falls the house of cards built up by the reformers.

J. O'SHAUGHNESSY.

THE DECREE 'LAMENTABILI SANE EXITU AND MODERNISM—III

WE shall have read again, or some, for the first time, before this the New Year's first number of the I. E. RECORD is published, those glorious Introits of the Christmas Masses : ' Dominus dixit ad me, Filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui te ' ; ' Lux fulgebit hodie super nos, quia natus est nobis Dominus, et vocabitur Admirabilis, Deus, Princeps pacis, Pater futuri saeculi ; ' ' Puer natus est nobis et filius datus est nobis cuius imperium super humerum ejus, et vocabitur nomen ejus magni consilii Angelus.' Who is the Son whom the Lord hath begotten ; the Lord, who is born unto us ? What are His claims ? How did He establish His claims ? What was the purpose of His coming ? These, undoubtedly, are questions of the very greatest importance. Strange answers have been given to them, these recent years, by some of our fellow-workers in the ministry. But the Supreme Pastor has spoken ; the confusion and uncertainty and doubts that were seizing people's minds and troubling them have disappeared ; and the Catholic world enters on the celebration of the Christmas festival with feelings of relief, in its usual calm untroubled faith, about to commemorate with joy the nativity of the Redeemer, and not, on the present occasion, without feelings of thankfulness to God and to His Vicar for the authoritative teaching given recently, by Decree and Papal Encyclical, about the sacred Person of the great central figure of the Christmas commemoration. The next section of propositions, after those I explained in my last article,¹ condemned in the Decree, *Lamentabili sane exitu*, deal with the divinity of Christ, His knowledge, His resurrection, and our redemption. I will deal with this section of propositions in my present article.

I

Who is Christ ? What are His claims ? What His credentials ? Is it true that He never claimed to be God ; that His miracles were not directed to establish the truth of His divinity ? How do we answer these questions ?

We say that the Infant born in Bethlehem, whose birth we commemorate at Christmas, was the eternal Son of the eternal Father, the Word become man to redeem and save us ; that, while retaining His divine nature with all its attributes, He took our poor nature and united it to Himself in unity of person, the divine person becoming the person of the assumed human nature as truly as any human person is the person of his nature ; that thus He united two natures, the divine nature and a human nature, each a complete and distinct nature, by the personal or hypostatic union of a common personality. We say, consequently, that Christ is the only-begotten Son of God, that He is the eternal Word, that He is God.

But what is our warrant for accepting this great mystery which, admittedly, lies outside the sphere of natural human knowledge ? Did Christ claim to be the Son of God ? And was He able to establish the justice of His claim ? We say that Christ did claim to be the only begotten and natural Son of God, and that He directed His miracles to establish this, the great central truth of Christianity.

It would be impossible within the space of a paragraph in a single article to do justice to the scriptural argument for the divinity of Christ. I will only refer to the discourses in the fifth and tenth chapters of St. John, from which an argument for the divinity of Christ can be formed, similar in structure to the argument for the Real Presence from the discourse in the sixth chapter of the same Gospel, so admirably developed by Cardinal Wiseman in his *Lectures on the Holy Eucharist*. Our Lord, in the fifth and tenth chapters, asserts in the clearest terms His consubstantiality with the Father. The Jews, who receive His words in their natural sense, are indignant at what they conceive to be His blasphemy, and they think to put Him to death.

If the interpretation put upon His words were wrong, our Lord should have calmed the angry feelings of His audience, and stilled the storm, by explaining that there had been a misunderstanding. But they had not misunderstood Him ; He did not seek to calm them by correcting their interpretation of His language ; on the contrary He re-asserted His unity of nature with the Father and appealed to His miraculous works in support of His astounding claim.

1. Our Lord had healed an infirm man on the sabbath day. 'Therefore,' we read,¹ 'did the Jews persecute Jesus, because He did these things on the sabbath day. But Jesus answered them : *My Father worketh until now, and I work.*' Here our Lord asserts His divine Sonship and His participation with the Father in all the cosmic operations implied in divine providence, divine conservation and divine co-operation with creatures. The claim would not have been justified if Christ were not really consubstantial with the Father. For the same numerical operation cannot emanate from two distinct principles. The same act of vision, or of hearing, or of thinking, or of willing, cannot emanate from two distinct principal causes ; and if two or more persons had the same numerical act of vision or hearing or willing, as it emanates from its principal, we should conclude that they had an eye, or an ear, or a will, in common. Our Lord's argument is this : From the morning of creation until now, week-day and sabbath-day alike, My Father worketh, and you do not accuse Him of transgressing the sabbath law ; why then do you accuse Me, who am the Son of God, who am consubstantial with My Father, who necessarily share in all His cosmic operations, of violating the sabbath ?

2. It is evident that the Jews understood our Lord to claim divine Sonship, not in the sense of being a created Messiah, but in the sense of being a Messiah who is the Son of God, consubstantial with the Father. 'Hereupon, therefore,' we read,² 'the Jews sought the more to kill

¹ John v. 16, 17.

² v. 18.

Him, because He did not only break the sabbath, but also said God was His Father, making Himself equal to God.'

3. Our Lord replies, not by correcting His audience, not by repudiating the charge that He had called God His Father, that He had made Himself equal to God, but by re-iterating the statement of His essential participation in all the cosmic operations of the Father and by appealing to His miracles for confirmation of His claims.

Then Jesus answered and said to them : Amen, amen, I say unto you : the Son cannot do anything of Himself but what He seeth the Father doing : for what things soever He doth, these the Son also doth in like manner . . . But I have a greater testimony than that of John. For the works which the Father hath given Me to perfect, the works themselves which I do give testimony of Me that the Father hath sent Me.¹

Observe the words : 'For what things soever He doth, these the Son also doth in like manner.' There can be no question here of imitation. The words cannot mean, for example, that when the Father created the world the Son following the Father's example created another world ; that when the Father creates a soul the Son creates another ; that all the Father's acts of providence and government in the world have their numerical replicas in corresponding acts of the divine Son. They mean that the Father and Son have of essential necessity the same numerical operations because they have the same nature, which is the principle of operation, because they are consubstantial.

The same form of argument is suggested by the controversy with the Jews described in the tenth chapter of the same Gospel. 'I and the Father are one,' our Lord says.² 'The Jews then,' the narrative continues, 'took up stones to stone Him. Jesus answered them : Many good works I have shewed you from the Father ; for which of these works do you stone Me ? The Jews answered Him : For a good work we stone Thee not, but for blasphemy, and because that Thou, being a man, makest Thyself God.'³ 'If I do not the works of My Father,' our Lord answers, finally, 'believe Me not. But if I do, though you

¹ John v. 19, 36.

² John x. 30.

³ 31-33.

will not believe Me, believe the works, that you may know and believe that the Father is in Me and I in the Father. They sought therefore to take Him, and He escaped out of their hands.¹

Who is Christ? What are His claims? What His credentials? Did He claim to be God? Did He direct His miracles to prove His divinity?—How do the Modernists answer these questions?

In order to represent intelligibly the Modernists' conception of Christ and to prepare the way for an exposition of the condemned propositions dealing with His divinity, I find it necessary to re-state, briefly, the broad general principles of Modernism. Agnostic-Modernists do not admit, as a mental truth, the existence of a Supreme Being distinct from the world. Modernists all deny the existence of a divine supernatural revelation addressed to the human mind. Supernatural revelation, they say, was nothing more at its inception, than a consciousness of right and wrong, the birth of the divine within us, the origin of 'religious life.' This 'religious life,' like organic life, grew and varied and under the action of Natural Selection experienced several transformations before it reached the term of the present religious consciousness of the world. Then it became necessary to formulate a theory of the 'religious life'; and Modernists distinguish three theories, the Scientific Theory (or the theory of natural theology and history), the Theory of Faith, and the Theory of Dogmatic Theology. The Scientific Theory is addressed to the intellect; and to the Scientific Theory, or to natural theology and history, Modernists have no objection, since natural theology and history impose no obligations on the conscience, but leave the student of the 'religious life' free to accept or reject their conclusions or to take up an agnostic position in regard to them. The Theory of Faith is the theory which *conscience* or the *religious feeling* formulates for itself: it borrows its terminology largely from natural theology and history; it is expressed chiefly in the Sacred Scriptures and Ecclesiastical Creeds: it is indifferent

¹ John x. 37-39.

to intellectual truth and values only practical truth : and, finally, its formulæ change or should be changed when they cease to be useful to foster and stimulate the latest developments of the religious life. And the Theory of Dogmatic Theology ? The essence and at the same time the cardinal error of Dogmatic Theology—so the Modernists say—consist in this that it represents the contents of the Sacred Scriptures and of the Ecclesiastical Creeds as truths addressed to us from heaven, as truths addressed to the human mind and intellectually true, as truths which demand our intellectual assent and acceptance under pain of the divine displeasure.

Starting with these principles the Modernists distinguish between the Christ of History, the Christ of Faith, and the Christ of Dogmatic Theology. And what, it will be asked, was the real historic Christ according to the Modernists ? We may say, negatively, that according to the Modernists He was not God, in the sense of an Infinite Being distinct from the world ; that He never claimed to be God ; that He never performed a miracle to prove His divinity. He was a man like ourselves, whose conception was natural, whose birth was natural, no doubt a very holy man, but possessed by certain delusions such as that the end of the world was imminent. And the Christ of Faith ? The 'religious life' experienced many trials and vicissitudes, Modernists say, during the period which immediately succeeded the Saviour's death. To emerge triumphantly from these trials it had to recast its old formulæ. Successively, then, it began to conceive Christ as the Messiah, as the Risen Lord, as Redeemer, as the Son of God, and finally, in St. John's Gospel, as God ; and thus it surmounted its difficulties. These were formulæ of the *Christian conscience*, of the latest developed of *religious feeling* : as such they were neither intellectually true nor intellectually false, for they were not addressed to the intellect at all : but they were practically true, they were useful for fostering and stimulating the growth of the Christian 'religious life : ' and Christians should live as if they were intellectually true. And the Christ of Dogmatic Theology ? Again,

according to Modernists, the fatal error and mischief of Dogmatic Theology consist in identifying divine revelation with itself ; in representing divine revelation as a divine communication of knowledge addressed to the human mind ; in teaching that it is intellectually true, and that we are bound to believe mentally, under pain of the Church's anathema, that Christ is God and consubstantial with the Father.

From this general statement it will be easy to see the meaning and the reason of the condemnation of the following propositions :—

27. *Divinitas Iesu Christi ex Evangeliiis non probatur ; sed est dogma quod conscientia christiana e notione Messiae deduxit.*

28. *Jesus, quum ministerium suum exercebat, non in eum finem loquebatur ut doceret se esse Messiam, neque eius miracula eo spectabant ut id demonstraret.*

29. *Concedere licet Christum quem exhibet historia multo inferiorem esse Christo qui est obiectum fidei.*

30. *In omnibus textibus evangelicis nomen *Filius Dei* aequivalet tantum nomini *Messias*, minime vero significat Christum esse verum et naturalem Filium Dei.*

31. *Doctrina de Christo quam tradunt Paulus, Ioannes et Concilia Nicaenum, Ephesinum, Chalcedonense, non est ea quam Jesus docuit, sed quam de Iesu concepit conscientia christiana.*

'The divinity of Christ,' Modernists say, 'is not proved from the Gospels ; it is a dogma which the Christian conscience deduced from the notion of the Messiah.' It is not that the divinity of Christ was deduced from the notion of the Messiah by an intellectual process and as a real intellectual truth, nor immediately. There was a succession of 'dogmas' of the nascent Christian conscience ; the 'dogmas' of the Messiah, of the Risen Lord, of Redeemer, of Son of God, and, finally, of God. They were not deduced from one another dialectically. They were not addressed to the intellect at all, nor did they express intellectual truth. They are represented as formulæ snatched up by the Christian conscience because of their practical truth, because they fostered, each for a time, the development of the Christian conscience. Hence with the rapid growth

and variation of religious life at the birth of Christianity 'dogmas' succeeded one another in rapid succession, each succeeding one supplanting its predecessor in the course of the struggle for existence; the notion of Risen Lord supplanting the dogma of the Messiah, to be soon supplanted itself by the dogma of Redeemer, which again gave way to the dogma of Son of God, which finally was succeeded by the dogma of Christ's divinity, of Christus-Deus. But these, understood as dogmas of the Christian conscience, were mere formulae having no intellectual truth, making no intellectual affirmation, conveying no meaning to the intellect; they are supposed to have been of practical utility, each for a time, the utility of the last being, perhaps, not quite exhausted; and hence they are said to have been, in succession and for a time, practically true, true with the truth of goodness, inasmuch as they were valuable for fostering the life of religion. But the scientist or historian, Modernists say, may prove them all to be unfounded in fact, may prove Jesus to be neither the Son of God nor God, to be merely man, of natural conception of natural birth, of natural life, to have been put to a violent death, to have crumbled into dust and to sleep still in the bosom of mother earth. And hence one may hold, the Modernists again say, that the real historic Christ was much inferior to the Christ of faith, to the Christ who was represented successively, in the practical dogmas of conscience, as Messiah, as Risen Lord, as Redeemer, as Son of God, as God. Jesus Himself, the Modernists say, did not teach that He was God; and hence the Christology of St. Paul, of St. John, and of the ecumenical councils, is merely the Christology of the Christian conscience, a collection of dogmas which are or were for a time practically true, because practically useful, but which were never intended by their authors to express intellectual truth, to demand intellectual assent, or to impose any obligation on men's consciences.

It is unnecessary to observe that, independently of the recent condemnation, this theory is opposed to the defined teaching of the Church. I may add that these propositions and the propositions throughout have been

drafted with very great care. Errors have been condemned but the propositions do not touch any of the questions debated in Catholic Schools. Thus, for example, the proposition is condemned that the name *Filius Dei*, in *all* the evangelical texts, signifies only a Messiah who is not the natural Son of God; but the proposition does not touch the question whether the name *Filius Dei* can be proved, in every text of Scripture in which it occurs, to signify the natural Son of God, who is consubstantial with the Father.

II

What was the extent of the knowledge of Christ? Was He in error about the imminence of the end of the world? Was He conscious from the beginning of His Messianic dignity? How do we reply to these questions? What answer do the Modernists give to them?

The subject of the Knowledge of Christ would require an article to itself. For the present I will only say that we distinguish two intellects, as we distinguish two natures, the divine and the human. His divine intellect, even within the time and sphere of the Incarnation, possessed in its entirety the infinite divine knowledge, which can no more submit to be suspended or overshadowed or limited, as the Kenotic theory would have it, than God can cease to be God. In regard to the human intellect of Christ, theologians distinguish beatific knowledge, as Christ enjoyed from the beginning the beatific vision, infused knowledge and ordinary experimental or acquired knowledge; and we can say that, between His beatific and infused knowledge, Christ knew all actual things, past, present, and future.

What is the Modernist position about the Knowledge of Christ? Modernists would distinguish here again between the Historic Christ, the Christ of Faith, and the Christ of Dogmatic Theology. The Christ of Faith is a mere formula, a fancy of the religious conscience. At different periods of the religious evolution, Modernists would say, Christ was conceived as having the knowledge of the Messiah, of the Risen Lord, of the Redeemer, of the Son of

God, and, finally, of God. This final theory of His divine knowledge was practically true, because it was useful, because it was stimulating to the religious life to conceive Christ as omniscient. But the theory of the omniscience of Christ was not addressed to the intellect, nor did it express real truth, nor was it necessary to believe mentally that Christ, at any time or in any nature, was possessed of all knowledge. And the real Christ, what was the extent of His knowledge? What the real Christ knew or did not know, Modernists would say, is not a question of religion. Accept the dogma of the Christian conscience, that Christ, as conceived by the religious feeling, is God and that He is omniscient, accept this dogma as practically true, as religiously useful, and then as a Psychologist or Historian you are free to hold that the real Christ was—well, a person of very ordinary human knowledge. Then, what of the Christ of Dogmatic Theology? Modernists would say, again, that the fatal error of Dogmatic Theology consists in referring to the mind what was destined only for the religious conscience, in claiming intellectual truth for and imposing an obligation of intellectual assent to the dogma of Christ's omniscience, a dogma, they would say, which is true only in the sense that it is useful and practicable.

With these preliminary observations I pass on to make a few remarks about the Propositions dealing with the knowledge of Christ, which have been condemned.

Prop. 32.—*Conciliari nequit sensus naturalis textuum evangelicorum cum eo quod nostri theologi docent de conscientia et scientia infallibili Christi.* There is question here of the text referring to the general judgment: 'But of that day and hour no one knoweth, no not the Angels of heaven, but the Father';¹ and of those texts in which Christ asks a question, as when speaking of Lazarus, He asked: 'Where have you laid him?'² or in which He expresses His astonishment on receiving a certain answer, as when it is said, speaking of the Centurion: 'And Jesus hearing this marvelled.'³ Theologians claim for Christ infinite divine knowledge in His divine intellect, and beatific, infused and

¹ Matt. xxiv. 36.

² John xi. 34.

³ Matt. viii. 10.

experimental knowledge in His human intellect; and it is contended by Modernists, as by many other ancient and modern adversaries, that this doctrine cannot be reconciled with the natural meaning of the Gospel texts. Now, it is worthy of remark that when Modernists find a text or passage of Scripture which seem to establish the divinity of Christ, they at once pronounce the text or passages unhistorical; but when they find a text or texts that seem to create some difficulty to the admission of the traditional teaching about Christ they admit them readily enough to be historical. I cannot here go into the explanations that are given by commentators and theologians to reconcile the doctrine of the plenitude of Christ's knowledge with the texts from which objections are taken. It is enough to say that a reconciliation is not impossible. And it is to be borne in mind that the condemnation of the proposition under consideration does not imply that we can give a direct decretorial solution to the difficulty which has been proposed. Assuming that the teaching of theologians about the infallible knowledge of Christ is somehow contained in revelation, we have indirectly an assurance that a statement contradictory to it cannot be found in Scripture. Then if not a certain, at least probable direct explanations can be given by which the received teaching of theologians about the consciousness of Christ can be reconciled with the texts I have quoted.

Prop. 33.—*Evidens est cuique qui praeorconceptis non dicitur opinionibus, Jesum aut errorem de proximo messianico adventu fuisse professum, aut maiorem partem ipsius doctrinae in Evangelii Synopticis contentae authenticitate carere.* This proposition deals with the real historical Christ, and states that, unless we are prepared to deny the authenticity of the greater part of His teaching in the Synoptic Gospels, we must admit that Christ was in error about the imminence of the end of the world, and of His second coming to establish His messianic kingdom. But we believe both in the authenticity of the Gospel doctrine and in our Lord's inerrancy.

Prop. 34.—*Criticus nequit asserere Christo scientiam*

nulla circumscriptam limite nisi facta hypothesi, quae historice haud concipi potest quaeque sensui morali repugnat, nempe Christum uti hominem habuisse scientiam Dei et nihilominus noluisse notitiam tot rerum communicare cum discipulis ac posteritate. On this I would observe that the expression, *Christ as man*, can be understood in a reduplicative or in a specific sense. Christ could not have had divine knowledge by reason of His human nature ; but the specific person, who was Christ-Man, had divine knowledge in His divine intellect. The present proposition again deals with the real historic Christ and states that a critic cannot admit unlimited knowledge in Christ ; first because, as a matter of fact, the claim would be opposed to historical evidence, and secondly because, on a question of law or ethics, it would be repugnant to the moral sense to suppose that Christ had divine knowledge which He refused to share with His disciples and posterity. The real, historic Christ therefore, according to the Modernists, was neither God nor had He divine knowledge. We affirm that the real historic Christ was God ; that He had divine knowledge ; that He was not bound to share—that He could not have shared—all His knowledge with His disciples ; that there is nothing in the Gospel history which cannot be reconciled with belief in His omniscience.

Prop. 35.—*Christus non semper habuit conscientiam suae dignitatis messianicae.* Finally the doctrine is condemned which states that the real historic Christ was not conscious of His messianic dignity from the beginning.

III

Did the Saviour rise from the dead ? Modernists would again distinguish between a real historical Resurrection, the Resurrection of Faith, and the Resurrection of Dogmatic Theology. A real resurrection from the dead, they say, cannot be demonstrated, because a risen or glorified body is a spiritualized body and can scarcely be regarded as the object of the trustworthy testimony of the senses. Modernists rarely deny in explicit terms the real resurrection of Christ. They content themselves with saying

that it has not been directly revealed by God to the human mind ; that God did not inspire the narrative of the Resurrection ; that it is not demonstrable by historical testimony, as being a fact of a supernatural order ; that it is not necessary to believe it mentally. How then has the religious doctrine of the Resurrection originated ? It originated solely in the Christian conscience. It was found to be a useful formula for stimulating the religious life. Immediately after the death of Christ the Christian conscience conceived Him as having entered on the enjoyment of an immortal life with the Father. To the belief in the immortality, Modernists say, there succeeded belief in His resurrection ; but neither the immortality nor the resurrection was a truth of the intellectual order ; neither need be believed mentally ; they both were truths of the practical order ; they were accepted as practical formulæ, useful for fostering the growth of the religious life. The two following Propositions dealing with the Resurrection of Christ can be easily understood, from the preceding remarks. It is only necessary to observe that a risen body does not cease to be a body whose presence can be verified by the testimony of the senses.

Prop. 36.—*Resurrectio Salvatoris non est proprium factum ordinis historici, sed factum ordinis mere supernaturalis nec demonstratum nec demonstrabile, quod conscientia Christiana sensim ex aliis derivavit.*

Prop. 37.—*Fides in resurrectionem Christi ab initio fuit non tam de facto ipso resurrectionis quam de vita Christi immortali apud Deum.*

IV

Finally the following proposition dealing with the Atonement has been condemned :—

Prop. 38.—*Doctrina de morte piaculari Christi non est evangelica sed tantum paulina.*

In dealing with the great subject of the Atonement, Modernists would again distinguish between the Historical Atonement, the Atonement of Faith, and the Atonement of Dogmatic Theology. There was no real, historical

Atonement, they would say. Christ may be said to have redeemed the world in a Socinian sense, they would admit, that is, by His preaching, by His example, and by His prayer ; but He was not offered as a vicarious victim for the sins of the world. But then there is the Atonement of Faith. It was not known, they say, to the Evangelists. But to meet the necessities of the advancing evolution of the Christian conscience, the theory of the Atonement was invented by St. Paul. It makes no pretence to real intellectual truth : it is not a truth of the intellect, but of the religious conscience : it need not be believed mentally : but it is practically true, because it is useful. And, of course, according to Modernists, the unpardonable sin of Dogmatic Theology, in reference to the Atonement as well as in reference to all the other dogmas of faith, consists in representing the Atonement and the other articles of the Creed as truths revealed by God to the human mind, as truths which claim, at the peril of salvation, the loyal submission of the human intellect.

But the Modernist theory of the Atonement was already condemned by its opposition to defined doctrine. *Crucifixus etiam pro nobis sub Pontio Pilato.* These words tell of the sacrifice of the real historic Christ for our sins. The theory therefore of the vicarious Atonement did not originate with St. Paul. Much less is it a theory of ' faith ' in the Modernist sense. It originated with Christ, our great High Priest and vicarious Victim. He atoned by His blood for the dishonour done to God by sin and merited for us a continuation of the supernatural order with all its gifts and graces. He established in the world a vast, an infinite reservoir of grace. This vast reservoir with the sacraments by which its sacred contents may be conveyed to our souls He has committed to the care of the Church. The Modernists have extended their theory also to the Church and the Sacraments. I will reserve an explanation of the propositions condemned in these matters to a future number.

DANIEL COGHLAN.

[To be continued.]

CORRESPONDENCE

NEED OF A POPULAR HISTORY OF THE IRISH CHURCH

REV. DEAR SIR.—Many of your readers will re-echo your sympathetic remarks on the Irish Catholic Truth Society published in I. E. RECORD of November. When I read your remarks on the paucity of useful and practical publications on the current errors of the day, I was reminded of a much felt want in Irish history. It is this. As far as I know, there is no popular history of the Irish Church from the dawn of Christianity down to (nearly) the present time in existence. By a popular history of the Irish Church, I mean one like that turned out by the English Catholic Truth Society, and entitled, *A Short History of the Catholic Church in England*. This publication of the English Catholic Truth Society is very readable, not encumbered with dates, but gives the ordinary reader a very accurate account of the general facts of the English Church History.

Could not the Irish Catholic Truth Society take up the question of Irish Church History on somewhat similar lines, or, if the Catholic Truth Society cannot see their way, would not this be a profitable point for the Maynooth Union to discuss? Most of us priests regret that we know so little about our own glorious Church. And, if we priests know so little, is it not reasonable to infer that the run of laymen know considerably less? They have not had our opportunities to refer to many dry, bulky, and unattractive volumes. And yet as managers of schools, and those who take an interest in them, we priests expect our teachers to impart a knowledge of the glorious history of the Irish Church. Could not, I repeat, the Irish Catholic Truth Society or the Irish priests do something to remedy this defect? Such a work published at a reasonable price would command a large sale and supply a widely felt want.

SYMPATHETIC.

Notes and Queries

THEOLOGY

MASS IN PRIVATE HOUSES

REV. DEAR SIR.—In the Maynooth Statutes I find this law : 'Missae post meridiem non celebrentur, nec in aedibus privatis, nisi necessitas urgeat et specialis atque expressa habeatur ab episcopo licentia, qui etiam aedes ubi sacrum fiat designare debebit.' In the old Statutes the law ran : 'Missae post meridiem non celebrentur, nec in aedibus privatis nisi de speciali et expressa episcopi licentia.' Does this change cause any serious deviation from old-time customs ? Does it bring Ireland completely under the Canon Law which rules the Catholic Church in countries where there are no special circumstances such as we have had in Ireland ?

C.

I. Formerly bishops had power to grant even habitual permission for the celebration of Mass in private houses, but the Council of Trent (Sess. XXII), enacted the following legislation : 'Neve patiantur (episcopi) privatis in domibus, atque omnino extra ecclesiam et ad divinum tantum cultum dedicata oratoria ab iisdem Ordinariis designanda et visitanda, sanctum hoc sacrificium a saecularibus et regularibus quibuscumque peragi . . . non obstantibus privilegiis, exemptionibus, appellationibus ac consuetudinibus quibuscumque.' Some diversity of opinion arose amongst canonists and theologians about the meaning of this legislation, some saying that it in no way limited the power of bishops to grant permission for the celebration of Mass in private houses, others holding that it took all power from the hands of bishops, and others again maintaining that the power of bishops was considerably restricted but not altogether taken away.

Desiring to settle the controversy, Paul V (1615) ordered

the following decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Council to be sent to all bishops :—

Tametsi Sacra Cardinalium Congregatio Concilii Tridentini interpretum, optimis enixa rationibus, saepissime responderit celebrandi licentias in privatis oratoriis nonnisi a Sede Apostolica esse concedendas . . . illustrissimi Patres, SSmi Domini Nostri jussu, significandum duxerunt facultatem hujusmodi licentias dandi ipsius Concilii decreto unicuique ademptam esse solique Beatissimo Romano Pontifici esse reservatum.

Benedict XIV (1751) also declared that the Council of Trent took away from bishops the power to grant permission for the celebration of Mass in private houses :—

Ex eo factum est ut non amplius Episcopis facultas sit usum oratoriorum privatorum in domibus laicorum, causa in iisdem Missam celebrandi ; cum licentia, quae ab ipsis daretur celebrandi Missam in oratoriis privatis, neutiquam stare possit cum praecepto a Concilii eisdem ipsis imposito, ne id permettere debeat.

Interpreting these and similar authentic declarations, canonists for the most part held that although bishops were deprived of the power of granting permanent (*per modum habitus*) permission, they were not deprived of authority to concede by way of dispensation temporary (*per modum actus*) permission. Thus Suarez,¹ Bonacina,² Layman,³ and St. Alphonsus Liguori⁴ held that bishops could for a just cause give temporary permission. The upholders of this opinion were not unanimous as to the meaning of temporary permission, some saying that the bishop could give permission only for one or two occasions ; others, amongst them St. Liguori, holding that he could give permission which would last as long as the necessity for which it was given remained.

This mild interpretation was not without serious difficulties arising from numerous decisions of the Roman Congregations. Thus, in 1847, the Bishop of Münster

¹ In 3 p. D. Thomae, disp., lxxxii, s. iii.

² *De Euch.* D. iv., q. ult., n. 11.

³ *De Euch.*, Lib. v., tract. v., cap. v., n. 3.

⁴ Lib. vi., n. 359.

received the following reply from the Sacred Congregation of the Council : ' Non licere ulli Episcopo hujusmodi licentias quocumque sub obtentu concedere, *ne pro actu transeunte* ; hanc facultatem esse soli Romano Pontifici reservatum.' Notwithstanding decisions of this kind the teaching of St. Liguori was put into practice by many bishops, and, in 1855, received a certain degree of sanction from a decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Council. The Bishop of Caltagirone in Sicily requested a decision on the questions : ' I. An Episcopus possit, justa interveniente causa, facultatem concedere celebrandi in oratoriis privatis in casu ? II. An cessante **causa** episcopali indulti, perseveret nihil ominus facultas in vim bullae Cruciferae in casu ? ' The Congregation at first replied *Dilata*, but subsequently, on December 20, 1855, replied : ' Ad I, Negative, nisi tamen *magna et urgente adsint causae, et per modum actus tantum* ; Ad II, Negative.' Hence, it is now the accepted teaching that a bishop can grant the permission in question if there are great and urgent causes for so doing, but only *per modum actus*.

It will be noted that whilst St. Liguori required simply a just cause the Sacred Congregation required great and urgent causes. Though some, v.g., Ballerini,¹ think that there is no substantial difference between St. Liguori's teaching and that of the Congregation, theologians for the most part rightly consider that there is a very marked difference between the two, since the grave necessity of St. Alphonsus could hardly be called a *causa magna et urgens*. For instance, in St. Liguori's teaching a bishop can grant the aforesaid permission not merely when Mass in a private house is necessary to provide the Viaticum for a dying person, but also when there is question of a sick priest, or even of a sick layman at least if he is of special importance, who desires to have the spiritual benefits to be derived from Mass which he cannot celebrate or attend in a church or authorized oratory. In fact, any really grave moral—not absolute—necessity would, in the opinion of St. Liguori,

¹ Gury-Ballerini, vol. ii., n. 386, ii., note

justify a bishop in granting the concession; such causes could not be appropriately called 'great and urgent.' Moreover, in considering the Caltagirone case, the Sacred Congregation drew a clear distinction between 'a just cause' and 'a great and urgent cause,' denying the former while admitting the latter as sufficient.

As for the phrase *per modum actus*, Cardinal Gennari¹ holds that the bishop can grant permission which will last as long as the urgent cause remains. This view is safe in practice; it seems to harmonise with the fact that, though the Congregation minutely inspected the teaching of St. Liguori on the occasion, it expressed no dissent from his meaning of *per modum actus*. Hence, by the general law of the Church, a bishop can grant permission for the celebration of Mass in private houses if there are great and urgent causes for so doing, provided no permanent permission is given so that the license will cease with the reason for which it was given.

II. It remains to see how far the legislation of the Synod of Maynooth has brought Ireland into line with the general law of the Church in the matter of the celebration of Mass in private houses. The Maynooth Statute says: 'Missae post meridiem non celebrentur, nec in aedibus privatis, nisi necessitas urgeat, et specialis atque expressa habeatur ab episcopo licentia, qui etiam aedes ubi sacerdotum fiat designare debet.'² In a later chapter the Synod makes reference to Stations in private houses:—

Synodi Thurlesiensis menti inhaerentes, 'vetamus' ut verbis utamur S. Congregationis de Prop. Fide, 'ne in vicis et oppidis ubi adsunt ecclesiae, et in locis omnibus quae prope distant ab ecclesiis, Stationes pro Confessionibus audiendis tam virorum quam mulierum in domibus privatis fiant, sed Stationes in ipsa ecclesia teneantur': ubi vero necessariae sint Stationes, carent episcopi ut omnia iuste et debita cum reverentia peragantur.³

How far do these laws differ from the common law of the Church? Can our bishops grant permission for the

¹ *Consultazioni Morali-Canoniche-Liturgiche*, vol. ii., p. 92.

² p. 67, n. 101.

³ p. 70, n. 121.

celebration of Mass in private houses on occasions when they could not do so if they were ruled simply by ordinary Church law ?

1. There is a principle of Canon Law that a general law does not destroy opposing local customs unless these are specially abrogated. Now the Synod of Maynooth has no abrogating clause, so it would appear that all purely local customs in reference to the celebration of Mass in private houses still remain in force notwithstanding the general law of the Maynooth Synod. What these customs in particular are the priests of each diocese know very well, so it is not necessary for me to mention them even if I were able to do so.

2. Stations are allowed in the future as in the past, since the Synod makes special reference to them, and says that the legislation of Thurles continues in force. It will be remarked that Stations are not mentioned by the Synod as if they were exceptions to the law already laid down in the previous chapter about celebration of Mass in private houses ; there is no hint that they are not under the ordinary law of the country.

3. In regard to the kind of necessity required by the Maynooth Statute, the words of the law seem to be milder than the phrase *causae magnae et urgentes* used by the Sacred Congregation of the Council. They fit in better with the view of St. Liguori that any truly grave moral necessity will suffice. It is quite conceivable that the Roman authorities would not insist that a country situated as Ireland has been should all at once fall into line with the rest of the Catholic world. As a matter of fact, the Synod of Maynooth permits Stations to be held for reasons which could hardly be said to come under the phrase '*causae magnae et urgentes*.' Hence, I am inclined to hold that our bishops can grant permission for the celebration of Mass in private houses for any cause that, considering all the circumstances, is really grave ; and in this connexion it is well to remember that existing customs sometimes render it very difficult to bring about a sudden change in a matter so important from the viewpoint of the faithful.

4. As for the manner in which the bishop must give the necessary permission, there seems to be no substantial difference between the Maynooth law and the common law of the Church. In both cases there must be a *special* license, i.e. license covering the case of necessity in which the concession is granted. In both cases there must be an *express* grant, at least except in very extreme and urgent cases. For instance, if a Church were burned down on Saturday evening Mass could be said the following Sunday in any convenient place with merely the presumed permission of the bishop.

5. It is stated in the Maynooth Statute that the bishop is to designate the house in which Mass is to be celebrated. Though this condition is not expressly mentioned in the general law of the Church, the kind of necessity required shows that it is implicitly contained therein. With us the bishop designates the house where Mass is to be celebrated either by a general indication as happens in the case of Stations, or by an act indicating a particular private residence for the celebration of Mass.

6. Since the Maynooth Statute has no clause similar to the phrase: *per modum actus*, employed by the Sacred Congregation of the Council, there can be no difficulty here about granting permission that will last so long as the reason for the permission continues. That has been the practice in regard to Stations, and there seems to be no serious reason for holding a different view about other cases of necessity. Even in regard to the common law of the Church the opinion is probable which holds that *per modum actus* excludes only permanent permission. *A fortiori* in the present case the same opinion can be adopted in practice.

BINATION

REV. DEAR SIR,—Is duplication allowed on a Sunday when the second Mass has to be said for a very small congregation, v.g., in a corpse house, a public hospital whose Catholic patients are few, or in the chapel of a small religious community? The

number present may vary from three or four to twenty or more persons, according to the day. What if such persons can easily attend the parish church?

C.C.

Before replying to the cases proposed by 'C.C.' it is necessary to see the extent of episcopal power in the matter of duplication. Irish bishops derive authority to permit bination from two sources—from the common law and from the *Formula Sexta*.

I. The common law of the Church is contained in cap. *Consulisti*, 3, *De Celebr. Missarum*, of Innocent III, and in the Constitution *Declarasti* of Benedict XIV. The question whether a priest could celebrate several Masses on the same day was proposed for the decision of Innocent III. His reply was: 'Respondeamus quod, excepto die nativitatis dominicae, nisi causa necessitatis suadeat, sufficit sacerdoti semel in die unam Missam solummodo celebrare.' Benedict XIV gave an authentic exposition of this text, and his teaching is now the common law of the Church. He points out in the beginning of his exposition that the word *sufficit* is preceptive, so that it is unlawful to say more than one Mass except (1) on the feast of the Nativity, and (2) in case of necessity.

(1) On the feast of the Nativity every priest can say three Masses, and the same privilege exists in some countries, v.g. Spain and Portugal, for the feast of All Souls.

(2) The case of necessity of which the cap. *Consulisti* speaks is not easy of explanation. Perhaps it will make things clear if I state, 1^o when there is no true necessity, and 2^o when there is true necessity.

1^o. There is no necessity in the sense of the cap. *Consulisti* if there is question of other days than Sundays and Holidays of obligation. Hence, not even for the suppressed holidays is the faculty of bination available.¹ Again, the necessity spoken of does not refer to any necessity of the celebrating priest, but to necessity on the part of the faithful. Hence no

¹ Cf. Inst. Prop. Fide, 1870, n. 5.

faculty of bination warrants a priest to celebrate two Masses on the same day simply because he is poor and desires, by a second Mass, to acquire a honorarium. In this connexion there are some interesting decisions referring to Ireland where serious abuses were prevalent during the eighteenth century.¹ Nor would there be sufficient necessity if the second Mass were required merely for the convenience of a private family; or to give a prince, a bishop, or other person of special dignity an opportunity of hearing Mass on Sunday, a point which has been made clear by Benedict XIV.² There would not be sufficient necessity, moreover, if there were question of a second Mass simply for obsequies *præsente cadavere*, as the S. Congregation of the Council expressly declared.³ Again, whenever another priest can conveniently be found to say the second Mass, there is no justification for bination; and a bishop can, by way of exhortation and admonition, but not under penalties or censures,⁴ induce priests to celebrate the second Mass if they are his subjects and are not otherwise engaged.⁵ Finally, if we leave aside the doubtful case of a Parish Priest who has more than two parishes, the faculty does not extend beyond two Masses.⁶

2°. There is true necessity in three cases and probably also in a fourth which I shall afterwards mention. The three cases are the following according to the Constitution *Declarasti* of Benedict XIV: (a) when a parish priest has two parishes so far apart that the people of both cannot conveniently attend one church; (b) when a parish priest has one parish consisting of two districts so far apart that all the people cannot attend the same church; and (c) when there are only one parish and one church, but all the people cannot conveniently attend one Mass. In these three cases there is authority for bination by the common law if only one priest is available. It is necessary

¹ Cf. Instr. Prop. Fide, 1870, n. 8.

² *De Sacr. Missae*, l. iii., c.v., n. 3.

³ *Const. Quod Expensis*, 1748.

⁴ S. Cong. Con. 25 Feb., 1617.

⁵ Cf. *Many*, *De Missa*, p. 67.

⁶ Instr. Prop. Fide, n. 3.

to have episcopal recognition of the necessity, and also episcopal license or permission ; but, as Benedict XIV states in reference to a parish priest having two parishes, the difference between permission and recognition is only theoretical, since a bishop who recognizes the necessity is presumed to give the required permission. In urgent cases the presumed permission of the bishop suffices.

As to the number of people who must be without Mass on Sundays or Holidays of obligation, and their distance from the church, there are apparently divergent decisions of the Roman Congregations. I say 'apparently divergent' because if we knew all the circumstances of the cases it would most likely turn out that in principle there was no diversity between the different authentic declarations. In the Constitution *Apostolicum Ministerium* for England it is stated that the faculty for bination is not available : ' *Nisi alicui sacerdoti duas missas eadem die celebrandi potestas concedatur Ecclesiae mandato plures non satisfacerent.*' Though the ecclesiastical position of England excludes parishes in the strict sense, canonists like Cardinal Gennari¹ look on this declaration as an exposition of the Benedictine necessity. In 1688 the Holy Office declared in one case that fifteen or twenty people who would be deprived of Mass on Sunday would not be enough to warrant bination, and in another case of the same year that ten or fifteen slaves detained in the baths of Tripoli would suffice. In 1847, the Sacred Congregation of the Council decided that the Bishop of Langres could grant his priests permission to binate for the sake of twenty people living a Roman mile (three-quarters of an English mile) from the parochial church. According to Cardinal Gasparri² the Sacred Congregation of the Council did not refuse to allow bination in a Salamanca case which was decided in 1862, and in which there was question of some parishes containing five or ten people living about a Roman mile from the parochial church. These cases

¹ *Consultazioni*, vol. i., p. 508.

² *De Euch.*, vol. i., p. 277. The decision itself does not make this point clear.

supply a rule by which a bishop can form a prudent judgment about the degree of necessity which will justify bination, but the bishop is left a large amount of liberty in coming to a conclusion in particular cases.

I mentioned that there is a fourth probable case in which bination is lawful; it is when viaticum is required, and cannot be obtained unless a priest duplicates. If a priest had not broken his fast when celebrating the first Mass there would be little difficulty, but it can only rarely happen that the priest has not broken his fast, since if he gets word of the necessity before the consumption of the Host, he can retain a small portion of the Host; and if word reaches him after the consumption of the Host he will probably have also taken the ablutions. If, however, the priest has broken his fast already then there is the difficulty of celebrating unfasting. Still it is probable that in such a case the ecclesiastical precept in regard to the fast will yield to the greater obligation which binds a dying person to receive the Viaticum.

So far I have spoken about the common law of the Church. Both Cardinals Gennari¹ and Gasparri² hold that the cases of necessity so far explained are in conformity with general Canon Law and, consequently, that bishops so far require no special faculties from the Holy See. The view of these eminent authorities is safe in practice. In fact, Cardinal Gennari looks on this teaching as certain and concludes: 'Dopo tutto quello che abbiamo detto, nessun vescovo dovrà esitare a riconoscere in sè tal potestà.' This brings me to the second part of the question —to the special faculties which our bishops have received from the Holy See in the Formula VI.

II. In the Formula Sexta we find a section which deals with the power of bishops to binate, and to grant their priests permission to binate:—

15. Celebrandi Missam . . . bis in die si necessitas cogat . . . Caveat vero ne praedicta facultate seu dispensatione cele-

¹ *Consultazioni*, vol. i., p. 510.

² *De Euch.*, vol. i., p. 280, n. 391. Gasparri mentions the Tripoli case in connexion with the Formulae.

brandi bis in die aliter quam ex gravissimis causis et rarissime utatur, in quo graviter ipsius conscientia oneratur. Quod si hanc eadem facultatem alteri Sacerdoti juxta potestatem inferius apponendam communicare, aut causas ea utendi alicui qui a Sancta Sede hanc facultatem obtinuerit approbare visum fuerit, serio ipsius conscientia injungitur ut paucis dumtaxat, iisque maturioris prudentiae ac zeli et qui absolute necessarii sunt, nec pro quolibet loco, sed ubi gravis necessitas tulerit, et ad breve tempus eamdem communicet, aut respective causas approbat.¹

There is question here of a bishop who binates, of a bishop who communicates to his priests the same faculty to binate which he has received from the Holy See, and of a bishop who merely approves of the necessity which is required for the exercise of faculties of bination received by a priest directly from the Holy See. At first sight it would seem as if the authority here mentioned were far more limited than the authority which Canon Law communicates, but the strictness belongs to the words alone. So far as the meaning is concerned, there is some concession not contained in the ordinary law of the Church, else this faculty of the Formula VI would be quite useless, if not injurious, at least in countries where there are canonically erected parishes. In 1832 the Sacred Congregation of the Propaganda, in a reply sent to the Bishop of Nicopolis in Bulgaria, indicated that the clauses of the Formula were not to be taken in their strict sense: 'Intelligendas haud esse in extremo rigore, habito prae oculis principio Sedem Apostolicam dictam facultatem concedere in bonum spirituale fidelium, desiderio ut omnes praecep- tum ecclesiasticum adimplere facile possint.' Writing, in 1832, to a missionary of Ciudad-Real, the Propaganda stated: 'Indultum non coerceri ad populi indigentias diebus festivis, sed cum generalibus terminis continentur, comprehendere quoque alios casus de quibus agitur, quemadmodum esset necessitas administrandi infirmis viaticum in utraque paroecia, et in hujusmodi aliis casibus locum habere debere praescriptas cautelas.' Moreover, the Instruction of the Propaganda, issued in 1870, says that the

¹ *Maynooth Statutes, Appendix*, p. 147.

Formula extends to cases not contained under the common law: 'Articulum formularum, cum sit facultativus, praetendi ad alios quoque casus necessitatis in communi iure non consideratos.' It is quite clear, then, that the fifteenth section of the Formula Sexta is an extension of the powers of bination contained in the common law. But to what extent is there an addition to the authority conceded by Canon Law?

There is an extension to *cases* not contained in the common law, and Many¹ holds that in virtue of the Formula Sexta bishops can grant permission to binate on days other than Sundays or Holidays of obligation, if there is exceptional necessity. This would seem to conform to the reply, already quoted, of the Propaganda to a missionary of Ciudad-Real, and also to the Instruction of the Propaganda (1870).

There is also some extension in regard to the *degree of necessity* required for permission to binate on Sundays and Holidays of obligation. Cardinal Gennari,² following Lucidi, says that there is an extension to this extent that, by reason of the Formula, bishops can judge more securely and with a safer conscience that the necessity required by the Benedictine law is present. According to his view the Formula does not concede power of bination where the Benedictine necessity is clearly not present; it merely relieves bishops from anxiety and scruples in judging whether or not that necessity is present. Gasparri,³ however, and Many⁴ hold that the Formula grants authority in cases of less necessity than that required by the Constitution of Benedict XIV, so that, for instance, a bishop can grant power of bination for a smaller number of the faithful. Though, speculatively, the view of Cardinal Gennari seems the more probable, in practice the opinion of Gasparri and Many are tenable. Certainly the bishop has been left very large discretion in forming a judgment

¹ *De Missa*, p. 73.

² *Consultazioni*, vol. i., p. 511.

³ *De Euch.*, vol. i., p. 280, n. 392.

⁴ *De Missa*, p. 73.

on the matter, as appears from several authentic statements of the Holy See, of which I shall give one example. Leo XII, writing to the Bishop of St. Louis in 1828, gave this instruction :—

Omnem te anxietatem animi deponere debere, et quin commovearis verborum [Formulae] rigore, se [Sanctitatem Suam] conscientiae ac prudentiae tuae committere, ut judices, quibus in casibus ratione habita adjunctorum dioecesis tuae graves adesse causae censendae sint facultatem, de qua sermo est, sacerdotibus impertiendi. Ubi vero has graves causas secundum conscientiam prudentiamque tuam arbitratus fueris, Sanctitas Sua, posse te absque ulla dubitatione ea facultate uti, benigne declaravit.

It is clear, then, that a bishop is not bound to be over anxious about the degree of necessity demanded for an exercise of his authority in reference to bination, and also that, when a bishop does grant priests power to binate in particular cases, they need have no hesitation in acting on his permission.

III. This brings me to the cases proposed by my correspondent. If the people of whom he speaks could easily go to the parochial church for Mass, there would be no reason for granting permission to binate; but, as I have already indicated, it is left largely to the prudent judgment of the bishop to say whether, taking all the circumstances of the case into account, the people can easily go to the parochial church. If they could not easily go to the parochial church there would be serious difficulty about bination if the congregation consisted usually of only three or four persons; but in the cases suggested, the number of persons present varies according to the day, from three or four to twenty or more, and in these circumstances it would be only reasonable to take the average number of 10 or 15 attendants as the basis of calculation. Any other course of action would entail considerable trouble and anxiety, and, moreover, the good of the faithful naturally centres in the customary number of people present. Hence I would say that in the circumstances the bishop can grant permission to binate, and that, pro-

vided he has sanctioned the celebration of Mass in the cases contemplated, the priest concerned need have no difficulty in acting on his authority. Even according to the powers conceded by the common law the number indicated would not be clearly and certainly under the mark, and *a fortiori* the special faculties of the Formula Sexta would cover the case.¹

J. M. HARTY.

CANON LAW

ALIENATION OF PROPERTIES BY MEMBERS OF RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS

REV. DEAR SIR,—According to the present law of the Church would it be competent for a religious professed with simple vows to dispose by will or otherwise of properties, real or personal, by simply getting the permission of the Superior-General of the Institute if there be such a person, or, if there be no such a person, with the permission of the immediate local superior of the religious house?

A. B.

This case may be considered under a two-fold aspect. If it be question of the validity of an alienation of property, real or personal, made by religious professed with simple vows and without permission of the competent authority, there is no room for doubt that such a disposal of property acquired either before profession or after it is perfectly valid. Bouix, Wernz, and especially Suarez, who discusses this question at length, come to the same conclusion; although the last mentioned author inclines to hold the opinion that such an act of alienation if valid is devoid of stability, being at all times subject to rescission by authority of the

¹ Since this reply was printed, I learned from the *Analecta Ecclesiastica* just published that the Congregation of the Council has taken up for consideration the whole question of bination, so that new regulations may be expected soon to appear. When they appear I shall explain how far they differ from the law now in force.—J. M. H.

religious superiors.¹ Some other and not less competent canonists, while sharing Suarez's view as to the validity of the alienation in question, absolutely deny its rescindibility, for the simple reason that religious with simple vows never lose the ownership of their goods and the capacity of acquiring and possessing properties ; so that by disposing of their belongings they complete an act certainly valid by natural law, a valid act which is not rendered rescindable by any positive ecclesiastical legislation.

If religious of that sort and under those circumstances, they proceed to argue, forgetful of their duties fail to ask and obtain the license required for the disposal of their temporal goods, they undoubtedly sin against their vow of poverty and, therefore, against religion, which is the only impediment preventing them from disposing of their properties, but they do not, in the least, violate justice nor natural or ecclesiastical law on which the value and stability of such an act depend, and adduce, in corroboration of their doctrine, the example of an individual who binds himself by vow not to make any promise either to God or man without his confessor's leave and who, by disregarding such an obligation, completes a certainly illicit but a firmly valid act.²

To our mind, the distinction introduced by Lugo³ in this case must be adopted. The alienation of properties made by the religious in question without the due permission of the legitimate superior is valid and not rescindable in case that *ius in re* has already, by such an act, being transferred, for no religious superior can take away *iura tertii* permanently acquired through a valid act ; but he might, although indirectly, rescind obligations undertaken by his subjects, thus making void their promises of donations of temporal things, and consequently depriving of the *ius ad rem* those to whom promises of such a nature were made by the religious.

¹ Suarez, *De Relig.*, t. iv., tract 10, lib. ii. c. 10, n. 12 ; Bouix, *De Lt. Rel.*, t. ii., sect. v., c. 1, art. ix., s. 8, quest. 9 ; Wernz, iii., p. 703, n. 377 ; *Monit. Eccl.*, viii., part 1, p. 202.

² Cf. St. Liguori, iii., n. 210.

³ Cf. Lugo, *De Just. et Iur.* disp 3, n. 8^o seq.

If this question be viewed from a different standpoint and if it be asked whether and when the alienation of properties made under such circumstances would be not only valid, but also lawful? it is not easy to assign a general definite rule, and give a categorical answer. Lucidi¹ enumerates various cases in which the observance of the vow of poverty varies according to different constitutions. Several other authors give practical examples illustrating such a diversity of observance especially with regard to the disposal of properties. In some congregations, they tell us, it has been enjoined to its members to ask the superior's permission when making their will; while in some others such a formality has been completely dispensed with.²

True, that according to the common discipline of the Church the obligations of the vow of poverty, imposed on all religious congregations are almost identical, and in the case of alienation of properties the asking of the superior's consent is made obligatory, but it is equally true that such a discipline is not always uniform and that exceptions are frequent and numerous. So, in order to know the special requirements of the vow of poverty it is imperative, in all cases, to consult the particular constitutions of different religious congregations, and see whether a leave of the competent authority is demanded for the disposal of temporal goods made by the religious of those institutes with simple vows.

But if no provision to that effect is made in special constitutions, is it lawful for a religious with simple vows to give, sell, change, or dispose in any way and without the permission of the superior, of his own properties acquired either before or after profession? There are some authoritative Canonists who answer in the affirmative,

¹ Lucidi, *De Visit.*, ii., n. 319, sqq.

² The Congr. of BB. and RR. on the 2nd of March, 1884, replied to a particular religious Congregation thus: 'Pro condendo testamento sorores etiam professae non indigent facultate superiorissae Generalis'—Battandier, *Guid. Canon.* 2nd edit., p. 104; while in some other case the same Roman Congregation on the 15th June, 1860, had already decided 'Poterunt vero (professi votorum simplicium) de dominio per testamentum de licentia tamen superioris Generalis . . . libere disponere.'—Bizzarri, *Collect.*, p. 847.

maintaining that an alienation of property is not, strictly speaking, an act of administration and if the simple vow of poverty only forbids to administer temporal goods, there seems to be no reason why religious after simple profession should be prevented from freely disposing of their properties. Hence Lucidi concludes : 'Si nihil specialiter in ipsis Constitutionibus Instituti, de quo agatur, sancitum fuerit *et valide et licite*, qui simplici paupertatis voto tenetur disponere potest pro *lubitu suo* de bonis ad se spectantibus aut post vota simplicia emissa sibi delatis.'¹

This theory, however, does not find much patronage amongst modern canonists, who commonly hold the opposite view. It has yet to be proved, they tell us, that any disposal of property does not assume the nature of an act of administration, and even supposing that that be the case, it is now generally admitted that the immediate and direct effect produced by a simple profession of poverty, far from being a prohibition of administering temporal things, chiefly consists in the privation of freedom of alienating them ; so that, were it not for the positive legislation of the Church forbidding religious to interfere in any way with worldly affairs in order to make them quite free in attaining perfection, it would not be against their vows to take care of their possessions. Under the simple vow of poverty they only pledge themselves to abstain, without due licence, from disposing of their belongings either by use *animo dominii* or by alienation through will or deed.²

This doctrine is clearly pointed out in the definition of the vow of poverty assigned by Pius IX in the Const. *Quam Maxima*, of 13th November, 1847,³ a definition which is the exponent of the teaching and discipline of the Church

¹ Cf. Lucidi ii., c. v., s. 8, n. 317 ; D'Annibale, iii., 219.

² Battandier, l.c., 3rd edit. n. 174, writes : 'S'il n'y avait pas de prohibition de l'Eglise, le sujet pourrait garder l'administration de ses biens. Cette administration n'est pas incompatible avec le vœu simple de pauvreté . . . Ce qui lui est interdit en est la libre disposition ; or administrer n'est point disposer, ces deux mots expriment deux concepts bien différents et qui n'ont aucun point commun.'

³ Pius IX defines the simple vow of poverty thus : 'Votum paupertatis quod sorores emittunt in eo situm est ut *libere* quocunque de re disponendi iure privantur.'

on this point, and which has been since retained in all official documents issued by the Holy See, and notably in the decree of the Congregation of Bishops and Regulars of 1901, where the norms are laid down which regulate this matter of ecclesiastical discipline at the present time. Needless to add that up-to-date Canonists are at one in advocating this doctrine. Hence religious with simple profession cannot, without violating the vow of poverty, freely dispose of temporal goods. For that lawful disposal a permission of the competent authority is essential.

But it may be further inquired, who is that competent authority? Is he the superior of the religious institute or the Holy See? Until a few years since the only and constant discipline of the Church in this regard, expressed in several Papal decrees and responses of the Congregations, was to allow religious with simple vows to dispose of their properties only with the consent of the religious superior. In fact, the Congregation of Bishops and Regulars officially interrogated as to the principle adopted by that tribunal in connexion with the simple vow of poverty when approving of new religious congregations, on the 30th December, 1882, answered by repeating the formula, imposed first to Marists, the 15th June, 1860, and afterwards invariably inserted in all new constitutions of congregations approved by the Holy See. This formula states: 'Poterunt vero de dominio sive per testamentum, *de licentia tamen superioris vel superiorissae Generalis*, sive per actus inter vivos libere disponere.'¹

However, on the 28th of June, 1901, the Congregation of Bishops and Regulars issued the decree *Normae*, which is composed of a number of rules to be followed by the same Congregation in approving of new religious institutes and constitutions in the future. There, under n. 121, it is stated that members of congregations, if desirous to dispose by deed of their properties, acquired either before or after profession, must obtain permission *from the Holy See*. The same principle is laid down in the following number,

¹ *Collect. S. Congr. Prop. Fid.* ii., p. 169.

with regard to making or changing a will ; allowing, however, to ask, in case of urgency, only the leave either of the ordinary or of the regular Superior-General, and even of the local religious superior, if necessary ; a permission which will be likewise sufficient in making and completing acts and documents prescribed by the law of the land.¹

It is in that decree, therefore, that we find the first mention of the necessity of a Papal license for the alienation of properties belonging to religious with simple vows ; but it must be borne in mind that the decree *Normae* has not, properly speaking, the nature of a law, and a general law of the Church ; it is only a code of practical rules drawn up as a guide for the Congregation itself when approving of new religious families, and it was made public simply to let local superiors know what are the demands of the Holy See about religious communities to be approved in the future, and how new constitutions must be formulated, in order to receive the approval of the Apostolic See. At any rate, the prescriptions of the *Normae*, and notably that which makes the Papal permission necessary for the alienation under consideration, cannot affect mere *diocesan congregations* ; nor do they regard congregations approved by Roman authorities *before the year 1901* ; for no law or injunction of any kind has a retroactive effect unless this effect be specially mentioned.

Again, even in recently approved congregations, the asking of the Papal permission, in order to be obligatory, must be clearly stated in the constitutions of each particular congregation, and, moreover, the disposal of property which requires such a permission must be *total* and *gratuitous* ; so that if it be a partial one or made by onerous contract the leave of the religious superior will amply suffice for the lawfulness of the transaction.²

¹ 'Sorores professae tum ad faciendum tum ad mutandum testamentum indigent venia Apostolicae Sedis ; attamen, in casibus vere urgentibus, sufficiat licentia vel Ordinarii, vel Moderatricis generalis, vel etiam si aliter fieri nequit Superioris localis.—Professis autem vetitum non est ea proprietatis acta peragere de licentia Superioris quae a legibus praescribuntur.'—*Normae*, nn. 122, 123.

² Cf. Bastien, l. c., p. 137 ; Vermeersch, l. c., pp. 124, 125, 145 ; Act. Conc. Plen. Amer. Lat. n. 322, sqq.

CASE OF FOUNDATION MASSES

REV. DEAR SIR.—I was recently appointed Parish Priest of this parish, and amongst the other duties incumbent on the Parish Priest I find the obligation of saying some foundation Masses for which no funds exist at present and no document can be traced to prove their foundation. The only well known fact is that all Parish Priests for more than a century have always said them. Can it be concluded, in such a case, that the doubtful existence of the foundation of the Masses does not impose a certain obligation of discharging them?

P.P.

That conclusion, to our mind, cannot be come to under the circumstances, for the reason that the presumption of the law is in favour of the real and legitimate existence of the foundation of those Masses. The very fact that the Masses have been faithfully said, and for ever so long, notwithstanding the absence of documents and funds to prove positively the existence of the obligation of celebrating them, makes us presume that the foundation was really established and never abolished, and that the funds originally assigned for the foundation were afterwards embodied in some other source of parochial revenue.

For the rest, it is a certain canonical doctrine that a centenary observance of an obligation not only supplies a strong presumption in favour of the existence of the legitimate title, but it is in itself *melior titulus de mundo* as Canonists use to put it; thus making the obligation certain in practice.

If our correspondent, however, will in process of time be able to prove by positive arguments that no funds were ever supplied for the foundation and that the celebration of those Masses or its continuance up to the present is due to misunderstanding or mistake, then he will be at liberty to discontinue the fulfilment of the obligation of discharging them. In that case, *praesumptio cedit veritati*.

**DIOCESAN AUTHORITIES AND REGULARS COLLECTING
MONEY IN THE DIOCESE**

REV. DEAR SIR,—If members of the mendicant or other religious Orders are sent about by their Superiors to collect money, are they bound to get the permission of the diocesan authorities, in whose dioceses they want to make collections? I thank you in advance for a brief reply.

SUPERIOR.

The Council of Trent¹ abolished the use and name of those formerly styled *Quaestores eleemosynarum*, who seems to have had for their exclusive occupation in life to go round from diocese to diocese to preach, and, for scanty remuneration, to raise funds on behalf of pious or religious institutions; and who, occasionally, when falling short of legitimate persuasive arguments to make the audience accede to their request and in order to stimulate feelings of religion and generosity, used to resort to unlawful means, often relating fictitious miraculous events or liberally dispensing spurious indulgences. In the meantime, the same Council decreed that the right of collecting and of granting permission to collect money in a diocese is reserved to the diocesan superiors.

Pius V, however, declared that the Tridentine law, as to the asking for the bishop's permission in making collections, does not affect and cannot, therefore, be extended to mendicant Orders. Similar declarations were subsequently made by Urban VIII, Clement XI, and especially by the Congregations of Bishops and Regulars and of the Council. Most of these responses of the Roman Congregations are quoted in full by Ferraris in his *Bibliotheca*.²

From the above documents the following conclusions may be drawn:—

(i) Mendicant regulars as well as members of religious congregations enjoying the Apostolic privilege of collecting are not bound to ask the permission of the diocesan authority in order to exercise their privilege within the limits of the

¹ Sess. XXI. c. 9, De Ref.

² Ferraris, v. 'eleemosyna,' n. 32, sqq.; Pius V., Const. *Etsi Mendicantium*; Urban VIII, Const. *Cum sicut*; Clement XI, Const. *Exponi nobis*.

diocese where their houses are established ; for they have already obtained such license not merely from the Holy See, but also from the diocesan superior when allowing them to construct or open their religious houses in the diocese. They are only obliged, if asked, to show to the diocesan Ordinary the document of authorization of their religious superiors in case that collections are going to be made beyond the district where their monasteries are built, and no diocesan or local authority has the power of impeding regulars so privileged from using their special favour. If, however, circumstances arise which make the prohibition of collecting absolutely imperative, diocesan superiors may have recourse to the Holy See which will send opportune instructions, and take the measures demanded by the case.¹

Formerly any superior who endeavoured to persuade his subjects to abstain from contributing to the collections made by regulars incurred an excommunication ; this penalty, however, is not retained in the Bull *Apostolicae Sedis*, and it is not in force in the present discipline of the Church.

(2) Mendicant and other religious Orders with the privilege of collecting cannot use it in dioceses where they possess no house of their Order, a permission of the diocesan Ordinary being, in that case, absolutely necessary if they as well as any other religious community enjoying no privilege of that sort, wish to collect for any purpose whatever in the diocese. Religious Orders, however, can at any time and without any permission receive money spontaneously offered to them, or even solicited by letter.²

(3) Regulars who, by Papal privilege are allowed to collect, may do so only *per se* and *pro se*.³ Hence it is not within their powers to make collections through members of different Orders, or through lay people without the consent of the diocesan Ordinary. Nor can they avail themselves

¹ S. C. EE. RR., 6 Oct., 1597—8 Jul. 1717 ; Clem. XI, l.c. ; Sixtus IV, Const. *Sacri*.

² S. C. EE. RR., 11 Mar., 1892—27 Mar., 1896 ; Piat, ii., p. 36, n. 8.

³ 'Posse Regulares Mendicantes quaestuare tantum per seipsos et ad propriam utilitatem.'—S.C.C., 17 Jan., 1692.

of the concession which they have been favoured with by the Holy See in order to raise funds for any other religious purpose, or on behalf of a confraternity and like institutions established in their churches.¹

(4) As to nuns, it is out of question that, if they are professed with solemn vows and bound to observe the law of Papal enclosure, they cannot, without dispensation of the Holy See, leave their convents for the purpose of making collections. This necessity, however, of collecting is not likely to arise, as they are always supposed to have means for their maintenance, derived from the dowry they bring with them when joining the Order. But if they want to make collections for any other pious purpose and through the instrumentality of lay people, they must obtain the permission of the diocesan Ordinary, who may grant or refuse it or add to the concession any such condition as it may be deemed expedient or necessary, according to different circumstances.

To nuns belonging to Congregations with simple vows and enjoying no special Papal privilege in this direction, instructions are given by the Congregation of Bishops and Regulars in the decree *Singulare quidem* of 1896, where rules are laid down to regulate this point of ecclesiastical discipline about collections; rules afterwards extended to congregations of men by the *Normae* of 1901. Amongst the warnings and practical directions given to collecting nuns in the said decree, in order to avoid occasions of sin and safeguard the dignity of their religious state, an injunction is made regarding the necessity of the Ordinary's permission; stating that, whenever members of religious congregations want to collect they must, before doing so, ask and obtain the permission both of their own bishop and of all those bishops in whose dioceses collections are going to be made. Santi-Leitner adds that, in addition to the bishops' leave, a Papal permission is of necessity for those Orders or congregations whose constitutions have

¹ Ferraris, l.c., n. 39, writes: 'Sic sine licentia in scriptis ordinarii loci nulli quantumvis privilegiati possunt eleemosynas quaerere pro aliquo opere pio.'

been approved of by the Holy See. He writes: 'Quando autem Religiosi sive Ordinum sive Congregationum elemosynas quaeritare intendunt, qui hoc iure nec *vi* propriae Constitutionis neque *vi* Apostolicae concessionis gaudent, veniam Apostolicae Sedis impetrare debent quoties eorum Constitutiones sunt approbatae ab eadem S. Sede.'¹

SUICIDE AND ECCLESIASTICAL BURIAL

REV. DEAR SIR.—Some time ago a man in this town committed suicide. It did not clearly appear whether, at that time, he was *compos sui*, or what was the motive that led him to the perpetration of that crime. Was he to be deprived of ecclesiastical burial according to the law of the Church?

A. M.

The Roman Ritual, *De Exequiis*, declares that the penalty of privation of ecclesiastical burial, threatened by the Church against perpetrators of suicide, is to be incurred only by those who voluntarily kill themselves *ob desperationem vel iracundiam*. Moreover, this deliberate commission of such a crime and for those motives, according to the ecclesiastical jurisprudence, must be evidently proved before the application of the penalty, because no certain punishment can be inflicted for an uncertain crime. In default, then, of proofs or of their certainty, and even in case of doubt as to the deliberation of the act and the nature of the motives for committing suicide, the decision must always be in favour of the deceased, who is presumed to have taken his life in a moment of mental aberration, and while irresponsible for his acts. It is a well known rule of law that *Nemo praesumitur malus nisi probetur*, and therefore he could not, under the circumstances, be punished and deprived of ecclesiastical burial.

Baruffaldo, the learned commentator on the Roman Ritual, writes: 'In quocunque vero casu non omnino claro semper bene fit praesumendo in favorem defuncti circa sepulturam, quum sepulturae privatio sit poena gravis fidelibus imposta ob mala voluntarie perpetrata.'

S. LUZIO.

¹ Vol. iii., tit. 36, p. 361, n. 15.

LITURGY

**VESTMENTS TO BE WORN IN BLESSING BEADS, ETC.;
NATURE OF PRESENCE REQUIRED IN ARTICLES TO BE
BLESSED; TABERNACLE VEIL, NECESSITY AND COLOUR
OF; CIBORIUM COVER; CHANTS AND PRAYERS AT BENE-
DICTION OF THE BLESSED SACRAMENT**

REV. DEAR SIR,—Might I trouble you to answer, at your convenience, the following :—

1. What is the nature of the obligation about wearing the stole in giving blessings, v.g., to medals, crucifixes, etc. ?
2. In blessing candles is it sufficient to sprinkle holy water on the packages in which the candles are wrapped, or should they be exposed to view ?
3. What is the regulation regarding the colour of the Tabernacle veil ? Is it always necessary to have such a curtain in front of the door of the Tabernacle ?
4. Should the cover or veil of the Ciborium be of a white colour both inside and outside, or may the lining be of another colour ?
5. During Exposition of the Blessed Sacrament, lasting an hour, is it necessary to begin with the *O Salutaris*, or *Tantum Ergo*, or may, e.g. Devotions to the Sacred Heart (in English) be commenced immediately after the Blessed Sacrament has been incensed ?

Supposing a sermon is to be preached must the cope be worn or need it be worn at all, until the *Tantum Ergo* is sung, and the proper rite of Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament has commenced ?

May the Litany of the Blessed Virgin be omitted at one's own convenience ?

6. Would it be contrary to the Rubrics to have a hymn in English sung immediately before the priest goes up to give the Blessing with the Monstrance ? (There is a church near Rome where a hymn is sung in Italian by the children at that time.)

JUVENIS.

1. With regard to the ordinary blessings of the Roman *Ritual*, for which no special vestments are therein prescribed, at least a surplice and stole should be worn by the officiating priest. This is in accordance with the directions of the *Ritual* itself. ' In omni Benedictione extra Missam, Sacerdos saltem superpellicio et stola pro

ratione temporis utatur.¹ As a rule, then, these two vestments may not be dispensed with apart from some reasonable cause. There are, however, cases in which many blessings can be given in virtue of a special privilege without the employment of the usual *formulae*. For instance priests sometimes are privileged to indulge rosaries, crosses, and medals, by simply making the sign of the cross over them. In these circumstances there is no need to use any vestment, for the Holy See in dispensing with the ordinary *formulae* may well be considered to dispense also in the use of any vestment. But if a priest has to use the *Ritual* in giving a blessing he should wear a surplice and stole if he can conveniently do so. As to colour of the stole, if not prescribed it should be such as, having regard to the analogy of the general laws of Liturgical colours, is best suited to the particular object that is being blessed, or if this rule is not found helpful, then the colour peculiar to the Season may fittingly be employed. For those blessings that are connected with the Mass it is unnecessary to say that the vestments worn at this sacred function are generally employed, excepting the maniple, and also the chasuble whose place is often taken by the cope. Moreover, very precise instructions are given in the Missal as to the particular vestments to be worn on these various occasions

2. That an article or object may receive a valid blessing all that is required is that it should be *morally* present to the minister who pronounces the benediction. What is meant by moral presence? The question can be answered only by appealing to the prudent judgment and estimation of men. Thus the things held up in their hands by people scattered throughout a large church would be regarded as morally present to the officiating priest standing on the altar. On the other hand an object concealed in the pocket of a person standing beside the priest would not be regarded as sufficiently present to receive a blessing. It must be brought under the notice of the officiant in some such

¹ Tit. viii, c. i, n. 2.

way that he can ordinarily apprehend its presence by some one of his senses. In the circumstances described in this query the candles are morally present, and therefore can easily be validly blessed by the priest, but since a more efficient presence can easily be secured by removing the wrapper and thus exposing the candles (which are to be sprinkled with holy water,) this ought to be done for it is only when physical presence cannot be conveniently procured that the other is permissible.

3. The Roman *Ritual* is quite clear and explicit in directing that the Tabernacle should be covered with a canopy or veil. Here are the words: 'Hoc autem tabernaculum conopeo decenter opertum,' etc.¹ For some reason or other this manifest ordinance has not always been duly complied with, and various attempts have been made to set up a prescription against it.

To all these attempts, however, the Sacred Congregation of Rites has invariably and uniformly opposed the weight of its authority, and so quite a number of decisions have been published calling attention to the law of the *Ritual* and insisting on its observance.² The last decree on the subject was issued in July, 1904, when the Congregation declared that the abuse of not using a veil for the Tabernacle in which the Blessed Sacrament was reserved was to be eliminated, and that such a custom was not to be tolerated. Not even when the Tabernacle is richly decorated exteriorly is the veil to be dispensed with.³ What, then, is to be said of the prevailing practice? Van Der Stappen says that in his Archdiocese (Malines) the veil is not generally employed, but that the omission may probably be excused on the ground that owing to the construction of the Tabernacles it is impossible to cover them without covering the entire altar. He seems to have before his mind the legitimate covering or *canopy*, which is contemplated by the *Ritual* and the Decrees of the Congregation of Rites, but the use of a veil or screen before the door of

¹ Tit. iv, c. i, n. 6.

² Cf. Decr. n.n. 3035, 3150, etc.

³ Aug., 1880.

the Tabernacle would appear to be recognized as ample for the liturgical requirements.¹ The colour of the canopy should be either *white*—which can be always used—or it may correspond with the colour of the office of the day or Feast. The latter is the more general practice, and especially in Rome, but both methods are approved and sanctioned.² Black is never used, its place being taken by violet on the occasion of Offices for the Dead.

As a detail of archæological interest it may be mentioned that the present Tabernacle veil is a relic of the curtains which in some of the ancient basilicas were suspended from the *ciborium* and which were used both for the purpose of preserving the altar from dust, and also for shutting it out from the view of the people during the solemn parts of the celebration of the sacred mysteries as is done at present in churches of Oriental rite.³ The Tabernacle is of comparatively modern introduction. Its substitute in ancient churches was a dome-shaped erection over the altar called a *ciborium*,⁴ which is itself still represented in certain styles of ecclesiastical architecture by what is called a Baldachino.

Under this structure and suspended from its roof was the receptacle for reserving the Blessed Sacrament called according to shape, appearance and design, *columba*, *turris capsæ*, *pyxæ*, etc.⁵ This was an additional reason why the *ciborium* should be securely and ornamentally covered. There was a further one. It is symbolical. According to Durandus,⁶ the veil of the Tabernacle is typified by that which Moses wore on coming down from the mountain to hide from the Jewish people, the resplendent proofs and tokens of his close communication and intimate intercourse with the Divine Majesty.

4. The veil of the Sacred Vessel for holding consecrated

¹ Cf. *Ephem. Liturg.*, 1904, p. 421.

² *Decr. S.R.C.*, n. 3035.

³ Bourassee, *Dict. D'Arch.*, cf. Antel, *Rideaux*; Duschene, *Origins of Christian Worship*, p. 85.

⁴ Mallet, *L'Art Chret.*, p. 175.

⁵ Reusens, *Elem. D'Arch. Chret.*, ii., p. 328.

⁶ *Rationale Off. Dir.*

particles and now called *ciborium* should be white, that is, if not made of cloth of gold or silver it should be of white silk more or less elaborately embroidered. As regards the colour of the lining there is no rule laid down just as there is nothing prescribed for vestments as regards this detail, but analogy would seem to suggest white as the most appropriate colour, or at least something of a yellowish colour which is not so easily soiled as pure white. In Rome the practice is to have, as far as possible, a lining of the same colour as the vestment, except that yellow is often used instead of white.

5. There is no rule about the order in which the Prayers, Hymns, and other Chants at Benediction are to be *begun*, but the *Tantum Ergo* with its versicle, response, and prayer should be sung immediately before giving the blessing with the monstrance. It is usual to sing the *O Salutaris* while the Blessed Sacrament is being exposed, and it may therefore be begun before the incensation. The other hymn mentioned should not be commenced before the Blessed Sacrament is completely exposed and consequently incensed for the two opening lines of the first strophe assume that It is ready to receive adoration. This does not apply to other hymns, or prayers.

When a priest gives Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament alone, that is, unassisted either by another priest or by sacred ministers, there is no strict obligation to wear the cope. Some authors¹ prescribe it, some do not,² while others recommend it as more becoming.³ Diocesan regulation or custom should set the normal to be followed in this case and, therefore, if it is usual to dispense with the cope during the recitation of the prayers and up to the actual blessing, this method may be adopted. It seems strange to have a sermon during the actual Exposition of the Blessed Sacrament on ordinary occasions such as the weekly Sunday Devotions, for in connexion with the Ex-

¹ Van Der Stappen, *De Adm. Sacr.*, 181.

² Appeltern, *Man. Lit.*, p. 369.

³ De Herdt, *Lit. Prax.*, ii. n. 26.

position of the Forty Hours', which is the exemplar of all others, it is forbidden to have a sermon unless the permission of the Ordinary is expressly obtained, and then the Monstrance should be covered with a veil during the sermon and the discourse itself should turn on some phase of the subject of Devotion to the Blessed Sacrament.¹ This regulation has undergone some slight modification from two comparatively recent Decrees of the Congregation of Rites, one of which (December 14, 1883) permits the delivery of a very short exhortation (*Fervorino*) immediately before the celebrant gives the blessing with the Most Holy Sacrament, and the other (May 10, 1890) tolerates the custom of having a sermon during the Mass of Exposition. Presumably, then, there is at least a recognized custom for the practice referred to in the query under consideration and if the officiant at Benediction has to give a sermon he should not wear the cope during its delivery.

The Litany of the Blessed Virgin is not of obligation unless it happens to be of the number of those chants or prayers that may be prescribed for Benediction by Diocesan regulation, and, apart from this assumption, it may be omitted at the convenience or wish of those in charge of the Devotions.

5. It is certainly contrary to several decisions of the Congregation of Rites to interject any hymn between the *Tantum Ergo* and the actual blessing with the Monstrance. This hymn should be the last.²

P. MORRISROE.

¹ Gardellini, *Com. in Inst. Clem.*, § xxxii.

² Cf. Decr. S.R.C., n.n. 665, 2725, 3058, 3513.

DOCUMENTS

LETTER OF HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS X TO THE ABBOT-
GENERAL OF THE CISTERCIANS

EPISTOLA

QUA NONNULLAS PONTIFEX INCOLCAT PRAESCRITIONES IN
UTILITATEM TOTIUS ORDINIS CISTERCIENSIVM REFORMATORVM
VENERABILI FRATRI AUGUSTINO EPISCOPO TIT. CONSTANTIENSIVI
ORDINIS CISTERCIENSIVM REFORMATORVM ABBATI GENERALI

PIUS PP. X.

Venerabilis Frater, Salutem et Apostolicam Benedictionem.

Inter plura et egregia, quae fel. rec. Leo PP. XIII Decessor Noster in bonum rei christiana perfecit, illud profecto est censendum, quod tres Congregationes Cisterciensium Trappistarum in Ordinem Cisterciensium Reformatorum seu Strictioris Observantiae sub unius Superioris Generalis regimine coëgit. Nos autem magno animi solatio affecti sumus, cum accepimus illam unitatem aequalitatemque disciplinae iam nunc esse omnino perfectam, eamque fructus, Ecclesiae et christiano populo salutares, efferre. Verum, ut bene coepta promoveantur in melius, opportunum Nobis visum est nonnulla praescriptionum inculcare capita his litteris; unde plane intelligere poteritis, quanta vos benevolentia prosequamur, quantoque studio utilitati Ordinis vestri consultum esse velimus.

I. Primum, dilecti filii, quae idem Decessor Noster, praesertim in litteris suis Apostolicis, quarum initium est 'Non mediocri,' anno MDCCCCII die xxx Iulii editis, in gratiam vestri Ordinis decrevit et statuit, ea omnia et singula, auctoritate Nostra Apostolica, approbamus et confirmamus.

II. Deinde vos omnes, Superiores ac subditos, vehementer admonitos volumus ut semper sanctam disciplinam custodientes, ex proprio Ordinis vestri instituto sine intermissione precationi et poenitentiae pro animarum salute incumbatis. Etenim si unquam alias, sane in hac rerum acerbitate, qua Ecclesia Dei premitur, huiusmodi religiosorum hominum officium necessarium est.

III. Praesertim vero vos, dilecti filii, qui eiusdem Ordinis domorum Moderatores estis, magnopere in Domino hortamur,

rogamus, obsecramus, ut nihil faciatis reliqui, quod ad pristinam Ordinis dignitatem revocandam pertineat. Itaque pro munere, quod geritis, studete, ut propriae Ordinis leges ubique inviolate serventur ; nominatimque haec attendite :

1. Norunt omnes, nihil ad relaxandam regularem disciplinam plus valere, quam nimiam in recipiendis alumnis facilitatem. Quare Superiores, ad quos id spectabit, sedulo current, ut in posterum nullus admittatur in Ordinem, quin eius utilitati et decori inservire posse aut velle videatur.

2. Summae etiam curae vobis esto ut secundum Ordinis vestri leges recta studiorum ratio vigeat, et ne quis ad maiores Ordines promoveatur, quin studio sacrae theologiae diligenter, ut oportet, operam dederit.

3. Regularis observantia non raro ob id collabi solet, quod Ecclesiae leges atque ipsa religiosorum Ordinum statuta super bonorum administratione non, uti par est, sancte custodiuntur. Quapropter, ad maxima deprecanda mala, omnibus et singulis Superioribus edicimus, ut, quoties agatur de bonis emendis, alienandis, permutandis, de mutuo contrahendo quod decem millia libellarum attingat, de aedificio extruendo, demoliendo, restaurando, aut de alia impensa facienda, extraordinaria et notabili, quae pertineat scilicet ad summam pecuniae dictam, ne quid tale faciant, nisi et habita. Capituli Generalis aut Abbatis Generalis venia, et ea fideliter servando, quae Constitutionibus et Decretis Apostolicae Sedis praescripta sunt.

4. Quoniam praesidium valde efficax ad disciplinam regularem conservandam aut instaurandam inest in Visitatione canonica, quae quotannis in singulis Ordinis domibus est peragenda, ideo Visitatores hortamur in Domino regamusque, ut gravissimum officium suum diligentissime impleant, et de monasteriorum statu personali, disciplinari, materiali et oeconomico Abbatem Generalem certiorem faciant ; Superiores autem domorum moneamus, ut Visitatori accuratissimam relationem de statu oeconomico sui quisque monasterii exhibeat.

5. Negotia sive totius Ordinis, sive singulorum vel monasteriorum vel monachorum, quae in Romana Curia expedienda sunt, Procurator Generalis, qui ex principiis iuris communis est gestor negotiorum Ordinis apud Apostolicam Sedem, ipse de mandato Abbatis Generalis solus omnia curet expedienda, deque iis : iniussu suo, cum Cardinalibus aut cum quibusvis Romanae Curiae Officialibus tractare quidquam nemo audeat.

Has leges potissimum sanctas esse vobis volumus : eis autem vos non solum pro vestro erga Vicarium Iesu Christi obsequio, sed etiam pro studio quo Institutum vestrum colitis, fore ut religiose semper obtemperetis, certo scimus.

Auspicem divinorum munerum et paternae benevolentiae
Nostrae testem, tibi, Venerabilis Frater, et Ordini tuo universo
Apostolicam Benedictionem peramanter in Domino impertious.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum, die xxxi Maii MDCCCCV,
Pontificatus Nostri anno secundo.

PIUS PP. X.

LETTER OF HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS X TO THE KING OF SWEDEN AND NORWAY ON THE OCCASION OF THE MARRIAGE OF HIS NEPHEW TO PRINCESS MARGARET OF CONNAUGHT

EPISTOLA

PII PP. X OSCAR II SUEVIAE ET NORVEGIAE REGI OCCASIONE
NUPTIARUM INTER NEPOTEM EIUS GUSTAVUM ADOLPHUM
DUCEM DE SCANIA ET MARGARITAM DE CONNAUGHT.

AUGUSTISSIMO SERENISSIMOQUE PRINCIPI OSCAR II. SUECIAE
ET NORVEGIAE REGI.—STOCKHOLMIAM.

PIUS PP. X.

Augustissime et Serenissime Rex, Salutem.

Quae bona, fausta ac felix procul dubio futura est res, affertur illud Nobis Regalem Celsitudinem Suam Gustavum Adolphum, ducem de Scania, Maiestatis Tuae e Celsissimo filio Principe haerede Regni nepotem, initurum proxime nuptias cum Regali Celsitudine Sua Margarita de Connaught. Communem duabus Augustis simis Domibus eventum, quemadmodum est Tibi ac Familiae Regali Tuae vehementissime carum, ita Nobis iucunde contingit. Quocirca Maiestati Tuae pleno ex animo gratulamur, id simul adprecantes, ut latos Tibi pro felicitate regni labores laetabili fortunae cursu remuneret Deus. Vota vero atque optata nuncupare pro Celsissimis Sponsis pergratum est; qui, si, Deo bene propitio, utantur et vita et sobole felici, id non sine catholici utilitate populi esse posse intelligimus. Omnipotens interea Numen exoramus, velit uti Tibi peroptabilia omnia largiri, Tuamque Maiestatem atque Augustam Familiam omnem et novos maxime Sponsos perfectiore semper Nobiscum caritate coniungere.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum, die xix Iunii a. MDCCCCV,
Pontificatus Nostri secundo.

PIUS PP. X.

NOTICES OF BOOKS

ASTRONOMY FOR 'THE MAN IN THE STREET.' By the Rev. E. S. Selley, O.E.S.A. (Public Lecturer in Astronomy). on Our Solar and Planetary System. Pulchrior ex Arduis. Dublin: Sealy, Bryers, and Walker. 1907.

THIS book is principally a collection of lectures delivered by the author to popular audiences, and, as the title suggests, is intended to give some clear notions on the beautiful science of Astronomy to those who cannot afford to go through a deep astronomical course. The author has succeeded admirably in making his subject interesting and easily intelligible. In popular language, enlivened here and there by jokes of a slightly broad kind, he manages to explain difficult notions and to convey a vast amount of useful knowledge.

His skill shows itself at once in the first lecture, in which he essays to give some fundamental ideas about 'Celestial Motion.' Here, however, he makes a curious slip in trying to bring home the distinction between Mass and Weight. He says (page 18): 'If you took one of our pound weights to a baker on the moon, and asked him for that weight of bread, even though you saw the scale turn, if you brought the bread you got to the earth, and then weighed it again, you would find you had got only about three ounces of bread instead of sixteen ounces.' It is quite evident, of course, that the amount of bread that would balance a pound weight on the moon, would balance that pound weight on the earth. The author apparently overlooked for the moment the fact that the bread would gain as much by being brought from the moon to the earth, as the pound weight would lose by being brought from the earth to the moon. This, however, is only a momentary inadvertence. On the whole, his explanations are quite correct and clear.

The next two chapters deal with the sun, three chapters with the earth, two with the moon, and one with eclipses. The ninth chapter is devoted to that fascinating, if speculative, question of the habitability of planets besides the earth, to which a return is made in the chapter on Mars. Eight chapters concern themselves with the planets and planetoids, and one with 'Our Isolation in Space,' a subject that may be familiar to readers of the I. E. RECORD. A very interesting and instructive chapter on Mean and Solar Time, the substance of which also appeared

in the I. E. RECORD, concludes the body of the book, while some appendices supply additional information on a few of the topics discussed. A full index adds to the usefulness of the book. Paper and print are excellent, and the book is illustrated by a frontispiece and a large number of diagrams. We can heartily recommend the book to all for whom it is written. X.

SHORT BIBLE HISTORY FOR SCHOOLS. The Life of our Lord; Part I., Part II.; each Part 3d. net. By the Rev. Martin Healy, C.C., with a Preface by the Most Rev. John Healy, D.D., Archbishop of Tuam.

The generous encomium pronounced in these little volumes by His Grace the Archbishop of Tuam is not in the least exaggerated. 'The language,' writes the Archbishop, 'is simple, the style clear and the narrative easy and attractive.' Father Healy's success shows that a master of the Irish language may be also an accomplished English writer. It would be very foolish indeed to attempt an improvement on the style of the sacred text; even the poet must fail in such a task. But while Father Healy has avoided this mistake he has accomplished what is indeed a very difficult undertaking, *viz.*, to unfold the Gospel story, partly in the words of the inspired writers, and partly in his own, and in such a way that we have a simple, consistent, orderly and fascinating narrative. The work is admirably suited to the capacity of children and of country people, and I am not surprised to learn that several Bishops have sanctioned its use as a class-book in the schools of their diocese. The chapters are all very short, and almost all of them illustrated. Perhaps the collection of photos of great pictures with which the pages of the two Parts are interspersed is the most notable feature of the work. Fra Angelico, Murillo, Raphael, Durer, Aubert, Domenichino, Rubens and some other great names are reproduced here to delight and instruct and it may be sometimes to amuse the youthful reader. Some of the photographs are little master-pieces in their own line, for example, those of Murillo's 'Immaculate Conception,' of Fra Angelico's 'Virgin' and Lady Butler's 'First Easter Morning.' It is a pity Millet's 'Angelus' did not come out better. In conclusion I should wish not to be understood as saying that the book is suited only for children. Simplicity has a charm for all, and I have no doubt that matured readers, and even those who are learned in the sacred sciences cannot resist being carried on from chapter to chapter and picture to picture in Father Martin Healy's dainty little book. T. P. G.

Cnó Coilleáu Chraobhaíge. THE IRISH OF THE PEOPLE.
By Rev. M. Sheehan, M.A., D.PH. Dublin: M. H. Gill and Son. Price 1s.

THIS is a book full of living native Irish as spoken in Co. Waterford, and recorded faithfully by the Rev. Dr. Sheehan. In his 'Sean-Čaint na nDéiré,' published last year, the editor described accurately 'almost all the peculiarities of grammar and pronunciation which are present in the speech of the authors of Cnó Coilleáu Chraobhaíge.' In his more recent work, the editor returns 'to the literary standard of grammar and spelling,' except in the case of 'the indivisible phrase.' Judgment and skill are displayed throughout. Every educated Irishman should read the book. With reference to *pian-ċorcaírt* (page 101), perhaps the first element is *pian*, a warrior, soldier. See Windisch's *Wörterbuch*. On every page there is something which will add to one's store of knowledge. The following points should be noted: 'So mbao ṣeac̄t mbneaḡtaēt beiró tú' (p. 67). 'A Chraobh Ni Ónúibne' (66). 'Líb' in the expression, 'plán agur beannaéac̄t líb' (55). 'Iar n-imcheac̄t vó' (56). 'Faḡ mala óuinn' (57). 'So ḃpáit,' on p. 78, last line.

The prayers at the end of the book are particularly beautiful and alone by themselves constitute a quite sufficient reason for the serious study and constant practice of the Irish language by all who are interested in the welfare of Irish souls.

ANECDOTA FROM IRISH MANUSCRIPTS. Edited by O. J. Bergin, R. I. Best, Kuno Meyer, J. G. O'Keeffe. Vol. I. Halle A.S.: Max Niemeyer. Dublin: Hodges, Figgis & Co., Ltd.

THIS contains 'Scéla Cano meic Gartnáin'; 'Tucail indarba na nDéssi'; 'The Colloquy between Fintan and the Hawk of Achill'; 'Imram Curaig Máiledúin,' and some other excerpts from Irish MSS. not hitherto published. Get the book and study it. There is scarcely a study better adapted for the development of Irish intelligence than the study of Old and Middle Irish. There is nothing in Greek as difficult as the Old Irish verb. Many labourers are needed in the field of early Irish. Critics of the modern language should hold their peace till they have mastered those earlier forms of which Modern Irish is the development. From the 'Colloquy between Fintan and the Hawk of Achill,' as well as from 'Tucail indarba na nDéssi,' the future historian of our country may glean some useful knowledge. The former should be read in conjunction with the myth of 'Tuan Mac Cairill' in *Lebar na hUidhre*.

Irish studies are inspired largely from the great German Universities. Germany of the twentieth century is reversing the condition of things which existed from the seventh to the eleventh century when Germany drew her enlightenment from hard-working educated Irishmen. It is to be hoped that the publication of *Anecdota* will not mean that *Eriu* passes into nothingness. It is a scandalous thing that Irishmen of culture and education do not give an intelligent support to the School of Irish Learning, 33 Dawson Street, Dublin.


THIS little book is as full of racy vigorous Irish as its four predecessors. The songs are arranged with the Sol-fa notation. The Rev. compiler is to be congratulated on the quality of his work. The songs were collected chiefly in Desmond, and are typical of a certain style of Irishman. ‘An Cúplaíún coir na Úrúisí’ shows particularly an Irishman’s power of close observation of nature. Irish singers and poets should get the book.

Naomí Columcille, IN IRISH AND ENGLISH. By a Redemptorist Father. Dublin: M. H. Gill and Son. 6d.

A very interesting booklet to all lovers of Ireland, and of her great men. The first part of the life of Columcille is drawn largely from the life as found in the 'Leabhar Breaic,' and ably edited and translated by the veteran scholar, Dr. Whitley Stokes. There are some things in this book which might be better expressed as follows, e.g.:—

Page 4, Βίοναρι να γέριορουιστέ ταΐτε τιαύδα καρταναά, instead of as in book; Page 10, γεραμάιντ λε η-α χαολταιβ; Page 12, ναρβ' αινη Σεαμάν (also pp. 30, 58, 62); *Ibid.*, λε η-α ραιβ τ' εολυρ αιγε αρι γταιη γ αρι φιλιόεαςτ να ήειρεανν; Page 28, Θαρμάξ might be described as nearer to Tullamore than to Birr; Page 30, ίρ ιοντιμιν λε; *Ibid.*, Ρεάέια is the Irish for Lambay; Page 34, αρι αν μαινιρτιρι οιηρόηις; Page 46, Λοέ να φαιλλε is not the name, but Λοέ φεάθαιλ; Page 54, Όρνιτιν να ήαιλλε should be Όρνιτιν Κλιαβ.

There are other matters requiring attention in a new edition. The book is well worth the money. Messrs. M. H. Gill and Son have done their part well.



THE NEW ARAMAIC PAPYRI FROM EGYPT

ALITTLE more than a year ago, the publication of Sayce and Cowley's *Aramaic Papyri discovered at Assuan*,¹ opened up a new world for students of *Semitica*, and particularly for those who were interested in modern theories of Hebrew religious development. These papyri, which are now quite familiar to Orientalists, and about which quite a large mass of literature has grown up, are evidently a portion of the archives of a Jewish family of Assuan.² The documents are contracts referring to donations of property and to marriage settlements. They are ten in number, and by their minuteness of detail and individuality give us a

¹ *Aramaic Papyri Discovered at Assuan*, edited by A. H. Sayce with the assistance of A. E. Cowley, and with Appendices by W. Spiegelberg and Seymour de Ricci. London, 1906. A small edition of the Assuan Papyri for the use of students has been published by Dr. W. Staerk, Privatdozent in Jena—*Die Jüdisch-Aramäischen Papyri von Assuan, sprachlich und sachlich erklärt von Lic. Dr. W. Staerk*. Bonn. 1907.

² The documents published by Sayce and Cowley are alleged to have been found at Assuan. But exact details as to the place of their finding are not forthcoming, and we may perhaps conjecture with Professor Sachau that they really come from Elephantine, where the new documents of which we treat in the text were found. The two sets of papyri—those from Oxford and the new ones from Berlin—will then have formed portions of a single group, and a kindred document published some years ago by Professor Euting of Strassburg seems also to have belonged to the same group. See the fragments which are brought together at the end of Sayce and Cowley's work.

Elephantine was, during the Persian and Roman periods, a fortress standing on the frontier between Egypt and Nubia. It is an island in the Nile opposite the town of Assuan, which stands on the west bank of the river. Elephantine is a Greek form of the old Egyptian designation *ȝbw* which is reproduced in the Aramaic Papyri as 'ib. We find the Egyptian name in a Greek inscription in the form IHB. In the text we have used Yeb and Elephantine in the same sense.

glimpse into a world hitherto quite unknown. They resemble in general structure the well-known Babylonian contracts, of which the British Museum has published so many. They are carefully dated, and the names of principals and witnesses are given with extraordinary carefulness. Their dates fall between the years 471 and 411 B.C., and it is interesting to notice in the well-executed facsimiles published by Sayce and Cowley the different handwriting of the witnesses to these very ancient contracts.

But the interest of the papyri does not lie in mere epigraphy. They are of the highest importance for philologists and students of comparative religion. They are written in the language which is known as Old Aramaic. This is the language which served as the medium of intercourse throughout the Semitic world from the time when Assyro-Babylonian began to wane until Greek displaced all forms of Semitic world-language. Yet, world-language though it was, Old Aramaic has left strangely few traces. Except a few tombstone inscriptions, certain portions of the Books of Daniel and Esdras, a verse of Jeremias, and occasional words here and there in the Old Testament generally, little was known until recently of this language. The publication by Sayce and Cowley of ten fairly long documents, written in the Aramaic spoken by a Jewish colony in Assuan in the fifth century B.C., has, therefore, opened up a new field for philologists. The language of the documents is practically identical with that of the Aramaic portions of Daniel and Esdras. It presents, however, certain peculiarities which probably were characteristic of Egyptian Aramaic.

But interesting though the Aramaic papyri are philologically, they are still more interesting for the student of comparative religion and biblical theology. They put before us, in a few brief touches, but with intense vividness, the daily life of a fifth-century Jewish colony, set like an oasis in the world of Egyptian commerce. They give us a glimpse into a world whose existence was scarcely suspected. They give us the first pages of the history of a Jewish diaspora which we could not otherwise have dreamed of. We were hitherto familiar with the notion of a Jewish Exile

in Babylonia ; and recent publications have made it clear to us that the Jew in Babylon was not less active commercially than are the Jewish business men of our own time. But now we have put before us in a vividly personal way the daily life and experience of the Jew in Egypt five centuries before the Christian era. And as the Semitic spirit finds always expression in religion, we might expect to find in these papyri considerable religious material. And we are not disappointed. Living in a strange land, surrounded by the shrines of strange gods, the little colony of Assuan and Yeb did not forget the God of its fathers. How faithfully it held to Jahweh we can gather from the names of the witnesses to the contracts. In nearly every Jewish name which occurs in the documents we find the name of Jahweh as a component part. Law suits are decided by taking an oath before Jahweh, and the religion of the Jews is so far recognized by the State, that even non-Jews are apparently forced to settle their disputes with Jews after the Jewish manner. The religious influence of the little colony is so marked that some of the witnesses seem to have passed over from other religions to Jahwism. Even at this early period, therefore, and far away from Palestine, proselytism was a striking feature of the Jewish religion.

The most interesting, however, of all the details as to the life and belief of the Jews of Assuan, which these papyri give us, is a reference to a temple of Jahweh¹ which stands by the roadside like the shrine or chapel of an Egyptian deity. This reference is made in two of the documents—in E (Sayce and Cowley), line 14, which dates from the 3rd of Kislev in the nineteenth year of Artaxerxes I, i.e., 446, and again in J, line 7, which dates from the 3rd of Kislev in the eighth year of Darius II (Nothos), i.e., 417. There is nothing more, however, than the mere mention of the Temple (אֱלֹהָיָה) of Jahu (יהוָה) and it is not clear from

¹ The name is written יָהָה in the Assuan papyri and was probably pronounced yâ-hû. This agrees with the form in which the name appears in certain Babylonian documents. In the translation of the new papyri we have transcribed the name as Jahu. Elsewhere we have used the form Jahweh. This is a compromise between the correct transcription Yah-weh and the old form Jehovah.

the Assuan papyri that this temple was a temple in the full sense of the term, and so more than a mere prayer-house or synagogue, such as we find permitted to the post-exilic Jews even in Palestine. The word used for temple is not decisive.¹ The documents of Sayce and Cowley are, therefore, though fascinating, still incomplete as to the religious life of the colony in Assuan. For any further light on the temple of Jahweh the student must needs be grateful. And this light has come quickly.

A few months ago Professor Sachau, the celebrated Orientalist of Berlin, published three new Aramaic papyri² which present the same general linguistic features as those published by Sayce and Cowley. They come, too, from the same district. They are not contracts, however, or legal documents. But they are immensely more interesting than any legal documents, for they give us full details concerning the temple of Jahweh, which stood on the island of Elephantinê. Professor Sachau, in his publication, has given an exhaustive analysis of the new papyri. His extraordinary familiarity with all forms of Aramaic literature, and his great knowledge of Persian and Oriental history generally, have enabled him to put before the public a practically final explanation of the new texts. Of the documents published by Professor Sachau, the second is (apart from a few short phrases), a duplicate of the first. The documents are a portion of a large collection of Aramaic papyri fragments which the learned professor hopes soon to be able to publish.³ To give a correct idea of these new documents we give here a full translation of the first and third.

¹ The word used hangs together with the Babylonian *ekur*. In the *Targum* a form of the same word is used for an altar of false gods.

² *Drei Aramäische Papyrusurkunden aus Elephantine.* Von Eduard Sachau. (Aus den Abhandlungen der Königl. Preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1907.) Berlin, 1907. Cf. Article by Professor Driver in the *Guardian*, November 6, 1907, 'A Jewish Temple in Egypt, B.C. 525-411.' See also in the *Expositor*, December, 1907, 'The new Papyri of Elephantine,' by Prof. Margoliouth; 'Note on the Elephantine Papyri,' by Prof. Griffith; 'The Jewish Temple of Yahu . . . at Syene,' by Mr. S. A. Cook.

³ Corresponding with me on the subject, Professor Sachau has informed me that he hopes to publish all the remaining fragments during 1908. There are about twenty fragments altogether. 'Some,' he says, 'are well-preserved, others badly. Some are business documents like those of Sayce and Cowley, others refer to the temple more or less directly and clearly, also to Arsames.'

I.

(1) To our lord Bagohi, governor of Jehûd (i.e., Judea), thy servant Yedonyah and his companions, the priests in the fortress Yeb. May (2) our Lord, the God of heaven, be greatly propitious to thee at all times, and grant thee favour before King Darius, (3) and before the sons of the (royal) house, even a thousand times more than now ; and may He grant thee long life ; mayest thou be rejoiced and strong at all times. Thy (4) servants Yedonyah and his companions speak thus :

In the month of Tammuz (July) in the 14th year of King Darius, when Arsham (5) was gone forth, and had proceeded to the King, the priests of the god Chnub in the fortress Yeb made with Waidrang [II. has, gave money and goods to Waidrang], who was governor here, a secret agreement of the following nature (?) :

The Temple (6) of the God Jahu in the fortress Yeb must be removed thence. Thereupon Waidrang (7) the . . .¹ sent letters to his son Nephâjân who was commander in the fortress Syene (i.e., Assuan) saying. The Temple in the fortress Yeb (8) must be destroyed. Then Nephâjân led out Egyptians with other forces : they came to the fortress Yeb with their mattocks (?). They (9) forced their way into this Temple, and destroyed it even to the ground, and the pillars of stone which were there, they broke. It came to pass also that (10) they destroyed the five stone gates built of hewn stone which were in the Temple, and their tops they . . . and the hinges (11) of the doors (these [of] bronze) ;² and the roof which was of cedar beams, and the stucco of the wall, and (12) whatever else was there, they burned with fire. And the bowls of gold and silver, and whatever else was in the Temple, they took them all, and (13) appropriated them. Now even in the days of the King [in II. Kings] of Egypt our fathers built this Temple in the fortress Yeb. And when Cambyses entered Egypt (14) he found this Temple already built, and whereas the temples of the gods of Egypt were torn down, no one injured anything in this Temple. And since (15) these (i.e., Waidrang and the priests of Chnub) have done this, we with our wives and children have worn mourning-garments, and fasted and prayed to Jahu, the God of heaven, who (16) has (since) given us knowledge of this Waidrang, the . . .³ The foot-chains (i.e., chains of office) have been taken from his feet and all the treasures which he had acquired have been

¹ Margoliouth reads Vidrang Lakhâjâ.

² Margoliouth translates : 'they set them on their heads ; and they burned with fire the copper hinges in those marbles' . . .

³ Vidrang Kalbâyâ (Marg.)

destroyed, and all the men (17) who wished evil against this Temple have been slain and we have seen this with satisfaction.

Previously too, at the time when this injury (18) was done to us, we sent a letter to our lord (Bagohi) and to Jehohanan,¹ the High Priest, and his companions; the priests in Jerusalem and to his brother Ostan, i.e., (19) 'Anani, and the princes of the Jews. But they sent us no letter.

And from the Tammuz-day in the 14th year of King Darius (20) and up to the present day, we have worn mourning-garments and fasted; our wives have become as widows; we have not anointed ourselves with oil (21) nor drunk wine. Besides, since that time, even up to the present day in the 17th year of K. Darius, no meal-offerings, incense or burnt-offerings (22) have been offered in this Temple. Now we, thy servants, Yedonyah and his companions, and the Jews, all the citizens of Yeb say this: If (23) it please our lord, so mayest thou be concerned for this Temple, to build it up again, since we are not permitted to rebuild it. Be propitious to the recipients (24) of thy favours and graces here in Egypt. May a letter be sent to them by thee concerning the Temple of the God Jahu (25), in order that it may be rebuilt in the fortress Yeb, as it was built in the days gone by. And they [II., we] will offer in thy name meal-offerings, and incense and burnt-offerings (26) upon the altar of the God Jahu, and we will pray for thee at all times, we and our wives and children, and all the Jews (27) who are here, if this be done [II., if thou doest thus] until this Temple is rebuilt, and a portion shall be for thee before Jahu, the God (28) of heaven, from each one who offers Him burnt-offerings and sacrifices, in value equivalent to the value of a silver sekel for a 1000 talents.² And concerning the gold (29) we have sent and made known. Besides we have given intimation of the events in a letter in our name to Delajâh and Shelemijâh the sons of Sanaballat, the governor of Samaria. Arsham (30), however, has received no intimation of all that has been done to us. On the 20th Marheswan, year 17 of Darius the king.

III.

(1) Memorandum of what Bagohi and Delajâh said (2) to me.

Memorandum as follows:—

Thou shalt say in Egypt, (3) before Arsham concerning the altar-house of the God of (4) heaven which was built in the

¹ Vide Hastings, *Bible Dict.*, art. 'Jehohanan.'

² The word for talent is the same as the Armenian kankar (Coptic *gingôr*=1,500 staters).

fortress Yeb (5) before our time and before Cambyses (6) which Waidrang, this . . . had destroyed (7) in the 14th year of K. Darius, that (8) it is to be rebuilt in the place where it was before ; and (9) meal-offerings and incense shall be offered upon (10) this altar as formerly (11) used to be done.

The circumstances of these two documents are simple enough. The Jewish colony at Elephantinê and Assuan was not popular with the native Egyptians, and the worship which was carried out in the temple on the island naturally roused the most bitter hatred of the priests of Chnum, the old deity of Elephantinê and the district lying near it. But the Jews enjoyed the friendship of the Persian official Arsames, and the priests of Chnum dared not show their hatred. When, however, Arsames for some reason or other left Egypt to go to the king, an opportunity seems to have presented itself to the vindictive Egyptians to show their hostility to the temple of Jahweh. The officer who was in command of the Assuan district must have been less friendly than Arsames to the Jews. His name was Waidrang.¹ This same Waidrang is called in one of Sayce and Cowley's papyri commander (רֹב חִילָא) of Syene (Assuan), and in Pap. H. 4, he is called commander simply. In our documents he is called פָּרָתָרָה,² and his son Nephâjân is called commander of Syene. Waidrang seems to have at once acceded to the wishes of the Chnum priests, and sent on instructions to carry out their proposals to his son, Nephâjân. This Nephâjân, acting on his father's orders, brought a detachment of troops and destroyed the temple or altar-house in Yeb, carrying off its gold and silver vessels and other objects of value. The temple in question is, beyond all doubt, the same as the temple of Jahu which is mentioned in the earlier papyri. The Jews, filled with dismay at the destruction of their shrine, wrote for help to the High Priest of Jerusalem, Jehohanan, and then to Bagohi, governor of Judea, and to the sons of Sanaballat, governor of Samaria. Their enemies—the Chnum priests and Waidrang—must have soon suffered for their mis-

¹ Sayce and Cowley write 'Widrang'; Margoliouth writes 'Vidrang'.

² The title seems to be the same as the Armenian, hratarak = herald, usher.

deeds, and a petition of the Jews of Yeb for the rebuilding of Jahweh's 'altar-house,' seems, if we may take the third papyrus literally, to have been granted by the Persian authorities.

The date of the papyri published by Sayce and Cowley was, as we have said, 471-411 B.C. The Yedonyah who stands out in our papyri as head of the community in Yeb is, most probably, one of three Yedonyahs who are mentioned by name in the other papyri. Our documents refer to the fourteenth and to the seventeenth year of King Darius. This king must have been Darius II (Nothos), who reigned 424-404 B.C. The first two documents are dated in the seventeenth year of Darius, i.e., 408-407. The documents refer to a Bagohi, who is governor of Judea, and a High Priest in Jerusalem named Jehohanan. Now, we find in Josephus mention of a High Priest *'Ιωάννης* in Jerusalem, and of a Persian official named *βαγώας*, who is some sort of a governor in Jerusalem. These two appear as contemporaries in Josephus, and the thought suggests itself at once that Bagohi and Jehohanan are identical with *βαγώας* and *'Ιωάννης*.¹ We find that *βαγώας* is called in Josephus ὁ στρατηγὸς τοῦ Ἀρταξέρξου (another reading gives more definitely, τοῦ ἄλλου Ἀρταξέρξου, Niese, p. 61).

This Artaxerxes must have been the second, i.e., Memnon, who reigned 404-358 B.C., and who was immediately preceded by the Darius (Nothos) of our papyri. Bagohi must then have been governor during the reigns of Darius II and Artaxerxes II. The Persian governor in Egypt who is called Arsham is probably the same as an Arxames who is mentioned by Ctesias as governor in Egypt when Darius II ascended the throne (424). Of the other names the most interesting is that of Sanaballat, governor of Samaria, who is, of course, the same as the arch-enemy of Nehemias.² Nehemias does not call him governor of Samaria, but his influence over the Samaritans, as described by Nehemias, is so great that we can readily suppose him to have held a governing position in Samaria. From Nehemias xiii. 28

¹ Vide Josephus, *Antiq. Jud.*, xi. 7, ed. Niese, iii. p. 60. Prof. Margoliouth refers to further mention of Bagoas in *Diodorus Siculus* xvi. 47, par. 4; *ibid.* 51, 2; xvii. 5, 3.

² Cf. Nehemias ii. iv., vi.

we learn, too, that a brother of the High Priest *Jehohanan* named *Manasse* married a daughter of *Sanaballat*.¹ This may throw light on the circumstance that *Jehohanan* and the sons of *Sanaballat* are mentioned together in our papyri.

These sons of *Sanaballat* are not mentioned in the Sacred Text. It is interesting to note how thoroughly Hebrew the names of both are (*Delajâh* and *Shelemjâh*), though their father's name is Assyrian—*Sin-uballit*. It is quite possible that *Sanaballat* may have been a pure-blood Israelite who had simply taken a second name.² It is curious to note that the Jews of *Elephantinê* should have written to the sons of *Sanaballat* for help to rebuild their temple. It was *Sanaballat* who set up the greatest difficulties for *Nehemias* in the rebuilding of *Jerusalem*. But it is possible that *Sanaballat's* hostility to *Nehemias* may have been based on purely personal motives. The colony in *Assuan* and *Elephantinê* seems, at least, to have quite ignored all that occurred in the rebuilding of the walls of *Jerusalem*, for *Yedonyah* writes at the same time to the High Priest at *Jerusalem*, and to the sons of *Sanaballat*.

It is interesting, further, to note that the letter³ to the Persian official *Bagohi* seems to have been written by the colony only when *Jehohanan* and the people of *Jerusalem* had shown complete indifference as to the fate of the temple in *Yeb*.⁴ When it is remembered that our papyri date from 408 B.C., and that *Nehemias* came to *Jerusalem* on his second visit in 432 B.C., it will be seen how near these three new papyri stand to the Old Testament. On this nearness to the Sacred Text, and on the religious questions which they involve, the main interest of the documents depends.

From the documents it appears that the temple of *Jahweh* in *Yeb* was already built when *Cambyses* con-

¹ According to *Neh.* xiii. 28, one of the sons of the High Priest *Joiada* was son-in-law to *Sanaballat*. According to *Neh.* xii. 11, *Joiada* is father of *Jonathan*. In *Neh.* xi. 22, we have the order *Eliashib*, *Joiada*, *Johanan*, *Jaddua*. *Josephus* makes *Manasse* the brother of *Jaddua*. But most probably *Jehohanan* and 'Anani were the sons of *Joiada*.

² Cf. the case of *Jehohanan's* brother in our *Pap. I.*, l. 18, 19, *Ostan*; i.e., 'Anani—*Ostan* is Persian, 'Anani is Hebrew.

³ *Pap. I.* and *II.*

⁴ *Vide Pap. I.*, 18, 19.

quered Egypt in 525 B.C. In the Persian invasion the temples of the Egyptian gods were, to some extent, destroyed and despoiled of their treasures, but the temple of Jahweh was spared. It fits in well with what we know otherwise of the Persian attitude towards subject peoples and religions, that Cambyses should have left untouched the centre of Jewish worship in Southern Egypt. This hangs together, too, with the Scripture narrative of the rebuilding of Jerusalem and its temple through Persian favour and support. We do not know well the secret history of Cyrus' conquest of Babylon, but it is not improbable that the large Jewish element present in the Babylonian capital at the time of Cyrus' invasion secretly favoured the Persian schemes. It may have been such secret support of Persian pretensions that purchased for the Jews the abiding favour of Cyrus and his successors.

Already then, in 525 B.C., there was a fully equipped temple of Jahweh in Yeb. Where did the Jewish colony come from that settled there? Are they the grandchildren of the Jews who fled with Jeremias into Egypt after the fall of Jerusalem in 586 B.C.? There are few passages in the Old Testament more vivid and dramatic than the chapters of Jeremias which tell of the days that followed the sack of the Holy City, of the passions that rent the remnant of the Judeans, of the treacherous slaying of the governor and the headlong flight of the murderers and their families into Egypt. Jeremias was forced to fly with the fugitives, and in the bitterness of his heart gave free expression to his contempt for the follies of his people. He told them of the dangers that would surround them in the land of Egypt. He foretells that they shall fall by the sword and die of famine, and curses their want of fidelity to Jahweh. In Jeremias xliv. 25, 26, we read:—

Thus saith Jahweh of Hosts the God of Israel, saying: You and your wives have spoken with your mouth and fulfilled with your hands, saying: Let us perform our vows which we have made, to burn incense to the queen of heaven, and to pour out drink-offerings to her: you have fulfilled your vows, and have performed them indeed. Therefore hear ye the word of Jahweh, all ye that dwell in the land of Egypt: Behold I

have sworn by my great name, saith Jahweh, that my name shall no more be named in the mouth of any man of Juda in the land of Egypt, saying: As the Lord liveth.

These companions of Jeremias, whom the prophet so bitterly denounces, have vanished utterly from history. No continuity of tradition has ever been set up between them and Jews of a later period in Egypt. May we suppose that the papyri of Sayce and Cowley, and the three published by Dr. Sachau, bring these vanished Jews of Jeremias on the stage of history again? We know that some of those who fled with Jeremias made their way to the South of Egypt. The first verse of chapter xliv. of Jeremias speaks of Jews of Pathros (p₃-t₃-r₃sj=the southern land) i.e., Southern or Upper Egypt. But the new papyri do not bear out the details of the prophet's curse. The Jews have not fallen away from Jahweh even a century subsequently to the prophet's time. The Jews of Elephantinê make no offerings to the 'queen of heaven,' and only one of those mentioned in the papyri, and that a woman¹ is represented as swearing by the name of any deity but Jahweh. It is not necessary, however, that the colony should have sprung from the companions of Jeremias. Nor is it in itself very probable that the colony should have acquired such individuality and importance in the interval between 586 and 525 B.C. as to set up a formal system of temple-worship in its midst. There is no proof that there were not Jews in Egypt long before the time of Jeremias. It is not impossible or unlikely that the troubled times which preceded and followed the fall of the Northern Kingdom in 722 B.C., may have driven many a Jew to seek a home in Egypt. Egypt was not, by any means, a land unknown to the Israelites of 722 B.C. It played an important part in the politics of the period. In the eighth century B.C. the kingdoms in and around Palestine were necessarily vassal either to Egypt or to Assyria. It was through an attempted coalition with Egypt against Assyria that Samaria brought on itself its final destruction. Trade with Egypt was

¹ Vide F. (Sayce and Cowley), 1. 6.

extensive, and shrewd business men of Samaria would seek a secure refuge, as they believed, from the inroads of Ashur in the distant lands of Upper Egypt.

Assuan or Syene would be a natural gathering-place for Jewish merchants. It was situated at the first Nile Cataract, and thus easily accessible from the north or from the Red Sea. It was, even from the oldest time, a busy centre of trade and commerce. Its name is derived from an Egyptian word which refers to trade and bargaining (swn.t=price). We know how Jewish caravans traversed the eastern lands even in the days of the glory of David and Solomon ; and even in that prosperous period it is not unlikely that Jewish traders were satisfied to live in exile for the sake of trade and wealth. The presence of a Jewish colony, then, in Assuan before the sixth, or even before the seventh century B.C., is not in itself very improbable.

The possibility of a Jewish settlement in Syene long before the fall of Jerusalem (586 B.C.) helps, perhaps, to throw some light on a passage of Isaias which has given some difficulty to commentators. As if he were looking towards colonies like Assuan and Yeb, Isaias says¹ :—

In that day there shall be five cities in Egypt, speaking the language of Chanaan and swearing by Jahweh of hosts. One shall be called the city of the Sun. In that day there shall be an altar of Jahweh in the midst of the land of Egypt and a monument of Jahweh on the borders thereof. It shall be for a sign and for a testimony to Jahweh of hosts in the land of Egypt. For they shall cry to Jahweh because of the oppressor, and He shall send them a saviour and defender to deliver them. And Jahweh shall be known by Egypt, and the Egyptians shall know Jahweh in that day, and shall worship Him with sacrifice and offerings. And they shall make vows to Jahweh and perform them.

Many critics have looked with suspicion on these verses of Isaias, and have been inclined to regard them as of much later date than the time of the prophet. 'Why,' they say, 'should we suppose that Isaias would attempt to convey

¹ xix. 18-21.

a lesson to his contemporaries based on a set of circumstances not realized for centuries after his own time? The circumstances referred to are the altar and worship in Egypt, and these the critics find first realized in the temple built by Onias in Leontopolis¹ in the second century B.C. But here we have in our papyri a temple mentioned which had certainly stood for some time before the Persian conquest of Egypt in 525 B.C., and which may possibly date back to a period not far removed from the fall of Samaria.

Isaias, then, will have known of the beginnings of a Jewish diaspora in Egypt even in his own time, and his words in the 11th chapter seem to refer also to this diaspora. 'And it shall come to pass in that day that Jahweh shall set his hand a second time to possess the remnant of His people which shall be left from the Assyrians, and from Egypt, and from Pathros, and from Ethiopia, and from Elam, and from Sennaar, and from Emath, and from the islands of the sea.' The mention of Egypt and Pathros points again to the possibility of Jewish colonies in Egypt at the time of Isaias or very soon after it. Everything considered, therefore, it does not seem improbable that the temple of Jahweh in Yeb dates back to a period long prior to the invasion of Cambyses in 525 B.C.

It is easy enough to suppose that a colony living far away in Upper Egypt would hear but few details concerning its home-land. Revolutions might pass over Judea which would not reach to the colony of Assuan. Vital religious reforms might be made in Jerusalem of which the exiles would hear but little. And, however full the knowledge the people of Assuan and Yeb might have of home-life and the changing features of Palestinian history, they could not feel with any real intensity the need of reforms in ritual and worship which were made in the home country. This thought must be kept carefully in mind when we try to compare the religious standpoint of Yeb with that of Jerusalem. From the new papyri we see

¹ Leontopolis was in the Heliopolitan nome Heliopolis = Sun-city; hence the expression of Isaias: one shall be called the city of the Sun. But the Hebrew text of the passage of Isaias is quite uncertain. Besides 'city of the Sun' there are the readings 'city of Destruction,' 'city of Righteousness.'

that the worship in Yeb was organized on the same lines as in the temple of Jerusalem. The temple of Yeb seems to have been an imposing structure. It has pillars of stone, and five stone gates. Its roof is of cedar-beams. It has an altar on which meal-offerings, incense and burnt-offerings are offered. It has gold and silver sacrificial vessels and all the belongings of elaborate worship. Not a little fidelity to Jahweh must those Jews have possessed who brought from distant Lebanon to the frontiers of Nubia the cedars for His dwelling. This dwelling, then, with its gates of hewn stone, its roof of cedar, its gold and silver vessels, was in the truest sense a temple, and not a prayer-house. This is a matter of intense interest for the biblical student.

The 12th chapter of Deuteronomy declares in the clearest of language that sacrifices are to be offered to Jahweh in one place only—in that place which Jahweh should choose out of all the tribes to put His name there and dwell in it. Yet here, in Elephantinê, we find a daily service of sacrifice in the temple of Jahweh. Are we to believe that in this central point of Jewish dogma—the unity of sanctuary—the distant Egyptian colony thought differently from the Jews of Palestine; or are we to accept the critical view of the date of Deuteronomy, and say that the beginnings of the Yeb colony and its temple-worship date beyond the period when the 'Law-book' was first published (621 B.C.)? Professor Sayce says in reference to the 'Temple of Jahu': 'We can now understand the feeling which led to the foundation of the temple of Onias near Heliopolis; the Egyptian Jew did not share the view of his post-exilic brother in Palestine in regard to the worship of Jahweh.'¹ It is quite clear that the temple worship in Yeb in 411 B.C. was opposed to the letter of the Deuteronomic law. If we accepted the view that the foundation of the colony took place soon after the fall of Samaria (722), and maintained with the modern critical school generally that Deuteronomy is the 'Book of the Law' referred to in 2 Kings xxii. (found in 621 B.C.) we might say

¹ *Aramaic Papyri, etc.*, p. 13.

that the reforms of Josias found no echo in the far-off district of Elephantinê.

But this is not the only way to explain the presence of a temple in Yeb in 525 B.C. We cannot regard the new papyri as an additional proof of the critical date of Deuteronomy.¹ The colony of Yeb may have sprung after all from the companions of Jeremias. In that case it must have been familiar with the Deuteronomic legislation on any hypothesis of its date and origin. But, further, were the colony founded and its temple built prior to 621 B.C., ignorance of Deuteronomy is not the only explanation of the worship in Yeb. It is a well-known principle that from the non-observance of a law we cannot directly infer its non-existence. We can gather from the Sacred Text that the extensive system of Bamoth worship which had grown up before the time of Josias was not quite rooted out by that monarch's zeal. In spite of all his reforming energy, the anger of Jahweh still burned against Juda even after his death.² The Sacred Text attributes this continued anger to the crimes of Manasses which were still unatoned for. But that is only another way of saying that the customs of Manasses' reign still lived on after the death of Josias. Thus, even the publication (or re-publication) of Deuteronomy did not avail to cleanse the land from ritual imperfection and to establish absolute unity of sanctuary.

Now, if the colony of Yeb were composed mainly of Jews from the Northern Kingdom, who had fled during the troubles of the Assyrian invasions in the eighth or seventh century, there is little difficulty in supposing that they could forget, at least as completely as their countrymen at home, the essential principle of unity of sanctuary. Their non-observance of the law does not prove its non-existence. In the midst of an elaborate system of worship

¹ In a very thoughtful article in the *Expositor* of January, Mr. S. A. Cook calls attention to the danger of building up all kinds of hypothesis on the narrow basis of the new papyri. 'It would be,' he says, 'quite unsafe to venture behind them and attempt to draw all kinds of inferences as to the precise character of the religious ideas which prevailed among the writers.' Vide his article, 'Supplementary Notes on the New Aramaic Papyri,' *Expositor*, January, 1908, p. 92.

² 2 Kings xxiii. 26, 27.

such as the Egyptian, the colony of Yeb might find itself in a sense forced to give expression to its faith in a somewhat elaborate ritual. This ritual would not, in any case, have been more unworthy of Jahweh's greatness than the worship in the 'high places,' which even the most conservative criticism must admit to have been quite usual up to the Exile.

That the colony did not feel itself to be different in belief from Jerusalem we infer from the fact that it writes to the High Priest, Jehohanan, for help to rebuild its temple. Yet at the date at which the colony writes to Jerusalem, the temple-worship of the post-exilic period with all its exclusiveness, was already long in force. From the fact that Jehohanan does not reply, we can infer but little. It is likely that the colony in Yeb would not have regained its temple had Jerusalem protested. It is a very difficult problem of Hebrew belief to determine what constituted schism or heresy for the Jewish believer. We do not know fully how the Jews of the monarchy looked on the laws of their worship. We cannot determine exactly the amount of the respect which they showed to the system of Mosaic dogma. The Northern Kingdom seems to have remained true to Jahwism after the separation—yet the Sacred Text does not explain how Jahwism could have continued to be the State religion beside the worship of the golden calves. It is not strange, therefore, that we cannot determine from our papyri the exact place which Deuteronomist legislation held in the esteem of the colonists of Yeb. It is not, however, impossible that the soil of Egypt may yet yield up some text or phrase of the 'Law' as read in the sixth century in Egypt, or some portion of a Targum used by the Jewish dwellers of Yeb. But we must await some further light before we can decide whether the temple of Yeb implies non-existence of Deuteronomy before 621 B.C., or merely disregard of its laws. Scholars and students will look forward with intense eagerness to the publication by Professor Sachau of the other Aramaic fragments which the Berlin Museum has secured.

P. BOYLAN.

SOME PRESENT-DAY ANOMALIES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

IN a previous article¹ I tried to show that the public were responsible for the official acts of their representatives. But it may be said, and is in fact often said, that political influence has been got under the control of a few great parties, and that it is useless for anyone outside these parties to attempt to affect the course of national or municipal affairs. Representatives are elected by the votes of the people, but the people as a rule have very little to say to the choice of candidates. The various parties make their own nominations, and the public are invited to decide between two or three candidates equally unknown, except by the recommendation of their friends and criticism of their enemies. Although theoretically, therefore, they may be said to select their representatives, since it is their votes that give them power, practically all the public can do is to decide between a small number of candidates, more or less unworthy, in great part unknown.

This contains a certain element of truth, and is on that account all the more dangerous plea. It is more dangerous still, since it affords a plausible excuse for the listlessness in public matters to which his native indolence and selfishness incline the ordinary man. It is a fact that generally no one, who has not attached himself to some powerful political party, has much chance of success in a parliamentary election; just as it is a fact that anyone who has not secured the patronage of a local organization rarely succeeds in municipal contests.

Individuals feel that, as a rule, their isolated votes cannot change the result of an election. Sometimes, moreover, one sees so little to choose between rival candidates, that he would not consider it worth while to cast his vote, even though he were convinced that by it he could determine who should be elected.

¹ I. E. RECORD, January, 1908.

This is true also, but it is not the entire truth. That such a fact has any weight against the principle I have been maintaining, it would be necessary to show that the individuals in question were ordinary members of the community, people whose views might be taken as typical of the class to which they belong, and that, in addition, the power of political parties to dictate to the public was natural, or at least now so firmly established, that, by a reasonable effort, voters may not be able to shake themselves free of it. For I have never supposed that isolated supporters of singular opinions should expect to determine the decision of the body, or that they should be condemned, because of any evils that might result from disregard of their views. In true democracies abnormal opinions cannot rule ; toleration is the most they can look for. But I do maintain firmly that, if the people make up their minds strongly and intelligently about what class of representatives they require, no party is strong enough to force a different type on them. That appears a truism, but if it is true at all, does it not at once dispose of the plea that ordinary voters cannot affect the result of public contests ? Does it not put an end to the excuse of those who try to justify their indifference about the selection of their representatives, on the ground that the selection is really determined by powerful parties ? The ordinary voter in practice has only a choice between the nominees of different parties, but his helplessness is the effect, not the cause of his indifference. Professional politicians enjoy an unnatural power at present, precisely because ordinary voters are not accustomed to take an intelligent interest in their public affairs.

A prominent politician once remarked that it is necessary for heads of public boards to work the boards, or be worked by them. Similarly we may say that it is necessary for the people to lead politicians, or be led by them. Up to the present the people have been altogether too content to allow the politicians do the leading. Let them once assert their authority, and the professional politician will very quickly find his true position—by no means a dishonourable

position, although not so ambitious as that he holds at present.

In municipal politics there is no reason beyond their own culpable negligence, why people do not secure suitable representatives. The issues at stake are not complex. The election area is so small, that the candidate may be personally known to all the voters, and even those to whom he is not known, cannot have much difficulty in satisfying themselves, on trustworthy authority, about his qualifications. *Ceteris paribus*, of course, the candidate who has most in common with the electors has the greatest chance of success. Religion, political convictions, and general sympathy must always count for something ; but unless in these rare occasions, when such things are substantial to the business of the particular board about which there is question, they should not weigh much in comparison with essential fitness. And even where they are substantial, they can never, no matter how conspicuous, be taken as substitutes for integrity and intelligence. Nor is there any reason why they should. In a normal community it will be always possible to find a sufficient number of honest, intelligent men supporting the proper policy, that can be put forward as candidates. If people could be once persuaded to act in this reasonable manner, and if those specially qualified for public positions could be convinced of their obligation to seek them in certain circumstances, the scandals that centre round this phase of our social life would rapidly cease.

Unfortunately, however, these principles are not attended to. The selection of candidates is left to some few enterprising spirits in the community, who very often have reasons for their choice known only to themselves. For the candidate thus selected public patronage is sought, on wholly irrelevant pleas—because his father was once evicted from his holding, or because his uncle went to jail in the heat of the land war ; because he is a friend of some local hero, or connected with some influential family. Thus wholesale canvassing comes to be the recognized practice. Votes are sought and obtained on purely per-

sonal considerations—as a compliment to a friend, or in gratitude to a benefactor. From this the step is not great to these really corrupt practices that shall be nameless here.

National politics present greater difficulty. A candidate cannot possibly be known to every voter in the constituency he wishes to represent, so that with the best intentions in the world electors must of necessity take a great deal on trust. Besides, there are generally a large number of interests—often conflicting interests—at stake. Had the issue been put simply to the Irish voters in England they would have no hesitation in opposing the Liberals on the question of primary education. As it was, this was simply thrown in incidentally as an item in the whole Liberal programme. If they voted against the Liberals on the education question, their votes counted just as much against the hopes—well or ill-founded—they entertained for the redress of Irish grievances, and against the promised improvement in the workman's condition. These difficulties are increased enormously, by the working of the present system of party politics. For even though a particular constituency might succeed in returning a representative independent of all parties, the advantage would not be very great, for as parliamentary business is now transacted, no member can hope to command any influence, unless he attaches himself to some strong party.

The story of civilization amongst European nations is filled with instructive examples of the transition of public authority from despotism to democracy, and from democracy back again to tyranny ; and usually the last state of these nations was worse than the first. So it was in Athens more than once ; so it was later in Rome ; so it was in England at the time of the Commonwealth ; so it was in France at the Revolution. Things move quickly in France, and once again the cycle seems complete. Democracy would appear to be moribund, and oligarchy blatant and aggressive has begun to tyrannize. The *bloc* is at best but a league of professedly partisan politicians ; in the interest and according to the principles of the section of the community these politicians stand for, public affairs are

administered. In England, too, although to a lesser extent, a similar state prevails. The great parties succeed one another in power, and whichever happens at any time to be responsible for the government governs according to party ideals.

It would seem that people are able to cope with despots, to make an impression on them, and to shatter their power when it becomes intolerable. But they cannot use power themselves when they have it, nor retain it long. They find it easy enough to criticize, but the positive work of governing they care not to undertake. What is every one's business is supposed to be no one's business. The free and easy citizen is content to let somebody else take the trouble or ruling. Thus an opening is made for the enterprising and energetic, of which a certain number will be always found to avail. These politicians soon come to wield a power more despotic than that of recognized despotisms, because as exercised in the name of the people it is more immune from criticism. 'An autocrat,' says the shrewd Chicago philosopher, 'is a ruler that does what th' people wants and takes th' blame f'r it. A constitutional ixicutive. Hinnissy, is a ruler that does as he pleases an' blames th' people.'

It is undoubtedly a defect in the present condition of society that principle is pitted against principle, interest is antagonistic to interest, and class is at war with class. Every interest and every principle gathers its own supporters whose object it is to advance that interest or principle, and who are not concerned how other interests or principles may suffer, content, if they think of them at all, to feel that they have their own champions to defend them. In this way the community, instead of being a solid organism, is split up into a number of mutually conflicting parties. Each party aims at having the upper hand ; class jealousy is encouraged, hatred and tyranny are engendered. We hear a lot of man's inhumanity to man ; yet I doubt very much if it comes natural to us to persecute one another. This at any rate is clear that whatever rivalry exists between individuals is increased a thousand-fold, when opposing

interests are accentuated as motives of action. People who ordinarily live together in peace and amity are thrown into bitter turmoil, as soon as party cries are raised. Farmers and farm labourers get on very well together, extending to one another the ordinary offices of Christian charity, until distinctions are made between their interests. Then it seems to be no longer remembered that all are bound together by brotherly bonds. Employers are often disposed to be as fathers towards their workmen, and are not unfrequently regarded as such, until the partisan cry is raised in a community, when the inoffensive master comes to be looked upon as the personification of the sweating capitalist. Suspicion and hatred prevail, where hitherto all was trustfulness and charity.

Similar results are discernible, where difference of principle is a means of perpetuating and intensifying party feeling. We hear of certain towns in Ireland, where Catholics and Orangemen have come to understand one another, and associate peacefully and harmoniously, for eleven months of the year. But, inevitably, as soon as the twelfth of July comes within measurable distance, the truce is withdrawn, and war to the death is the order once more. Faction cries, punctuated by the most opprobrious and offensive epithets, take the place of friendly greetings, and the hand that used be held out to soothe or assist now wields a stick or hurls a brick.

When the community is thus split up into conflicting parties, and when each party is striving to secure the most advantageous terms for itself, common interests easily come to be ignored. In every party these men will come to the front, who will promote or promise to promote its particular interests or principles most effectually. In such circumstances, it is easy to see that it is not the most enlightened statesman or disinterested patriot, but the most whole-hearted partyman that will take the lead. And ultimately when the representatives of any party or combination of parties come to administer the affairs of the nation, they will remain partisans all the time and legislate according to party ideals. Thus does it happen that there

is a constant cruel struggle for existence going on in civic life. Those principles and interests whose supporters cannot form a strong working party, or enter into an alliance with a strong party, will receive but little consideration in public enactments. The strength of party majorities is exerted as relentlessly as that of those brutes that prey on weaker species. Minorities must suffer, we have been told, it is the badge of their tribe.

As has just been said, it is the most pushing party-man, the best fighter, as he is called, that wields power in political parties. The rough usage, the blows and thrusts of the political arena have little attraction for timid dispositions, adventurous spirits find themselves completely masters of the situation, and on such the advantages of their position are rarely lost. For championing its interests they receive the support of the party. But they generally have interests and principles of their own—in no way shared in by their supporters, often even objectionable to them—that they throw into the programme and insist on promoting, if they are to remain leaders at all. Moreover, in the exercise of their power, they sometimes find it profitable to come to understandings with leaders of other parties, to refrain from being too insistent on all the desires of their own supporters, and to take on some of the aims of others, in return for their aid, or to prevent opposition. The result is a new complex party, with a programme consisting of a certain number of the interests of the component parties, and usually a much larger number of the interests of the leaders themselves. Another party similarly constituted opposes it, and both appeal for the support of the public. It is very easy to understand that in the programme of either of these parties the ordinary voter may find little to approve of, much perhaps to object to. But what is he to do? He cannot start a new party, and generally he finds himself compelled either to remain passive or, taking the lesser of two evils, support the least undeserving.

Such, in brief, is the genesis of the power of the professional politician. Its two great supporters are the party system and the indifference of the ordinary public.

The party system has gone far to reduce politics to the level of a mere game between skilful leaders. No doubt leaders are often most disinterested, self-sacrificing men, who take part in politics from purely unselfish motives, having no ambition save to serve their country. But they cannot change the existing order, and if they want to serve their country by politics—and for many there is no higher way in which they can serve it—they must simply play the game as they find it. They may contemn in their hearts the empty shibboleths, the mere clap-trap arguments, the unworthy appeals to the cupidity and passions of a certain section of their followers by which influence is extended and power increased, but they must descend to such devices.

And this game of politics inflicts an intolerable injustice on the public. If the public has a right to be consulted on the policy of governments at all—and it is the assumption of all electioneering tactics that it has—then it has a right to be afforded an opportunity of giving a clear decision on every vital measure, and cannot justly be forced to vote on a varied programme consisting of totally unconnected items. Why, for instance, should Home Rule and Undenominational Education be so united as to stand or fall together? Might not a Home Ruler believe in denominational education? And if he does, why deprive him of the opportunity of voting for it? Why should he be compelled to select between his attachment to Home Rule and denominational education? Similarly, why should a fiscal policy of Protection be necessarily connected with Unionism? Might not a Unionist believe in Free Trade? It is the merest jugglery of words to say that the public decide matters that are so presented to them. They are decided already by party leaders who simply try to run them on the country, having first with practical skill considered well how each item they propose will weigh for and against the success of the entire programme.

It is really strange that people should quietly submit to such dictation and hardships from their political leaders. The fact is that the party system has now become such an established institution that it appears almost indispensable.

It is not so, however. It has its advantages, no doubt, but the evils it engenders, and the abuses it lends itself to far more than outbalance them. It would not be so bad if there were two real parties divided on broad principles, each prepared to govern according to its own principles, without committing itself to any definite position with regard to particular issues. Such would be a genuine Liberal and a genuine Conservative party. If a party were returned to power on such broad principles, it could reasonably set itself to legislate with the confidence that it had the authority of the people behind it. The people would be satisfied with their expressed Liberalism or Conservatism, as the case might be, and could be left to themselves to select representatives to whom they would be content to entrust matters of detail, without further guarantee. As it is, however, there is no broad principle strong enough to unite an active governing party.¹

Liberalism is nothing more than a name now. The party is simply a conglomeration of Free Traders, Non-conformists, Socialists more or less professed, and Home Rulers more or less sincere. The Conservatives are worse still. Even the name is scarcely retained, being too evidently unsuited to designate a party composed of Unionists, Protectionists, Capitalists, and orthodox Anglicans.

To show the absurdity of the system as it works at present, it may be worth while pointing out that a Liberal candidate may be returned to Parliament to support, as he would not be slow to declare when occasion arose, the several measures on the Liberal programme, by a constituency that had not a majority of voters in favour of any one of these measures. Thus an English constituency may consist of 1,600 Anglicans, 800 Nonconformists, and 600 Irish Catholics, actual voters. Of the 1,600 Anglicans we may reasonably assume that 1,400 would be Unionists, 1,000 Protectionists, and 200 in favour of undenominational education. Similarly of the Nonconformists,

¹ The Home Rule claim may be strong enough to keep the Nationalist Members of Parliament united as a party. But that is because that party can never become a governing party. If it once attained such power, difference of principle would soon be manifested amongst its members.

400 may be assumed to be Home Rulers, 500 Free Traders, and all supporters of Undenominational Education. The 600 Irish Catholics would be all Home Rulers, and all opposed to Undenominational Education, and 300 would be Free Traders. If the electors of that constituency were asked to decide severally on the three questions of Home Rule, Free Trade, and Undenominational Education, of the 3,000 voters there would be only 1,200 for Home Rule, 1,400 for Free Trade, and 1,000 for Undenominational Education. That is, there would be a pronounced majority against the Liberals on every point. Yet it would be possible by skilful and persuasive electioneering tactics—by appealing to the Irish Catholics in the Home Rule interest, to the Nonconformists in the interests of Undenominational Education, and to a certain section of the Unionists in the interests of Free Trade—to obtain a decided Liberal majority on the whole programme, and to enable the representative of that constituency to profess that he had a mandate from his constituents to support Home Rule, Undenominational Education, and Free Trade.

Much easier, of course, would it be to get a member returned for a constituency, the majority of whose voters were against a particular point of his policy. To take an example from the Liberals again : in a constituency that is very pronounced in favour of Free Trade, a Liberal candidate would be sure to be returned even though a vast majority of the electors were opposed to his Education policy.

Of course, it may be said that all this is necessary, that in such a complex matter as that of representative legislation, there is always a necessity for compromise. I suppose there is a necessity for compromise of some kind, but surely not for such compromise as would take all real power out of the hands of the people, and transfer it to those of the political leaders. Why, as already asked, should voters that are in favour of Home Rule not be allowed to decide for it, without at the same time being compelled to declare for Undenominational Education? That is simply an instance of compulsory compromise for which there is not the slightest justification. And it is the system that main-

tains it, that puts so much unjustifiable power into the hands of skilful party leaders, who by the aid of eloquent speakers and a vigorous Press can succeed in getting the support of the public for their nicely-adjusted programmes, to the different items of which large sections, or even a majority of that same public might be opposed.

On these leaders in turn powerful individuals and well-organized factions exert an enormous influence. The services of an able member of the party must be retained even at the sacrifice of a good deal to his particular convictions. And if a number of such almost indispensable members agree on any measure or number of measures they are practically certain to have their way. And even more powerful is the influence of wealth, whether again of individuals or of factions. For a political party necessarily incurs great expenses. It requires money to meet these expenses, and of course this money does not drop from the clouds; it has to be contributed by the supporters of the party. And the wealthy individuals and the wealthy societies that contribute large sums will naturally expect something in return for their money. As they pay the piper they will insist on their right of naming the tune. For supplying the sinews of war they will not unnaturally claim a strong voice in the determining the mode of campaign.

As has been said, although the system of party government may appear indispensable at present, it is not so in reality. The existence of avowed political parties, organized on the basis of the modern system, trying to legislate in the manner they do, is a scandal to civilization. It is not my purpose to discuss the manner in which politics might be conducted, if all express political parties were abolished. A number of methods, any of them a decided improvement on the present, could be easily suggested. The evil that would require to be particularly guarded against would be the tendency to develop new parties that would remain as a legacy of the lamentable faction-promoting spirit of the present system.

Whatever we may think of party politics, however much we may deplore the evils for which the system is

responsible, we must not forget that it is an established fact that cannot be ignored in our calculations. Moreover, it is likely to remain a fact for some time at least.

But the other fact—public indifference—that, as I said goes to establish and maintain the abnormal power of professional politicians, we can and ought to remove. Its removal, too, would make immediately for the weakening and ultimately for the destruction of party influence. In ordinary life people are tolerant enough of others that differ from them on matters of very grave import, so would they be in political matters also, if political matters were made part of their ordinary life. If people only made a reasonable endeavour to judge public questions for themselves, there would not be so much attention paid to the party cries by which faction is preserved and stimulated. Even during the time that parties would remain and control influence, the general activity would produce many desirable effects. A watchful public would not allow so much scope for the manipulation of skilful leaders. We should not then have so many opportunities for measures being proposed in the name of the people, that as a matter of fact are acceptable to only a comparatively small minority. In time, too, the politician would cease trying to dictate to the people, and look to them for dictation instead.

From all that has been said, it must be evident that I have no sympathy with organized parties. However, as sometimes the surest way to preserve peace is to be prepared for war, so, too, when at present so many interests have their organized supporters, the best way to prevent these organizations from injuring others is to have all interests that may be affected by public policies organized as well. If communists organize on one side, equity is most likely to be preserved by individualists organizing against them. If Nonconformists organize for undenominational education, believers in the denominational system should organize in its defence. While aggression is allowed to go on unopposed, it is only too likely to continue and increase; when it is actively opposed, it will soon be prepared to come to a truce with its opponents.

J. KELLEHER.

THE HYMNS OF THE BREVIARY¹

IN the course of an article in these pages some years ago, I briefly indicated the process by which, after eight hundred years of monastic favour, hymns at length became part of the Roman Breviary under the pontificate of Gregory IX (1227-1241).² They were then introduced to practically the extent we find them occupying at present. As most readers are doubtless aware, they were subjected to rather drastic treatment at the hands of Breviary-reformers of the Renaissance, and their position has been more than once seriously threatened by those who would restore the Divine Office to its early simplicity. But, whatever their devotional value or æsthetic fitness, they still hold possession and are likely to remain. For the priest, who meets them every day in the recital of his Office, they cannot fail to have a living interest ; and this is my apology for publishing the present notes. Bearing in mind the extent of the subject, I am sure no one will expect me to do more than touch upon its main outlines in a short article like this. I shall content myself with some brief observations upon the authorship and structure of the hymns, pointing out a few peculiarities here and there more or less at random.

The authorship of the various hymns is naturally a question of interest to most people. When first introduced into the Office in various monasteries and local churches it was made a condition that the name of the author, real or reputed, should appear at the beginning of each. This practice was continued for many centuries, and was observed even in the revised edition of Pius V, published in

¹ To avoid the necessity of repeated references, I may say here that I am indebted to the following for the substance of this paper :—Albin's *Poesie du Breviaire*, Lyons, 1899 ; Pimont's *Hymnes du Breviaire Romain*, Paris, 1874 ; Chevalier's *Poesie Liturgique*, Paris, 1893 ; Semeria's *Gli Inni della Chiesa*, Milan, 1903 ; Batiffol's *Histoire du Breviaire*, Paris, 1895 ; Bacuez's *Saint Office*, Paris, 1887.

² 'Rise and Decline of the Ancient Roman Office,' I. E. RECORD, Nov., 1903.

1568. But the edition produced under Clement VIII dropped the names of the authors, and no attempt has since been made to restore them. The reason for this change was doubtless the great difficulty, the impossibility, in fact, of determining with certainty in each case the real author of the piece. In the long interval since then, however, many earnest students have devoted themselves to research in this department and not without a considerable measure of success. Much that was long doubtful has been, to all appearance, definitely settled ; and incidentally a great deal of additional light has been thrown upon many interesting personages and events of medieval Christianity.

From St. Hilary († A.D. 367) to Leo XIII, many illustrious names are wedded to the sacred songs of the Office. A list of them is given in both the French and English editions of Abbé Bacuez's work on the Office, familiar, no doubt, to many of our readers. I may mention, however, that in several entries the author is not in agreement with the more up-to-date writers on the subject. A more satisfactory catalogue arranged in a chronological and alphabetical order will be found in l'Abbé Albin's *Poesie du Breviaire* (pages 525-533).¹

The father of Christian hymnology was undoubtedly St. Ambrose, although we find many fragments of sacred songs written before his day. All those who have read the life of the great Milanese Bishop will remember how he used the hymn as a weapon in the struggle against the Arian and other heresies. He embodied in these simple chants the sublime truths of faith, and encouraged the laity to sing them in church and in public. It may be fairly said that in those days he set the whole city a-singing ; since then these same unaffected and expressive lyrics have resounded through all the Christian world. It is true these compositions do not in every detail conform to the classical standards ; their author had no great desire that they should—though he was one of the most elegant Latinists of his time. He used them as a means of familiarising the common people with the truths of religion, careless of

¹ *Supra*, p. 149.

exquisite forms so long as that great end was attained. The words of St. Gregory in this connexion will bear quotation : ' Ipsam artem servare despexi : indignum enim vehementer existimo ut verba coelestis oraculi restringam sub regulis Donati ' We have only to examine the hymns of St. Ambrose to find how wonderfully he clothed in those modest iambics the loftiest teachings of faith. Let us take as an example the little hymn for terce :—

Nunc sancte nobis Spiritus,
Unum Patri cum Filio, etc.

In the liturgy of the Church the third hour is consecrated to the Holy Ghost, in memory of His descent upon the Apostles about that hour.¹ In this hymn we hark back to the wonders of Pentecost. We ask the Spirit to reinfuse into our hearts the gifts once poured upon St. Peter and his companions. The very wording of these stanzas is worthy of note, for not a letter has been put down at random. *Nunc* : not for the present moment only ; for with God all time is *now*. *Unum*, not *unus* ; because he is referring to the substance as distinguished from the Person, and uses the neuter form as St. John does in his Gospel to convey a similar meaning.² And so on. Indeed there is hardly a strophe in those little songs of the Church which is not pregnant with deep meaning and well worthy of our serious attention.

More than thirty of the hymns of the Breviary are attributed to this saint. They are all uniform in style, i.e. iambic dimeter, like those of prime, terce, etc. One of the best known works of St. Ambrose is his *Hexaemeron*, a commentary on the six days' work of creation. The substance of this he threw into poetic form, and this metrical version is found distributed over the dominical and ferial vespers of every day in the week. This hexaemeron of vesper hymns is well worthy of study, not only for what they contain, but as a striking illustration of the practical genius of this great saint and doctor.

St. Ambrose was the founder of a school of sacred

¹ Cf. Acts ii. 15.

² 'Ego et Pater unum sumus,' John x. 30.

songsters, and the pieces written in those gentle iambics by subsequent imitators are past numbering. The style has long been called Ambrosian. We have a large number of anonymous Ambrosian hymns in the Breviary, some of them of the very highest excellence, as for example, the *Te lucis ante terminum*, at compline, and the *Deus tuorum militum*, in the common of a martyr.

After St. Ambrose, probably the greatest of the Breviary poets is Prudentius. If judged simply by the quality of his verse, he is, indeed, superior to Ambrose or any other Christian poet of his time. He is represented in the Breviary by eight or nine pieces of which I may mention the vesper hymn of the feast of the Transfiguration, and those at matins and lauds of the Holy Innocents.

The poetic gem of the Breviary, by the unanimous consent of critics, is the *Salvete flores martyrum*, two strophes taken from the *Cathemerinon*, an exquisite cycle of sacred songs written by Prudence in his old age.¹

Only a little inferior to Prudence in poetic grace and vigour we have Sedulius, an Irishman, contemporary of the former. He was a man highly distinguished in many departments of learning ; an eminent theologian, a polished orator. In search of knowledge he travelled through most of the world known in his day, and finally settled down in Rome where he was held in high repute for his great and varied attainments. Only one of his poems finds a place in the Breviary. Of this one I shall have something to say farther on.

Several of the sweetest lyrics in the Office—for instance, *Ave Maris Stella*, *Pange Lingua . . . lauream*, and the *Vexilla regis*—were written by Venantius Fortunatus, who as a brilliant student of rhetoric had to fly from Ravenna to escape death at the hands of the Ostrogoths. He was

¹ This poet, whose full name was Aurelius Prudentius Clemens, was a Spaniard born near Calahorra in Old Castile about the middle of the fourth century. He studied eloquence under the best masters of his day, and became an expert in the art of declamation. He was for several years governor of provinces in Spain, and was afterwards raised to the very highest honours by the Emperor, Theodosius. Growing weary of court life, he renounced his exalted position and ever after led a life of retirement and sanctity. He died about A.D. 410.

ordained priest at Poitiers about the year 565, and subsequently became Bishop of that city. About the year 570 St. Radegondes, having obtained a small piece of the true cross as a special favour from the Emperor Justin, organized a procession of surpassing magnificence for the occasion when the precious relic was to be borne into her monastery. It was for this that Fortunatus, then a simple priest, wrote the truly beautiful hymn, *Vexilla regis*. As regards the *Ave Maris Stella*, we know that it was for a long time attributed to St. Bernard—as was many another anonymous gem of the Middle Ages, and without any very solid reasons. Now, however, most authorities are agreed that it is the work of the Bishop of Poitiers.

The other Breviary hymnists more worthy of note are SS. Hilary and Gregory the Great; Raban Maur,² the friend of Charlemagne, at one time Abbot of Fulda and afterwards Archbishop of Mentz;¹ St. Bernard and St. Thomas; Cardinal Bellarmine; Urban VIII and Leo XIII—the last named being the author of the hymns for the feast of SS. Cyril and Methodius.

Even in classic times the Latin of all Romans was not the refined speech of Cicero or Virgil. There could be heard the *sermo nobilior* and the *sermo plebeius*, just as we find to-day the *favella* of the Trasteverini mingling with the more polished but less poetic speech of the city. In the same way also there were two distinct kinds of verse: the classic written in *sermone nobiliori*, metric, elegant, scanning throughout according to the rules of prosody as we know it; and the popular, often composed in *sermone plebeio*, rhythmic, and ruled by accent rather than quantity. The Church adopted as her speech the *sermo nobilior*, but not to the complete exclusion of the other. Hence in her earliest hymnaries we find both the metric and the rhythmic or syntonic versification. The same holds in the Breviary, where we have, for example, the refined classic elegance of Prudentius as well as the grand sonorous 'barbarism'—the *etruscus rythmus*—of St. Thomas Aquinas.

¹ To this writer has been ascribed the *Veni Creator*; but there is no positive proof that he was the author.

In all, seven kinds of verse are found in the Breviary. Their names, with one or two examples of each, may not be entirely without interest. They are :—

(a) Iambic dimeter :

 Jam lucis orto sidere . . .
 Deus tuorum militum . . . etc.

(b) Iambic trimeter :

 Egregio Doctor Paule mores instrue . . .
 Sit Trinitati sempiterna gloria . . . etc.

(c) Trochaic : the *Pange Lingua* is in this measure.

(d) Sapphic :

 Iste Confessor Domini colentes . . .
 Christe, sanctorum decus angelorum . . . etc.

(e) Asclepediac :

 Te, Joseph celebrent agmina coelitum . . .
 Sacris solemnii juncta sint gaudia . . . etc.

(f) Archiloquian :

 Opes decusque regium relinqueras. . . .

(g) Hexameter :

 Alma Redemptoris mater, quae pervia coeli, etc.

As will be at once observed, the great bulk of the hymns are written in iambic dimeter. This was the kind of verse adopted by St. Ambrose, and scrupulously adhered to by all his imitators. The sapphic, of which we have several specimens, is a fine swinging measure much in vogue with medieval hymnists. It is much in evidence in the famous hymnal of Ferreri, published in the year 1525. Of the measure called archiloquian we have only one sample : the hymn for the feast of St. Elizabeth of Portugal, written by Urban VIII, the *apis attica* of the Renaissance. The *Alma Redemptoris* is the solitary instance of hexameter in the Breviary.

The Breviary is the last place, perhaps, where we might expect to find examples of mere literary trickery. But the unexpected happens even here. Take the hymn at lauds in the ferial office of feria sexta. The censors of Urban

VIII unhappily spoiled its individuality by changing several of the lines. I will therefore give the original version as it stood in the earlier editions :—

Aeterna coeli gloria,
Beata spes mortalium,
Celsi tonantis unice,
Castaeque prolis virginis.

Da dexteram surgentibus,
Exurgat ut mens sobria
Flagrans et in laudem Dei
Grates rependat debitas.

(H)ortus refulget lucifer,
Ipsamque lucem nuntiat ;
Kadit caligo noctium ;
Lux sancta nos illuminet.

Manensque nostris sensibus
Noctem repellat saeculi,
Omniq[ue] fine diei
Purgata servet pectora.

Quaesita jam primum fides
Radicet altis sensibus ;
Secunda spes congaudeat,
Tunc major exstat caritas.

This is what the French call an *abécédaire*. Here, as can be seen, the initial letters of the lines follow strictly the order of the Latin alphabet, except that *c* is once repeated. This composition has been attributed to St. Ambrose by the majority of critics. Some, however, have held otherwise, on the ground that such a style was too frivolous for the great doctor. On the other hand, it is well known that several writers of unimpeachable gravity, including St. Augustine, have not hesitated to employ this peculiar form of versification. But, whatever may be said on this point, I venture to think that the hymn itself is the best justification of its author. It conveys its little message of devotion with as much grace and naturalness as does almost any other hymn in the book.

Belonging to the same genus, but of a somewhat different class, is the hymn for lauds on Christmas Day. Its author is Sedulius whom I have already mentioned. It is taken from a poem of twenty-three stanzas on the life and miracles of the Redeemer, written in perfect classic iambics, and universally regarded as one of the most exquisite things of its kind in existence. The initial letters of the stanzas are in alphabetical sequence; but the obvious exigencies of such an arrangement do not seem in the least to have strained or cramped the natural expression of the poet's thoughts. The four strophes in the vespers of the Epiphany are taken from the same; but here the order has not been strictly followed, as two stanzas beginning *Katerva matrum*, and *Miraculis dedit*, have been omitted. The text of even this literary gem did not escape an overhauling at the hands of the four censors appointed by Urban to revise the songs of the Office; but they showed themselves comparatively merciful towards it, changing only a few words, and in such a manner as not to interfere with its characteristic form.

We have only to glance at the bibliography of the subject to realize, in some measure, what a vast amount of research has been given to the elucidation of the questions I am here so briefly reviewing; and yet many of the most interesting points have up to the present baffled the zeal of the investigator. A very large number of the hymns have still to be classed anonymous. And these include several of the most beautiful and popular. What efforts have been made in certain quarters, for instance, to discover the real author of the *Veni Creator Spiritus*? Yet the piece remains anonymous. Of course, it has been associated with several great names—with those of Ambrose, Gregory the Great, Charlemagne, etc.—but on the strength of mere conjecture. We do not know who wrote the *Iste Confessor* nor the *Ave, Regina coelorum*; and so of many another favourite.

Yet this is not due to any lack of effort on the part of historians or critics in this department. We have the Homeric question and the Shakesperean question, and many a kindred puzzle in the history of comparatively modern

literature. Is it any wonder, then, that there should be obscurity about the origin of certain fugitive lyrics brought forth in out-of-the-way places perhaps more than a thousand years ago? On the whole, we have reason to be deeply grateful to the various writers like Daniel, Chevalier, and Pimont, whose industry has done so much to illuminate this portion of the liturgy, and to weave a most interesting study round those little flowers of the Divine Office.

J. HASSAN, C.C.

NOTE.

The following list follows the order given in Bacuez's work. I have revised it in accordance with the most recent and reliable authorities:—

ST. HILARY.

Beata nobis gaudia Pentecost, Laud.

ST. AMBROSE.

Aeterni Christi munera . . .	Apostolorum	Comm. Apost., Mat.
Christo profusum sanguinem	Comm. Pl. Mart., Mat.
Aeterne retum Conditor	Dom. Thiem., Laud.
Coeli Deus sanctissime	Feria iv., Vesp.
Consors paterni luminis	Feria iii., Mat.
Hominis supreme Conditor	Feria vi., Vesp.
Immense coeli Conditor	Feria ii., Vesp.
Jam sol recedit igneus	Sabb., Vesp.
Jesu, corona Virginum	Comm., Virg.
Lucis Creator optime	Dom., Vesp.
Magnae Deus potentiae	Feria v., Vesp.
Nunc sancte nobis Spiritus	ad Tertiam.
O lux beata Trinitas	SS. Trinit., Vesp.
Rector potens, verax Deus	ad Sextam.
Rerum Deus tenax vigor	ad Nonam.
Splendor paeternae gloriae	Feria ii., Laud.
Telluris alme Conditor	Feria iii., Vesp.
Tu Trinitatis Unitas	Feria vi., Mat.

PRUDENCE.

Ales dici nuntius	Feria iii., Laud.
Audit tyrannus anxius	SS. Innoc., Mat.
Lux ecce surgit aurea	Feria v., Laud.
Nox, et tenebrae, et nubila	Feria iv., Laud.
O sola magnarum urbiuum	Epiph., Laud.
Quicumque Christum quaeritis	SS. Innoc., Laud.
Salvete flores martyrum	

SEDULIUS.

A solis ortus cardine	Nativ., Lauds.
Crudelis Herodes, Deum	Epiph., Vesp.

PAUL OF AQUILEIA.

Miris modis repente	S. Pet. in Vinc.
Quodcumque in orbis	Cath. S. Petri.

ELPIS.

Beate pastor, Petre, clemens accipe	.	.	Cath. S. Pet., Laud.
Decora lux aeternitatis	.	.	SS. Pet. & Paul., Vesp.
Egregie Doctor Paule, mores instrue	.	.	Conv. S. Pauli, Vesp.

FORTUNATUS.

Ave maris stella	.	.	B.V.M.
Lustra sex qui jam peregit	.	.	D. Passionis, Laud.
O gloriosa virginum	.	.	B.V.M., Laud.
Pange lingua . . . lauream certaminis	.	.	D. Pass., Mat.
Quem terra, pontus, sidera	.	.	B.V.M., Mat.
Vexilla regis	.	.	D. Pass., Vesp.

ST. GREGORY THE GREAT.

Audi, benigne Conditor	.	.	D. Quadr., Vesp.
Ecce jam noctis	.	.	Dom. Aest., Laud.
Ex more docti mystico	.	.	Quadr., Mat.
Nocte surgentes vigilemus omnes	.	.	Dom. Aest., Mat.
Nox atra rerum	.	.	Feria v., Mat.
Primo die quo Trinitas	.	.	Dom. Hiem., Mat.
Rerum Creator optime	.	.	Feria iv., Mat.
Somno refectis artibus	.	.	Feria ii., Mat.

PAUL WARNEFRID THE DEACON.

Antra deserte teneris sub annis	.	.	J. Bapt., Laud.
O nimis felix meritique celsi	.	.	J. Bapt., Vesp.
Ut queant laxis	.	.	

RABAN MAUR.

Christe sanctorum decus	.	.	Michael, Laud.
Te Splendor et virtus Patris (?)	.	.	Michael, Vesp.

ST. ODO OF CLUNY.

Aeterni Patris unice	.	.	M. Mag., Laud.

ST. BERNARD.

Amor Jesu dulcissime	.	.	Transfig., Laud.
Jesus, decus Angelicum	.	.	SS. n. Jesu., Laud.
Jesu dulcis memoria	.	.	SS. n. Jesu., Vesp.
Jesu, Rex admirabilis	.	.	SS. n. Jesu., Mat.

ST. THOMAS.

Pange lingua	.	.	Corpus Xti., Vesp.
Sacris solemnii	.	.	Corpus Xti., Mat.
Verbum supernum	.	.	Corpus Xti., Laud.

CARD. ANTONIANUS.

Fortem virili pectore	.	.	Com. Virg.

CARD. BELLARMINE.

Aeterne Rector siderum	.	.	Ang. Cust., Laud.
Maria castis oculis	.	.	M. Magd., Mat.
Pater superni luminis	.	.	M. Magd., Vesp.
Summi Parentis unice	.	.	M. Magd., Laud.

URBAN VIII.

Domare cordis impetus	:	:	:	Eliz. Port.
Haec est dies	:	:	:	S. Teresa, Mat.
Martinae celebri	:	:	:	S. Martina, Vesp.
Regalio solio	:	:	:	Hermenegild, Vesp.
Regis superni nuntia	:	:	:	S. Teresa, Vesp.

EUSTACE SIRENA.

Hymns of the feast of our Lady of the Rosary.

JACOPONE DI TODI.

Stabat Mater.

LEO XIII.

Hymns of SS. Cyril and Methodius.

Of the Antiphons of Compline the *Te lucis ante terminum* belongs to that large catalogue of uncertain authorship called Ambrosian. The *Alma Redemptoris* was written by Herman Contract, a monk of Reichenau. The *Ave, Regina* is still of doubtful origin. The *Regina Coeli* probably belongs to Gregory V, and the *Salve Regina* to Ademar, Bishop of Puy. It is well known that St. Bernard added the closing invocation, but authorities differ as to the time and place. The Annals of Citeaux relate the fact as having occurred at Spires in the year 1146.

The hymns not mentioned in the preceding list still remain anonymous.

DIALOGUES ON SCRIPTURAL SUBJECTS:
THE PENTATEUCH—VII

FATHER O'BRIEN.—Since our last interview a very important document has been issued by the Pope, which bears on one of the questions you then proposed to me, and affects somewhat the reply I gave.

PATRICK O'FLAHERTY.—Pray what is that?

FR. O'B.—I refer to the *Motu Proprio* regarding the authority of the decisions of the Biblical Commission, issued on the 18th of November, 1907, by Pius X.

P. O'F.—Will you kindly give me the substance of this document?

FR. O'B.—His Holiness having alluded to the Encyclical *Providentissimus Deus* of his predecessor on the Sacred Scriptures, issued on 19th November, 1893, and to his defence of the Bible against the errors and calumnies of the Rationalists as well as against the 'false teachings of what is known as the higher criticism, which are clearly nothing but the commentaries of rationalism derived from a misuse of philology and kindred studies,' tells us how, in order 'to provide against the propagation of rash and erroneous views,' he, Leo XIII, by Apostolic Letters of 29th October, 1902, established a Pontifical Council or Commission on Biblical matters, composed of a number of Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, distinguished for their learning and prudence, adding to these, under the title of consultors, a considerable body of men in sacred Orders, chosen from among the learned in theology and in the Holy Bible, of various nationalities and differing in their methods and views concerning exegetical studies; wishing thereby to have every question fully discussed from every point of view, and furthermore, ordaining 'that the Cardinals of the Commission were not to come to any definite decision until they had taken cognisance of,

and examined the arguments on both sides, omitting nothing which might serve to show in the clearest light the true and genuine state of the Biblical questions proposed for solution ; and when all this had been done, that the decision reached should be submitted for approval to the Supreme Pontiff, and then promulgated.'

' In these words of Pius X you have the origin, the object, the constitution, and *personnel* and procedure of the Biblical Commission. His Holiness continues : ' After mature examination and the most diligent consultations, certain decisions have been happily given by the Pontifical Commission on the Bible, and these of a kind very useful for the proper promotion and direction on safe lines of Biblical studies. But We observe that some persons, unduly prone to opinions and methods tainted by pernicious novelties, and excessively devoted to that principle of false liberty, what is really immoderate license and in sacred studies proves itself to be most insidious and a fruitful source of the worst evils against the purity of faith, have not received and do not receive these decisions with the proper obedience. Wherefore We find it necessary to declare and prescribe, as We do now declare and expressly prescribe, that all are bound in conscience to submit to the decisions regarding doctrine, of the Biblical Commission, which have been given in the past, and which shall be given in the future, in the same way as to the Decrees approved by the Pontiff ; of the Roman Congregations ; nor can all those escape the risk of disobedience or temerity, and consequently of grave sin, who in speech or writing impugn these decisions ; and this in addition to the scandal they give and the other reasons for which they may be responsible before God, for other temerities and errors usually accompany such oppositions.'

I think it is better to give you the very words of this weighty and most important document so far as it has reference to the subject of our discussion. The remainder is taken up with the Syllabus and Encyclical against the Modernists, both of which he repeats and confirms, adding ' the penalty of excommunication against contradicitors.'

From the extracts I have given you, you see that the decisions of the Biblical Commission have the same authority as the decrees of the other Roman Congregations which have been approved of by the Pope, and that those who impugn or refuse to submit to them are guilty of 'disobedience or temerity, and consequently of grave sin.'

P. O'F.—I see now the reason of your reserve in reply to my question at our last interview, what is to be thought of those who still maintain that Moses is not the author of the Pentateuch. Your reply, if I remember aright, was that it was not for you or any private individual to condemn anybody of disobedience or temerity in such matters: that it belonged to the Holy See to do so. Now the Pope has spoken, and it would appear, from what you have just read, that if anybody henceforward denies the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, he would be disobedient, temerarious, and guilty of a grave sin.

FR. O'B.—Yes, if my interpretation of the decision of the Biblical Commission be correct; and on that point, though my opinion may not be worth much, I have no doubt whatever in my own mind.

P. O'F.—But am I bound to believe that Moses himself wrote every word in the Pentateuch?

FR. O'B.—That does not follow by any means. As I told you in our last interview, you must distinguish between the question of the Mosaic authorship and the mode of the authorship. The decision of the Commission in response to the first dubium, refers to the authorship itself. Your question brings us to the second dubium, which you will remember, was 'Whether the Mosaic authorship necessarily implied that Moses wrote with his own hand or dictated to amanuenses all and everything contained in it; or whether it is possible to admit the hypothesis of those who think that Moses conceived the work under the influence of divine inspiration, and then entrusted the writing of it to some other person or persons, but in such manner that they faithfully rendered his meaning, wrote nothing contrary to his will and omitted nothing; and that the work thus formed, approved by Moses as the

principal and inspired author, was made public under his name ?'

In reply to this question, the Commission tells us that the Mosaic authorship does not necessarily imply that Moses wrote it all with his own hand, and that there is no incompatibility between the Mosaic authorship in the true sense of the word, and the opinion of those who hold that he did not write it all personally, but may have done it in the way suggested in the doubt. According to Josephus, Philo, most Jewish and early Christian Biblical scholars, Moses himself either wrote or dictated to secretaries the whole Pentateuch. Latterly some Biblical and thoroughly orthodox critics say that probably Moses was not the author of the Pentateuch in that sense, nor is it necessary for his authorship to hold it, but it would be quite sufficient to believe that he, Moses, 'conceived the work under the influence of divine inspiration, and then entrusted the writing of it to others, who faithfully rendered his meaning ; and that Moses himself inspired, approved of the work thus written, and had it published in his name.'

As you will observe, the Commission does not decide in which way Moses became the author of the Pentateuch, it simply says that it is not necessary to hold that he was the author of it in the first way indicated, and that the second opinion is quite compatible with his authorship. This is very clear and simple, and presents no difficulties.

P. O'F.—I see that. I dare say it is an everyday occurrence. I suppose it is not necessary to hold that the Popes when issuing Encyclical or other letters of which they are truly the authors, should either write them with their own hands, or dictate them word for word to their secretaries ; but in many cases they may have acted in some such way as that mentioned in the second part of the dubium.

FR. O'B.—I should say so.

Let me now explain to you the meaning of the third doubt—and the reply thereto. In order that you may more easily understand it, let me tell you that it deals with what is called the 'document hypotheses' regard-

ing the Pentateuch, the history of which is briefly as follows.

So far back as the year 1753 a Parisian medical man named Astruc published a book in which he propounded the opinion that Moses composed the book of Genesis from pre-existing written documents. Noticing that the word Elohim is used in some parts of Genesis to denote God, whilst in other parts He is called Jehovah, he conceived the idea that the sections in which these different appellations are given to the same Supreme Being must have been borrowed by Moses from quite distinct anterior memoirs. At first he divided the sources of the Pentateuch into two distinct sets of documents, which he called respectively Elohistic and Jehovahistic. Subsequently, however, he thought these would not comprise all the pre-existing documents, but that there were ten minor portions or fragments which do not belong to either.

This theory was seized on with avidity by the authors of the then incipient Rationalism. They clearly foresaw that it gave them a basis for making an assault on the foundation of the whole fabric of Revelation. They proceeded timidly and cautiously at first, but as time went on, new critics began to improve on the destructive theories of their predecessors, with the result that the hypotheses which were for one decade the accepted truths of these rationalistic and rationalizing critics, in the next decade were utterly discarded, and more advanced and destructive theories propounded. What was at first applied only to Genesis was soon applied to the other four books; and, finally, it was and is now maintained, that many of these documents of which the Pentateuch is composed are of a date subsequent to the time of Moses. The document hypotheses of Astruc and Eichorn were supplanted by the fragment hypotheses of J. S. Vater, 1826, and A. Hartman, 1838. These again were either corrected or set aside by a new batch of critics, Bohlen, Tuck, Dewette, who invented what is called the supplement hypothesis. After a short time this new theory was set aside for a return more or less to the old

document theory by Herman Hupfeld in 1853, who, however, instead of one discovered two sets of Elohist documents, one Jehovahist and one final editor. But that hypothesis is now more or less obsolete, and the latest craze is the development theory of Reuss, Graf, and Wellhausen, which has been adopted by Driver in his *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, and in his new edition of the Hebrew Lexicon of Gesenius, which he is collaborating with C. A. Briggs and J. Brown. Doubtless in a few years time this latest theory will be repudiated by other and more advanced critics. What I wish to direct your attention to in this rather bald and brief history of these theories of documents and fragments is, the downward and ever-changing course of the destructive critics, their contradictory hypotheses, and the unity and aim of each and all, that is, to try and discover some intelligible theory to take the place of the Mosaic authorship, to which they are all opposed for the reason given you in our last dialogue.

P. O'F.—But is there any foundation for this document hypothesis, or is there any sense in which it may be accepted by a true Catholic?

Fr. O'B.—In the first place, I may say, that those who, with the Rationalists, hold that the Pentateuch is composed of documents subsequent to the time of Moses, are completely out of court, and are condemned by the recent decree, because such persons deny the Mosaic authorship of the book. If, however, the document hypothesis be understood in the sense that Moses in writing the Pentateuch, consulted pre-existing written documents, as well as oral tradition, to discover and confirm the truth of the facts which he was about to narrate, in this sense the document theory is not only admissible but most probable, if not certain. For, on the one hand, as I mentioned to you in one of our first interviews, it is certain that the art of writing existed before the time of Moses, and hence it is quite credible that there may have been some documents written either by the patriarchs or by Egyptian authors, which Moses had at hand and consulted; and, on the other

hand, as inspiration does exclude human industry in finding out truth, especially the facts of history, if such documents did exist, Moses as a prudent and painstaking historian would naturally have studied, sifted and compared them with the oral traditions. I am speaking of course of the historical facts of Genesis, prior to his own time, of which he was not an eye-witness. That such a consultation and study of pre-existing written memorials is quite consistent with inspiration, is evident from the Second Book of Machabees, ii. 20-27, in which the inspired author speaking of the history of Judas Machabeus and his brethren, their exploits and wars against Antiochus, tells us that 'all such things as have been comprised in five books by Jason of Cyrene, we have attempted to *abridge in one book* . . . and as to ourselves indeed, in undertaking this work of abridging, we have taken in hand no easy task, yea rather a business full of sweating and watching.' A similar course was adopted by St. Luke in writing his Gospel, as is evident from the first three verses of the first chapter.

P. O'F.—Is this the sense in which the Biblical Commission has decided that 'it can be conceded without prejudice to the Mosaic authenticity, that Moses in his work used sources, i.e. written documents or oral tradition, from which, to suit his special purpose, and under the influence of divine inspiration, selected some things and inserted them in his work, either verbally or in substance, summarised or amplified'?

FR. O'B.—I think so.

P. O'F.—But is there any other sense in which this document theory is understood, and propounded by some Catholic critics?

FR. O'B.—Yes. There are not wanting some of them who say that Moses not merely consulted these pre-existing documents, but took them as he found them, wholesale, and incorporated them in his book as so many separate and independent fragments.

P. O'F.—What is the need or basis of such an hypothesis?

FR. O'B.—There is no need for it, as I hope to be able to show you; and as for the basis of it, its authors and

defenders allege in addition to the use of the words Jehovah and Elohim, to which I have already alluded, that there are certain repetitions regarding the creation of man, the history of some of the patriarchs, etc., also some omissions, titles and conclusions, as well as difference of style, which would seem to demand such an hypothesis, and not to be otherwise capable of explanation.

P. O'F.—What is your opinion on that point?

FR. O'B.—My opinion is, that such a theory is not in the least necessary, is destitute of solid foundation, and critically ought be rejected.

P. O'F.—Your opinion is so clearly expressed that, whatever be its value, there is no mistaking its meaning. Pray give the grounds for your opinion.

FR. O'B.—Let me examine for you the argument which they base on the Jehovahistic and Elohistic documents; which is the strongest in favour of their theory. This will serve as a specimen for the present. They say, that in some parts of Genesis the word Jehovah only is used, and in others Elohim; and from this they conclude that there were two sets of documents written by different authors, and at different periods, and that Moses took them as he found them, and embodied them in his book.

This hypothesis is destitute of foundation, and is refuted by the Book of Genesis itself. For in the sixth chapter of Genesis, in verses 3, 5, 9, 12, and 22, we find God called by the name Elohim, but in verse 8 He is called Jehovah. What say the authors of the theory to this? Will they hold that it was a different author wrote verse 8 from the others? Again, in Genesis viii., verse 15, God is called Elohim, but in verses 20 and 21 He is called Jehovah. Perhaps different authors wrote these different verses—though they are in the same context and form part of one and the same narrative. But most striking of all is that in verse 16, chapter vii. of Genesis, we find Him called both Elohim and Jehovah. 'And they that went in, went in male and female of all flesh, as God [Elohim] had commanded him; and the Lord [Jehovah] shut him in on the outside.' Will the authors of this theory tell us that it

was an Elohistic writer wrote the first part of the verse and a Jehovahistic the second?

P. O'F.—In the face of these texts it is very hard to see how they can maintain their hypothesis. But have you any explanation to give of the use of both words to signify the same Supreme Being?

FR. O'B.—In reply I may say, that the promiscuous use of both words is not confined to Genesis. It is to be found in the prophecies of Isaías, Jeremias, and the others, as well as up and down through the Psalms. Even in the very same psalm God is called now Elohim and now Jehovah. The same is observable in the exhortation of Moses to the Israelites in the 4th chapter of Deuteronomy, which the rationalists themselves admit is the work of one author. And why not Moses, the same as any other writer, either to avoid monotonous repetitions of the same word, to embellish his style, or for other reasons, use now one word now another to designate the same thing?

From this you will see that this document theory, besides being unnecessary, rests on no solid foundation, so far as the use of words Jehovah and Elohim are concerned. Nor are the other arguments adduced in support of it of greater force. But I prefer to defer the discussion of these until a future occasion.

H. D. L.

THE RETURN OF THE BENEDICTINES TO IRELAND

MANY Irishmen fear that the Irish nation is dying from sheer loss of blood. Emigration is drawing the young and healthy to foreign lands, and leaving the old and the diseased to keep up the nation. There is some truth in this hopeless view, but yet there is a gleam of light through these dark clouds. A certain number of our exiles from the very love of their own nation are returning to see whether they individually can do anything to revive that nation. Returned Irishmen from the United States and from England are now to be found in nearly every part of Ireland. These men having seen what national spirit can do in other countries are helping to revive the national spirit in Ireland.

A larger event, however, than the mere returning of individuals has occurred. One of the Church's great monastic Orders has returned to Ireland. The Benedictines have been absent from us since they were expelled during the reign of Henry VIII, and now they have returned; no doubt, only in a tentative way, but yet with every prospect of success, if God continues to enable them to overcome future obstacles as He has enabled them to overcome many serious difficulties in the past.

A few young Benedictines from Downside Abbey, in Somersetshire, were inspired some five years ago with a desire to establish a Benedictine monastery in Ireland. Their scheme was to begin in a very small way, and to establish at first a preparatory school for the class of boys who were going to the English Catholic Colleges. Their first step was to obtain the consent of the Chapter of the Downside Benedictines. It seemed to be nearly a hopeless undertaking, but they adopted the old means of prayer. They began a novena to St. Patrick, that, as it were, he

and St. Benedict should put their heads together in heaven, and induce these English servants of St. Benedict to do something for Ireland by supporting the views of those young monks who desired to return to Ireland. *Do cum glóripe Dé agur Onóra ná hÉireann.* The result of this novena was marvellous. The Chapter, quite unexpectedly, agreed nearly unanimously that steps should be taken to see what their prospects would be with regard to obtaining boys, if they were to open a school in Ireland, and whether they would be likely to get a suitable house in a diocese where the bishop would welcome them. The then Abbot of Downside, Abbot Ford, who was rather opposed to the project, became enthusiastic in its favour when he inquired fully into its prospects.

It was discovered that such a school would, without doubt, meet a great want in Ireland. A few parents, who had been educated by the Benedictines in England, were most anxious, from a national feeling, to have their boys educated in Ireland, but, at the same time, to have them educated with the spirit of the Benedictines, which is one of liberty and of the love of God. The Benedictine spirit is directly opposed to that Jansenistic spirit of looking on God as an ogre who is always trying to catch one of His creatures at a disadvantage. The Benedictines do not suspect boys of being anxious to commit every crime under the sun, and they are not constantly watching them. Their boys, therefore, grow up with manly and independent characters, without which men cannot be really good Catholics, nor good Nationalists, but must be, more or less, slaves all their lives. God wishes to be served by freemen, not by slaves.

Very many parents, however, who were without any national feeling, and who would have preferred to send their boys to English schools, found that the modern system of sending boys home for three vacations during the year entailed a great expense for travelling and risk to the health of the boys from crossing the Channel during the winter months ; and, therefore, they were glad to find a preparatory school nearer home for their younger boys. When it was

discovered that there would be no difficulty in getting boys, and that it seemed possible to get a suitable house and the hearty welcome of an Irish bishop, the matter had again to come before the Benedictine Chapter at Downside, and as the scheme seemed now far more feasible, the opposition from those who formerly looked on it as impossible suddenly gained in strength ; but, in the end, St. Patrick and St. Benedict triumphed, and the Chapter voted by a majority in favour of the experiment.

There was then a long delay in finding a suitable house, as when one was found, and the rent asked was agreed to, the owners refused to give the lease, and the work of looking for a house had to be begun again. At last two years ago, a house was taken near Enniscorthy, and the school was opened with two Benedictine priests and three boys. Last summer the house was found to be altogether too small for the number of the boys who were applying. It so happened that the very house, that the owners had previously refused to let, was for sale, with nearly 400 acres of land. It was purchased by the Benedictines in fee simple, and during the last term there were twenty-three boys and four priests at Mount St. Benedict, Gorey, Co. Wexford. It is a curious fact that this property is within six miles of where there was an old Benedictine foundation before the time of the suppression of the monasteries.

The success of the undertaking is now assured, if enough Irishmen with the Benedictine spirit join this new Benedictine foundation, and in that case we may hope once again in Ireland solid work will be done for learning by Irish monks. The spirit of St. Benedict is not one of preaching, but of teaching and study, and therefore Benedictines would not interfere with the present preaching Orders.

The Pope has just appointed the Benedictines to revise the Vulgate, and it is remarkable that this Commission of the Benedictines of the world have selected Abbot Gasquet, one of the Downside monks, as their president. Abbot Gasquet has been a strong supporter of the Irish foundation, and Abbot Butler, the present

learned Abbot of Downside Abbey, was one of its principal supporters from the beginning.

Irishmen have in the past run all over the world to join religious houses; it is to be hoped that there will be no difficulty in finding suitable young men with vocations, both as choir-monks and lay-brothers, to re-establish the great Benedictine Order in Ireland, and to devote themselves to study, teaching youth, singing the Divine Office, and cultivating the land, as did the Benedictines in the time of St. Benedict.

A LAYMAN.

NOTE.—The writer is alone responsible for the foregoing sketch. The writing of it has not been suggested to him by any person.

'SOLOMON'S TEMPLE: ITS HISTORY AND STRUCTURE'¹

ALL those who take an intelligent and practical interest in the advance of Biblical studies know about Dr. Caldecott's recent decipherment of some cuneiform texts which have been a standing puzzle to the best Assyriologists. We allude to the tablets that contain the triple metrical system. The successful application of his extraordinary discovery of their hidden meaning to one of the greatest problems in Scripture was made known in his book *The Tabernacle: its History and Structure*. (Second edition, 1906.)

Then for the first time the results of extraordinary ingenuity coupled with unwearied application took the place of conjectures, of well-meant but unsubstantiated theories. Who can tell how many fanciful persons in the course of centuries were each in turn convinced that he had explained the apparently insoluble difficulties in the sacred text. But nevertheless the given measurements of the Mosaic tabernacle with its sacred contents—the golden lampstand and the altar of incense, the veil of the Holy of Holies, the Ark of the Covenant, etc.—were incapable of mutual reconciliation, until Dr. Caldecott demonstrated by his reading of the mysterious cuneiform signs that centuries before Moses a three-fold system of measurement was used in the native land of Abraham, and then showed as clearly as noonday that it was in accordance with these three different Babylonian standards that Moses reckoned the respective dimensions of wood-work (ground area), tapestry, and gold ornamentation. In a moment everything was evident. All that we ever read in Scripture, in Josephus, etc., could henceforward be readily understood. It is a pleasure to add that certain

¹ *Solomon's Temple: its History and its Structure*. By Rev. W. S. Caldecott. London: The Religious Tract Society, 1907, 6s.

invidious remarks by persons of the Wellhausen school proved unavailing to obscure the light of truth. The critics suffered a woful defeat, and they felt it. The discoverer's book is regarded as a triumph of exegesis by all competent and unprejudiced judges, and has received the highest encomiums.

The new volume, now lying before us, is the second of a series which the learned author, notwithstanding, his years, intends to complete. In it he tests the accuracy of his calculations (for Dr. Caldecott is a believer in Scripture) by applying them to the Biblical *data* of the measurements of Solomon's Temple and all that belonged to it. Once more his system comes out of the ordeal victorious. But it is not for his system considered in itself that Dr. Caldecott is most concerned; his chief object is to defend the truth of the Bible, and the truthfulness of the men that wrote it, against the attacks of unbelievers. And it is not in our power to see how a more complete and crushing answer to many objections could be given than that which is contained in his second volume. It is also a veritable mine of erudition. But what he has on the Temple area and architecture our readers will study for themselves. The accompanying tables, and the illustrations give all possible help. As regards the view Dr. Caldecott takes of Old Testament history, which by the way is that of Schöpfer (*Geschichte des A. T.*) and also of his French translator Abbé Pelt, there can be no doubt of its correctness. Dr. Caldecott expresses his view thus: 'What we have in certain books of the Old Testament is, primarily, not a history of the people, but a history of religious thought and feeling in the people.'

He devotes a large part of his admirable introduction to the explanation of contested dates, and even gives us page 23, a 'new chronological scheme of the Hebrew kings.' As he intends to continue his researches when he comes to deal with the history of the second Temple, we would fain bespeak his attention to the following remarks on the chronology, i.e., in particular on the duration of the captivity. It probably lasted not seventy

but only forty-nine years. This provisional statement, which possesses so much to recommend it, has been made since the publication of Schöpfer's and other recent standard works on Hebrew history. It is not in accordance with the articles in the latest Biblical dictionaries, so as Dr. Caldecott is engaged on the article entitled 'Old Testament Chronology,' for the forthcoming dictionary which is to refute the vagaries of the *Encyclopedie Biblica*, etc., we commend the following system to his best consideration. It was published a few years ago in the *Museon*, and ever since it has seemed infinitely preferable to the ingenious theories of Oppert¹ and others.

1. It seems that we must distinguish between the captivity and the subjection to Babylon. In one the people were in a foreign land, in the other their cities were humbled. It is not in regard to the captivity, but in regard to the subjection to Babylon which the Jews in common with so many nations (*that never were in captivity*) had to suffer, that the seventy years are predicted. Jeremias says, 'Et erit universa terra haec in solitudinem, et in stuporem: et servient omnes gentes istae regi Babyloniae septuaginta annis' (xxv. 11). 'Cum coeperint impleri in Babylonia septuaginta anni visitabo vos: et suscitabo super vos verbum meum bonum ut reducam vos ad locum istum' (xxix. 10). Then Daniel (ix. 2), 'Anno uno regni ejus, ego Daniel intellexi in libris numerum annorum, de quo factus est sermo Domini ad Jeremiam prophetam, ut completerentur desolationis Jerusalem septuaginta anni.' And Zachary (i. 12) say, 'Et respondit angelus Domini et dixit; Domine exercituum usquequo tu non misereberis Jerusalem, et urbibus Juda, quibus iratus es? Iste jam septuagesimus annus est.'

2. Not one of the passages in Jeremias that foretell the captivity, mention seventy years as its duration. The following list includes all the passages, and readers can judge for themselves—v. 19 (?) viii. 3, ix. 15, x. 18, xiii. 19, xv. 2, xvi. 13-15, xx. 10, xxix. 10, xxx. 18, xxxi. 23, xxxii. 37, xxxiii. 11-26 (xx. 4-9, xxi. 8 should be compared

¹ *Proceedings of Society of Biblical Archaeology*, vol. xx., p. 24, sqq. 1898.

with Isaias xxxix. 1-7, and Micheas iii. 12, vii. 13, iv. 10). These prophecies are addressed to the *nation*, so it is plain that the captivity does not commence to date from the transportation of an individual or of a group of individuals. In fact there were two such transports before, and one after, the captivity. This all-important point has, however, frequently escaped notice or been lost sight of. It will therefore be necessary to indicate the four transports.

1. *That of Daniel and others.* Nabuchodonozor sent by his father Nabopolassar, gained the victory over Necho II at Karchemisch in 605. This Pharaoh had for three years before been master of Syria and Palestine. Nabuchodonozor pursued him to the frontiers of Egypt, and on his way took Joachim, King of Juda, and loaded him with chains. Nabuchodonozor's intention was to send Joachim a prisoner to Babylon. It is not certain that he actually sent him (apparently he did, according to the Hebrew text of 2 Paralipomenon xxxvi. 6 : in which case he allowed him to return to Jerusalem), for he himself had to hasten to Babylon, in consequence of the tidings of his father's death. But at any rate he took some prisoners, among whom were Daniel and his companions. 'In the third year of Joachim' (Daniel i. 1-3), 'In the fourth year' (Jeremias xxv. 1-9). Apparently Daniel speaks of a third year ending, and Jeremias of a fourth year beginning, during the siege.

2. In 602 Nabuchodonozor came into Syria to repress a revolt. Joachim was beaten and compelled to pay the tribute. Three years afterwards he conspired with the Egyptians and Tyrians. Nabuchodonozor set out again, but before his arrival Joachim was dead (4 Kings xxiv. 1-2, Jeremias xxii. 18-19). Joachim or Jechonias was unable to resist the invaders; and 18,000 men, among them being Ezechiel (i. 2, 3) and Mardochai (Esther ii. 5, 6; xi. 4) were transported to Babylon in 598.

3. Sedecias, uncle of Jechonias, who was placed on the throne by Nabuchodonozor, rebelled. Taking occasion of Nabuchodonozor's trouble with the Medes he became an ally of the Egyptians in order to throw off the

Babylonian yoke. The downfall and ruin of Jerusalem was the consequence of this action. Nabuchodonozor besieged it for eighteen months. (Sedecias, ninth year, tenth month—tenth year, fourth month) A.C. 588. The Pharao, Ouhabra, tried to assist the Jews, but in vain. Famine forced them to yield, and the Chaldeans plundered the city and burned Solomon's temple (4 Kings xxv. 1-21). Only a few wretched paupers were left in Judea; 832 persons were transported from Jerusalem (Jeremias lii. 29). This happened in the nineteenth year of Nabuchodonozor, according to 4 Kings xxv. 8; in the eighteenth, according to Jeremias lii. 29, and Josephus, *contra Apion*, i. 21. We see here the same difference in reckoning as before.

4. In the twenty-third or the twenty-fourth year of Nabuchodonozor. He had left a governor in the country, Godolias. The few Jews who had succeeded in escaping banishment rallied round him. But he was assassinated, and the Jews fled into Egypt in order to escape from the King's vengeance (4 Kings xxv. 22-26). Jeremias, whom they took with them by force, foretold that Nabuchodonozor would conquer Egypt (xlvi. 13-26; xliii. 6-13). Ezechiel did the same (xxix. 2-10, 18-20). He invaded Egypt twice, in the twenty-fourth and in the twenty-seventh year of his reign. On the first occasion Nabuchodonozor transported to Babylon the Jews that he found (Josephus, *Antq.*, X. ix. 7), in all 745 (Jeremias lii. 30). Nabuchodonozor, who made Babylon one of the wonders of the world, reigned forty-three years.

The third transportation is the *one* that Jeremias had in view. It is to this that the prophecies indicated above refer. He concludes his description of the appalling catastrophe in the reign of Sedecias by saying, 'Et translatus est Juda de terra sua' (lii. 28). The same mournful words occur in 4 Kings xxv. 21, which he probably wrote. Again in Jeremias I. 3, we read, 'Usque ad consummationem undecimi anni Sedeciae filii Josiae regis Juda, usque ad transmigrationem Jerusalem in mense quinto.' And Ezechiel (xxv. 3) makes the ruin of the city and the

temple identical with the captivity of Juda. Everyone that has read Ezechiel knows that his warnings during the reign of Sedecias all presuppose that Juda is still a people. How much they differ from words addressed to a number of captives !

The captivity began at the destruction of Jerusalem (588) and ended in the first year of Cyrus. The 'seventy years captivity' is therefore nothing more than a popular error. Nabuchodonozor reigned twenty-six years after the destruction of Jerusalem. Evil Merodach two, Neriglissar four, Nabonaid seventeen, Cyrus some months before the return—so the captivity lasted forty-nine years. This really must be the meaning of the allusion in Baruch vii. 2.

As everybody knows Ezechiel dates by the years of Joachin's captivity, or of his own. The return must be placed under Cyrus, Isaias xliv. 26-28, xlv. 1-5; and in the first year of his reign, Esdras i. 1, etc., and 2 Paralipomenon xxxvi. 22, 23 (A.D. 538). But the end of the captivity was not contemporary with the end of the ruins of Jerusalem. This happened in the second year of Darius Hystaspes (520), from the burning of Jerusalem (588) to (518) there are seventy years. Daniel ix. 2 speaks of the seventy years of ruin for Jerusalem (ix. 2) foretold by Jeremias, xxv. 11. (I do not see my way to answer xxix. 10). Zacharias evidently supposes that the exile is over and that the Jews are back (see viii. 15). Aggeus supposes the same (1-4). So that twenty years after the return Jerusalem had neither temple nor fortifications (Esdras vi., Aggeus i., Zacharias i.-iii.).

Jeremias xxv. 11 (Heb., Sept., Vulg., Pesh.) announce seventy year of *servitude* not of captivity. **נַסְעָה** never means 'to be captive.'

After the return, Esdras (ix. 8, 9) uses the word of his nation. And in Jeremias xxvii. 11 it is used in antithesis to the condition of captivity. In 590 Jeremias, predicting the captivity, shows that it is not yet. Babylon was taken 538. There are not seventy years between. Were 'all these nations' captive for seventy years ?

In v. 11 this country will be laid waste, and these nations will not serve the King of Babylon. Seventy years, the period indicated, refers to both preceding clauses. The beginning of the period dates apparently from the fall of Ninive, 609 A.C.

Thirty-one years of Josias, who was the ally of the Ninivite King (4 Kings xxiii. 29); Nabopolassar, seventeenth or eighteenth year; the end 539. This period of servitude does not *coincide* with the period of the ruins of Jerusalem. The latter begins with the eleventh of Sedecias, eighteenth of Nabuchodonozor, when the city was taken by assault and the temple burned. It ended with something connected with the restoration of the temple. The Jews began to rebuild the Temple the 24th day of the sixth month of the second year of Darius=sixty-eight years. Darius' edict issued two years after=seventy. Temple finished 3rd day of Adar or twelfth month in sixth year =seventy-two.

REGINALD WALSH, O.P.

A WAY OUT FOR FRANCE

THE promise of 'issue with temptation' made to units of the Church Militant, applies also to sorely-tried groups of individual souls—to the family, and to the nation. Christendom, therefore, has no abiding fear for Catholic France—the true Christendom, that is, which cherishes the faith that enabled Faber to say that 'properly speaking there have been no nights in the history of the Church. There have been but eclipses.'

The Church Teaching of France has bound herself to the See of Peter more irrevocably than ever. The Church Taught is obeying the voice of its pastors. Consequently it will soon be the turn of the laity to suffer persecution for justice' sake. And there is little doubt that the *Bloc* will strike the sheep where it struck the shepherds, viz., in purse and in pocket.

Now this *argumentum ad crumenam* is so very secular a matter that a sympathetic Irish lay-student of French affairs may perhaps be permitted to examine the situation, and to suggest a possible 'way out' from the financial difficulties that Mass-going householders of the great French middle class will shortly have to face. With the closing down of the *écoles libres* that the *Blocards* are hourly threatening,¹ or the twin measure which they also have

¹ It will be effected by the proposed abrogation of the *loi Falloux*. This was passed under the presidency of Prince Louis Napoleon in 1850, with M. de Falloux at the Ministry of Public Instruction. A devoted Catholic, M. de Falloux was in politics a democratic Legitimist; a 'Liberal-Conservative' of the Berryer school. He was of the Academy, and edited the posthumous works of Lacordaire's saintly friend and counsellor, Mme. Swetchine. It is, however, to the efforts of Montalembert and M. A. Dupinloup that the law bearing the Minister's name was due. The latter, indeed, may be considered the creator of free education in France.

Before the *loi Falloux*, the State possessed the monopoly of public instruction, which was vested in the University of France. There were *ministériums* and *petits séminaires*, but their pupils had to be taken to the public classes held in the local colleges or *lycées*. They were restricted to providing boys with board and lodging, with *éducation* in the French sense (manners, morals, and breeding), and with religious instruction.

The *loi Falloux* permitted any persons (priests, laymen, or religious)

up their sleeve, of vetoing candidates for Civil Service appointments who have not passed through the Godless schools and *Lycées*, the French *père de famille* will find himself baulked of what has been perhaps too long his main ambition for more promising sons: *une petite place sous le Gouvernement*.

Three years ago a French Catholic writer¹ was expressing his fears that Masonic influence would sooner or later succeed ‘à peser sur le Gouvernement, et à rendre plus sévère l'ostracisme partiel qui pèse déjà sur les jeunes gens sortis des écoles Catholiques.’ This was said in 1904, and the sword has not yet fallen. But orators all over France are fretting the cord that holds it. Supposing that the worst does come to the worst, that every Catholic youth in France finds the doors of the huge Civil Service of his country slammed straight in his face, what then? How will he and his be ‘able to bear it’—this crushing frustration of the hopes of a secure livelihood, with social position and a retiring pension?

It appears to the writer that financial salvation is to be sought in the ‘issue’ forced upon French Protestants by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Catholics in

duly furnished with a bachelor’s diploma, or a special certificate supplied by the State, and, of course, of good moral character, to open secondary Schools and colleges, and to choose professors, who need not belong to the University of France, nor indeed have any degree at all. It was then that the Dominican colleges under Lacordaire were opened at Sorèze and Arcueil; the Jesuit schools of Vaugirard, the Rue des Postes, etc., and Dupanloup’s famous *petit séminaire* at Orleans. The whole of France was covered with the *écoles libres*, and is so still. The repeal of the *loi Falloux* will close all these automatically.

As it is, all the *petits séminaires* have been closed and seized by the State. A French friend, M. Henri Bosc, formerly of the staff of M. Paul de Cassagnac’s paper *L’Autorité*, writes to me as follows: ‘The two seminaries of the diocese of Orleans, the Junior House of La Chapelle and Sainte Croix in the town itself, were very flourishing, and had between them 600 pupils, of whom not more than 150 were church students. I learnt with grief during the summer vacation that the two splendid houses were no more.’

Not only in Orleans, however, but in every French diocese, the success of the *écoles libres* was such that the State schools were almost deserted. They had scarcely any pupils beyond foundationers (*boursiers*) and a few paying scholars from non-Catholic families. The natural consequence has been that even the social status of boys at the State *lycées* has suffered acutely—a circumstance peculiarly infuriating to upstarts of the *Bloc*.

¹ M. d’Azambuja, in a pamphlet entitled *L’Esprit Chrétien et les Affaires*, in some spirited suggestions to which the writer is deeply indebted.

their turn must take to trade, in its best and broadest sense. Agriculture, industry, commerce: there is the 'way out' for the fine young fellows who love to entitle themselves *la Jeunesse Catholique de France*. Before the harsh measure chiefly noted in our history manuals for having sent certain Huguenots of the artisan class to Spitalfields and Bethnal Green, there to weave silk and drone psalms in peace, French Protestants of the *bourgeoisie* were even as their Catholic compeers of to-day. They vied with one another in buying civil offices and dignities for their sons—*charges royales* they were called in monarchical days. Young Protestants of the middle class, once securely perched on their government office stools, conceived as serene a disdain of trade in all its branches as the most immaculately-groomed 'first division' clerk who saunters down Pall Mall in the liberal luncheon interval. The upshot was that the brightest Protestant minds were cooped in administrative cages, while *productive* callings were left to Frenchmen who had lower brain power, or were hampered by the inferior education arising from straitened circumstances.

In excluding Protestants from *charges royales*, the revocation of the Edict of Nantes compelled Huguenots who would not emigrate, to seek an independent means of earning bread at home. They promptly swallowed their scruples against the plough and the hammer, the ledger and the till. Strong new blood was injected into the veins of languishing French commerce. One direct result of the revocation was the dazzling prosperity of La Rochelle through the whole of the eighteenth century. But indeed the evicted Protestant *fonctionnaires* and their children created an enduring 'boom,' as Americans call it, in French trade as a whole. The nation saw a century of material progress it has scarcely since surpassed. What, then, was the result of the revocation? Surely this, that French Protestants became wealthier and more influential for their relegation to private life. They grew apter to profit by the social and political changes, alike of evolution and of revolution, that were to follow. Their personal

independence, and their well-filled strong-boxes, made them a power to be reckoned with in the State out of all proportion to their numbers. Never would they have achieved this had they remained well-oiled wheels of the administrative machine.

Let us have hope, then, that when the persecution of the French laity breaks out, it may have results very different from those anticipated by the savage intolerants of the *Bloc*. Let M. Clémenceau et Cie stuff the bloated French Civil Service with irreligious aspirants ; let them send all Catholic would-be *fonctionnaires* to follow productive callings ; the result may well be to place French agriculture, industries and commerce in the hands of the rising Catholic generation. As a by-product of this, French banking may yet come under Catholic control—a summation most devoutly to be wished. Catholic shopkeepers in the French colony of London, for instance, are now finding it increasingly difficult to obtain credit from France, unless they become Freemasons. Need it be added that, the moment practising Catholics are producers and paymasters in France, and the pious place-hunter is no more, all carpet-bagging politicians who now rule the country will be packed about their business like so many rebellious man-servants ?

At present French Government tactics towards Mass-going civil servants consist of pin-pricks and the withholding of promotion. I have been made personally acquainted with the position of one gentleman, who has been kept stationary as regards grade in a French Government office for the past three years, to the sincere regret of his immediate chief, who is personally attached to his Catholic subordinate, although himself a Freemason. He looks upon his able junior simply as a Quixotic person, too wrong-headed to be persuaded for his own good, and certainly does his best to save him from petty departmental persecution. While rendering the brave fellow's life somewhat tolerable, however, he assures him that he will never earn an extra sou a year till he abjures Mass and the Sacraments. Surely we cannot wonder that the excuse of weaker

Frenchmen who become Freemasons should so often be : ' *Faut vivre, Monsieur.*' Poor perverts in the great London colony frankly admit that they detest Freemasonry, its works, and its pomps. They join it in the spirit of our mythical countryman in the Famine year, who went to hear the parson preach—for a consideration. ' Good-bye, God Almighty,' said he, ' till the good potatoes come '

Some think that Clémenceau and his ragged regiment have now been vouchsafed enough rope to hang themselves withal, and that their political *felo de se* may precede the closing of the *écoles libres* and the boycott of Catholic examinees. *Quien sabe?* as the Spaniard has it. Yet even so I fear me it will spell reprieve, not release. There may be an armistice in the case of a peculiarly ignominious Cabinet collapse, but no peace till this fight is fought through to a finish. Would not French fathers be wise in their generation, if while staving off the inevitable at the polls as long as may be, they mapped out the future of their sons as if the crash had come ? Forewarned is forearmed. ' You want all the Government jobs for your sons,' they might say to the *Bloc*. ' Be it so. Our sons shall grow up independent of you.'

The chief stumbling-block in the way is that preposterous scholastic French fetish, the *baccalauréat*—a poor Arts degree that is a veritable obsession in respectable French households. It is of no distinction ; it is just a necessary preliminary to medicine, the law, and the Government service. We are considering the last of these exclusively in these pages, but it may be said in passing that the over-production of doctors and lawyers in France has been very serviceable to the devil. The Chamber of Deputies is a hive for briefless barristers and doctors out of work. Like the permanent placemen, they are *bud-gétivores*—budget-eating and quite non-productive animals. Need I remind readers that French *députés* are paid, and paid rather well for a country where money is dear ?

The classical standard of the *baccalauréat* is not any higher than that of the London matriculation. Yet it keeps the budding *bachelier-ès-lettres* thumbing lexicons and

dipping into 'cribs' till he is nineteen or twenty. Since there is to be a battle for lay temporalities in France, why not win half of it at once, by dethroning the *baccalauréat* from its niche among Catholic *penates*? There is a too familiar type of French parent; the father (or mother) who says to the cleverest son: 'Get your degree *first*, and we'll see what to do with you *afterwards*.' These good people must learn to reverse the sequence of ideas, before necessity compels them. Experience is a good school, but, as Heine said, 'the fees are high.' Before the blow falls they should make it a point to *see* first, and then, should there be really good prospects in medicine or the law, by all means let the youth take his degree afterwards. But if, on this first 'seeing,' parents can discern no more solid reason for the *baccalauréat* than the maintenance of a highly respectable family tradition, coming down from the placid, pinchbeck days of the Second Empire, why not throw the thing to the winds in time? That course would give priceless years to any wideawake Catholic youngster, which he could 'put in' on a model farm, at an engineering firm, etc., while office-seeking Jewish, Protestant and Masonic lads of his age and class were left to sing $\tau\acute{u}\pi\tau\omega$ till their beards grew.

Bourgeois feelings of caste are bound to be modified by the newest persecution. Would that they might vanish forthwith, not only in the matter of the *baccalauréat*, but of everything in which uncalled-for cosiness renders them vulnerable. In this, as in all else, their clergy are showing them good example. In a letter from Paris quoted by the *Manchester Guardian*, the writer says:—

With good courage and energy the French curé is putting his shoulder to the wheel, and taking up a manual occupation. In the country, many become gardeners, beekeepers, joiners; in the small towns they are printers, book-binders, watch-makers, workers in metal, and so on. In the great cities it is evident by the marked increase of their presence at the great public libraries, that many of the most highly educated work at literary occupations—hack-work often, no doubt.

This is splendid. If these good priests can follow

St. Paul, surely their flocks can follow *them*? *Qui facit per alium, facit per se.* Let them see to it at any rate, and betimes, that their sons are 'not of charge to any man,' least of all to the treasurer of an infidel government.

And now may I anticipate here a comment that is like to be passed upon the suggestions embodied in this short article? Some readers may say: 'Here is an Irishman who wishes to work out temporal salvation for Catholic France by turning it into what Napoleon called England: a nation of shopkeepers.'

With respect, I am disposed to consider such a verdict rather a witticism than a criticism. And for this reason, among a host of others. When Portugal swarmed with prosperous merchants (or 'shopkeepers' if you will) it was just the epoch in the history of that wonderful little country when she sent forth her legions of saintly and successful missionaries. The sons of Portuguese merchants laboured as well as prayed, and they knew *how* to labour. If they turned the waste places of the earth to God's account so swiftly, one is forced to the conclusion that they were aided, not hindered, by the business instincts and habits of organization that were their birthright, and their earliest home environment.

Be it whispered that perhaps some of our own people are as shortsighted in earthly stewardship as the French. All the Celtic and Latin peoples need reminding at times that we are not only permitted, but commanded, to make unto ourselves friends of the Mammon of iniquity, and to combine the wisdom of the serpent with the simplicity of the dove.

Four years ago the late Judge Carton drew a pathetic picture of the number of young men who haunt the Four Courts: clever, well-educated, anxious to work, yet getting nothing to do. Mr. Michael J. Gill quoted the Judge's words to point the moral of an important article entitled, 'Commercial Openings in Ireland,' which he contributed to the March number of *St. Stephen's*, in 1903. In the following month, Father Matthew Russell, S.J., in a notice

of Mr. Gill's article among the 'Notes on New Books' of the *Irish Monthly*, penned a couple of thoughtful sentences so applicable to the rising generation of France no less than to that of Ireland, that I venture to transcribe them: 'How much talent must here be wasted, how many lives spoiled!' he exclaims. 'It is eminently desirable that a far larger number should seek an outlet for their energies in the *various careers which commerce, and science in its modern practical applications, open nowadays to properly trained and educated youth.*' The italics are mine.

Some weighty words spoken by General Sir William Butler before the Catholic Truth Society of Ireland recently, while directly applying to the fight that a future Ireland may have to wage, might have been spoken—*mutato nomine*—of France. The General's remarks on the dignity, nobility, and necessity of callings involving a greater or less degree of manual labour should be taken to heart, of course, everywhere in the Catholic world. But nowhere more so than in harassed France and Ireland, where the latter-day trend of parental opinion is all in favour of the so-called liberal professions and of government service, a tendency fostered in both countries by systems of education unsuited to the needs of either.

Agriculture, industry, self-reliance, there we have General Butler's cure for Ireland. May they prove 'a way out' for Catholic France as well. Plus personal sanctity, they will undoubtedly purge the foul body of an infected state, if, like other good medicines, they be only taken in time.

JOHN HANNON, B.A.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LORD BACON

AMONG the writings of Lord Bacon there is no treatise especially devoted to Psychology. This is not surprising, when we remember how little importance he attaches to the study of the soul in comparison with the study of external nature. But there were other reasons—whether he was influenced by them or not—why he should not have written about Psychology. He has left us no evidence that he knew anything at all about that science. Indeed, if we suppose his remarks on some of its fundamental principles to have been the expression of his convictions—a supposition which you are not very safe in making when you have to do with a courtier, and with such a courtier—he has left us sufficient evidence that he knew very little about it. When, therefore, we speak of the Psychology of Lord Bacon, we mean nothing more than a series of heterodox assertions about that science which are to be found scattered through his writings, assertions which have nothing whatever to recommend them except the authority of Francis of Verulam, Viscount St. Alban's, and Lord High Chancellor of England.

After having hurled the bolt of 'utility' against Scholastic philosophy, and left it, as he thought, half dead, he returns to complete the work of destruction, by showing that that philosophy is erroneous in addition to being useless. Whether he set himself the task for philosophy's sake, or from some less worthy motive, it is difficult to say. He himself assures us a hundred times over that it is because he is 'overcome by the eternal love of truth.' The extravagant character of his philosophic writings, however, his assertiveness on subjects about which he must have known himself to be but ill-informed and therefore but ill-qualified to speak, his ambition to merge the intellectual superiority of all future generations in the surpassing excellence of his 'method,' the unmerited contempt in which he holds the philosophy of Aristotle

and the Schoolmen, the sinister means he makes use of to discredit it, his immoderate zeal for the spread of the new philosophy, and his burning anxiety about the sentence posterity will pronounce on that philosophy and on its author—all this points in another direction. Moreover, it must be borne in mind, that a reformed philosophy goes hand in hand with a reformed religion, and that Bacon was not above being enlisted into the service of the Court in order to batter down any stronghold that stood in the way of the National Church of which the ruling sovereign was the acknowledged head.

The poet who calls him the 'wisest' and the 'brightest of mankind,' does not hesitate to call him the 'meanest' also. At all events, he took his stand upon the world's thoroughfare of thought—a thoroughfare that was paved with the convictions of two thousand years—and called to the wayfarers to stop, adding that the right way lay in an altogether different direction. He assures them that they have had blind guides for their leaders, that Aristotle and Augustine, Albert Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure and Duns Scotus, instead of leading the way aright, have gone astray themselves, and persuaded the rest of the world to follow in their wake. These are his words:—

The fabric of this universe is like a labyrinth to the contemplative mind, while the guides who offer their services are confused themselves, and increase the list of wanderings and wanderers. *Our only hope and salvation is to begin the work anew, and raise or rebuild the sciences, arts, and all human knowledge from a firm and solid basis.*¹

And he did bring these wayfarers to a standstill, and prevailed on many of them to turn back, though it was only to do in reality the very thing he had falsely accused the ancients of having done, namely, to 'increase the number of wanderings and wanderers.'² Wanderers and

¹ The italics occurring in this and all subsequent citations from Lord Bacon's works are ours.

² 'The philosophy of sensation,' writes Schlegel in his *History of Literature*, 'which was bequeathed to the world by Bacon, and reduced to the shape of a regular system by Locke, first displayed in France the

wanderings there have been ever since—sensists and sensism, idealists and idealism, positivists and positivism, materialists and materialism, empiricists and empiricism, determinists and determinism, sceptics and scepticism, nihilists and nihilism—a veritable Babel of new philosophies and a perfect counterpart of the sects of Protestantism, while that deductive philosophy, at whose heart the dagger of the Lord Chancellor was directed, remains

Constant as the northern star,
Of whose true-fixed and resting quality,
There is no fellow in the firmament.

But let us follow him through some of his vagaries about the human soul, its faculties and the senses through which it operates. Eager for novelty, he brings back from the grave a mythical theory that had been dead for centuries about a two-fold vital principle in man—a sensitive soul in addition to the rational soul :—

The doctrine of the human soul [he says] has two parts, the one, treating of the rational soul, which is divine, the other, of the irrational or brute soul which we have in common with the brutes. As to the primitive emanation of the rational soul, the Scripture says that God formed man of the dust of the earth and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life. But the generation of the irrational or brute soul was in the words: 'Let the earth bring forth.' And this irrational soul has the same origin in us as in brutes. For it is not said that God formed the *body* of man of the dust of the earth, but God formed *man*, that is, *the whole man*, the breath of life excepted, of the dust of the earth.¹

We have here a good specimen of the arbitrary dogmatizing which above all else characterizes every line of Bacon's writings. Harvey, his contemporary, a true scientist, perceiving how scanty Bacon's knowledge of physical science was, and observing at the same time the

true immorality and destructiveness of which it is the parent, and assumed the appearance of a regular sect of atheism.' 'Every line of Bacon's philosophy,' says De Maistre, 'leads to materialism, but in no part of it does he show himself a more skilled sophist, a more profound, refined, and dangerous hypocrite, than in what he has written about the soul.'

¹ *Advancement of Learning*, bk. iv., chap. iii.

authoritative manner in which he wrote about it, remarked that 'he wrote philosophy like a Lord Chancellor.' With just as much reason might the master of Biblical exegesis complain that he interprets Scripture like a Lord Chancellor. Verily the Bible is the book in which each one finds his own dogmas.

Hic liber est in quo quaerit sua dogmata quisque,
Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua.

How can man be said to have been included in God's decree that 'the earth bring forth the living creature in its kind,'¹ unless we wish to classify him among the 'cattle and creeping things and beasts of the earth'? No other creature is mentioned in that decree. What need was there that God should afterwards decree² to 'make man' to His 'own image and likeness'—a decree of which Bacon says nothing—if man had already been included in the *producat* of Genesis i. 24? If not only the *body* of man, but *man—the whole man*—was formed out of the slime of the earth, then that wonderful 'breath of life' which God breathed into the face of man and of man alone—and which Bacon concedes to be the rational soul—is no essential part of the human being. He is a man independently of the principle of intellectual life. He has a rational soul, but it is something superadded to his nature. The essential parts of man are a body and a brute soul. Man is essentially a brute! Did the Lord Chancellor see the conclusion? If he did not he was dull; if he did he was irreverent. 'It is not said,' he argues, 'God formed the *body* of man of the dust of the earth but God formed *man*.' In other words, man—soul and body—is from the dust of the earth. As reasonably might he have contended on the authority of Sacred Scripture that man has no soul at all—that he is nothing but dust. For God did not say to Adam, 'Thy *body* is dust and into dust *it* shall return,' but, 'dust *thou* art and into dust *thou* shalt return.'³ Besides, how could man become 'a living soul' by the 'breath of life'⁴—the rational soul—if the life of a sensitive soul had already

¹ Gen. i. 24.

² Gen. i. 26.

³ Gen. iii. 19.

⁴ Gen. ii. 7.

constituted him a living being? Your dogma, then, my Lord, of a two-fold active principle of life in man, is not contained in Revelation. Revelation contradicts it.

But is it not also contradicted by Reason? Is not each of us conscious that the soul within him which thinks, is the very same one that feels and sees and hears? Are we not hourly comparing our thoughts with our sensations, and finding the former more or less agreeable, more or less enduring than the latter? One who is fond of music, but with no decided liking for philology or mathematics, will not fail to compare the torture he underwent in the forenoon while studying Grimm's Law or the Conic Sections, with the pleasure he experienced in the afternoon while listening to an opera or an oratorio—a process which would be impossible if the soul which made the reflections in philology or mathematics did not also receive the musical sensations. Every comparison requires a previous cognition by one and the same comparing faculty, of both the things compared.

After establishing to his satisfaction the existence of a purely sensitive soul in man and giving an account of its origin, he goes on to describe its nature:—

The sensitive or animal soul [he says] must indeed be regarded as a truly corporeal substance, refined and rendered invisible by heat. It is *a species of gas mixed with air and fire*,¹ the air by its softness making it impressionable, the fire by its energy rendering it active. This soul is *the product of a combination of oily and aqueous ingredients*—is enclosed in the body, and in the more perfect animals, is located principally in the head. It flows through the nerves, and is nourished by the spirituous blood from the arteries.²

This is indeed a crude conception of the radical active principle by which the lower animals see and hear and feel. A combination of aqueous and oily ingredients mixed with air and fire! How, one may ask, was this conclusion about the nature of the brute soul arrived at? The author does not tell us. He merely asserts that it is so, and calls the

¹ Bacon here seems to imply that fire is a distinct specific substance.

² *Advancement of Learning*, bk. iv., chap. iii.

process 'investigation.' Such an account, however, even if it were true, would not be an explanation of the nature of the sensitive soul. Any 'investigation' worthy of the name, must inquire what are the properties which distinguish the brute soul from the inanimate matter of the inorganic world, and also from the merely vegetable soul of the tree or the plant. Now the foregoing explanation makes neither of these distinctions. Mixtures of oil and water and air and fire, abound as much in the mineral and vegetable kingdoms as in the animal, and even more.

But the account is not true. For what is it that makes the 'mixture' which Bacon calls the brute soul, live and feel? Not every combination of oil and water and air and fire, has life and sensation in it, or is capable of making the body through which it 'flows,' a living, sentient body. What, then, is it that this combination has, but which other 'mixtures' of oil and water and air and fire have not? That, whatever it be, is the radical principal of life and sensation in the brute; it is the brute soul. The oil and the water and the air and fire are not and cannot be. They are lifeless themselves, and therefore cannot be the formal principle of life and sensation in anything else. Moreover, if the brute soul were such a 'mixture' then, either one ingredient alone would see and hear, or the seeing and hearing would be due to a combination of two or more ingredients. If the latter, then one portion of the object would have to be seen, and one portion of the sound heard, by one ingredient, another by another, and so on. How, then, are these different portions of sensation ever going to be united into one whole, since the ingredients remain each separate from every other? In the 'mixture' the oil is not the water, and neither of them is the air or the fire. If it be a single ingredient alone that sees and hears, then none of the other ingredients is any part of the brute soul, for none of them is a partial primary principle of the immanent acts of seeing, hearing, and the like, which characterize the brute.

The oil, then, and the water and the air and the fire

must go. That the soul of the brute is impressionable because of an admixture of air, and active because of fire, that it is located principally in the head, that it flows through the nerves, and feeds on the blood—all this is too ludicrous for serious comment. And yet Lord Bacon, with a single stroke of his magisterial pen, wipes out of existence the whole doctrine of Aristotle and the Scholastics regarding the nature of the brute soul. ‘As regards the sensitive soul,’ he writes, ‘its nature *can be fully investigated though this investigation is hitherto wanting*. For of what significance are the terms *actus ultimus* and *forma corporis*, and such logical trifles, to the knowledge of the soul’s substance?’ The ‘investigation’ that was ‘hitherto wanting’ Bacon finally made, and we have seen the result. He has dragged down the brute soul to the level of the brute body. Before he has done with the question of the soul he will have dragged down the human soul to the level of the brute soul.

Turning now to the intellectual soul, he says of it :—

The considerations of the origin of the soul, whether it be native or adventive, how far it is exempt from the laws of matter, of the immortality thereof, and many other points, have not been more laboriously inquired than variously reported, so that the travel therein taken seemeth to have been rather in a maze than in a way. But although I am of opinion that this knowledge may be more really and soundly inquired even in nature than it hath been, yet in the end I hold that it must be bounded by religion, or else it will be subject to deceit and delusion.¹ For as the substance of the soul in creation was not extracted out of the mass of heaven and earth, but inspired immediately from God, *no knowledge of the nature of the rational soul can be had from philosophy*, but must be derived from the same divine inspiration whence the substance thereof originally proceeded.²

We have again to face an *ex cathedra* pronouncement, in which it is asserted that philosophy has not established,

¹ It is not difficult to see whose tracks Hume is following in when he says: ‘It is the Gospel, and the Gospel alone that has brought life and immortality to light.’ *Essay on the Immortality of the Soul*.

² *Advancement on Learning*, loc. cit.

and cannot establish, the origin, the spirituality, or the immortality of the human soul, and that any effort to do so must be attended with 'deceit and delusion.' He asserts, too, that the course in which the attempted demonstration has proceeded is a maze rather than a way, but he does not undertake to show where these demonstrations cease to be a way and begin to be a maze. It is very probable that he did not know them, and what is worse, that he did not care to know them. If, as he contends, the knowledge of the soul's nature could be 'more really and soundly inquired even in nature,' why does not that 'eternal love of truth,' with which he tells us he is 'overcome,' lead him to institute the enquiry? The theme was surely a worthy one, more worthy than many another problem with which he occupied himself.

And is there any 'deceit or delusion' in concluding that the human soul is a substance, and not a mere quality or modification of a substance, that it exists in itself, and does not inhere in something else? Is it not the origin and source of our acts of thinking, willing, feeling, and the like, and hence the very root-principle of the physical being of him who thinks, and wills, and feels? Are not these acts of thinking, willing, and feeling, transitory modifications of the soul and sustained by it as their ultimate subject? A thought which is not in any soul is as impossible as a sensation of sound which is not in any ear. Such a root-principle then, of man's physical being, and the ultimate subject of his thoughts, volitions, sensations, and the like, can only be a *substance*.

Again, no one was ever conscious of conceiving a portion of an idea, or of eliciting a portion of a volition. When I gather together and mentally represent to myself several concrete individual beings under the general term 'being,' or several concrete individual truths under the general notion 'truth,' both the act of representing and the representation itself are without parts; they are indivisible; they are simple. Is there any deceit 'or delusion' then, in concluding that the soul which produces the simple indivisible act of representing, and receives the simple

indivisible representation, is itself *indivisible and simple*? Lotze, who is not remarkable for being always on the orthodox side of the question, bears testimony to what we are here contending for. Speaking of the act whereby the soul recognizes its successive ideas, emotions, sensations, and so on, as states of an abiding self, he says: ' If the soul be capable of even once bringing together variety into unity of consciousness, this slender fact is sufficient to render imperative, the inference to the individuality of the being by which it can be performed.'

Furthermore, when my intellect thinks about itself or my will determines itself, does not the whole faculty act directly and immediately on its whole self, whereas in any material thing, the nearest approach to reflex action is the action of one of its parts upon another, and this is, properly speaking, not reflex action at all? Are not such abstract universal ideas as ' virtue,' ' goodness,' ' causality,' and the like which every soul is conscoius of possessing, purely immaterial? Otherwise why should they not in some way or other impress some one of the senses? Is not self-determination by the exercise of free choice, an act directly opposed to all the laws of matter? Does the conclusion, then, that the human intellect and will, and consequently the soul of which they are the faculties, are neither composite nor material, but on the contrary both *simple* and *spiritual*, suffer from ' deceit or delusion'? And since the human soul is an indivisible substance, since it has no parts, it cannot pass out of existence by the separation of parts, after the manner in which, for instance, the death of a man results from the separation of soul and body.

Neither can it be destroyed indirectly, that is, by the direct destroying of something else without which it cannot continue to exist—as happens in the case of the radical principle of purely material life, such as the souls of the brutes—for it is besides a spiritual substance, and is therefore capable of existing independently of every bodily substance, whereas the soul of the brute has an internal dependence on the body of the brute, and therefore cannot survive it. The only way left by which the human soul

can cease to exist, is annihilation, that is the withdrawal of the act of conservation, but as that act is not exercised by any creature, it is not in the power of any creature to withdraw it. The slender thread of the soul's existence, like that of every other created being, hangs suspended only from the finger of the Almighty.

The human soul is, therefore, exempt from every form of dissolution through natural causes. It is naturally capable of *existing* for ever. Its connatural activity, too, is exercised independently of the body even while united to the body. It thinks and wills, and the body can have no share in the acts of thinking or willing. It has, therefore, a natural aptitude and consequently a natural exigency to be and to act, to endure and to *live* forever. *It is naturally immortal.* But will God sustain it in existence forever? Even this question we can answer in the affirmative without fear of 'deceit or delusion.' God is obliged to sustain the human soul in existence for some time after its separation from the body, since the good are not rewarded nor the wicked punished in this life according to the full measure of justice. 'The whole system of our belief,' says Sidgwick, 'as to the intrinsic reasonableness of conduct must fall without a belief of some kind or other, that the moral order, which we see imperfectly realized in the actual world, is yet absolutely perfect.' Moreover, the belief in a future life has existed among all nations of all times. 'Ut deos esse natura opinamur,' says Cicero, 'sic permanere animos arbitramur, consensu omnium nationum.'¹ And a belief so universal can only be due to a natural prompting of man's rational nature, since a future life is opposed to all sensible appearances.

Finally, God's wisdom and goodness require that He should preserve the human soul in existence forever. His wisdom requires it. For it were vain to endow the human soul with a natural aptitude for perpetuity, and at the same time withhold the permanent conservation by which alone its realization is possible. God's goodness requires

¹ Tusc. Disp. i. 26.

it. For why should He have implanted in the heart of every human being a rational desire for perfect and unending happiness, if that desire is to be universally and inevitably frustrated, and that, without any fault of the human being itself, and even despite its utmost effort to attain it.

As to the origin of the human soul, it was not produced from nothing by the parents, for it is only infinite power that can produce from nothing. It cannot be from the bodily substance of the parents, for it is not itself a bodily or material substance. Neither can it be part of the souls of the parents, for the souls of the parents are not made up of parts. It is not a part of God Himself, as the Pantheists contend, for God besides being a spirit, is infinite and therefore has no parts. There remains no other conclusion except that it was fashioned immediately by God's own hand, a conclusion which can be drawn without apprehension of 'deceit or delusion.'

The venom of the assertion we have just been considering lies not alone in its tendency to throw doubt on the soul's immediate creation, its spirituality and immortality as established by reason. Like many another assertion of the same author, it aims besides, and perhaps more primarily, at degrading the human intellect and destroying our confidence in its guidance, and this is the greatest of all sins which Bacon has committed against Philosophy. But it is also the sin which he commits most frequently. Over and over again he tells us that unaided Reason can acquire little or no knowledge save of 'external nature.' The knowledge of God, the knowledge of ourselves, the knowledge of our duties to God and to our fellow-men—all this is to be sought for in Revelation, and there alone.

We conclude [he says] that sacred theology is founded only upon the word and oracle of God, and not upon the light of nature. This holdeth not only on those points which concern the great mystics of the Deity, of the Creator and of the Redemption, but likewise those which concern the true interpretation of the moral law. . . . So it must be confessed that a

great part of the Moral Law is of that perfection whereunto the light of nature cannot aspire. How, then, is it that man is said to have, by the light of nature, some notions of virtue, vice, justice, wrong, good and evil? Only as it is *imprinted on the spirit of man by an inward instinct*,¹ according to the law of conscience, *but not as springing from reason, sense induction or argument*. But how? Sufficient to *check vice* but not to *inform duty*. . . . So then the *doctrine of religion, as well maral as mystical, is not to be attained except by inspiration and revelation from God*.²

No science, then, of Natural Theology or Natural Ethics. No inference from the creature to the Creator! The Psalmist spoke falsely when he said: 'The heavens show forth the glory of God and the firmament declareth the work of His hands'!³ Human reason left to itself can discover no Natural Law written in man's heart; no principles of natural justice, or equity, or temperance, or prudence, or fortitude! It can see in the social order no grounds for civil or domestic rights or obligations! For anything that reason has to say to the contrary, the most degrading vices were as befitting man's nature as the most exalted virtues! If Jehovah had not said amid the thunders of Sinai, 'Honour thy father and thy mother,' filial obedience and respect and reverence had never been

¹ This citation shows plainly enough where the 'blind instinct,' which Reid, Stuart and the rest of the Scottish school teach to be the criterion of morality, originated.

² *Advancement of Learning*, bk. ix.

Cardinal Newman is so much at pains to interpret the first part of this passage benignantly that his interpretation is a misinterpretation (cf. *Idea of a University*, p. 225). He sees nothing but sound doctrine in a paragraph which the context shows to be replete with agnosticism and ethical scepticism. Elsewhere in the same book he pronounces Lord Bacon 'the most orthodox of Protestant philosophers.' He would have said what had been nearer to the truth if he had called him the *least orthodox*. There is scarcely one of the great philosophic heresies, of which no traces are to be found in Bacon's writings. Besides, it must be borne in mind that he was the first of Protestant philosophers to be heterodox. He was the Luther of philosophy. Small thanks to him for not having drawn from his own vicious principles, the atheistic conclusions which the French Encyclopedists afterwards drew from them, and which served them as the basis of a literature flippantly corrupt, that for more than a century past, has been sapping the life-blood of their country's religion.

³ Ps. xviii. 2.

thought of ! If St. Paul had not bidden us ' to be subject to higher powers,' no one would be obliged in conscience to recognize lawful authority, or to comply with its injunctions ! If Christ had not commanded all to ' love one another,' the principle of the ' survival of the fittest ' would have been a seemly norm of moral rectitude in our relations with our fellow-men, and the hungry might with propriety be left to starve, and the sick to die by the wayside. In a word, natural Reason has no knowledge of any moral principles, and can acquire none. By an ' inward instinct ' —a faculty distinct from Reason, and therefore a ' blind instinct '—man has some knowledge of the Moral order, but only enough to ' check vice.' It is not enough ' to inform duty.' That ' inward instinct ' tells man that he is not to blaspheme his Creator ; it does not tell him that it is his duty to adore Him. It tells him that he must not take the life of his neighbour, nor otherwise injure him in his person, or property, or reputation ; it does not tell him that he is obliged to assist him in his spiritual and corporal necessity. Little wonder that Hobbes and Rousseau, accepting the philosophy of Lord Bacon, but breaking loose from all Revelation, should have taught that man is by nature a solitary savage, as much adapted to the forest as the tiger or the leopard, and that he remains in society only by doing violence to that nature.

But we have dwelt long enough on the Psychology of Lord Bacon, its tendencies, its inconsistencies, its absurdities. It is neither more nor less than an open denial of any science of Psychology, and even of the possibility of such a science. It asserts that the human soul, left to itself, is incapable of acquiring any knowledge of its own origin, or its own nature, or its own obligations, or its own destiny, and that ' deceit and delusion ' must be the inevitable result if man should endeavour to give a satisfactory answer to his own questions : ' Whence have I come ? ' ' What sort of a being am I ? ' ' What am I here for ? ' ' Whither am I going ? ' The author of that Psychology leaves nothing undone to convince us that the secrets of Nature may be unfolded to human Reason ; but he would enshroud Nature's

God and all that pertains to Him in darkest mystery. He warns mankind against the 'idols' of other theatres; but he would beguile them into worshipping the idols of his own.

'Tis strange;
And oftentimes to win us to our harm,
The instruments of darkness tell us truths,
Win us with honest trifles, to betray's
In deepest consequence.

MICHAEL HOGAN, S.J.

Notes and Queries

CANON LAW

THE HEARING OF CONFESSIONS IN NEIGHBOURING EXTRADIOCESAN PARISHES

REV. DEAR SIR,—You will greatly oblige by throwing a little light on the Decree n. 128, page 71, of the Maynooth Synod Statutes, and by answering the following:—

1. Can an administrator call priests of a neighbouring parish belonging to a different diocese to hear confessions of his parishioners?
2. If a priest obtained permission, once for ever, to hear confessions in a neighbouring extradiocesan parish on certain days of the year, does that permission expire with the death of the parish priest who gave it?
3. Can a parish priest invite not only secular priests, but also regulars of a neighbouring extradiocesan parish to hear confessions of his people?

CONFESSOR.

I. The statute of the Maynooth Synod Decrees referred to by our correspondent runs as follows:—‘Volumus ut ubique in Hibernia in paroeciis diversarum dioecesum affinibus, servetur praxis qua sacerdotes in utravis dioecesi adprobati, facultates, invitante Parocho alterius dioeceseos finitimo, ad poenitentes in eius paroecia absolvendos ordinarias habeant, nisi eiusdem Episcopus aliter statuat.’ In virtue of this decree, priests of one diocese have faculties to hear confessions in the adjoining parishes of a neighbouring diocese, when invited for that purpose by the pastor of the parish where the confessions are to be heard. Now the question arises, whether by the expression *invitante Parocho*, the privilege of asking extradiocesan confessors to hear confessions in a neighbouring parish is confined exclusively to parish priests, or whether the word *Parochus*

of the statute covers the case of any other superior, such as an administrator who takes temporary charge of the parish *sede vacante*?

We are of opinion that the expression in question embraces the latter case, and that an administrator may, in force of the statute quoted above, invite extradiocesan neighbouring priests to hear confession of his people, if during the interregnum the necessity of having confessors is felt in the parish. First of all this appears from the fact that the privilege accorded by the Irish Bishops to parish priests in the decree under consideration, far from being a merely personal one, is a real privilege in the canonical sense, that is, a privilege granted and attached to the parochial office rather than to the person of parish priests, and through the office it is conceded to those who take charge of it.

What, however, is the difference between personal and real privileges, and how is one to know when a privilege is to be regarded as personal, and when as real? In answering this second question all canonists are at one in assigning the following rule. If the person to whom a power or privilege of any kind has been granted, is designated by the name of the title or dignity of his office, such a concession is commonly understood to be a real one and attached to the See; on the contrary, it is a personal favour if the receiver is indicated by his proper name, which always refers to the person. The principal difference between real and personal privileges is that only in the first case, and not in the latter, the privilege remains after the removal from the office or the death of the actual incumbent, as the office in these cases does not expire but only becomes vacant; and with the office, therefore, the real privilege attached to it passes down to those who are entrusted with, and succeed in its administration. 'Delegatio,' writes Suarez,¹ 'commissa alicui sub nomine dignitatis intelligitur commissa Sedi.' 'Quamobrem,' concludes D'Annibale,² 'privilegia concessa dignitati transeunt

¹ Cf. Suarez, *De Leg.*, lib. viii. c. 3, n. 11.

² D'Annibale, i., n. 229.

ad successores, cum ea finiuntur concessa personae.' Now, in looking at the wording of the statute with which we are dealing, we find that the concession of the Bishops to parish priests, empowering them to invite an extradiocesan neighbouring confessor to hear confessions in their parishes, is made under the name of the parochial office; a sure indication that the favour thus conceded is not a personal, but a real one, attached not to the person of those local pastors who occupied parochial benefices at the time of the publication of the Decrees, but rather to the parishes themselves. According to the canonical principles, therefore, such a favour ought to descend to all those who may be at any time entrusted with, and who may be truly called successors in the administration of a parish. But it may be further inquired, who can be truly called successors of a late parish priest? Some are inclined to restrict the term successor to the next canonically appointed parish priest, and decline to extend it to any temporary superior who does not bear the title of parish priest, although he might rule the parish during the vacancy. However, they fail to discriminate between successors in the dignity and successors in the office. In the former case, no doubt, only a newly appointed parish priest can be properly called successor in the dignity and title of his predecessor; but when we are dealing with successors in the parochial office, and with those who acquire a privilege attached to it because of their succession in the parochial administration, it is quite immaterial whether they are named parish priests or administrators, whether they hold their position temporarily or otherwise; once they take charge of a parish and its administration, they may be truly styled successors of parish priests in the parochial office and in the use of all the powers attached to it. Hence every new parish priest is certainly a successor in the office of the late pastor, but not every successor in the parochial office need be a parish priest. This view receives confirmation from competent authorities who explicitly declare that administrators succeed to, and can make use of all real powers connected with the office. 'Transit ad adminis-

tratorem,' says Pihring¹ '(delegata potestas) si data est non ratione dignitatis tantum sed ut iurisdictioni officii adnexa.'

Of course it might be urged against the argument expounded above that the canonical rule which leads to the distinction between real and personal privilege is not an invariable and universal one, as it admits of innumerable exceptions; so that there are many cases in which a power given or an injunction made by a superior to his subjects, under the name of their dignity, is solely confined to those who are vested with it; but it must be borne in mind that those cases, whenever they happen, are mere exceptions which are a confirmation of the general rule and are easily discovered by the fact that the abstract name of the dignity is used, such as *Episcopatus, Parochatus* instead of the concrete word *Episcopus Parochus*. Moreover, those exceptions take place in circumstances of strict interpretation, and notably in cases of infliction of penalties, which are generally as personal as the crime which they are intended to punish; thus, if an excommunication is inflicted on a parish priest of a certain parish, this punishment is personal and confined to the actual occupant of the office; but here, on the contrary, we are dealing with a case in which the general rule holds good, with a case of a favour granted for public weal, and therefore of large interpretation.

Nor is there here question of faculties delegated by administrators to extradiocesan priests, for it might be controverted whether administrators of parishes enjoy ordinary or delegated jurisdiction, and how far their power of delegating or sub-delegating their faculties can be extended. In the statute under notice the faculties of hearing confessions are given to extradiocesan priests directly by the Bishops and local superiors of parishes may only use the privilege, attached to their office, of calling in approved confessors whenever wanted in the parish; a privilege which requires only the tenure of the office to be exercised, and is quite independent of the quality of the jurisdiction possessed by the actual superior of the parish.

¹ Cf. Pihring, lib. i., tit. 29, sect. 7, n. 170.

But should the meaning and extension of this law be still somewhat doubtful and uncertain, it will become quite clear when we consider the legislator's intention which is revealed by the end of the law. It is true that 'finis legis non cadit sub lege,' but it is equally true that the object of the law is one of the best factors in detecting the superior's mind when framing his law, and one of the best rules of interpretation of decrees.

Now, what is the end of this statute, and what the intention of the superiors in framing it? It seems quite plain that this law aims at making suitable provision for parishes in need of confessors, and situated at the extreme end of the diocese; and that the Bishops supply the want by according faculties of hearing confession to extra-diocesan priests of a neighbouring parish. Naturally, the exercise of these faculties was made subject to the invitation of the superiors of parishes who are cognizant of the needs of their flocks and responsible for the administration of the parochial office; and since the superiors of parishes, as a rule, bear the title of parish priest hence the reason for the mention of this title in the statute under notice. But, should the necessity of having additional confessors exist in any parish, and, therefore, the motive for the enactment of this law be realized there, what does it matter to its scope, which is only to see such a necessity provided for, whether the acting superior of the parish, who has to invite extra-diocesan confessors, be called parish priest or administrator? Or is not an administrator a real, though temporary, superior of a parish, responsible for the spiritual welfare of his people and entitled to all the rights of parish priest with the exception of the title which, however, adds nothing to the jurisdiction of local pastors? This tends to show that it was foreign to the Bishops' intention to confine the privilege in question only to parish priests, or give it to them as a prerogative of their title; and that, on the contrary, they intended to attach it to the parochial office and grant it to superiors of parishes *pro tempore* independently of their denomination. Indeed, if for the expression *invitante Parocho* may be substituted this other '*invitante eo qui munere*

parochiali fungitur ; it seems to follow that even a curate on whom the administration of the parish devolves soon after the death of the parish priest, may avail himself of this concession, although it is more advisable for him to abstain from using it and to leave it to the superior who will be responsible for the administration of the parish permanently, especially if the necessity of having a supply of confessors in the parish does not appear to be particularly urgent, and the parochial benefice, as it is nearly always the case, will soon be filled. This view is shared by several authorities, who maintain that rights and privileges attached to the parochial office may be used or subdelegated by curates who are commissioned to take charge of the parish during the parish priest's temporary absence.¹

II. But if a parish priest invites a neighbouring extra-diocesan priest to hear confessions in his parish, and gives such an invitation once for all and for some specified days of every month or week ; first, can the invitation be made in that general way ; and, secondly, can, in the affirmative, the priest thus invited use the permission of hearing confessions even after the death or removal from office of the parish priest who invited him ?

To both cases we have no hesitation in giving an affirmative reply. The privilege accorded by the Bishops to parish priests in this connexion may be styled, and it is, in fact, a quasi-ordinary jurisdiction rather than a mere delegated power, as it is given in general *permodum habitus* and attached to the parochial office. Now it is a well recognized canonical doctrine, that a power of that description, called either quasi-ordinary or habitually delegated, stands on the same footing as ordinary jurisdiction for all juridical and practical purposes, and, consequently, it may be sub-delegated for one or several cases, *toties quoties* or once for all occurring cases.²

On the other hand, the invitation once given and duly

¹ Cf. D'Annibale, i., 73, not 24 ; Lugo, *De Poenit.* 19. 16 ; Sanchez, iii., 31, S. Alph., vi. 566.

² Putzer, *Com. in Facul. Apost.*, n. 25.

accepted does not expire with the death or removal from office of the superior of the parish who gave such an invitation and permission. Here we are dealing with a permission or favour already granted—*gratia facta*—which is a kind of donation; and a donation once completed by acceptance does not depend for its conservation on the existence of the donor's authority. This theory holds good even in the case that the donation consists of a power to be exercised on behalf of third persons, and which has not been used yet, such as the power of hearing confessions. Some are inclined to believe that in this latter instance the favour should be regarded as a *gratia facienda*, which expires with the death of the delegating superior; but they fail to discriminate between a power and its use. Here we are concerned with the former, and not with the latter.¹

Moreover, if there may be diversity of opinion among canonists as to whether a delegated power to be exercised in favour of others, such as that of hearing confessions, assisting at marriages, etc., is *gratia facta* or *facienda*, and, therefore, whether it remains or otherwise after the death of the delegating superior in the case that it is delegated only for one determined instance; it is agreed upon all hands that when it is a question of a delegation in general or for all occurring cases, it is always understood to be a favour already granted, and a position of authority in which the delegated person is constituted independently of its use and of the existence of the delegating superior. 'Si concessio,' says Genicot,² 'generalis est sive ad tempus sive illimitata non expirat cum iurisdictione concedentis sed durat donec a successore vel confirmatur vel revocatur.'

This conclusion, in fine, will appear more evident if we look at the question from a different standpoint. We

¹ Pihring, tit. 29, sect. 7, n. 109, writes:—'Si vero habet rationem gratiae seu beneficii acceptati cuiusmodi sunt rescripta gratiae, tunc non expirat morte concedentis, tametsi integra sit: Decet enim a Principe concessum beneficium esse mansurum iuxta reg. 16 in vi. Tales gratiae seu facultates sunt, *potestas absolvendi a peccatis*,' etc. Also Suarez, *De Leg.*, lib. viii, c. 31, n. 3.

² Genicot, ii. p. 35; S. Alph., vi. n. 559; Putzer, l.c.

have hitherto regarded a parish priest, who invites neighbouring extradiocesan priests to hear confessions in his parish, as a superior who grants some power or favour, and his invitation as a sort of privilege ; but he may be considered, as in effect he seems to be, as a mere intermediary person, who simply passes down and communicates to others the facultes directly conceded by the Bishops. Now, it is beyond any controversy that a communicated power does not depend on the communicating person for its conservation, as the power thus transferred is kept and exercised on the authority of the first superior who granted it. 'Id quod est communicatum,' says Putzer, loc. cit., p. 42, 'adhbeat et possideat (ille cui fit communicatio) non nomine communicantis, ut ideo ei non pereat licet communicans perierit.' In our case, therefore, the faculties acquired by extradiocesan priests to hear confessions in an adjoining parish, after being invited for that purpose by its superior, do not expire, although the parish priest who communicated the faculties, or, more correctly, placed the condition necessary for their transmission, dies or is removed from office.

III. To answer the third question it will suffice to recall two principles commonly adopted in the interpretation of laws.

We have oftentimes remarked that the concession of the faculties of hearing confessions is a real favour, a favour granted for public good and within the limits of the written and customary common law. It is well known that a favour, and especially a favour of that nature, admits of wide interpretation—'*favores sunt ampliandi*'—one of the results of such a liberal interpretation being that a law may be extended as far as its application is possible and reasonable ; and in our case, that the faculties in question may be given, not only to secular priests, but also to regulars, who are equally capable of receiving them.

Again, in favourable laws and laws of wide interpretation it is uncanonical to put restrictions or make any distinction wherever the legislator himself did not assign one—'Ubi lex non distinguit neque nos distinguerem debemus'

—the presumption being that superiors are generous in granting favours, and that they themselves put limitations to their concessions ‘ whenever desirous to do so ; unless, indeed, a law taken as it stands without any modification or distinction injures rights acquired by third persons, contradicts the existing legislation or involves some sort of legal inconvenience. According to that canonical principle, then, there is no reason why the word *Sacerdotes*, occurring in the decree under interpretation, should be restricted to mean only secular priests, and why a distinction should be made between secular and regular clergy where the superior himself declined to make one.

So far we have made an interpretation and given expression to our opinion, mainly relying on juridical principles, grounded for the most part on presumption ; but if the legislators make either an explicit or implicit manifestation of their intention to the contrary, of course, *praesumptio cedit veritati*.

S. LUZIO.

LITURGY ALTAR CANDLES

REV. DEAR SIR.—Rubricists say that twelve, or, at the very least, ten wax candles should be burning on the altar during Benediction of the Most Holy Sacrament. Is it permissible to add, say, as many more lighted composite candles for greater effect and to excite devotion ?

Stimart says : ‘ Lumina non cerea laudabiliter adduntur saltem extra mensam Altaris.’ Does he mean that ‘ *lumina non cerea* ’ should not be used on the altar during Benediction of the Most Holy Sacrament ? An answer in the I. E. RECORD will much oblige.

SACERDOS.

Stimart,¹ the latest edition of whose work was published in 1905, does not seem to have had before him the recent Decree of the Congregation of Rites about the *quality* of candles employed in Liturgical functions. His opinion on this point, therefore, must yield to the instruction contained in

¹ *Comp. Lit.*, p. 495. (Paris, 1905.)

the Decree¹ referred to. Now there regulations are that the Pascal Candle and the two candles lighted at Mass should consist for the most part of pure bees'-wax, and that all the other candles placed on the Altar should contain this substance in more or less notable quantity. The last phrase is sufficiently explicit, and implies, if it means anything at all, that no candle should be placed on the Altar at any function that does not contain in its composition some admixture of bees'-wax. For this country the Bishops have authentically interpreted the Decree of the Congregation to mean that 'the Pascal Candle and the two principal candles on the Altar at Mass should contain at least 65 per cent. of bees'-wax, and that all the other candles used on the Altar should contain at least 25 per cent.'² Nothing is said in the Decree about candles that are placed outside the Altar or on the predella. Hence it is assumed that the new regulation does not apply to these.

Some priests are often very scrupulous about the character of the candles they use for Mass. It seems to be for the purpose of bringing peace of conscience to such anxious and troubled souls that the Congregation has added to its regulations this thoughtful observation: 'Qua in re parochi aliqui rectores ecclesiarum et oratoriorum tuto stare poterunt normis a respectivis Ordinariis traditis, nec privati Sacerdotes Missam celebraturi de qualitate candelarum anxie inquirere tenentur.' It is, therefore, for the Ordinary to make regulations about the sort of candles to be used at the Altar, and for those in charge of churches or public oratories to carry them out, while other priests having no responsibility in the matter are not to needlessly trouble themselves or their conscience about what they find unless—it may be remarked—a very gross and palpable Rubrical abuse comes under their notice.

P. MORRISROE.

¹ S.R.C., Decr., 14th December, 1904.

² I. E. RECORD, December, 1905, p. 553.

DOCUMENTS

SHRINE OF ST. COLUMBANUS AT BOBBIO
SECOND LIST OF CONTRIBUTIONSTOWARDS THE RESTORATION OF THE SHRINE OF ST. COLUMBANUS
IN BOBBIO, RECEIVED BY HIS EMINENCE CARDINAL LOUGHE
SINCE THE 20TH OF OCTOBER, 1907.

Maurice Woulfe, Esq., Clonmel	£	1	0
(Through a clerical error this subscription was in- correctly reported in the I. E. RECORD for November, 1907.)					
Most Rev. Dr. O'Dwyer, Bishop of Limerick	..	10	0	0	
Most Rev. Dr. Brownrigg, Bishop of Ossory	..	5	0	0	
Most Rev. Dr. Boylan, Bishop of Kilmore	..	5	0	0	
Right Rev. Mgr. Byrne, P.P., V.G., Dungannon	..	5	0	0	
Clients of St. Columbanus, Dungannon	..	3	11	0	
Rev. F. A. O'Loughlin, C.C., Bray	..	1	0	0	
Very Rev. E. A. Ryan, O.P., St. Malachy's Priory, Dundalk	..	1	0	0	
Rev. Peter McCartney, P.P., Forkhill, Co. Armagh	..	1	0	0	
Rev. Charles Hurson, C.C., Forkhill, Co. Armagh	..	0	10	0	
Rev. Hugh Boyle, C.C., Long Tower, Derry	..	0	10	0	
Very Rev. Peter Dooley, P.P., V.F., College House, Galway	..	1	0	0	
Rev. Patrick Magee, P.P., Kilcoo, Co. Down	..	1	0	0	
Very Rev. A. Canon Ryan, P.P., V.G., Tipperary, and a few Cashel Priests	..	4	5	0	
Very Rev. P. J. Canon O'Callaghan, P.P., Charleville	..	1	1	0	
Rev. Patrick A. Duffy, S.T.L., St. Finian's College, Navan	..	0	10	0	
Rev. James Flynn, B.D., St. Finian's College, Navan	..	0	10	0	
Rev. P. Clarke, P.P., Carnacross, Kells	..	1	0	0	
Very Rev. James Dolan, P.P., V.G., Manorhamilton	..	3	0	0	
Rev. John Cullen, P.P., Tinryland, Carlow	..	1	0	0	
Right Rev. Mgr. Fahy, D.D., P.P., V.G., Gort	..	1	0	0	
Rev. Hugh O'Neill, Adm., Monaghan	..	1	0	0	
Very Rev. Patrick M'Kenna, Professor, Maynooth College	..	1	0	0	
Very Rev. Patrick J. Toner, D.D., Professor, May- nooth College	..	1	0	0	

Very Rev. Hugh O'Reilly, M.R.I.A., President, St.			
Coleman's College, Newry	£	1	0
Very Rev. Dean Kinane, P.P., V.G., Cashel	1	0	0
Rev. Patrick Ryan, C.C., Cashel	0	10	0
Right Rev. Mgr. M'Fadden, P.P., V.G., Donegal ..	2	0	0
Very Rev. P. Canon Corr, P.P., Ballymacnab,			
Armagh	2	0	0
Rev. Hugh Murphy, P.P., Cooley, Co. Louth ..	1	0	0
Very Rev. M. M'Conville, D.D., P.P., Lower Drum-			
gooland, Dromore	2	0	0
Rev. David P. Mulcahy, P.P., Swords, Co. Dublin	1	0	0
Rev. John Mullen, C.C., Cooley, Co. Louth ..	0	10	0
Rev. Aloysius M'Oscar, C.C., Clonoe, Co. Tyrone ..	0	10	0
Very Rev. Joseph Canon Canton, P.P., Athenry ..	2	2	0
Very Rev. Michael O'Doherty, D.D., Irish College,			
Salamanca	1	0	0
Rev. Patrick M'Conville, P.P., Barr, Newry ..	1	0	0
Rev. Benjamin M'Loughlin, P.P., Killygordon,			
Donegal	2	0	0
Rev. John Lane, Levenshulme, Manchester ..	1	0	0
Very Rev. Michael Forker, Ph.D., Professor, May-			
nooth College	1	0	0
Very Rev. James Donnellan, D.D., Bursar,			
Maynooth College	1	0	0
Rev. Patrick Hurley, P.P., Ballygran, Charleville	1	0	0
The Marist Fathers, Dundalk	1	0	0
Very Rev. M. Canon Gilligan, P.P., Carrick-on-			
Shannon	2	2	0
Rev. Bart. Quinn, P.P., Craughwell, Co. Galway ..	1	0	0
Rev. Peter Kerley, P.P., Cullyhanna, Co. Armagh	2	0	0
Rev. Patrick Gogarty, C.C., Cullyhanna, Co. Armagh	1	0	0
Rev. A. P. Smyth, C.C., Cullyhanna, Co. Armagh	1	0	0
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Inchicore	5	0	0
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Rev. J. Brennan, C.C., Westland Row, Dublin ..	1	0	0
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Very Rev. James C. M'Ginley, D.D., Maynooth			
College	1	0	0
Very Rev. James M'Caffrey, Ph.D., Maynooth			
College	1	0	0
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Rev. John Clarke, P.P., Clogherhead, Co. Louth ..	1	0	0
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Rev. Laurence Walsh, C.C., Danesfort, Kilkenny			
	0	10	0

Rev. Ptk. Keown, P.P., Aughamullen, W., Clogher	£	1	0	0
Rev. P. Drennan, C.C., Callan, Kilkenny	..	0	10	0
Δν τ-Δξαιρ Μάιητιν ΉΔ Μαολδομάντιξ, Όροισεαν υι Ήρισιν, Δξα-Σιλλ, Co. Δν Κλάιρ	..	1	0	0
Rev. Eugene M'Kenna, P.P., Shantonagh, Castle- blayney
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Right Rev. Mgr. Howley, P.P., V.G., Callan, Co. Kilkenny
Rev. Frs. M'Enerney, C.C., Westland Row, Dublin	..	0	10	0
Mrs. Maher, Moyvoughley, Moate
Chevalier Sheeran, K.G.S., St. Sylvester's, Black- rock, Dublin
Mr. Lionel O. Radiguet, St. Ursanne, Switzerland	..	2	0	0
John H. Sheeran, Esq., New York, U.S.A.	..	1	0	0
Right Rev. Mgr. O'Riordan, Irish College, Rome	..	5	0	0
Rev. F. M'Guinness, P.P., Warrenpoint	..	1	0	0
Very Rev. P. Canon Smyth, P.P., Ballybay, Co. Monaghan
Very Rev. J. Archdeacon Cotter, P.P., Blackrock, Cork
Rev. E. Stack, Mapleton, Minnesota, U.S.A.	..	2	0	0

CAN THE HEROIC ACT BE RECALLED?

EX S.C. INDULGENTIARUM ET SS. RELIQUIARUM

CHICOUTIMIEN

ACTUS HEROICUS REVOCARI POTEST

Ad hanc S. Congregationem Indulgentiarum transmissum
est a S. C. Christiano Nomini propagando praeposita sequens
dubium, cuius solutionem R̄m̄us Episcopus Chicoutiensis
postulavit, nempe:

An fidelis emittens *actum heroicum*, quod *votum* ordinarie vocatur, quo in suffragium defunctorum, divinae Maiestati offert omnes indulgentias, quas vivens lucrari potest, nec non omnia sua opera satisfactoria, et etiam suffragia sibimet post mortem conferenda, possit, quando ipsi libuerit, revocare?

Et S. C. proposito dubio respondendum mandavit:
Affirmative.

Datum Romae ex Secretaria eiusdem S. Congregationis, die 20 Februarii 1907.

S. Card. CRETONI, *Praefectus.*

Pro R. P. D. PANICI, Archiep. Laodicens., *Secretario.*
JOSEPHUS M. Can. COSELLI, *Substitutus.*

PRIVILEGES OF TERTIARY SISTERS OF REGULAR ORDERS

DUBIORUM

DE SORORIBUS TERTIARIIS REGULARIBUS QUOAD USUM KALENDARII ET INDULGENTIARUM PARTICIPATIONEM.

A Sacrorum Rituum Congregatione nuper expostulatum est:

I. An Sorores Tertiariae Ordinum Regularium Ordinariis locorum subiectae, quae in Communitate vivunt, vota simplicia nuncupant et tantummodo Officium parvum B.M.V. recitant, teneantur in propria ecclesia, seu Oratorio, sequi Kalendarium respectivi Ordinis, relicto Kalendario dioecesano, quo annuente ac praecipiente loci Ordinario, a diurno tempore usque in praesens utuntur?—Et quatenus *Negative*.

II. An eadem Sorores praedictum Kalendarium dioecesanum adhibentes participant omnes indulgentias quae a Romanis Pontificibus directe concessae sunt tantum respectivis Ordinibus eorumque ecclesiis?

Et Sacra eadem Congregatio, ad relationem subscripti Secretarii, exquisito Commissionis Liturgicae suffragio, attentisque decretis Sacrarum Congregationum Rituum et Indulgentiarum, ita respondendum censuit:

Ad I. *Negative.*

Ad II. *Affirmative.* Serventur autem Decreta praesertim S. R. C. n. 3862 *Urbis et Orbis* 9 Decembris 1895, et S. C. Indulgentiarum et SS. Reliquiarum *De indulgentiis Tertiariorum* 28 Augusti 1903.

Atque ita rescripts ac declaravit, die 10 Maii 1907.

S. Card. CRETONI, *Praefectus.*

✠ D. PANICI, Archiep. Laodicens., *Secretarius.*

BEATIFICATION OF THE VENERABLE BONAVENTURE OF
BARCINONE, O.S.F.

EX SECRETARIA BREVIIUM

BREVE SOLEMNIS BEATIFICATIONIS VEN. SERVI DEI BONAVENTURAE
A BARCINONE, LAICI PROFESSI ORDINIS MINORUM

PIUS PP. X

AD PERPETUAM REI MEMORIAM

Salvator ac D. N. I. Christus, qui *infirma mundi eligit, ut fortia quaeque confundat* saepe numero humili atque obscurō loco natos homines, nullis artibus, nulla eruditione, nulla eloquentia, nullo denique instructos humanae potentiae praesidio excitat, ad illustria facinora pro Ecclesiae suae bono et religionis incremento patranda. Inclita Minorum Fratrum Familia, vertente saeculo decimo septimo, inscrutabilis huius divinae Providentiae consilii mirabile exemplum prodidit, quum humilis illius laicus Venerabilis Dei Famulus Bonaventura a Barcinone, non sine maximis contentionibus et laboribus tutum communire sodalibus suis asylum ad rigidius ac perfectius vivendi genus ineundum, atque etiam Sacrum in hac Alma Urbe Nostra Recessum fundare non dubitavit. Nimirum in eo apparuit quantae sit veritatis ac virtutis Summi illa Magistri promissio: *qui sequitur me, habebit lumen vitae*; nam divina tantum spe fretus, et propositum sibi finem, omnibus difficultatibus devictis, assequutus est feliciter, et innumeros socios ad sanctitatis semitam decurrentiam instruxit, et vitae suae actis universo Franciscali Ordini novum decus atque ornamentum addidit.

Anno reparatae salutis MDCXX die Novembris mensis quarto et vicesimo, in oppidulo Riudoms prope Barcinonem urbem Hispaniarum florentissimam, a Michaele Gran et Catherina eius uxore natus, eodemque die lustralibus undis ablutus, Michael Baptista nomen habuit. Parentes tenuis conditionis fuere, sed vitae integri, qui agrorum cultura sibi victum suisque comparabant. Accepta ab iis christiana pietatis rudimenta, vel a primis annis moribus suis, egregiae indolis puer, optime expressit; nugis enim atque oblectamentis aetatis illius propriis omnino abstinentis ac solitudinis potius silentique cupidus, innocentia, pudicitia et mira erga genitores obedientia floruit. Scholam non sine laude per breve tempus celebravit, nam crescentibus rei familiaris angustiis, illam deserere coactus,

et magistro et condiscipulis magnum sui desiderium reliquit. Itaque custodiae gregis addictus, assiduae rerum divinarum commentationi vacavit, et saepe rusticas ante aras in Virginis imagine defixus, devote flexis genibus orans, suavi illam matris nomine compellabat. Postquam prima vice ad Synaxim accessit, cum dilecto Iesu consociatus pius adolescens ad uberiores efficiendos in virtute progressus curas omnes suas cogitationesque intendit, ideoque religiosas induere vestes, seque Deo totum mancipare summopere cupiebat. Sed licet invito nuptias parabat pater, dictoque audiens Michael, quam ille proposuerat puellam, duxit uxorem. At nuptiarum die laetum fugiens convivium, novus in templo sponsus manebat, Angelorum Dominam fervidis precibus flagitans, ut sibi suaeque vitae comiti virginitatis florem intactum servaret. O praeclarum facinus et angelicae potius quam humanae naturae proprium! Michael a sponsa tuendae puritatis promissionem obtinuit, et donec uxor vixit, videlicet sexdecim mensium spatio, sanctissimis coniuges, non sine Dei praeensione, promissis steterunt. Evidem morti proxima mulier, assidenti matri, se Michaeli sororem fuisse, non uxorem, et purum illibatumque Deo corpus reddere fatebatur.

Mortua uxore, atque impetrato tandem genitoris consensu, S. Francisci Assisiensis habitum postulavit; sed Provinciale loci patrem diu reluctantem expertus est, qui denique humilitate ac virtutum Michaelis fama motus, illum diurni voti compotem reddidit. Anno MDCXXXX aetatis suae decimo nono, die mensis Iulii decimo quarto, quo S. Bonaventurae Doctoris festum agitur, in coenobio S. Michaelis oppidi Escornalbon asperum Fratrum Minorum sagum, coelestiali laetitia profusus, assumpsit, et Michaelis in illud auspicatissimum Bonaventurae commutavit. Vix tirocinium posuerat, iamque in ipso vitae claustralium exordio, christianae perfectionis forma apprime referre visus est. Religiosae disciplinae observantissimus, ne in minimis quidem illi unquam defuit, et paupertatem, castimoniam, humilitatem ac virtutes omnes servantem munitentemque obedientiam, singulari prorsus studio est prosequutus. Paupertatem ita dilexit ut in victu cultuque vilissima quaeque semper requireret, vestibus uteretur obsoletis, munera infima libens impleret et cellam inhabitaret angustiorem. Simplicitatem et candorem cum poenitentia coniungens, innocens corpus ieuniis, flagellis, vigiliisque compescuit. Ad obedientiam quod attinet mandata praepositorum adamussim servavit, et nullam unquam parendi moram interposuit: tandem in unaquaque virtute ita enituit, ac si caeteris posthabitis, illam unam viribus totis solummodo excoluisse. Ex eo factum est, ut a tironibus

non modo, etiam a proiectioribus sodalibus absolutissimum Seraphicae vitae exemplar sit habitus.

Tirocinii anno rite confecto sollemnia vota nuncupavit, atque inter Ordinis laicos cooptatus est. Continuo Morae, Tarassiae ad S. Agnetis atque in illis Catalauniae regularis provinciae coenobiis in quibus moram duxit Venerabilis Dei Servus Bonaventura vitae sanctimoniam admirationem sibi omnium conciliavit, accendentibus etiam coelestibus signis. Nam cum ipse conrogandae stipis cura fuit concredita, per compita et finitima loca pedetentim incedens, patientiae et christianaee caritatis documenta dedit miranda. Sollertia maxima et flexanimis verbis perditos homines ac dissolutas foeminas e vitiorum coeno revocare nitebatur, aegrotos et pauperes humanis officiis recreabat, alebat. Puerum iam fere animam agentem, obstupescente medico, a suffocationis periculo liberavit.

Saepe dum coqui munus obiret, paratas dapes aut ignis absumpsit, aut rapuere feles, aut ipse egenis imprudens distribuit, et nihilominus statis horis suavioribus cibis mensa Fratrum redundavit. Saepe in extasim coram populo rapiebatur procul a terra, et licet in ipsum, ira aestuans christiani nominis osor, interdum noctu diris cruciatibus et multo verbere saeviret. Omnipotens Deus, qui iam Venerabilem Dei Servum ad maiora vocabat, humilem eumdem laicum delegerat, in quo abundantioris gratiae suas divitias ostenderet. Quare ab omnibus Frater sanctus appellari publice coepit, et cum divino spiritu afflatus Romam adeundi veniam a superioribus, id aegre ferentibus, impetravit, magna christiani populi discessum morantis turba ad portum usque Barcinonensis urbis Bonaventurae est comitata. Sed ille tenax propositi, nec fletu fidelium nec terrae natalis caritate permotus, navim concendit, et post varia procellosae navigationis pericula et piratarum incursionem in nomine Domini reiectam, Genuam appulit. Inde regulae statutis obsequens, etsi adulta hyeme altis terra rigeret pruinis, longum Romam versus iter pedes emensus est, et primum Sanctam Lauretanam domum invisit, dein Assisium, qua in urbe, dum loca S. Francisci vita et miraculis clara summa devotione lustrat, quod iamdiu cooperat consilium coelesti signo acceptum superis esse persensit. Nam dum noctu ad S. Damiani, coram SSma Eucharistia, orans advigilat, audivit vocem de celo dicentem: 'I Romam laetatum domum meam.' Et sane Ven. Dei Famulus Bonaventura a Barcinone salutare illud propositum animo moliebatur instituendi in Romana Provincia sacrum pro religiosis viris sui Ordinis Recessum, in quo iidem rigidiori ratione Seraphici Patris legem servantes, suae proximoruimque saluti atque aedificationi uberius consulere

possent ; eumdemque ad finem ex Hispania ad hanc Almam Urbem ipse properabat.

Vix Romam pervenit anno MDCLIX ianitor in Conventu S. Isidori positus, in humili officio tanta ac tam singulari virtutum praestantia enituit, ut non modo penes confratres, verum etiam penes Romanos omnis conditionis cives magnam sanctimoniae famam adeptus fuerit. Verum ubi primum instituendi Recessum consilium patefecit, innumerae continuo ortae difficultates, ipsis regularibus superioribus mirantibus, quod laicus Hispanus, qui vix litteras calleret, italicae linguae ignarus atque omni prorsus eruditione destitutus, tam arduum opus aggredi praesumeret. Sed destinatus Dei Servus, in Eo tantum sperans qui humiles corde exaltat, adversa cuncta patientia constantaque vicit. Cardinalis enim Barberinius, Franciscalis Ordinis Protector, Bonaventurae votis annuens, illum ad pedes Alexandri PP. VII rec. memoriae Praedecessoris Nostri adduxit, qui in obscuro laico Dei spiritum agnoscens, sacri Recessus institutionem probavit, illiusque regulas et statuta ab eodem Dei Servo exarata, Apostolicis Litteris quorum initium *Ecclesiae catholicae regimini* die XXX mensis Augusti anno MDCLXII datis, suprema auctoritate interposita, sanxit.

Idcirco Recessui sacro inchoando adsignatus fuit Conventus S. Mariae e Gratiis oppidi Ponticelli in Sabina, montanus ac silvester, sed aptus solitudini ac poenitentiae locus. Plures sine mora religiosi viri Franciscales illuc ad umbratilem vitam, in assidua oratione, ieunio, et carnis afflictationibus ducendam confluenterunt, quibus gratum admodum fuisse, si sanctus institutor ac legifer Recessus ipsius regimen obtineret. Sed renuit humilis laicus praesesse sacerdotibus, atque utpote coquus sodalibus suis maluit inservire, donec a Cardinali Protectore, sub sanctae obedientiae vinculo adstrictus, Custodis munus licet invitus assumpsit. Qua prudentia commissum officium implerit, qua caritate, qua solertia in timore Dei et virtutum omnium exercitatione, suis potissimum exemplis, sodales confirmaverit, ex eo facile coniici potest, quod recurrentibus impedimentis ac difficultatibus feliciter superatis, primum Montorii, dein variae in agro Tiburtino duae aliae sacri Recessus domus brevi apertae fuerint. His Venerabilis Dei Servus modo uti Custos praefuit, modo uti Commissarius Visitator advigilavit, modo omni abdicata dignitate, dimissis in officiis ianitoris, coqui vel olitoris inservit. Interea sanctitatis illius fama percrebuit in dies *tanquam prodigium factus multis* : quocumque incederet, dimissus et pedes, laeto populorum concursu excipiebatur : inter finitimas gentes veteres simultates iam ad caudem prorumpentes, quasi e Coelo delapsus angelus, adspectu suo tantum composuit ; omnesque

eum optimum tanquam parentem ducebant sanctumque appellabant, mutationis enim cordium et prophetiae dono divinitus pollebat.

Anno Iubilaei MDCLXXV et Romae, in hoc orbis catholici centro, pia sacri Recessus domus condita fuit. Nam Cardinalis Barberinius, ab eodem Venerabili Dei Famulo a certae mortis discrimine liberatus, illi locum in Urbe ubi Conventum aedificaret quaerenti, penes veteres Caesarum Palatii ruinas solitarium ac praeruptum, spinis et dumetis refertum agri modum donavit. Nulla mora, benefactorum tantum eleemosynis fretus, perarduam ille operam inchoat, et quamvis paupertatis votis observantissimus ne obolum quidem possiderit, tamen operarii fabricae addicti ne uno quidem die pacta mercede caruerunt. Ipse Bonaventura, permixtus aliis laicis, saxa et latera congerens, structores adiuvabat, et post plurimos per quinquennii spatium exantlatos labores, coenobio et continenti templo ad finem adductis, quod templum Deo in honorem S. Bonaventurae Ecclesiae Doctoris sacrum esse voluit, Venerabilis Dei Servus tum novi Conventus Custos, cum universi Recessus moderator et praepositus est Apostolica auctoritate renuntiatus. Verum etsi iure ac merito supremus esset sacri Recessus praeses, vilia tamen officia nunquam detrectavit, immo sese in illis versari maxime in deliciis habuit. Itaque dum Recessus coenobia ex demandato sibi officio lustrat diligentissime, nunc Variae, nunc Montorii, nunc in Conventu S. Mariae Gratiarum vel mensae confratrum consultit, vel stipem pro iis, sarcinis onustus, quaeritat, vel infirmis suavibus fraternae caritatis officiis ministrat. At Romae non modo populares, sed viri Principes, Praesules et Sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae etiam Cardinales certatim ad S. Bonaventurae Conventum Dei Famulum allocuturi confluebant, nemo non recreatus abibat, minime deficientibus prodigiis, cum humana subsidia deficerent. Divino enim lumine illustratus cum viris doctissimis de theologicis disceptationibus indoctus disseruit, et Patris Assisiensis indolem suavissimam referens, nudo simplici genere animorum motus et lacrymas ciebat. Romanis quoque Pontificibus Alexandro VII, Clementi IX ac X atque Innocentio XI Praedecessoribus Nostris rec. mem. acceptissimus fuit, qui humilis laici coeptis annuentes, sacrum auctoritate sua Recessum firmarunt, eleemosynis sospitarunt, indulgentiis ac spiritualibus gratiis auxere.

At sanctus Fundator dissolvi cupiens et cum Christo esse hilari vultu *in paradisum, in paradisum* repetens, adesse sibi finem praesentiebat. Mors autem fuit vitae tam sancte actae plane consentanea. Nam febri correptus, etsi medici eum morti proximum minime subolerent, tamen se triduo moritum

nunciavit, et revera die undecima mensis Septembris anno MDCLXXXIV, aetatis suae sexagesimo quarto, Ecclesiae Sacramentis rite munitus, benedictis confratribus suis circa lectum adstantibus, placidissimo exitu mortale aevum cum immortali commutavit. Quoniam vero *in memoria aeterna erit iustus*, corpus quidem conditum sepulchro est non sine tumultu Romanorum civium, sancti viri vultum postrema vice invisentium: virtutum vero famam consequentes etiam aetates exceperunt; nam sacri Recessus opus, ab ipso Venerabili Dei Servo tam strenue propugnatum, uberiora semper in Franciscalis Familiae bonum incrementa suscepit; et surgens adhuc medias inter veteris Urbis ruinas in Palatino clivo Recessus, a S. Bonaventura nuncupatus, quasi testimonium christianaे humilitatis super ethnicum fastum victoriam referentis, pluribus in posterum sanctissimis viris tuta fuit sedes ac potissimum Leonardi a Portu Mauritio apostolatu praefulsit.

Itaque etsi serius propter publicarum rerum in Hispania conversionem de Bonaventurae fama sanctitatis et prodigiis penes SS. Rituum Congregationem causa agitari copta est, et iuridicis probationibus rite confectis, virtutes illius heroicum attigisse culmen rec. mem. Pius PP. VI Praedecessor Noster decreto edixit XVII kal. Septembres anno MDCCCLXXV dato. Initia deinde actio est de miraculis quae eo deprecante divinitus patrata ferebantur, omnibusque de iure absolutis, Nos Ipsi per decretum diei vicesimi quarti mensis Aprilis nuper elapsi super duobus miraculis Apostolica auctoritate constare sanximus. Cum autem de virtutibus ac duobus miraculis iam esset iudicium prolatum, unum supererat inquirendum nimirum ut VV. FF. NN. S. R. E. Cardinales Congregationi SS. Rituum praepositi interrogarentur, utrum Beatorum Coelitum honores Venerabili Dei Famulo Bonaventurae a Barcinone tuto decerni possent. Hoc praestitit dilectus Filius Noster Dominicus S. R. E. Cardinalis Ferrata, causae Relator, in generali conventu coram Nobis in Vaticanis Aedibus octavo kal. Maii labentis anni habito, omnesque tum praedicti Cardinales cum qui aderant Patres Consultores unanimi suffragio affirmative responderunt. Nos vero ab aperienda mente Nostra supersedimus, rati exorari Deum oportere ante edendum supremum in re tam gravi iudicium Quod cum impense fecissemus, tandem Dominica tertia post Pascha huius anni, Eucharistico litato Sacrificio, accitis adstantibusque Aloisio S. R. E. Cardinali Tripepi SS. Rituum Congregationi Pro-Praefecto et Dominico S. R. E. Cardinali Ferrata causae Relatore, una cum Venerabili Fratre Diomede Panici Archiepiscopo titulari Laodicensi, eiusdem S. Congregationis Secretario ac Rev. Patre Alexandro Verde, Sacrae Fidei Pro-

motore, sollempni decreto sanximus tuto procedi posse ad Venerabilis Servi Dei Bonaventurae a Barcinone laici professi Ordinis Minorum S. Francisci et conditoris sacri Recessus S. Bonaventurae Almae huius Urbis sollemnem Beatificationem.

Quae cum ita sint, universi Ordinis Minorum S. Francisci supplicationibus permoti, auctoritate Nostra Apostolica, harum Litterarum vi, facultatem facimus, ut Venerabilis Dei Servus Bonaventura a Barcinone, eiusdem Ordinis laicus professus, nomine Beati in posterum nuncupetur, eiusque Corpus et lypsana, seu reliquiae, non tamen in solemnibus supplicationibus deferendae, publicae fidelium venerationi proponantur atque imagines radiis decorentur. Praeterea eadem auctoritate Nostra Apostolica concedimus, ut de illo recitetur Officium et Missa singulis annis de communi Confessorum non Pontificum, cum Orationibus propriis per Nos approbatis iuxta Rubricas Missalis et Breviarii Romani. Hanc vero Officii recitationem Missaeque celebrationem fieri dumtaxat concedimus, in hac Alma Urbe Nostra eiusque districtu, et in civitate ac dioecesi Barcinonensi, nec non in templis omnibus et Oratoriis, quibus ubique terrarum utitur Ordo Minorum, ab omnibus fidelibus tam saecularibus, quam regularibus qui Horas canonicas recitare teneantur, et quod ad Missas attinet, ab omnibus sacerdotibus saecularibus sive regularibus ad ecclesias in quibus festum agitur confluentibus, servato Decreto SS. Rituum Congregationis n. 3862 *Urbis et Orbis* IX Decembris MDCCXCV. Denique concedimus, ut sollemnia Beatificationis Venerabilis Dei Famuli Bonaventurae a Barcinone in templis supradictis celebrentur ad normam seu instructionem SS. Rituum Congregationis die xvi Decembris MCMII de Triduo intra annum a Beatificatione sollemniter celebrando, quod quidem fieri praecipimus, die per Ordinarium designanda intra annum postquam eadem sollemnia in Basilica Vaticana celebrata fuerint. Non obstantibus Constitutionibus et Ordinationibus Apostolicis ac Decretis de non cultu editis, ceterisque contrariis quibuscumque.

Denique volumus, ut harum Litterarum exemplis, etiam impressis, dummodo manu Secretarii praefatae Rituum Congregationis subscripta sint et sigillo Praefecti munita, eadem prorsus fides in disceptationibus iudicialibus habeatur, quae Nostrae voluntatis significationi hisce Litteris ostensis haberetur.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum sub anulo Piscatoris, die **xxi** Maii MDCCCCVI, Pontificatus Nostri anno tertio.

ALOYSIUS Card. MACCHI.

THE RESIDENCE OF THE APOSTOLIC DELEGATE AT
WASHINGTON

EPISTOLA

QUA PONTIFEX DE CONSTRUCTIS AEDIBUS PRO DELEGATO APOSTOLICO WASHINGTONI GRATES PERSOLVIT ARCHIEPISCOPO BALTIMORENSI CAETERISQUE ARCHIEPISCOPIS ET EPISCOPIS FOEDERATARUM AMERICAE SEPTEMTRIONALIS CIVITATUM.

Dilecte Fili Noster et Venerabiles Fratres, salutem et Apostolicam benedictionem,

Absolutis, ut accepimus, ferme aedibus, quas Delegatus Apostolicus Washingtoni posthac habebit sibi proprias ad incolendum, libenter facimus, ut per has litteras benevolentissimum vobis animum Nostrum testemur. Vos enim, quum Delegatum Nostrum videretis paullo habitare angustius, quam deceret eum qui Nostram apud vos personam sustinet, subveniendum hac quoque in re tenuitati Sedis Apostolicae decrevistis; utroque collata pecuniae copia honestius ipsi commodiusque domicilium comparastis. In quo vestra non solum laudanda liberalitas est; sed etiam et praecipue studiosa voluntas erga Pontificem Romanum cuius dignitatem maxima vobis esse curae ostendistis. Quare gratias vobis Nos quidem agimus pro tributo nobis officio, singulares; per amplas autem referat, precamur, Christus Dominus, cuius Nos, nullo Nostro merito, gerimus vices; actuosamque virtutem vestram ad laetiora quotidie incrementa Ecclesiae, lectissimis gratiae suae muneribus, promoveat. Horum auspiciem et peculiaris Nostrae benevolentiae testem, vobis, dilecte. Fili Noster et Venerabiles Fratres, itemque vestro cuiusque clere ac populo Apostolicam benedictionem amantissime in Domino impertimus.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum die IX Novembris anno MCMVI, Pontificatus Nostri quarto.

LETTER OF POPE PIUS X TO M. LEROLLE, PRESIDENT OF
THE 'JEUNESSE CATHOLIQUE'

EPISTOLA

PII PP. X AD DNUM. M. LEROLLE PRAESIDEM ASSOCIATIONIS IUVVENTUTIS CATHOLICAE GALLICAE, OCCASIONE CONVENTUS BURDIGALAE HABITI MENSE MARTIO ELAPSO.

Chers Fils, salut et bénédiction,

Votre dévouement pour notre personne et votre obéissance au Siège apostolique Nous étaient déjà bien connus; Nous en

avons un nouveau témoignage dans la lettre récente par laquelle vous Nous annoncez le Congrès national que votre association va bientôt tenir à Bordeaux. Et ce n'est pas seulement cette preuve de respect et de soumission qui Nous a réjoui : c'est la nouvelle même du Congrès.

Nous voyons que le projet est approuvé et encouragé par nombre d'évêques et que vous devez vous réunir sous la présidence de Notre cher Fils le cardinal archevêque de Bordeaux et de Nos vénérés frères les évêques d'Angers et d'Agen. Il Nous est très agréable de voir ainsi l'autorité épiscopale favoriser une association qui Nous est chère et que Nous souhaitons voir estimer par tous les gens de bien.

La fin qu'elle se propose est ce qu'il y a de plus utile et même de plus nécessaire aujourd'hui : en un temps où l'hostilité contre la foi et les mœurs chrétiennes va croissant, elle veut préserver ses membres d'un tel danger, et par eux sauver les autres jeunes gens de France, à quelque classe de la société qu'ils appartiennent.

Pour atteindre cette fin, ses moyens sont excellents : donner ouvertement l'exemple des vertus chrétiennes, se tenir en dehors des disputes et passions politique, s'occuper avec ardeur des doctrines sociales et de leur mise en pratique, poursuivre vigoureusement son dessein par la parole, les écrits et les institutions convenables.

Il y a lieu également d'approuver votre genre d'organisation, grâce auquel, en se multipliant pour toute la France, les groupes de jeunes gens restent harmonieusement unis comme les membres d'un corps unique.

Rien n'est plus sage, Nous tenons à le dire, car c'est l'affaire de tous que le salut de toute la jeunesse nationale, et voilà pourquoi Nous estimons, chers Fils, qu'il vous faut garder avec soin votre cohésion.

Continuez aussi cette pratique, dont vous vous êtes fait sage-ment, une règle, d'avoir dans chacun de vos groupes un prêtre pieux et instruit, non seulement pour présider aux réunions religieuses, mais pour diriger les études et les discussions doctrinales. De la sorte il vous sera facile, dans des questions qui touchent de près à la religion, d'éviter les erreurs auxquelles vous seriez exposés.

D'ailleurs, l'initiative et la saine liberté ne seront pas entravées par la présence du prêtre ; il n'est présent dans vos groupes et dans vos Comités que pour y être, selon les cas, le docteur, le conseiller, le guide.

Mais ce qui fait votre plus grand mérite, c'est l'exacte obéissance avec laquelle vous suivez les prescriptions du Pontife romain sur l'action catholique sociale et le soin que vous avez,

quand il s'agit de les mettre en pratique, de vous laisser guider par les évêques et les autres pasteurs ; vous tiendrez avant tout à mériter cet éloge ; Nous vous y exhortons fortement.

En effet, la principale raison d'attendre de votre association les fruits désirés, c'est son union étroite avec l'Eglise. Votre prochain Congrès, qu'accompagne la faveur si marquée et l'adhésion des évêques, servira encore à resserrer cette union.

Courage donc, chers Fils. A la voix bienveillante de vos pasteurs, la Nôtre s'ajoute pour affermir vos âmes : cherchez comment vous pourrez, à une époque qui en a tant besoin, concerter vos efforts d'une façon plus utile à l'Eglise et à votre patrie.

Nous cependant, dans la sollicitude particulière et les soucis où Nous sommes à l'égard de la chère France, Nous prions Dieu avec ardeur de vous soutenir des meilleurs dons de sa bonté, vous chers fils, avec qui grandissent les espérances d'un meilleur avenir. Comme gage de ces dons, Nous vous accordons très affectueusement, à vous et à toute votre association, la bénédiction apostolique.

Donné à Rome, près Saint-Pierre, le 22 février de l'année 1907, quatrième de Notre Pontificat.

PIUS PP. X.

NOTICES OF BOOKS

THE GARDEN OF ROSES OF OUR LADY. By Father M. Meschler, S.J. London: Burns and Oates. Price 2s. 6d.

THIS work is an authorized translation of Father Meschler's work on the Rosary, in which the excellences of the Rosary and the best means of reciting it are ably and devoutly expounded. A short history of the devotion is also given, but what will most appeal to 'Mary's children' is the glowing appreciation given by the incomparable beauties and fruitfulness of the Rosary which Father Meschler calls 'Mary's mystical garden of roses.' The book will be found very useful to all who wish to recite their Rosary as it should be recited. On account of the frequent repetition the Rosary is in special danger of being recited in a thoughtless and helter-skelter fashion. The ideas and methods put forward by Father Meschler will concentrate the mind and give it the proper turn as against this danger.

The writing of the book has been one passionate act of love of the Rosary. Reading it you learn to love the Rosary more than ever, and you realize that after devotion to the Blessed Sacrament it is the most divine of Catholic devotions.

P. B.

ESSENTIALS AND NON-ESSENTIALS OF THE CATHOLIC RELIGION. By Rev. H. G. Hughes. Notre Dame, Ind.: The *Ave Maria* Press.

THIS is a very readable book. The writer sets before himself the task of dispelling from the minds of people who are eagerly seeking the truth certain crude and foolish notions about our Catholic faith and practices. In my humble opinion he has succeeded admirably. In the first chapter he commences logically by explaining what is meant by 'faith' and 'practice.' In the second and third chapters he explains in most clear and concise language what Catholics are bound to believe. The fourth and fifth chapters he devotes to what Catholics are free to believe or not. The sixth and seventh chapters are devoted to what Catholics are bound to practise and what

Catholics are free to practise respectively. It is a very short book—if I may call it a book—composed of papers which appeared originally in the *Ave Maria*, and now published in book form. What I liked especially in the book was the absence of all Latin words and phrases which are found sometimes in theological writings in the vernacular. As I have said before the writer puts his ideas in clear language, but I think it is in chapter five this clearness of diction is seen to best advantage, when he treats of the question of the Church's attitude toward ecclesiastical miracles and private revelations. It is not an ambitious work. The writer sums up his object in writing it in the following paragraph: 'If it should be made even a little clearer to any inquirer that the Catholic religion is not to the children of the Church as it appears to so many who are not of her, an intolerable burden, but the highest of privileges, a sweet and easy yoke, a help and not a hindrance to happiness here and hereafter, the object with which I write will have been obtained.' In a word, it is a book that gives a solid exposition of Catholic belief and practices, and will be found as useful to those inside the fold, as to those who are outside the fold, but with a will, and a very good will, are endeavouring to find out which is the true fold of Christ.

M. U. R.

THE CATHOLIC WHO'S WHO, AND YEAR BOOK, 1908. Edited by Sir F. C. Burnand. London: Burns & Oates. Price 3s. 6d.

SIR FRANCIS BURNAND deserves the thanks of all Catholics for this interesting and useful volume. It is a regular mine of information, and should be the most popular book of the year. Sir Francis and his assistants evidently took great pains to secure accurate information. The fact that they have not always succeeded only means that the work is not perfect, although as near perfection as could well be expected.

We miss a good many names that ought to be there and are not. Where, for instance, is Sir F. Bertie? Where is Mrs. Thurston, author of *John Chilcote, M.P.* Where is Mrs. Stephen Gwynn? Where is Professor Stockley of Cork? etc.

Sometimes works written by one author are attributed to another. This has happened to myself, as I am credited with a work in collaboration with Count Plunkett which should be attributed to my distinguished namesake in St. Stephen's Green.

Father Bernard Vaughan is given down as the twelfth child of Colonel Vaughan of Courtfield, and as having been born in the year 1849. Further down we meet Mr. Reginald Vaughan, the sixth child of the same Colonel Vaughan, who was also born in the year 1849. No wonder the *modern Savonarola* should be a prodigy.

The editor of *Punch* sometimes breaks out in the editor of the collection. Tim Healy's *persiflage* has not always been spent upon the enemies of his race and creed. The Bishop of Limerick has written a good many letters not all of them pastorals. Daisie Boote, the actress, has by the conversion of the House of Headford accomplished a feat in which many grave and reverend signors failed. To Lady Euan Smith, a Hindoo once began a letter in characteristic style with the words 'Honoured Enormity.' Two sons of Earl Nelson have proved themselves worthy of their great ancestor for they have boarded the barque of Peter, etc.

Somewhat in keeping with all this is the suggestion made in an advertisement by a priest in Wales that every Catholic in *Who's Who* would fittingly celebrate their being brought together for the first time by sending him three guineas each (*sic*) for the building of a church at Bangor—a modest request which I am sure will be responded to with alacrity.

One gets a good deal of casual information in this volume. For instance, I see that Mr. Robert Dell, who writes diatribes on the Pope and Roman authorities in the *Times* and other more professedly Protestant organs, is the son of a rural vicar in Hampshire, who complimented the Church by joining it in 1897. He is now a picture dealer in Paris, and let us hope will stick to his prints and paintings and not bother us further with his views on church-government. Attacking the Church and its rulers from inside may be more effective and more lucrative than if it were done from without. I prefer to see the work done by open enemies rather than by professing friends. Mr. Dell is not, I fear, the only interloper in Sir Francis Burnand's list. Guy Fawkes was a sincere and courageous man, no matter how misguided and wicked. There are Guys at the present day who have none of his courage, but somewhat of his power of doing mischief. They do it for the most part anonymously, for the edification and enjoyment of their Protestant friends. This, however, is no fault of Sir Francis Burnand, who deserves the thanks and congratulations of all Catholics for his most interesting volume.

J. F. H.

MEDITATIONS FOR THE USE OF ECCLESIASTICS. A Supplement to the All Hallows Manual. Dublin: Browne & Nolan, Ltd.

THIS very useful little book is announced as follows:—

‘The superiors of All Hallows College convinced of the vital importance of their students not failing in the practice of daily meditation during their missionary life have thought that a portable book of *Ecclesiastical Meditations* with forms of morning and evening prayers, and those prescribed before and after celebrating Mass, would be a great means of promoting this holy and most desirable end. The new meditations of the present edition of the All Hallows Manual with others, but shortened, of Cardinal Wiseman’s, have been selected as most appropriate.’

It is needless to say that this is an admirable little book, suited in every way to the purpose it is intended to serve, small, portable, clear, suggestive, sympathetic, reasonable. May it become the companion of many priests. At holiday-time or any other time it will help them to live up to the best ideal of their state.

J. F. H.

A COMMENTARY ON THE PRESENT INDEX LEGISLATION.

By the Rev. Timothy Hurley, D.D., Priest of the Diocese of Elphin, with a Preface by Most Rev. Dr. Clancy. Dublin: Browne and Nolan, Ltd., 1907. Price 3s. 6d. net.

J

THIS is a very useful book, and its author, Dr. Hurley, deserves the thanks both of laity and clergy for the pains he has taken in producing it. Latin documents are not very attractive to persons not accustomed to peruse them; and, I fear, if a knowledge of the recent Index legislation depended on the reading and study of the document in which it is drawn up, some practical reasons for letting it stand over to some future time would be invoked by not a few even among the clergy. Dr. Hurley’s compact volume will facilitate matters very considerably; and those who think that he has sometimes gone beyond his text can easily verify the matter; for the text is printed at the head of the volume and can be referred without any trouble.

The treatment is clear, logical and full. There may be statements and assertions of the author with which

canonists and theologians would not all agree ; but they are not of much importance ; and substantially I think Dr. Hurley is on sure ground and has kept a safe course.

The character of the questions dealt with is of the highest practical importance for priests and bishops. Nothing could be more practical than to know how, according to the law of the Church, one is bound to deal with works of apostates, heretics, schismatics, whether writing professedly or not on religious subjects ; how to deal with persons writing on the Scriptures, whether Catholics or not ; how to deal with immoral books in all the grades and shades of immorality ; books on devotions, indulgences, liturgical books and prayer-books. Who has the right of censorship ? How it is exercised ? What are its effects ? etc., etc.

Dr. Hurley's book will prove decidedly interesting and useful to all priests who have to deal with such questions ; and in one shape or another what priest has not ?

J. F. H.

DIE BÜCHERVERBOTE IN PAPSTBRIESEN. J. Hilgers, S.J.
Freiburg : Herder, 1907. Price 2s. 6d.

THIS complete list of books, condemned not by Roman Congregations, but by the Sovereign Pontiffs themselves, bears witness to the unwearied researches of the learned author. He deserves well of theologians, canonists and historians, for tracing from the first age of the Church all the works that have been thus singled out for the severest kind of censures. Four years ago Father Hilgers published his monumental work on the Index, to which the present brochure is an appendix. The *Index der verbotenen Bücher* (Herder, 1904) contains a history of the prohibited books ever since the *Thalia* of Arius was condemned at Nice, a detailed account of the Roman Index since its commencement under Paul IV (1537), and a commentary on the *Officiorum et Munerum* of Leo XIII, etc., etc. But the forty-seventh section of that law, dealing as it does with the books of apostates and teachers of error, written in defence of error, as well as with those condemned by name in Letters Apostolic, suggested to Father Hilgers the advisability of drawing up a catalogue of all such productions. He divides it into two parts ; the first contains the books condemned prior to 1600, and others condemned since but not mentioned in the Constitution of Leo XIII. The second contains books condemned since 1600 that are named in the Constitution. This section

is eminently practical. As many of the relevant Letters Apostolic are not to be found in any collection hitherto made, Father Hilgers gives them in the third and concluding section of this erudite and useful little work.

J. M.


PHILOSOPHIA MORALIS IN USUM SCHOLARUM. Auctore Victore Cathrein, S.J. (Editio Sexta, ab Auctore recognita.) Freiburg: Herder, 1907.

THIS is a new edition (sixth) of the sixth volume of the *Cursus Philosophicus*. The author is too well known to need any introduction to our readers; his works have earned for him a name which is sufficient to bespeak a welcome for his new edition of his *Philosophia Moralis*. The work, which in its present form is not a mere reprint of earlier editions, is worthy of study both for its clearness and its solid and scholarly treatment of many questions of the day. The learned author has something to say on subjects which are of absorbing interest, and at the same time does not pass over, as some 'up to date' authors have done, questions which, although little heard of outside the class hall, are of great importance, inasmuch as the answers to these questions contain the solutions of many problems in daily life—fountains from which are to be drawn arguments to refute the most modern fanaticism. Are not all the new theories in one sense old? Some of our Catholic writers, however, appear to be either ashamed or unwilling to refer to the great doctors and theologians of the Church. Not so Father Cathrein, who basis his treatise on the works of St. Thomas, Suarez, etc.

The author divides his book into two parts: I. *Philosophia Moralis Generalis* (pp. 1-219); II. *Philosophia Specialis* (pp. 220-493). Part I. contains eight chapters: (a) *De fine ultimo hominis*; (b) *De actibus humanis physice consideratis*; (c) *De bonitate et malitia morali actuum*; (d) *De virtutibus et vitiis*; (e) *De lege naturali*; (f) *De conscientia*; (g) *De proprietatibus bonitatem et malitiam actus consequentibus*; (h) *De jure in genere*. Part II. is subdivided into two books: I. *Ethica Specialis Individualis*, in which the author treats of (a) *De officiis hominis erga Deum*; (b) *De officiis hominis erga seipsum*; (c) *De officiis hominum mutuis inter se*; (d) *De jure proprietatis*; (e) *De contractibus*. II. *Ethica Specialis*. (a) *De societate universim*; (b) *De societate domestica*; (c) *De societate civili*; (d) *De jure internationali*. From this analysis it will be seen

how extensive the work is. One would almost be inclined to say too extensive to be thoroughly treated in a book of 500 pages. Yet the author has done his work admirably. Special attention must be called to the chapter in which he treats of 'De Jure Proprietatis et De Societate Civilis.' Here in a short space will be found the most up-to-date, and above all, the teaching of the Church on these important every-day questions. If, however, when treating of another equally important subject, the author would only accept the commonly received definition of probabilism, he would not speak as he does. Probabilists demand 'vera et solida probabilitas' as a necessary condition of a lawful act, but at the same time they maintain that such *probabilitas* can be found in a 'sententia minus probabili sic cognita et judicata.' There may be a question not about the existence of a law, but about conformity to a law known to exist. If you can say your *sententia* is solidly probable, probabilists will tell you that you may follow it, even though you think that the opposite opinion, i.e., the *sententia* conformed to the law, is more probable (see Ter Haar, *Das Decret des Papstes Innocenz XI. über den Probabilismus.* pp. 5, 6). This is what the Pope condemned, as Ter Haar following Mandonnet shows (see the text of the Decrees, ib. pp. 29-31). Probabilism was held by St. Alphonsus, but he lived to change his views. His own system, as he again and again declares in his works, was *Equi-probabilism*, and this is the one which confessors are safe in following.

C. McC.



THE SCRIPTURES FOR THE PEOPLE¹

IT is a trite anti-Catholic shibboleth that the Church of Rome has for centuries consistently kept the Bible from the people; that the providing of the masses with the pure and unadulterated Word of God is one, and not the least, of the glories of the Reformation; that whereas the first Christian communities read and were encouraged to read the Scriptures, the development of ecclesiastical government and the fixing of doctrinal teaching were characterised by a narrow conservatism which gradually removed this excellent practice; that either from hatred or fear of the light the Church of Rome elected the comparative obscurity of dogmatic instruction in preference to the clear light of the Gospel. Even the liberal spirit that is supposed to inspire recent Protestant writers has not yet silenced this old refrain.

Those who keep harping on this ancient theme obviously forget, that if in certain places and at certain periods the reading of the Scriptures in the vernacular was interdicted by the Church, it by no means follows that the people were deprived of the Word of God. They had the Bible given them, not merely by the preaching of their pastors and the liturgical rites of the Church, all of them Scriptural

¹ *Il Santo Vangelo e gli Atti degli Apostoli.* Nuova traduzione italiana con note, 28^a edizione. Pia Società di S. Girolamo. Roma: Typ. Vaticana, 1907.

La Clef des Evangiles. par M. l'Abbé H. Lesêtre, Curé de St. Etiennne du Mont. Septième édition. Paris: Lethielleux. 1907.

L'Histoire Sainte, par M. l'Abbé H. Lesêtre, Curé de St. Etiennne du Mont. Sixième édition. Paris: Lethielleux. 1907.

in the truest sense, but even in the very stones of these great houses of prayer that grew up under the eyes of the people. Does not Ruskin immortalize the glorious pile that raises its stately towers and marvellous façade over an ancient French town by calling it the 'Bible of Amiens'? Again, it is often lost sight of that the reading of the Bible in the vulgar tongue is not necessary for the attainment of salvation; that such reading, on the contrary, if it is not safeguarded by such restrictions as those found in the Church of Rome, may prove prejudicial to this end; that, on the testimony of St. Irenæus,¹ one of the early Fathers to whom our adversaries are fond of appealing, whole nations were converted and received the faith without being able to read, inasmuch as they obtained from the Church the teaching which was necessary and sufficient for salvation; that, furthermore, had Bible-reading been necessary for salvation the greater part of the human race would have been excluded from the means of grace until the invention of printing.

The Church has always regarded herself as the custodian and legitimate interpreter of Holy Writ. Her discipline in reference to its use by the faithful has varied with varying circumstances. For from discountenancing or discouraging the use of the Scriptures the Church has ever been solicitous that the knowledge of the things of God should permeate the masses of the people. When, however, with the rise of heresy, such as that of the Albigenses, she beheld the fountains of truth deliberately poisoned; when she saw corrupt translations of the Sacred Text industriously disseminated in favour of doctrines which she felt called on to condemn, she prudently restrained practices which ran the risk of being abused. Thus the Council of Toulouse, in 1229, forbade the laity to read the Scriptures; and we find the Council of Tarragona, in 1234, issuing a similar decree. Pius IV required bishops to refuse lay people to read the Bible unless their confessors or parish priests judged such reading to be useful for them.

¹ Iren. iii. 4.

These, however, are not hard and fast rules, but measures of prudence dictated by special circumstances, for we find Pius VI writing to Martini, the author of a translation of the Bible into Italian, and expressing his approval thus:—

You judge well that the faithful should be excited to read the Scriptures, for these are the most abundant sources which ought to be open to everyone to draw from them purity of morals and of doctrine. . . . This you have seasonably effected by the publication of the Sacred Scriptures in the language of your country . . . especially when you show you have added explanatory notes which, being extracted from the Fathers, preclude every possible danger of abuse.

These remarks, and many more that might be made, may be said to savour of antiquity. Quite so; they are repeated here merely for the sake of preventing a possible misunderstanding of the title of this article to the effect that an entirely new development is taking place in the attitude of the Church to the Scriptures. This, of course, is not the case. There is question only of better methods in the form of cheaper, and at the same time solid, publications, with a view to the wider diffusion of sacred science.

Our present Holy Father's solicitude for all the Churches has not prevented him from giving his attention and encouragement to minute details of pastoral work. Eager to carry out the wishes of his illustrious predecessor in reference to the reading of Scripture by all classes of people Pius X has recognized the merits and services of the pious Society of St. Jerome.¹ Founded now some ten years, it began to realize, under Leo XIII, the desire expressed in the opening paragraphs of the Encyclical *Providentissimus*, 'that the Sacred Scriptures, the grand source of Catholic revelation, should be made safely and abundantly accessible to the flock of Jesus Christ.'

The one object placed before itself by the San Girolamo is the diffusion of copies of an authentic translation of the Gospels and Acts of the Apostles amongst Catholic families.

¹ Special indulgences were granted by Pius X to persons in any way connected with the San Girolamo, on August 10, 1903. Indulgences had been already granted by Leo XIII.

‘The Society proposes to print and distribute copies of the Holy Gospels in the Italian language, and extends its proper action to all those countries in which the Italian language is spoken.’¹ The San Girolamo has its headquarters in Rome, and its branches throughout Italy. Nearly every town has an association consisting of clerical and lay members who make it their business to distribute the editions of the Gospels and Acts published in Rome. This book is a marvel of good printing and cheapness, to say nothing of the excellent explanatory notes given on almost every text that might be considered difficult for the ordinary reader. Though the book contains 512 32mo pages, and is well indexed, and analysed by means of headings in different type, the San Girolamo Society is able to put it on the market for the modest sum of two-pence halfpenny. On page 4 of the last edition of this admirable little work we read:—

The Pious Society of St. Jerome for the diffusion of the Holy Gospels believes it has served a good cause by the present volume, which tends to make of the Gospels a truly popular book. It is necessary to distinguish this from an analogous propaganda carried on at present with much activity by our separated brethren, the Protestants. Faithful to their principles these latter wish to substitute the Gospels for the Church, inviting the readers of the Gospels to draw thence directly and exclusively the doctrines of faith, and the rules of moral conduct. With us, Catholics, on the contrary, the Gospels, far from taking the place of the teacher, the living word of the Church, rather suppose and claim this latter. And in fact, to use an ancient saying of St. Augustine’s, ‘How can we believe the Gospels without the testimony of the Church.’

The four Gospels are, as it were, an episode in the uninterrupted history of ecclesiastical preaching or teaching. At the death of Jesus there did not exist a single Gospel to perpetuate His mission and to continue His work essentially living and oral. The first Gospel, according to calculations most favourable to its antiquity, and which, from a critical point of view, are not too certain, dates at the earliest from the year 42 of our era; that is to say, it was written ten years after the death

¹ Art. 2, *Statuto della Pia Società di S. Girolamo.*

of our Saviour. There was, on the contrary, the Church, the living society, represented and governed by the Apostles, who spoke and preached, repeating the words of Christ as the needs of their hearers seemed to require them. The subject of their preaching was Jesus Christ, and sometimes to make their preaching more efficacious and durable, they reduced it to writing, and thence arose the Epistles and Gospels. He who would wish to find in each of these, or in the entire collection of them, the whole Christian dogma, would seek therein more than the authors intended to put into them. Were the evangelical writers to arise from their tombs they would be the first to be astonished at the rôle which Protestants wish to attribute to their works. And just as preaching and ecclesiastical teaching began before the Gospels, so it did not cease after their compilation.

This short instruction concludes by giving some of the many uses to be derived from the perusal of the Gospels. The faithful will find therein the statement, often heard from the lips of the Divine Master Himself, of the truths of faith and of the rules of morality. Unbelievers must recognize in the Gospels a history as capable of giving as reliable information about the life of Jesus Christ as the works of Thucydides are of telling us the events of the Peloponnesian War. And if the writings of a pagan historian stir their imagination, arouse their enthusiasm, and elicit their sympathy, the evangelical narratives ought in all reason produce similar effects, for the events related are more wonderful, the ideal purer and more beautiful, than those found in any other ancient writer.

The notes on difficult texts are frequent, brief, and clear; though occurring oftener than in the Douay Version, they are intended to simplify merely obvious difficulties that may suggest themselves to a lay person.

On the text (Matthew xii. 31, 32) dealing with a sin that shall not be forgiven, the following note is added:—

Difficult expressions which might be rendered thus in our language: There is no sin that is irremissible; in fact, amongst all classes of sinners there are found people who are converted; but he who maliciously calumniates the goodness of God by attributing to the demon what God has done for the salvation

of men is beyond hope of conversion or pardon. Even if God works miracles to convert him, these very miracles, inasmuch as they are interpreted as works of the devil, will only serve to make him more obstinate in his blindness. Thus, as long as you, O Pharisees, interpreted My human actions wrongly, by saying that I love good living (*che sono ghiottone*), there remained some hope of converting you by miracles ; but now that you in your wickedness consider these divine works as diabolical they are no longer profitable for you, and you will die in your sins.

The spirit of the Society is clearly manifested by these few extracts. The founders and promoters recognizing the fundamental principle that the Church existed before the Gospels, wish that the faithful may use the latter according to the mind of the Church, and in willing obedience to her directions regarding them.

It is the work of the reading of the Holy Gospels for the sanctification of the Christian family that specially commends itself to the members of the San Girolamo.

Most useful and specially to be commended is the custom of daily reading [the Gospels] in the bosom of the family ; and in this way parents, besides performing an act of piety in union with their families, and on that account one that is most acceptable to God, bring to perfection in a wonderful manner the instruction and religious, as well as moral, education of their children by exhibiting constantly to them in a lively way the most perfect ideal and the most sweet source of every virtue. The daily reading in the family ought to be brief, intelligently performed, with clear pronunciation, without monotony, discreet pauses being made betimes to induce reflection. . . . If possible the father of the family or some other person in authority should endeavour to perform this exercise of reading, either for the sake of good example, or to attach to this act greater reverence and importance. In order to succeed better, let there be some preparation made beforehand, especially if one feels oneself wanting in nerve and fluency.¹

Special portions of the Gospels and Acts of the Apostles are allocated to special times of the year by means of a table at the end of the book, and in this way a correspondence with the liturgy of the Church is maintained. The

¹ *Alcuni Ricordi per la pia Lettura del Santo Vangelo.*

priests are recommended to remind the faithful of suitable selections for festivals and times of devotion such as Advent and Lent. The parish priests are called on to inaugurate the distribution of these pious books by some suitable ceremony, blessing them and earnestly exhorting their flock to read them.

This pious enterprise has met with the success that always crowns a well-organized system of working. Already it has made its name well-known throughout Italy. Some Sicilian students, following a course of studies in Paris, speak with enthusiasm of its progress in their native land, and say that the one obstacle in its way is the fact that so many of the poorer people are unable to read. This defect, however, is in part remedied by the visiting of pious people who catechise and read for those who are unable to establish the prescribed practices in their families. Such visiting, of course, is confined to Sundays and days of devotion, when the members of the family can meet together. In the good work of the Society lay members co-operate generously with the clergy, and the list of promoters counts the names of many laymen of various professions. The Society, too, has been generously subsidized by some wealthy Catholics, and so has been able to publish its books at a very low figure. The lowness of price, and presumably, too, the excellence of production, of these little volumes have attracted the Protestant Bible Societies in Italy, and one of these thought it could do nothing better than sell the San Girolamo book in the interests of its own propaganda. This, however, was not done without a protest from the San Girolamo, and the sale was accordingly restricted to the bureaux of the Society.

Other small books which will help the good cause of popularising Scriptural knowledge are *La Clef de l'Evangile*, and *L'Histoire Sainte*, by M. l'Abbé Lesêtre. The former of these might be described as the notes of a finished Scriptural scholar arranged and simplified so as to facilitate and render attractive the reading of the New Testament. The questions treated are all of them dealt with more at length in larger works, but as the author says these works, by reason

of their development, their erudition, or the place which they occupy in series of commentaries, are within reach of comparatively few. The abridgment has for aim not to replace larger works and more ample treatment, but to summarise the results of others' labour in the great field of Biblical learning and research. *La Clef de l'Evangile* will secure for readers of the Gospels—and may their number increase according to the wish of the Church—those summary notions which are indispensable for their guidance during their perusal of the pages of Holy Writ. Perhaps, too, it will develop a taste for the Gospels, and will lead people to make them the object of their reading, their meditation, and daily study.

No better book than *La Clef de l'Evangile* could find a place amongst the books of a busy missionary priest, whether for use by himself in the preparation of catechetical instruction, or as a work he may safely recommend to such as he thinks are sincerely anxious to understand the Gospel narrative. To a priest this little book will in a few moments recall much of what he has read as a student, and should he wish more information than is actually supplied to him in these short paragraphs, he has references which will guide him securely. 'To understand a man,' says John Morley, 'you must understand his age.' The right intelligence of Jewish customs and laws is essential to a proper grasp of Christ's public life. The political, social, and religious life of the Jews, such questions as those concerned with divisions of times, distances, money, language, religious or political organization among the Jews themselves, or in their relations with other peoples, receive concise yet explicit treatment in *La Clef de l'Evangile*. The author abridges a great deal because he knows so much. A Biblical commentator of eminence, M. l'Abbé Lesêtre has enriched modern Biblical literature with quite a number of works.¹ Students of Scripture will recall the fact of M. Lesêtre's appointment as a member of the Biblical Commission at its inception under Leo XIII. If his reputation

¹ *Les Psaumes*; *Le Livre de Job*; *Les Proverbes*; *Introduction à l'Etude de l'Ecriture Sainte*, etc.

as one of the Biblical *savants* of the Catholic world is deservedly great, his practical instincts as a missionary priest of long and varied experience in the archdiocese of Paris are also well known. He writes, therefore, as one thoroughly *au courant* with actual needs, and has given to the smaller manuals a certain practical flavour which makes them specially useful. Done in quite a modern style, with a studious avoidance of pedantry, and of such ecclesiastical phraseology as might embarrass a lay person, these books impart precise information without even slightly fatiguing the reader.

In chapter iii. (page 148) of *La Clef de l'Evangile*, under the title 'Les Relations du Sauveur,' the relations of our Lord with all classes of people are adequately described. His intercourse with His Mother, St. Joseph, the holy women, children, sinners, the Pharisees, and the crowds, forms each of them the subject of a short paragraph. Any one of these paragraphs, which may be read in a moment or two, gives abundant matter for a beautiful instruction, and for a teacher in charge of the religious instruction of people, young or old, it would be difficult to find a book more helpful towards furthering such a person's efforts to make a class interesting. To take a paragraph at random from many which might be selected ; of Christ's intercourse with sinners, he writes (page 151) :—

The name sinner was applied to pagans, publicans, and in general to all who did not adopt the manner of life sanctioned by the pharasaical teachers. Our Saviour had nothing but compassion for those on whom the proud heaped their contempt. He is kind and merciful to the Samaritan woman (John iv. 7-27), to Matthew the publican (Mark ii. 14-17 ; Luke v. 29-32), to Mary Magdalen (Luke vii. 37-50), to the woman taken in adultery (John viii. 3-11), to Zacheus (Luke xix. 1-10), to Peter who denied Him (Luke xxii. 61 ; John xxi. 15-18), to His executioners (Luke xxiii. 34), to the good thief (Luke xxiii. 42, 43). He declares that He is not come to call the just but sinners (Matt. ix. 13 ; Mark ii. 17 ; Luke v. 32) ; that He came in behalf of the sheep that are lost of the house of Israel (Matt. xv. 24), and He says there is great joy in Heaven over the conversion of one sinner (Luke xv. 7-10). The Pharisees were scandalized

at His condescension to sinners (Matt. ix. 11; xi. 19; Luke v. 30; vii. 34; xv. 1, 2; xix. 7); He replies by the parable of the prodigal child in which He shows what He intends to do in their favour.

At page 113 some interesting particulars of Eastern social life are given under the heading of 'La vie Sociale':—

The relations of the people of Israel with each other were regulated by laws which were inviolable. In the East hospitality constitutes a sacred duty. Every house was invariably open to the stranger. There were even in certain places, and especially in the neighbourhood of towns, *khans* or *caravanserais*, where those who did not wish to make a longer sojourn might rest and pass the night (Luke x. 34, 35). They consisted of an enclosure provided with a roofed corridor consisting of apartments, which surrounded an open yard in which animals might be stabled. Such was the *khan* of Bethlehem in which St. Joseph, who does not appear to have addressed himself to the houses of the town, at first sought shelter (Luke ii. 7). There was a custodian of the *khan* who sold provisions (Luke x. 35). Friends never met without a long and ceremonious interchange of salutations, which retarded the journey (Luke x. 4). On entering a house the salutation of peace was given (Matt. x. 12). In the reception of respectable people the custom of kissing was observed (Luke vii. 4, 5; Matt. xxvi. 49; Mark xiv. 45); and that also of washing the feet. The newly-arrived person took part in the family repast (Luke x. 7, 8). To shake the dust from the feet in that place where hospitality was refused was taken as implying that one had strayed as it were into a pagan country, with which one could have nothing in common (Matt. x. 14; Mark vi. 11; Luke ix. 5). Presents were offered to the person visited to testify veneration for the host (Matt. ii. 11). It was also considered a mark of honour to a host to break a precious vessel the perfume of which had been poured on the host's head (Mark xiv. 3). Amusements and music find mention in the Gospel (Luke xv. 25). Mention is also made of sports of children who chant refrains, imitating what they have seen others do (Matt. xi. 17; Luke vii. 32).

The style of both *La Clef de l'Evangile*, and *L'Histoire Sainte* is so direct and clear, that a translation of them would seem to be unnecessary. Besides being popular manuals written for French people, and with a view to their special requirements, it is questionable whether they

would not suffer materially in the translation. Their mission in other countries would rather be to inspire the production of similar books, should it be considered useful to give such manuals to people whose education does not enable them to read easy French.

That a knowledge of the facts at least of the Old Testament history should form part of the mental equipment of educated Catholics in pretty generally admitted. Though the Old Law is inferior to the New as the shadow to the substance, we know from St. Paul that 'if God in these latter days hath spoken to us by His Son He spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets.' But an urgent reason renders the study of Bible history imperative at the present day. The immense interest taken in purely religious questions by those outside the Church is well catered for by present-day periodical literature. There is scarcely a serious review that reflects modern thought but has month after month an article on a religious subject, and for some years past one of two subjects engage attention—an attack on some chapter of Scripture, or a dissertation on the French ecclesiastical crisis, Higher Criticism, or the recent Vatican policy. The unsettling effect of such periodicals on the minds of many Catholics is well known. The literature on Biblical questions offered by public libraries is almost invariably from Protestant sources; without doubt some of the books of reference, such as Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, or the *Dictionary of Christ in the Gospels*, are excellent in many points, and conservative to quite an unexpected degree. Yet, is it not desirable to have a work compiled from Catholic sources that will reflect the mind of the Church on such questions? A small book, too, is required which will give a complete course and prepare the minds of young people for difficulties which they are sure to encounter. To supply such a need as this *L'Histoire Sainte* of M. Lesêtre seems admirably suited. As a Bible history is it superior to a work like Reeves' *History of the Bible*, inasmuch as not merely are the facts of history given, but some explanatory pages are interspersed where such are deemed necessary. The author takes from his

treasury old things and new. The new things bring his book up to date, as he gives in brief, and with the lucidity and order for which French writers are eminent, the opinions of the best Catholic scholars on the problems presented by portions of the Sacred Text. As he very modestly remarks in the Introduction to *L'Histoire Sainte* : 'The few explanations which are given have all of them been formulated by Catholic authors specially qualified by their learning in Biblical and theological subjects. They represent the limit to which one can actually go without incurring any censure from the Church.' The authors he refers to are well-known names in modern Biblical scholarship—Cornely, Hummelauer, Knabenbauer of the *Curus Scripturae Sacrae*; M. Vigouroux, director of the *Dictionnaire Biblique*; M. l'Abbé Broglie, etc. But should anyone wish fully to recognize the merit of M. Lesêtre's Bible history, he has but to read some pages of Hummelauer on Genesis or Exodus, and then the brief page or two given by M. Lesêtre; a comparison of the original sources with the compendious notes given in *L'Histoire Sainte* will convince any student that M. Lesêtre uses his power of making strait ways plain to wonderful advantage.

In the introductory chapters of M. Lesêtre's work, some excellent paragraphs are devoted to a clear understanding of the position of modern Biblical scholarship. As much adverse criticism in all subjects arises out of misunderstanding of points at issue, the author of this Bible history spares no pains to define and explain what, perhaps, too many take for granted that they know already :—

Many people imagine that a Bible history cannot be and ought not be anything else than a tissue of marvellous facts. Some think by this means to render homage to the omnipotence of God, to whom no miracle is impossible; others, on the contrary, believe themselves entitled to see in the miraculous character of a narrative the proof that it is legendary. Perhaps some would be found to be all the more satisfied in proportion as the marvellous shines out brilliantly in the pages of a religious history; the legendary note in that case becoming accentuated in their eyes, the moral authority of the narrative thus framed

contains no longer anything that obliges or disturbs them [*rien d'impératif ni de gênant*].

It is evident that in a Bible history the supernatural holds a leading place. It is necessary to state the importance of this place without any disloyal effort to restrict it more than is reasonable, or even to suppose it, but also without any rash tendency to exaggerate it. We must arrive at an accurate knowledge of what the ancient authors wished to tell us. Now, if some of these have left us simple narratives in prose, many others have clothed their thoughts in poetic or Oriental imagery ; so that by taking these latter expressions literally one would run the risk of misrepresenting altogether the narratives or the ideas which they express. And thus it is necessary with a certain delicacy of touch to collect the *facts* of the prose passages and only the *sense* of the poetic passages of the Sacred Books.

For a long time people contented themselves when reading the Bible by asking *what God can do*. It sufficed to have an idea of His power to believe themselves obliged to give unlimited credence to all the narratives which were offered them under cover of divine authority. At the present day people ask more willingly, and also more reasonably, *what God has done*. It is this in fact which it truly interests us to know. For God governs us, teaches us, guides us, and saves us not by what He can do, but by what He wishes to do, and by what He has done.

In the present Bible history the events are related according to the most sure and venerable source, the Bible, in the production of which God has engaged His responsibility. The Bible is, above all, a book of religious instruction ; it is also, and with good reason, a book of history, revelation having been confided to men whose lives belong to history ; it is not a book of science except so far as it is interpreted.

Of the Bible in relation to physical science, he writes, at page 6 :—

Without doubt, the Bible cannot speak of the physical world and of the life of men without making allusion to many things which are the object of science. Many have concluded too hastily that if God has inspired the Bible He should not have allowed these matters to be spoken of save with that exactness required by science. Well, then, by what science ? Science is progressive. What satisfied the minds of yesterday is out of date to-day ; the science of to-day, though too advanced for

the minds of yesterday, will, in its turn, be ousted to-morrow ; and as for the science of to-morrow it will meet the fate of what went before it, and its comparative progress will soon be considered retrograde. Had God, then, made the Bible a scientific book He would have rendered it unintelligible to the greater part of mankind, and during the greater part of time.

He has done better. Under His inspiration Biblical writers have spoken of things according to their appearance. This appearance is the same for us as for them ; it rests with us, then, to carry out according to the measure of our actual scientific knowledge the work of observation or reflection which will allow us to attain the reality or approach it. This work has always been done in the Church from the time of Origen and of St. Augustine to our own day, but it has been done by the aid of the science of the time. To reproach the Church with having understood certain narratives in a manner which appears to-day unacceptable, and even childish, is to reproach the learned people of former times with not having had all the science possessed by the *savants* of to-day. This is ungrateful as well as unreasonable ; for without the imperfect science of yesterday, which has cast the first rays, the more perfect science of to-day would not exist.

The Bible, it is true, affirms peremptorily, and the Church will never abandon, facts which are evidently historical or scientific : the existence of God, the creation of the world, and the fixing of the laws of nature by His independent and all-powerful will, the right and fact of God's intervention in the world, His relation to men, the coming on earth of the Son of God in the Incarnation, etc. But beyond certain primordial facts, on which even it is still permitted to human reason to exercise its investigating activity, the Bible and the Church have not the mission of intervening to inform us as to the ' how of things ' [*le comment de choses*]. The domain of science is not reserved ; it belongs to all minds. If sometimes Churchmen, extending further than they had any right to, the inalienable domain of religious truth, pretended to affirm authoritatively what a science well informed had the right of denying, or *vice versa*, the Church herself did not follow them ; their rash acts had the sole effect of making her more circumspect and also attentive in concentrating on her own special domain the intellectual efforts of her members.

This is what happened notably when the theologians of the Holy Office in the seventeenth century pretended to condemn the system of Copernicus, of Kepler, and of Galileo, in the name of a Biblical text which to their minds implied the move-

ment of the sun round the earth. Though the supreme authority was not engaged in the question, the condemnation was not the less regrettable. God, without doubt, permitted this imprudence that care might be taken not to repeat it.

The explanations which are here and there appended to the incidents of the Bible history manifest a spirit of frankness and simplicity that wins the reader at once. The difficulties are admitted and the answers made are such as good scholars have given ; if they are not in all cases satisfactory they are at least the best that can be had ; they are the manifestation of the Church's attitude in the light of advancing scholarship. If more light comes later on the Church will be the first to welcome it.

Besides strictly exegetical elucidation the author betimes checks, as it were, the course of his work to take the reader aside, and by means of what we might call a homely chat instil into his mind some guiding principles of wide application. These digressions will be found eminently useful.

Anent miraculous events, and the supernatural in certain portions of the Bible, he remarks, with great good sense :—

Men in virtue of their free will and their own energy are constantly offering resistance to the laws of nature by preventing them from producing the effects which, left to themselves, they would naturally produce. Why should the power of modifying these laws be granted to men and denied to their Author ? It is said that this would imply the upsetting of nature. But God no more upsets the laws of nature by momentarily drying up the bed of the Jordan than engineers upset these laws by making bridges and boring mountains. Who does not see besides that outside the laws of mathematics, which belong to divine reason itself, all the laws of the physical world are what they are in virtue of an arbitrary will, which would have been able to establish them in other conditions ? Should the will that had the power of fixing these laws lose all power over them ? The most elementary logic is obliged to affirm the contrary. The adversaries of miracles, who are asked to base their denial of them on even the semblance of reason, have not yet succeeded in issuing forth from a very vicious circle : ' The supernatural is impossible because it has never been proved in the world. The supernatural cannot be proved

in the world because it is impossible.' It would be more honest to say: 'Not wishing at any price to admit the supernatural, we refuse to examine the facts that are presented to us as implying its existence.'

Reason is obliged to admit the possibility of miracles; history and observation show that certain facts are miracles. To say that these facts might be explained by laws which are unknown to us does not solve the problem. We see that such a fact is in formal contradiction with a law that is known to us, and the application of which excludes that of every law to the contrary. Besides, would it not be a miracle greater than those which it is desired to disown, if Moses, Elias, Jesus Christ, had in their time known and made use of laws of which our learned men have not an idea to-day?

Where an exegesis is given it will be found both interesting and opportune. The author is thoroughly alive to the rationalistic trend of popular literature, and the stock-in-trade objections usually encountered are very satisfactorily dealt with. Not every one of these, or even every form of cavil, can be mentioned in so small a book, but such as are treated are typical, and the answers, too, are framed on broad principles such as any educated Catholic can easily grasp, and such also as lay bare the tactics of the enemy. What the author insists on most of all is clearness and precision in the statement of the Church's relation to the various side issues which may arise in Biblical studies. This, perhaps, is the most important point for a Catholic, an intelligent grasp of Catholic doctrine.

Of the narrative of the Creation, he writes:—

The narrative aims first of all at affirming the creative power of God, His anteriority and superiority to the universe which He called into existence by His will alone, and which He subsequently organized according to His good pleasure. On that account men are wrong in regarding as divinities the different forces of nature, and above all the stars which so many people have adored, and the appearance of which Moses relegates to the fourth day.

The place assigned by Moses to the creation of the stars

when the earth had already existed and had begun to be covered with vegetation, indicates of itself alone that the narrative has not a strictly scientific character, and that the real order of appearance of things ought not be sought for therein. Without doubt, on comparing certain cosmogonic theories with this page of Scripture, such as those of Laplace, and by supposing a spectator who contemplates on the surface of the earth the successive phases of its organization, we can recognize a certain *concordance* between the scientific hypothesis and the Mosaic narrative.

But this relation ceases the moment we enter into details. Thus it is necessary to interpret with more idealism the words of the Sacred Text. Moses writes an eminently scientific work when he affirms that God alone is the creator and organizer of the universe. From this point of view his cosmogony has a remarkable superiority over that of other peoples. When, however, he describes the appearance of other beings on the earth he confines himself to very general and simple terminology, such as suffices perfectly to attain the end which he proposes to himself. 'Speaking to a people still gross,' says St. Thomas (*Summa Theol.*, i., q. 68, a. 3), 'he accommodates himself to their weakness, and proposes to them only what appears to the senses.'

The intention of Moses, then, is to give in his narrative a basis for the institution of the week and the day of rest. He divides the work of creation into six days that it may serve as a model for the work of man, who ought to labour for six days, and rest on the seventh in imitation of God's repose. And so he says formally, 'God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it,' so that this day became 'the day of the Lord,' and that man accordingly might not have the right to occupy himself with his own labour 'on that day.'

The sense to be given to the word 'day' in the narrative is of very little importance. The sacred author establishes six divisions in the divine work and to have his meaning made thoroughly clear he calls them by a name which suits the natural divisions of human labour; i.e., 'days,' without wishing any conclusion to be drawn from this that these days of creation resembled in any respect ordinary days.

Thus, two ideas may be taken from this first page of Genesis with striking clearness; a philosophical idea, that, namely, of God drawing the universe out of nothing, and presiding over its organization; and a liturgical and social idea, that of a holy day consecrated to rest after six days of labour.

To take one other example, he makes the following restrictions on the character of King David :—

David, admirable in so many respects, especially for his noble transports of faith, his confidence in and love of God, his valour, his generosity, was not a saint. When he is called 'the holy King David' it is solely on account of his mission, which made him king of the people of God, the ancestor, the figure, and the prophet of the Messias. Moreover, his conduct is not proposed either for imitation or admiration.

Other questions treated are such as those of the age of humanity, the Deluge, the ethical aspect of certain Jewish forms of laws, various points of contact between the Bible and contemporary history.

These little books of M. Lesêtre have, from their first appearance, attained a wide circulation where French is the language of the country. *L'Histoire Sainte* is looked upon as a classic of its kind by the clergy of Paris. It is extensively used by the aumôniers of the lycées, and by others charged with the instruction of youth. Unfortunately, the nefarious laws of France prevent such a book being used by the pupil themselves in any Government school. It is, however, one of the books largely recommended to young people for private reading.

A feature that must not be forgotten in reference to these books, is the vein of solid piety that runs through them. Intelligent reverence for the attributes of God and respect for the Church are strongly inculcated on every page of them.

In view of the aim of such publications as those that form the heading of this article, it might perhaps be asked whether sufficient is being done in Ireland for the popularising of Scriptural knowledge. It has often been pointed out as an anomaly, that whereas young people in Ireland are found to be fairly conversant with portions at least of English history, they betray lamentable ignorance of cardinal facts in the history of their own country ; that while capable of giving a rough estimate of a Marlborough or a

Wellington, they are innocent of the existence of strategical or other merits in an Owen Roe O'Neill. It would appear to be a still more glaring anomaly to discover Catholics beginning life with so little knowledge of even New Testament history. The Catholic, otherwise well educated, who protested to a friend that he had no need of reading St. John's Gospel as he read it so frequently with the priest at the conclusion of Mass, did not touch the low-water mark of ignorance in such matters. How many are there among educated Catholics who could wax eloquent on British valour displayed along the Nile, and who would not be clear on one of the many thrilling events that happened on the banks of the Jordan? Moreover, where some knowledge of Scriptural events exists it is very often confined to hard facts shorn of their circumstances of time, place, and environment, every one of which is full of significance. The events of sacred history should people the imagination of a Christian and make him long to linger on the foot-prints of Christ. A well-instructed Catholic on seeing a picture or a monument representing a miracle such as the raising of Lazarus, should feel his mind aglow with beautiful thoughts; the sympathetic relations of our Lord with the family of which Lazarus was a member should occur to him; the details such as that of Lazarus being four days dead, and of the bewilderment of the crowds, and the consequent admission of the Jews that the 'whole world was gone after him,' should not escape him. Such knowledge as this implies considerable familiarity with the Sacred Books. When faith was stronger and religion held a firmer hold on the minds of people, knowledge of this kind prevailed among the masses. Some such religious knowledge must have been that of the ancient Greeks, for the dramatist of that day knew he could draw crowds when he attuned his inspiration to religious sentiment; and the fact that vast crowds sat out, as we say, the plays of a Sophocles, argues a wide religious culture in the audience. Is it not an echo from the ages of faith that the modern drama took its rise in the morality and mystery plays of the Middle Ages? If such representations were to tell with

the people, these latter should have had that preparation of mind which argues a knowledge of Holy Writ.

What is desirable is that people should know the Sacred Books as they know such portions of profane literature as they really like, and have accordingly made their own. A person who knows Scott, Dickens, or Thackeray, has made the characters of their works the domestics, as it were, of his household ; his mental faculties have had full play on them, and they live on the canvas of his memory as realities ; their sayings have become his household words, and often the framework of his ideas on men and things. If such a person goes to Edinburgh he has a world to interest him in a single monument. Every statue on the Scott Memorial recalls an incident or many, and from his point of view he is able to inquire intelligently as to whether justice has been done to a Sergeant Bothwell or a Dominie Sampson.

It were certainly to be wished that the minds of the young, especially, were better equipped with the beautiful philosophy derivable from the Sacred Books ; that those who can quote so glibly from the poets knew by heart some of that earliest and noblest of all poetry, the psalmody of David ; that many whose minds are well stored with saws of wise men would learn accurately more of those utterances that fell from the lips of Him who had the words of eternal life. Such knowledge must be the outcome of greater taste for Sacred Scripture than actually exists. Schools must do their part in opening the minds of children to sacred literature, and might advantageously insist on children learning by heart some well-chosen selections from the Sacred Books. But even where this is done, as it is done in many places, the desire for Scriptural reading and meditation fails through want of some organization or system to prevent elementary knowledge from fading away or to assist its development.

Excellent work has already been done by the Catholic Truth Societies ; but these generous workers and their benefactors must not rest till they rival the San Girolamo edition of the Gospels, by a publication as cheap and as excellent in other important details.

However, over and above the work of any mere publishing society, there is need of an active organization to diffuse such literature as will popularize the Scriptures. With all due respect be it said, that if an edition of the Gospels be placed on a Catholic Truth Society book-stand in competition, so to speak, with a story, especially if this latter possess a sentimental title, the story will win. And this because people are attracted to the story, and protest that they know the Gospel, thus indeed manifesting how unconscious they are of their own ignorance.

In the archdiocese of Cologne the Borromeo-Verein does much exemplary work by distributing books of this kind. Though not restricted by its rules to any class of pious book, nor indeed to pious books at all, the members consider the diffusion of portions of Scripture, and books dealing with Scripture, as part of their work.

Spain has quite recently founded a society on the principles of the San Girolamo, and for precisely similar ends. With its head-quarters in Valladolid and under the protection of the Archbishop, and having as patrons and promoters many ecclesiastical dignitaries, as well as prominent members of the Spanish nobility, it bids fair to be a successful venture against the propaganda of Protestant Bible Societies, 'which are palming off on the people millions of vitiated, truncated, and prohibited copies of the Holy Scriptures.'

There would seem to be in this particular branch a field for zealous workers in Ireland. Possibly the co-operation of many who are engaged in the religious instruction and training of the people would render existing institutions amply sufficient for the wider spread and greater thoroughness of Scriptural knowledge. As in other departments the rising generation claims greatest attention. In reference to the youth of Ireland there is one consideration which, let people strive as they will, remains practical, and that, needless to say, is the question of emigration. The unmistakable antipathy that often falls to the lot of Irish workers in such centres as the manufacturing towns of England generally takes the shape of

jeers at the Catholic religion. It is indeed humiliating and often positively destructive to the faith of these emigrants to find themselves baited, as it were, like a bear in a barrel, with chapter and verse, and to feel that their memory supplies them with little if anything to say in reply. It is not necessary to train up controversialists ; such wrangling effects no positive good. But ability to quote the commonplace texts in favour of such fundamental doctrines as the magisterium of the Church, its infallibility, the primacy of St. Peter, the power of forgiving sins, the necessity of communion, the eternity of hell, cannot but be serviceable. Even if such weapons are not used, or are handled clumsily, the very existence of an armoury of the kind inspires self-respect, and makes one neither afraid nor ashamed of the faith that is in one. Anything that inspires confidence is wholesome. Some years ago, during the late Queen's reign, a poor Irish labourer completely silenced an English workman, who was also a trained controversialist in his way, by simply remarking to the latter that 'the Gospels anyhow had nothing to tell of a Church with a woman at the head of it.' Doubtless the setting suggested by a homely mother-wit supplied piquancy as well as point to the rejoinder ; but it was sound theology all the same, and a very common-sense application of Scriptural knowledge. But it is to be said, however, that such answers are the exception ; and that religious training should get a stimulus and, perhaps, some direction from the warfare to which such a class of people are exposed.

It is not the aim of this article to put forward definite plans—these should come from more capable hands—but merely to outline some general principles in view of the wishes of the Holy Father, and of what is being actually done elsewhere. Such principles might be thus briefly summarized :—

(1) Render young people especially familiar with the Gospels and Acts of the Apostles, and this not so much by books on the texts as by the reading of the Gospels themselves. If it be thought profitable in Irish-speaking

districts to have the text in Irish, let a translation such as can be guaranteed be presented to children.

(2) Let children, while their memories are still fresh, learn by heart, and accurately, suitable parts of the Sacred Books.

(3) Where the pious exercise of reading the Scriptures daily can be established in families and institutions, let means be adopted to secure this worthy object.

(4) Let those whose secondary education is in progress be further encouraged to a deeper and broader knowledge of the Sacred Books by the study of such manuals as those here reviewed.

E. J. CULLEN, C.M.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE ROMAN CANON—II¹

IV.

IT is now, I think, pretty well established that the original type of Mass Canon was one long consecratory prayer, which commenced with what we call the Preface and ended with an *Amen* before the *Pater Noster*. Definite expression has recently been given to this view by two such distinguished liturgists as Dom Cabrol and Father Thurston.² In his article on ‘*Amen*’ in the *Dictionnaire d’Archéologie Chrétienne et de Liturgie*, the former, discussing the question how far an *Amen* said aloud by the people in response to the words of Consecration is an argument in favour of the view that the Canon of the Mass was recited aloud in early times, makes the following remarks³ :—

Ordinarily there was in fact no *Amen* after the formula of Consecration, which, moreover, was not looked at from the same point of view as at present. The *action* is one, the different moments of which are not divisible; it is only considered complete at the close of the *Epiclesis*. Preface, recital of the institution and of the Last Supper, *Anamnesis*, *Epiclesis*, are so many terms invented by liturgists for the sake of clearness, which do not indicate different *actions*. In our view it would be much more logical as well as more conformable to antiquity and to reality to give the general name of Consecration to this sole and indivisible *action* which takes the elements of bread and wine, offers them by prayer to the Heavenly Father, trans-

¹ See I. E. RECORD, June, 1907.

² See *Tablet*, October 19, 1907.

³ ‘En fait, il n'y avait pas ordinairement d' *Amen* après la formule de consécration, qui, du reste, n'était pas envisagée primitivement du même point de vue qu'aujourd'hui. L'*action* est une, les différents moments n'en sont pas divisibles, elle n'est considérée comme accomplie qu'à la fin de l'épiclesse. Preface, recit de l'institution et de la cène, anamnese, épiclesse, autant de termes commodes inventés pour plus de clarté par les liturgistes, mais qui n'indiquent pas des *actions* différentes. Selon nous il serait beaucoup plus logique, plus conforme à l'antiquité, et aussi à la réalité, de donner le terme général de consecration à cette *action* unique, et au fond indivisible, qui prend les éléments, etc.’—*Dictionnaire*, col. 1558.

forms them into the Body and Blood of Christ, and invokes the descent of the Holy Ghost upon them. The whole prayer ends with a doxology to the glory of the Father through the Son in the unity of the Holy Ghost as in the Roman Canon, *Per ipsum . . . est tibi Deo Patri in unitate Spiritus Sancti omnis honor et gloria per omnia secula seculorum*. And to this doxology the people answer, as at present, by the word *Amen*, thus uniting themselves with the whole sacrifice and with the prayer of the Canon.

This view is confirmed by the fact that is was here, viz., at the close of this doxology, the elevation of the host and chalice took place in early times, a ceremony which is still retained¹ in a small way, even in the Roman rite. What has now come to be called the Elevation, i.e., the solemn lifting up of the host and the chalice after the words of Consecration are pronounced over them, is of modern introduction, dating from the twelfth century, and is the ceremonial expression of the fully-developed dogmatic teaching of Catholic theology² about the moment at which the transubstantiation of each species takes place in the Mass.

While this prayer of consecration was *one* in a very strict and true sense, we may distinguish in it several distinct elements. The first part of it up to the *Sanctus* was a thanksgiving for Creation and for the wonderful works of God in the physical and moral order; the second part, from the *Sanctus* to the *Qui pridie* or its equivalent, was a thanksgiving for the Redemption; the third part was a recital, so to speak, of the Last Supper; the fourth part contained an *Anamnesis*, i.e., an offering up of the Sacrifice in commemoration of the Death, Resurrection, and Ascension of Christ. This was usually followed by what is called an *Epiclesis*,³ i.e., a prayer that the Holy Spirit might come down and change or sanctify the elements. This would be the solemn ending of the Canon; but then followed generally

¹ At the *omnis honor et gloria*.

² See articles on this subject by Father Thurston in the *Tablet* of October 19, 26, and November 2, 1907.

³ ἐπικλητος has in Liddell and Scott for second meaning 'a calling upon, δαιμόνων, Dio C. 78, 4.'

a long prayer of intercession, which included prayers for the Church, Pope, bishops, priests, deacons, etc., prayers for various intentions, for the sick, for travellers, for the dead, and a commemoration of some of the saints. It was, one must confess, a very suitable place to introduce such a prayer, as the consecration of the elements was regarded as having been just completed, and the mystically slain Saviour was in the very act of making intercession for the faithful.

It is assumed that the oldest form of Roman Canon was after this model. But our present Canon, which dates at least from the time of St. Gregory (590-604), follows quite a different order. The part of it between the *Sanctus* and the *Qui pridie* is not a thanksgiving for the Redemption, is not, in fact, a continuation of the Preface in any sense. It is made up of various kinds of prayers—prayers that the Father may accept the Sacrifice (*Te igitur*, etc., *Hanc igitur*, etc., *Quam oblationem*; etc.¹); prayers of intercession (*in primis . . . memento*), and prayers of commemoration (*communicantes*). The prayers which follow the recital of the Institution do not include an *Epiclesis*. The prayers of intercession and commemoration remain but in a very much reduced form (the *Memento* for the dead and the *Nobis quoque peccatoribus*). The doxology before the *Pater Noster* remains, but in a kind of unattached condition, as if the prayer, to which it was at one time the suitable conclusion, had been dropped. In a former paper I mentioned some recent theories about the origin of those changes in the part of the Roman Canon between the Preface and the *Qui pridie*, and I now propose to discuss briefly the problem of the composition of this venerable document in the part which follows the solemn recital of the words of Institution.

V.

The *Unde et Memores* (called the *Anamnesis*) presents no special difficulty. Its equivalent is found practically in all

¹ This contains also something like the equivalent of an *Epiclesis* viz., *ut nobis Corpus et Sanguis fiat*, etc.

liturgies. Its present form in our Canon embodies at least two ideas, viz., (a) an offering up of the Bread of Eternal Life and of the Chalice of Salvation (b) in commemoration of the Passion, Resurrection and Ascension of Christ our Lord. The questions of its origin and of its different forms are discussed at great length by Dom Cabrol under the word 'Anamnèse' in the monumental dictionary above referred to. That its origin and position are connected with Luke xxii. 19 ('Do this in commemoration of Me'), and with the parallel text in St. Paul, 1 Corinthians xi. 24, 25, there can be no doubt; and we may well believe with Probst¹ that it was one of the formulæ introduced into the Liturgy by the Apostles. Speaking with all the caution and reserve of a scientist, Dom Cabrol would admit that its main idea was embodied in the Apostolic Canon.

Although [he writes] it is very hazardous to attempt the reconstruction of a primitive formula from posterior elements, and any such reconstruction must be partly guesswork, we may, nevertheless, say without rashness that the *Anamnesis* taken in the sense of an allusion to the Supper, to the Passion, to the Death, and probably to the Resurrection and Ascension, in the offering of this Sacrifice to the Father, was part of the primitive liturgy and of the Apostolic Canon.²

And if we suppose that the Apostles did set about adding anything to the rehearsal of the Last Supper, what addition could be more suitable than an expression of their obedience to the command of Christ: 'Do this in commemoration of Me?' Hence the force of the *Unde*, which connects the *Haec quotiescumque*, etc., with the offering of the sacrifice in memory of His Passion, Resurrection, and Ascension.

Some writers include in our *Anamnesis* the *Supra quae . . . Sanctum sacrificium immaculatam hostiam*. It will

¹ 'An den Auftrag des Herrn: Thuet dieses zu meinem Andenken, reiht sich unmittelbar die Anamnese (Unde et Memores) an und ihr folgt das Opfergebet: Oferimus praeclarae majestati tuae. Da diese Gebete alle Liturgien enthalten, so ist ihr Ursprung, dem bekannten Satze des h. Augustinus gemäss, auf die Apostel Zurückzuführen.'—*Liturgie des vierten Jahrhunderts und deren Reform*. Münster, 1893, p. 23.

² *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie*, etc., col. 1893.

be noticed, however, that in the Roman Missal it is printed as a distinct paragraph, and that the idea it embodies has no intrinsic connexion with the sentiment expressed in the *Unde et Memores*. Duchesne prefers to connect it with the next prayer, viz., the *Supplices te rogamus*, which he calls an *Epiclesis*, but the rubric of the Roman Missal prescribes a profound inclination of the body to be made by the priest while saying the latter, while the *Supra quae* is directed to be said with the erect attitude. To appreciate the point, it should be remembered that in the Gallican liturgies the prayer which follows the words of Institution is variable, and that sometimes it is an *Anamnesis* in the strict sense and at other times includes not only the equivalent of the *Supra quae*, but also an *Epiclesis*. What some consider the earliest extant Roman *Anamnesis*, viz., that found in the *De Sacramentis*, includes in one paragraph the main ideas of the *Unde et Memores*, of the *Supra quae* and of the *Supplices te rogamus*. It is as follows¹ :—

Ergo memores gloriosissimae ejus passionis et ab inferis resurrectionis et in coelum ascensionis offerimus tibi hanc immaculatam hostiam, rationabilem hostiam, incruentam hostiam, hunc panem sanctum et calicem vitae aeternae et petimus et precamur ut hanc oblationem suscipias in sublimi altari tuo per manus angelorum tuorum, sicut suscipere dignatus es munera pueri tui justi Abel, et sacrificium patriarchae nostri Abrahae et quod tibi obtulit summus sacerdos Melchisedech.

Baumstark is of opinion that our *Supra quae* is compounded of elements which originally belonged to different liturgies. He points out that the words *accepta habere* have no direct grammatical object, and that the closing words of the prayer in question, viz., *Sanctum Sacrificium immaculatam hostiam*, were not in their original context associated with the Sacrifice of Melchisedech. They were rather, he contends with great show of reason, the words of an *Anamnesis*, and have their parallel in the *hostiam puram*, etc., of our *Unde et Memores*. This *Anamnesis* and the *Supplices te rogamus* were, he contends, taken from the

¹ I take the text from Baumstark's *Liturgia Romana*, etc., p. 185.

Ravenna Liturgy and embodied in the Roman Canon by St. Leo (440-461). He supposes that the oldest form of the *Unde et Memores* ended with the words 'supra quae propitio ac sereno vultu respicere digneris,' and that as the words 'Sanctum sacrificium immaculatam hostiam' could not well come in immediately after those, this Pope was obliged to alter their position in the text of the Ravenna *Anamnesis*, which he incorporated in the Roman Canon. His theory will be understood at once from a glance at the accompanying three columns, which I have taken the liberty of transcribing from his book.¹

OLD ROMAN CANON	RAVENNA CANON	LEONINE CANON
Unde et Memores Domine nos servi tui . . . hostiam puram, hostiam sanctam hostiam immaculatam, panem sanctum vitae aeternae et calicem salutis perpetuae, supra quac propiteo ac sereno vultu respicere digneris.	sanctum sacrificium immaculatam hostiam, quae accepta habere digneris sicut accepta habere dignatus es munera pueri tui justi Abel et sacrificium patriarchae nostri Abrahae et quod tibi obtulit summus sacerdos tuis Melchisedech. Suplices te rogamus gratia repleamur.	Unde et Memores et calicem salutis perpetuae: Supra quae propatio et sereno vultu respicere digneris et accepta habere sicut et quod tibi obtulit summus sacerdos tuus Melchisedech sanctum sacrificium immaculatam hostiam. Suplices te rogamus gratia repleamur. Per eundem Christum Dominum nostrum. Amen.

We have, it seems, the testimony of the *Liber Pontificalis* that Pope Leo added the words: 'Sanctum sacrificium immaculatam hostiam' to the Roman Canon. While Duchesne² is of opinion that those words refer to the Sacrifice of Melchisedech, and were introduced as a protest against the Manichean view about the use of wine, Baumstark, as I have said, thinks that the words must have originally referred to the Holy Eucharist. He points out that the

¹ *Liturgia Romana et Liturgia dell' Esarcato*, p. 185.

² Origines du Culte Chrétien, p. 176.

actual words of the *Liber Pontificalis* are: 'Hic constituit ut intra actionem Sacrificii diceretur sanctum sacrificium et cetera.' Now, why should the *cetera* be limited to the words 'immaculatam hostiam,' as is asserted in the Roman Breviary (Office of St. Leo, 11th April, lectio vi.)? If, as is quite plain, someone is responsible for the obviously composite character of the Roman Canon, we have here the ground for a theory which accounts for the introduction not only of the *Supra quae* in its present form, and of the *Supplices te rogamus*, but also of the *Hanc igitur* and the *Quam oblationem*.

The weak points, to my mind, in Baumstark's theory are (1) that there is no documentary evidence that such a Ravenna Canon existed, and (2) granted that it did exist, one can see no reason why such an enlightened Pope as Leo the Great should have overweighted the old simple and logical Roman Canon with pieces from another liturgy, some of which are practically a repetition of ideas that were already expressed in the old Roman Canon.¹

VI.

I come now to the interesting question: Was there an *Epiclesis*, in the strict sense of the word, at any time in the Roman Canon? I refer to a solemn invocation of the Holy Spirit (pronounced after the words of Institution) to come down and sanctify or change the elements into the Body and Blood of Christ. Baumstark is convinced that there was some such invocation of the Holy Spirit in the Roman Canon in the time of Pope Gelasius.

We have [he writes²] Roman testimony that the modern form of the Canon is not, at least in this point (the *Epiclesis*), that which it had at the close of the fifth century. Whatever may be thought regarding its origin and antiquity, we must always hold as true that the Roman *Canon Missae* contained at

¹ I think it is quite clear that, in St. Gregory's opinion, the Canon which he found himself obliged to alter was not the work of Pope Leo, for he speaks of it as a *pres* composed by some *Scholasticus*. (*Origines du Culte Chrétien*, p. 184.)

² *Opus. cit.*, p. 48.

one time a true *Epiclesis*, that is, an invocation of the Holy Spirit upon the Eucharistic elements. St. Gelasius is witness that this was so in his time.

And then he adds, in a footnote, 'In his letter to Elpidius, Bishop of Valterra (Thiel, *Epp. Rom. Pontif.* i., 486), St. Gelasius writes: "Nam quomodo ad DIVINII MYSTERII, CONSECRATIONEM COELESTIS SPIRITUS INVOCATUS ADVENIET, si sacerdos et qui eum adesse deprecatur, criminosis plenus actionibus reprobetur."

Supposing, then, as seems to be quite certain, that there was such a prayer in the pre-Gregorian Canon, where did it come in? It was, according to some, to be found in the *Supplices te rogamus* between the words 'divinae majestatis tuae' and the words 'ut quotquot,' etc. But, as Baumstark points out, the sentiment in the first part of this prayer, viz., in the words 'We humbly beseech Thee, Omnipotent God, command that these be carried up by the hands of Thy angel to a high altar into the presence of the divine Majesty,' would not accord very well with an invocation to the Holy Spirit to come and bless or change the elements. It is rather in the *Te igitur* before the words *in primis*, etc., that Baumstark would find the *locus* of the old Roman *Epiclesis*. He argues (1) from the analogy between the solemn language of the *Te igitur* and that used in the *Epiclesis* of other liturgies, and (2) from the fact¹ that such a solemn introduction to the prayers of intercession is not known to exist in any other liturgy. His view, as I have said in a former paper,² is that in the old Roman Canon the *Te igitur* came after the *Anamnesis* (*Unde et Memores*), and that it was the introduction to the *Epiclesis*, which, after the model of the Syrian type of Anaphora, was followed by the prayers of intercession (*in primis*, etc.).

Duchesne³ seems to hold that the prayers *Supra quae* and the *Supplices te* constitute, as they stand in our Roman Missal, the Roman form of the *Epiclesis*, and he

¹ 'D'altra parte questo tono realmente è affatto inauditto all'inizio di preci intercessorie.'—*Opus. cit.*, p. 128.

² See I. E. RECORD, June, 1907, p. 588.

³ *Origines du Culte Chrétien*, p. 181.

contrasts the precise language of the Oriental *Epiclesis* with the symbolic forms of expression used in those two formulæ. Dom Cabrol¹ commits himself to the positive statement that the *Supplices* is the old Roman *Epiclesis*, which has been modified to avoid the appearance in its terms of dogmatic error. The strongest argument to my mind in favour of the view that the *Supplices te rogamus* represents a part if not the whole of an *Epiclesis* is that the last part of this formula, viz., *ut quotquot*, etc., which is a prayer for the communicants, was a usual ending of the *Epiclesis* in other liturgies. It is noteworthy that the *Te igitur* and the *Supplices te rogamus* both mark two of the few places in the Mass where the Celebrant is bound to make a profound inclination of the body. As they stand, one is practically a duplicate of the other; they are each, as they stand, a prayer that the Omnipotent God may accept the Sacrifice. May we not then suppose that in their original context both contained an *Epiclesis* and belonged, of course, to different liturgies? Whatever may be the solution of the Roman Canon problem, nobody who studies Baumstark's analysis of it can fail to be struck by its obviously composite character, and for my part I have no difficulty in believing with Baumstark that the *Te igitur* has been transposed from its original place in the Roman Canon, and in admitting with Cabrol that the *Supplices te rogamus*, wherever it came from, has been modified; but I think that the dates, agents, motives, and manipulation still remain to be unveiled.

There remain still in the Roman Mass two prayers before the Consecration, which have the character of an *Epiclesis*, viz., the *Veni Sanctificator*, etc., said after the offering of the chalice, and the *Quam oblationem* said immediately before the *Qui pridie*. The former is now

¹ 'La suite : *Supplices te rogamus*, n'appartient plus directement à l'anamnèse; nous en parlerons dans l'épiclesse. Rappelons que dans toutes les liturgies, celle-ci suit l'anamnèse, qui souvent fait corps avec elle; il faut donc dire dès maintenant, par analogie, que malgré toutes les opinions contraires, ce *Supplices te* représente l'ancienne épiclesse romaine dont la forme a été légèrement modifiée pour éviter les erreurs d'interprétation auxquelles a donné lieu l'épiclesse dans certains liturgies.'—*Dictionnaire*, etc., col. 1885.

without the Canon, but possibly it is the transposed equivalent of, if not the actual *Epiclesis* referred to by St. Gelasius in the above quotation. The latter was very probably taken from a type of liturgy in which the *Epiclesis* came before the words of Consecration, and if, as Baumstark holds, St. Gregory transposed the *Te igitur* to its present position, there was an obvious reason for omitting from it the *Epiclesis* it is supposed to have contained, since its substance was already expressed in the *Quam oblationem*.

VII.

An *Epiclesis* or its equivalent coming before the words of Consecration does not present any dogmatic difficulty, but its position in the Eastern liturgies after the recital of the words of Institution, if not founded on error, has certainly given rise to false notions about the moment in the Mass when the change of the elements is accomplished. There is abundant evidence that in parts of the Eastern Church the *Epiclesis* has been considered essential. This is how Dom Cabrol puts it towards the close of his learned article on *Anaphore*.¹

This prayer [the *Epiclesis*] is of great importance in the East; it is considered essential. . . . We should, however, remark that all Eastern liturgies do not accord it the same importance; many of them recognize that the words of Institution are not less essential for the validity of the sacrament. After a conscientious study of all the formulæ and of the teaching of those Churches, Neale concludes that on the whole the Eastern Church believes that the bread and wine offered upon the altar are changed into the body and blood of Christ by the words of Institution,² as well as by the invocation of the Holy Spirit, and that either wanting, the Eucharist is invalid.

That this strange error arose from the form in which the *Epiclesis* was often expressed is, I think, obvious, but how account for the first introduction into the Liturgy of this solemn invocation of the Holy Spirit? It is noteworthy, as

¹ *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie, etc.*, col. 1905.

² . . . par les paroles de l'institution aussi bien que par l'invocation du Saint-Esprit et si 'une ou l'autre manque, l'eucharistie est invalide.'

Probst points out, that in our earliest extant complete Liturgy of the Mass, viz., that found in the *Apostolic Constitutions*,¹ the form of invocation is not an *Epiclesis* in the strict sense, i.e., it is not a prayer that the Holy Spirit should come down and *make* the bread the Body of Christ and *make* the wine His Blood. It is rather a prayer for faith in the mystery of the real presence.

The Holy Ghost is invoked as the witness (cf. John xv. 26) of Christ's Passion that He would show ($\alphaποφήνη$) this bread as the body and this wine as the blood of Christ. That is, through His working the faithful will discern the bread and wine as the Body and Blood of Christ.²

This invocation is perfectly intelligible, and one need have, I think, no difficulty in accepting Probst's view, that its introduction was of Apostolic origin and was the echo of Christ's own teaching about the office of the Holy Spirit to teach and to sanctify. The first part of it, which, as I have said, is a prayer for faith, is followed by a prayer for the sanctification of the communicants that those who partake may be confirmed in piety, etc.

It is in the liturgy derived from the *Catecheses*³ of St. Cyril of Jerusalem (fourth century) we find what is, I think, the earliest form of an *Epiclesis* in the strict sense. 'We call on the good God,' he says, 'to send down the Holy Spirit on the gifts so that he may make ($\iotaνα ποιήσῃ$) the bread the Body of Christ and the wine the Blood of Christ.'⁴ Probst remarks, in a footnote, that St. Cyril is the first who exchanges the words of the *Apostolic Constitutions*, $\deltaπως$ $\alphaποφήνη$, for the words $\iotaνα ποιήσῃ$, and he suggests the translation of this liturgy from Aramaic into Greek may have been the source of this latter expression.

Now, there is no doubt that in the mind of St. Cyril

¹ Brightman's *Eastern and Western Liturgies*, p. 21.

² 'Sie ruft den h. Geist als Zeugen (cf. John xv. 26) des Leidens Christi an, dass er erscheinen mache (offenbare, $\alphaποφήνη$) dieses Brod als den Leib und diesen Wein als das Blut Christi. Das heisst: durch seine Einwirkung werden die Gläubigen Brod und Wein als den Leib und das Blut Christi erkennen.'—*Liturgie des vierten Jahrhunderts*, etc., p. 24.

³ Brightman, p. 466; Probst, p. 95.

⁴ Probst, p. 95.

the invocation in question was a prayer that the Holy Spirit might come down and have some kind of a mysterious and sanctifying contact with the Sacrificial elements. That this was his idea is quite clear from the quotations from the *Catecheses* collected by Probst. He is quoted, for example, as justifying the invocation of the Holy Spirit given above by this statement: 'For that is completely sanctified and changed which the Holy Spirit has touched.'¹ And this is also the meaning of the *Epiclesis* in some other liturgies.² But whatever may have been the saint's idea the language in which the invocation is couched is certainly misleading, and may, I think, be held accountable for the false notions that have been read into this type of *Epiclesis*. I cannot help then thinking that the original *Epiclesis* was a prayer for the communicants or a prayer that the Holy Spirit might sanctify in some way the sacred species, and that the form in which this invocation came to be expressed gave rise to the notion that such an *Epiclesis* was essential.

Now, supposing that there was an *Epiclesis* in the Roman Canon, located in the *Supplices te* as Cabrol thinks, or in the *Te igitur* as Baumstark holds, and supposing even that its form was after the type referred to by St. Cyril, of which there is, I think, no conclusive evidence, may we not, in all reason, hold that the idea it expressed was not a prayer for the actual transubstantiation of the elements which had already taken place, but an expression of Faith in the office of the Holy Ghost to operate upon and sanctify even the most sacred material things? And the presence of such a prayer accounts, I think, for the old notion about the Canon referred to in the opening of this article, viz., that it was one *consecratory* prayer. The *Epiclesis* was regarded as a prayer of consecration. We know, of course, that the operation of the Holy Spirit in the miracle of transubstantiation is really concurrent and identical

¹ 'Omnino enim quocunque attigerit Spiritus Sanctus, id sanctificatum et transmutatum est.'—*Cat.* 5, n. 7. (Migne).

² *Paleographie Musicale*, p. 86.

with that of the Son, but as the Holy Ghost is a distinct person, it is lawful and logical for us to conceive and express His action *ad extra* as distinct and proper. In any case the early disappearance of an *Epiclesis* in the strict sense from the Roman Canon shows how careful the Roman See was in discarding a usage, which, as we know, became a source of dogmatic error in parts of the Church. Although the Bishops¹ who represented the East in the Council of Florence read a correct meaning into the *Epiclesis*, their orthodoxy in this matter was very soon repudiated throughout the Eastern Church.

With regard to particular forms of the *Epiclesis*, for example, that found in the Canon of Serapion,² in which, after the recital of the words of Institution, the Word,³ and not the Holy Spirit, is addressed, it should be noted that, in the first centuries, the Officiant was allowed great liberty in improvising even within the Canon. Such a formula, then, as this or kindred ones are not in any sense the official teaching of the Church, and only show at the very most that an individual bishop of that time had not attained our exact notions about such a highly philosophical dogma as that of transubstantiation. There is no question here of the real presence. Of belief in that doctrine the *Epiclesis* is the clearest testimony. There is only, at most, question of the moment when the Miracle of miracles was completed, and if, as Father Thurston⁴ has recently explained, there was, as late as the twelfth century, a controversy whether the change of the bread into the Body of Christ took place immediately after the words '*Hoc est Corpus meum*' were pronounced, or rather took place only when the form was pronounced over the chalice, is it any wonder that a fourth-

¹ See Franzelin, *De Eucharistia*, Thesis vii.; also *Kirchenlexicon* under 'Epiklese.'

² Serapion was Bishop of Thmuis in Egypt and contemporary and friend of St. Athanasius.

³ 'Come, God of truth, let thy sacred Word descend on this bread and upon this chalice so that the bread may become the body of the Word, and upon the chalice so that the chalice may become the blood of the Truth. And grant that all those who participate may receive a vivifying remedy against all maladies,' etc.—Translated from the text of Duchesne's *Origines*, etc., p. 77.

⁴ See numbers of *Tablet* above referred to.

century bishop should, in improvising a prayer, betray an indistinct conception of a dogma which, what theologians call, the *expolitio doctrinæ* has now set in crystal-clear language?

There yet remain to account for the prayers of intercession (the *Memento* of the dead and the *Nobis quoque*, etc.) and also the connexion of the *per quem haec omnia* with what precedes, but, as I have now reached the limit of space at my disposal I must only count on the indulgence of the Editor to be allowed at another time to complete this mere surface treatment of a problem which the researches of Probst, Duchesne, Cabrol, Lucas, Thurston, Baumstark, Bishop, Morin, not to mention others, have invested with new interest.

T. P. GILMARTIN.

A PLEA FOR THE C.Y.M.S.

AT a meeting of the Irish Hierarchy, held in St. Patrick's College, Maynooth, on the 8th October, 1907, it was unanimously resolved that: 'The Archbishops and Bishops of Ireland hereby approve of a Federation of the Branches of the Catholic Young Men's Society of Ireland.' This important pronouncement has set the seal of approval from the highest quarter upon the courageous efforts of a small body of Catholic young men to resuscitate a once powerful organization, and to restore it to the proud position it occupied half a century ago.

One of the saddest reproaches ever brought against the clergy of Ireland has been their apparent aloofness from the laity in social intercourse. How far there has been foundation for the existence of such estrangement, and how many circumstances have brought it about, it would now be idle to discuss. It may, however, be presumed that any movement like the proposed federation tending to bring priests and people closer together will be welcomed by all.

It is not in Ireland alone that this want of union has been deplored, and even has been productive of disastrous consequences to religion and country. Long before the rise of the many evils wrought in France by the rejection of Christianity in the schools, the persecution of the Church, and the flood of heathenism that appears now to have reached its height in that once great Catholic land, Montalembert and Lacordaire impressed upon the people the necessity of a united effort in behalf of their common religion. Their warnings were unheeded, and when the last and most deadly blow that divorced religion from the State descended, there was no disciplined body of laymen to support their ministers. The chanting of the *Credo*, the singing of hymns, and the processions that signalized the eviction of the Bishops from their houses were consoling evidence of their Faith, but those manifestations never for an instant succeeded in

staying the relentless course of plunder and confiscation. The altered circumstances of the Curés, the influence of the secular movement amongst the ranks of those from which the clergy had been recruited, have contributed to lessen considerably the number of vocations to the priesthood, and to deter young men from entering the religious state. To remedy this evil, so far-reaching in its effects, the French Bishops have resolved so to change the system of their Colleges as to receive youths who are not preparing for the ecclesiastical state, admitting, in the words of one of their most distinguished members, Mgr. Gibier, 'that the fusion of clergy and laity has become a necessity of the first order, and that it would be a good thing to prepare this fusion in the Seminary by education in common, and daily contact between the priests and laymen of the future.'

In Italy a similar *rapprochement* is in progress, as can be seen from the exhortations of the Bishops, especially from a remarkable address by Cardinal Capecelatro, Archbishop of Capua, in which, speaking on the 'Culture of the Clergy,' he recommends his priests 'to take a greater interest in studies and lines of thought foreign to their sacred calling, and thus by knowing more of the layman's way of thinking to understand his difficulties, and use knowledge thus acquired for his good.'

In Spain, where gloomy prospects for religion prevailed some time ago, a great reaction has set in, and Signor Maura has succeeded in welding together in one great Conservative Union all Spanish Catholics in support of Church and Crown.

Nearer home, our countrymen in England are preparing for the coming fight for the schools by thoroughly organizing the Federation of Catholic Societies, and by securing a valuable source of help in the lately-formed Catholic Women's League, the counterpart of the *Frauenbund* in Germany. It is a rather painful commentary on the evils of apathy and inaction on the part of the laity of our Church that they are invited to look for inspiration and guidance to a country where heresy took deep root.

The German Volksverein, with its Central Party in

Berlin, and its half a million of members throughout the Fatherland, has proved too strong for all the combinations that the enemies of the Faith have formed against it. It brought defeat and humiliation to the giant Bismarck, and it is now a power that can hold its own against any party of the State. The secret of its triumph has arisen from the fact that the German layman has thoroughly realized his responsibility, that he has not left the priest unaided and alone to maintain his rights, and that the assistance willingly given has been gratefully accepted and appreciated. At the Eighteenth International Eucharistic Congress, held in Metz last August, celebrated with all the pomp and dignity befitting the occasion, it was the speech of Justice Groeber, a prominent member of the Reichstag, that created the most marked impression, evoked general and long-continued applause, and induced the Cardinal Legate, who presided, to leave his throne and shake hands with the speaker on the conclusion of his brilliant effort. In the course of his address the Justice said :—

It behoves us, men, to stand in the front line, in the great battle for the interests of the Church. There is only one salvation for the modern world—a return to Christ in every department of life. We want men, thorough men, Catholic men, who are always in everything real Christians. We want more men than formerly, men in every class and position, because the battle is carried into every class of the people. The clergy, even if they could multiply themselves, could not be everywhere. They require to be backed by a general levee of Catholic men.

These words are a trumpet-call to the soldiers of the Faith. They have already awakened echoes in the Catholic world. Will they elicit no response in this Land of Saints and Sages ? The shadows of the conflict against the powers of darkness are drawing near, and agencies are at work to pervert the heart and poison the mind of the Catholic young man. At his entrance into public life his path is surrounded by a network of clubs and associations, all appealing to his different tastes, but all tending to remove the impressions of boyhood, and to treat with disrespect his once-loved guide and pastor, now often portrayed as the

'Black Man,' whose presence chills, whose preaching terrifies.

In addition to all the sources that have threatened to widen the gulf thus created, we are promised by our thoughtful rulers the doubtful boon of the Village Hall and the Free Library. On those institutions the faithful guardians of morality have looked askance, and in consequence are termed obscurantists and despots, fearful of the advance of knowledge, and jealous of the 'enfranchisement of the human mind.' Even amongst members of their own flock there are found critics who reproach them with adopting a dog-in-the-manger policy in this respect.

A case in point that occurred very lately deserves to be recorded: An attempt was made in a rural district to adopt the Public Libraries Act. With commendable discretion an expression of opinion on the project had been solicited from the neighbouring clergy previous to the meeting held for its discussion. Several replies were received and read, all indicating their disapproval; and one of the correspondents took the trouble of submitting to the Board the experience of a fellow-priest in another part of Ireland regarding the working of the scheme. It was summarized in the following statements: (a) 'There is a halfpenny rate struck throughout the union for the library, bringing some £140 a year; (b) we have taken pains to select many useful books, but these for the most part are not read. They are lying idle on the shelves; no demand for them. The books chiefly read are trashy novels.' In face of this evidence the resolution in favour of the introduction of the library fell through. Before the meeting concluded the proposer gave expression to his sentiments in the form of a challenge, in which he said: 'I ask publicly from this board-room will the clergy put their heads together, and give some chance to the young fellows to keep away from the public-houses?'

Although it might be urged, in reply to this startling query that even if the priests 'put their heads together' for this object they would meet with opposition from various quarters, still they would occupy a position of

greater advantage if they could offer an alternative that would not be exposed to any objection, and thus silence their opponents. The introduction of a Branch of the C.Y.M.S. in the parish will now supply this remedy.

The constitution has adapted it to meet the requirements of the smallest district as well as of the most thickly populated centre. There is scarcely a locality where a room or two cannot be engaged, and a selection of books and papers free from the nuisance of the trashy novel supplied. The religious atmosphere is preserved and safe-guarded by the rules that enjoin the formation of the Association, if possible, in the Church, the monthly Confession and Communion of the members, and the submission of the list of candidates for admission to the Spiritual Director.

The priest is, therefore, as much at home in the rooms of his Branch of the C.Y.M.S. as in his church and school. His presence and guidance will not be resented, and his power of doing good will be considerably enhanced. Close contact with the young members of his flock, who hitherto had received a passing nod or a friendly word, will develop mutual esteem, and the shadow of aloofness, so often misinterpreted, will disappear for ever. His tact and prudence will suggest to him to avoid undue interference with the liberty of the associates, and at the same time to encourage them in the pursuit of so many objects now engaging the minds of Young Ireland, such as the Preservation of the Gaelic Tongue, the promotion of Native Industries, and, above all, the advocacy of the Temperance movement, which has been made a prominent plank in the platform of the C.Y.M.S. Apart from all these considerations, it should be borne in mind that the proposed federation of Branches will afford a splendid fighting force against the various attacks made upon the Faith.

It will have at its command the brilliant services of the official organ, the *C.Y.M.*, a magazine that, in its short life, has achieved a reputation as a fearless exponent of Catholic principles, and an uncompromising defender of the rights of the priests, as well against their open foes as against their 'candid' friends, who, 'disguised in the war-paint

of patriots, have never been known to do anything for their country unless find fault with those who have done their best.' It has not been afraid to tackle the much-abused Managerial question, and to expose the 'other side,' so carefully suppressed—where the 'tyrant' and 'despot' is seen intimidated and threatened by an ignorant people because he seeks to do his duty to the children and their parents.

These are some of the advantages offered to the priests of Ireland at a critical period in the struggle against secularism. It would be idle to ignore them. It would be folly to despise them. It would be an act of common prudence to make the most of them.

THOMAS M'GEOY, P.P.

THE FIRST HYMN OF THE NATIVITY

GOOD EVENING, Father Joseph. A happy feast. Welcome, Father John. A happy feast to you.

You were not expecting me this evening, I know. The truth is I have had rather a hard day, and thought I would drop in for a quiet chat.

Quite right. I know that you have been busy, for, on my way home, I looked in at your preparation for to-morrow's feast. The church certainly presents a festive appearance.

How did you like the effect of the legend above the altar?

Ah, yes. 'Glory to God in the highest, on earth peace to men of good-will' (Luke ii. 14). It will assuredly catch the eye of your congregation, as you, no doubt, intend. By the by, I feel sure that you have more than once made a meditation on those words of the first hymn on the birth of our Saviour?

I have; but why?

It may, perhaps, have occurred to you at such times as somewhat strange that the Canticle especially celebrating the fulfilment of the promise made in Eden should seem to contain no direct allusion to it?

I cannot say that it has.

Did it ever strike you that in each of the other recorded angelic utterances there is something directly bearing on the economy of Redemption?

I think it did. Gabriel indicates the speedy coming of the Redeemer, when he says of St. John Baptist, about to be born, that 'he shall go before Him . . . to prepare . . . a perfect people' (Luke i. 17). The same angel declares to the Blessed Virgin the work of redemption for which the Child to be born of her is destined, as manifested by His name, 'thou shall call His name Jesus' (Luke i. 31). St.

Joseph's angel reveals to him in like manner the salvation to be wrought for men which Mary's Child shall compass, ' He shall save His people from their sins ' (Matt. i. 21). The shepherds' angel announces the birth of the Redeemer, ' this day is born to you a Saviour ' (Luke ii. 11).

Quite so. And thus, the words of the hymn honouring the event are in strong contrast to these oracles ; since, where we should naturally expect to find the clearest reference to it, there is but an interpretative allusion.

I am not prepared to enter on a discussion of the subject, but, if you have been thinking over this matter, I shall be pleased to have the benefit of your reflections.

Well, Father John, I may as well tell you at once that I have a prepossession as to the sense of the words of the hymn as recorded by St. Luke.

Then, let us have the prepossession.

If one examine the couplet as it stands in ecclesiastical language the three last words seem to strike one as a foreign idiom in Latin vesture, '*hominibus bonae voluntatis*' If, in the hope of finding an explanation of this construction, one turn to a most carefully verified Greek reading¹ one has *ἐν ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκίᾳς*.

Beyond adding *in* to the Latin, that does not appear to help much. '*Ανθρώποις εὐδοκίᾳς* smacks as much of the outlander as *hominibus bonae voluntatis*.

Quite so ; but if you glance again at the word *εὐδοκίᾳς* you may observe something which may throw some light on the matter.

I notice that the word *εὐδοκίᾳς* is enclosed within the marks of a more probable reading, but I do not perceive how that can help us in our quest.

And yet it would seem to denote that the text-corrector was at work even in the earliest times.

How so ?

Since we find the term *εὐδοκίᾳ* substituted for *εὐδοκίᾳς* in some of the manuscripts.

¹ *The New Testament in the Original Greek.* Westcott and Hort. Macmillian, 1898.

Then you are of opinion that there is some uncertainty about the genuineness of the reading *εὐδοκίας*?

By no means. The Church has delivered to us the equivalent of *εὐδοκίας*, and not of *εὐδοκία*, as the genuine portion of the text, and since the days of the holy Pope and martyr, Telesphorus, about A.D. 150, has enshrined this equivalent in the liturgy of the High Mass.

Then how would you account for the alternative reading in the manuscripts referred to?

If two languages were widely different in their respective idioms, and, for some special reason, one wished to preserve, in the precise form in which it was delivered, a communication made in the one while rendering it in the other, is it likely that the version thus made would in its foreign dress labour under apparent defects, both as regards structure and signification?

Not only probable, but almost certain, from the very nature of the case.

If, then, some purist of the language of translation, ignorant, it may be, of the original idiom, knowing nothing of, or not adverting to, the special purpose of the translator, but seeing only a barbarism in the construction, and, as it seems to him, the sense obscured by what he unreflectingly assumes to be an inaccuracy of the text; if, in order to shed the barbarism and to improve or to restore the signification, such an one were to alter the offending word his manuscript might afterwards become the type of a series.

It may well be that there were such purists among the Greek scribes or copyists, but was there any need, as you suppose, to preserve the exact form of the original?

There would appear to be, as we shall see later.

Well, now, what inference do you draw from the fact that the word *εὐδοκία*, and not *εὐδοκίας*, is the reading in some of the manuscripts?

It would seem to provide a two-fold argument. First, that to the early Greek mind there was neither constructive nor sense-connexion between *ἀνθρώποις* and *εὐδοκίας*. Secondly, since we have it on the authority of the Church that *εὐδοκίας* forms a part of the genuine text, it

should apparently be referred to some word other than *ἀνθρώποις* for the determination of its meaning.

And how do you propose to fix what that word is ?

Partly from the grammar and usage of the languages, in one of which we may suppose the words of the hymn to have been pronounced by the angels and reported by the shepherds ; partly from the interpretation the circumstances would seem to justify.

The interpretation the circumstances would seem to justify ?

Yes. The sacred record informs us that the ' multitude of the angels ' were ' praising God ' (Luke ii. 13). This statement supposes some topic of praise. *Confitemini Domino quoniam bonus* (Ps. cxvii.), *Laudate Dominum . . . quoniam confirmata est super nos misericordia eius* (Ps. cxvi.), *Confitebor tibi, Domine. Magna opera Domini* (Ps. cx.). In these Canticles we have the goodness, mercy, and power of God as themes of praise. The hymn of praise of the angels, it would seem, should likewise be presumed to have its topic.

I think that your conclusion is reasonable. And what do you suppose the theme of the hymn to be ?

Εὐδοκία—benevolence, good-will.

But whose ?

God's benevolence. The angels were praising *God*.

Do you understand this benevolence in any special way ?

I have considered both the promise of redemption and its fulfilment as an act of grace or favour on the part of God, implying His subjective benevolence and man's objective acceptability.

So, according to the aspect under which it was viewed, you would interpret *εὐδοκία* as benevolent or acceptability ?

Precisely.

Well now, what of its interpretation according to the original languages, in one of which the word may be supposed to have been first spoken ?

That we shall now examine. In such expressions as ' love of brotherhood ' (2 Peter i. 7), ' peace of God ' (Phil. iv. 7), ' patience of Job ' (James v. 11), may I ask

what connexion exists between the terms love, peace, patience, and the rest of the phrase?

The first word is particularized by what follows.

Suppose we were to connect the term 'peace' of the couplet with 'of benevolence,' or 'of acceptability,' we should then have phrases similar to those framed by SS. Peter, Paul and James; *peace of benevolence*, *peace of acceptability*. The general term 'peace' would thus be specialized, and, with its determination, capable of being referred to God as an act of His grace or favour.

But would not such a settlement be quite arbitrary? What precedent could you claim for it?

That it would be nowise arbitrary may be gathered from the syntax of either of the languages used by the Jews at the time of the birth of our Saviour, it being by far the more general mode of determination. As for precedent, I have already cited the example of SS. Peter, Paul and James in fixing the signification of the like terms, love, peace, patience, and it would be easy to quote numerous passages from the Scriptures in support of the practice.

So your first step towards the final determination of the interpretation you would give to *εὐδοκίας* would be to connect it with *εἰρηνή*, as the grammatical and probable sense-particularization in the original language of that term?

Quite so.

Very well. Now what do you understand by the phrase 'peace of benevolence'?

Assuming the language of 'the angelic host' (Luke ii. 18), in order to have been comprehended by the shepherds, to have been either Hebrew or an impure Syriac, we get, as the equivalent of the term, peace, *שְׁלֹם* (*shelóm*), or *shalom* in Syriac. These are from the same root, *שְׁלָם*, (*shálam*), or Syriac *shalém*. Here I show the primary and distinct signification of these two forms of the same verb.

Yes; 'he (or it) was (or became) whole, complete, perfect.'

Here again, I place before you the nomenclature of the main division of Hebrew verbs.

I see that they are named **שָׁלָם** (*shálam*), and are styled respectively **שְׁלֵמִים** (*shelémim*), complete, perfect, and **בְּלִתְשְׁלֵמִים** (*bilti-shelémim*), defective imperfect.

From this you may infer what was the primary and direct signification of the term **שְׁלֹמָה** (*shelóm*), the equivalent of the word peace, it being the infinitive of the simple form of the verb (*Qal*), used as a verbal-noun.

I should say that as a noun of the substantive form of the verb it would have meant *completeness*,¹ and as a noun of the transition form of the verb it would have signified *complement*.²

So it would seem.

Then under what aspect is such a word come to have the sense of *peace*?

Under an aspect to which I shall now direct your attention. Here is our Saviour's discourse and prayer as recorded by St. John. If you will glance at xv. 11, xvi. 24, xvii. 6, you will observe that the expression, *to fill up with joy*, occurs in each of these places.

Yes; it is as you say. May I ask what you understand by *filling up* in such expressions?

The completing, or adding the complement to what already exists in part, so far as to produce a state of fullness or completeness. Will you now read those of our Saviour's words, which I have marked at fifteenth chapter, eleventh verse, of St. John?

'These things have I spoken to you . . . that your joy may be full' (John xv. 11).

May I ask you to read also the closing words of the address, as underlined, at sixteenth chapter, thirty-third verse?

'These things have I spoken to you that in Me you may have peace' (John xvi. 33).

It would seem that the secondary clauses in these two passages are equivalents, since each represents the one purpose of our Saviour in the things which He spoke to

¹ In Syriac, *Shulomé da'alma*, the consummation of the world (Matt. xxviii. 20). Pesh.

² In Syriac, *Shulomé dazábna*, the fullness of time (Gal. iv. 4). Pesh. VOL. XXIII.

His Apostles. Hence, *to have full joy* of the one signifies *to have peace* of the other; wherefore, *full joy* means *peace*.

Then it would appear from this that, in the Jewish mind, the underlying idea of peace was that of *fullness* of whatever was in question.

That would apparently be a fair inference.

This would seem to imply that, to the thinking of those using the language, fullness was a mode of wholeness or completeness, and that *full joy*, or *full grace*, was equivalent to whole, complete, perfect joy or grace.

Undoubtedly.

Could you produce evidence of this?

I will try. You may remember my pointing out to you the division of the Hebrew verbs into *shelémim* and *bilti-shelémim*. Now, you may see here that, just as the defective verb is known not only as *bilti-shalém*, but as *hásér*, so also the entire, complete, or perfect verb is not only styled *shalém*, but likewise *malé*; that is, *full*. It would seem, therefore, that, to the Jewish mind, the notion conveyed by *malé* was also contained in the far more comprehensive *shalém*. Hence, also, it would appear that, to their thinking, fullness, as a mode of wholeness or completeness, would be comprehended under, and conveyed by, the term *shelóm*.

So the underlying idea of *shelóm*, as the equivalent of the term peace, was fullness or completeness of something in question; of joy, of grace, or the like?

That it admits of such an explanation appears from what has been advanced.

But is not such a mode of thought quite special to the Jews?

By no means. It is not unfamiliar either in Celtic or in English.

Indeed.

The O.E. *waes hael*, both as to meaning and usage, would seem to have been originally the exact counterpart of *shálam*, or in Syriac *shalém*. As a salutation, leavetaking-wish, or toast, with those who spoke the language ' *Waes*

hael! would appear to have signified 'Be (or Become) whole!' with reference to something known to the persons concerned.

I think that you are right. The German '*Werde heil!*' seems to have had the like meaning in early times.

Now this, too, would apparently have been the sense of *shelóm*, second person, masculine, imperative, of the simple form (*Qal*), of *shálam*, under similar conditions.

Imperative forms in both cases?

Yes. There were, however, other modes where an optative seems to have been understood. Such were—'*Thé haelth!*' and '*Eower haelth!*' Here again, with the substantive sense of the verb, the meaning would seem to have been 'Wholeness to thee!' 'Wholeness to ye!'¹ the particular form of wholeness intended being known from the circumstances under which the wish was expressed.

But where does the notion of peace enter in?

Addressed to the sick the signification would apparently be 'Completeness (of normal condition) to thee!' Spoken to one striving after wealth, it might mean 'Completeness (of fortune) to thee!' Applied to an ambitious man, it could impart 'Completeness (of desire) to thee!'

Quite so; but the peace.

To one sick, recovery of normal condition means peace. To one moiling and toiling, the acquisition of a competency means peace. To one lawfully ambitious, success means peace. These are forms of prosperity, and prosperity implies peace.

Would such have been the sense of *shelóm*! used in like manner?

This would appear to have been the primary and direct signification of *shelóm*, *shalom* in Syriac, in the forms, *Shelóm éléika!* *Shelóm alikem!* *Shalom lok!* *Shalom lakúm!* used in daily life.

But this meaning is not contained in *εἰρηνή*, which is derived from *εἰρένειν*, to connect, and so seeming

¹ Compare the Celtic *plán leat*, *plán leatib*, or *plánca agat*, *plánca agatib*.

to signify peace in the sense of unity arising from a fusion of peoples, or of their interests ; nor is it found in *pax*, which comes from the Aryan root, *pak*, through *panjere* and *passisi*, meaning *established*, *fixed*, and apparently implying peace in the sense of unity of action, namely, conformity to what had been fixed or established by treaty.

Your observations would seem to be correct. *Eἰρηνη* and *pax* are but conventional equivalents for the word used by the shepherds when reporting the hymn, and, as a comparison of the derivations shows, do but remotely reflect its meaning. The Greek counterpart of *shelóm*, or Syriac *shalom*, would seemingly be more nearly expressed by some form of *ὅλος*, and the Latin by some form of *salvus*.

Quite so. And although *fullness* is well replaced by *πλήρωσις*, the other Greek terms for *completeness* all appear to be composite. *Shelóm*, or Syriac *shalom*, therefore, could apparently be represented in a pure form in that language only by coining some such term as *ὅλοσύνη*. The Latin equivalent would seem to be the word *salus* in its primary signification.

It is more or less certain that these terms have the same general meaning, but is there any evidence of their common, radical origin ?

We may look a little into the matter after the close of our present inquiry ?¹

Very good. Then to continue. From what you have advanced you are of opinion that the term peace, of the phrase ' peace of benevolence,' might be understood in a similar manner to the like word in the sixteenth chapter and thirty-third verse of St. John, namely, as fullness or completeness ; this fullness or completeness being particularized by an underlying idea corresponding to the notion, joy, of that passage ?

I think that it might be so understood.

It follows, then, from this that you are of opinion St.

¹ See a brief Note on this p. 288 *supra*.

Luke (whose knowledge, both of the original tongues and of Greek, may be presumed to have commenced where yours leaves off), in rendering what had been spoken from Hebrew or Syriac, by using conventional terms, did not on all occasions convey, or was not always able to express, the precise sense of the original ?

I assume that, in this respect, St. Luke laboured under the difficulties which any translator would experience who was restricted by a very limited stock of words from which to select, and by the accepted meaning such words might have.

Ah ! then you attribute the defect not to negligence, but to necessity ?

Most assuredly. Let us briefly examine in the case of this particular word what latitude the Greek permitted to him. Seemingly, he had before him as equivalents for *shelóm* four words: *εἰρήνη*, *ἡσυχία*, *ἀταραξία*, and *εὐθυμία*. We have already considered the derivation and signification of the first. The second, familiar to us as affording their designation to the Quietists, appears to mean peace as the absence of sound or motion. The third is, literally, *imperturbation* ; hence peace of calmness or of tranquillity. The fourth we might turn by *cheerfulness* ; the peace arising from a certain disposition of mind. With such a repertory to choose from St. Luke had to express the import of a word meaning peace in the sense of fullness or completeness as its general notion, with the attached idea of an understood specific notion by which the fullness or completeness was particularized. That he culled the best of the terms we can have no doubt ; that the best was but a poor equivalent need not be a matter of surprise.

It is unnecessary, Father John, to remind you of what is well known to you : that words are but the ready-made vesture of ideas, and that, with the most varied stock, and after the most judicious selection, we must end by adopting the idea to the dress, and not the dress to the idea. As a result, how poor, how imperfect, how unsatisfactory, both to ourselves and to others, are often the presentments of

our most carefully prepared literary productions—and this, too, when we are using our mother-tongue. What wonder, then, if St. Luke, labouring as a translator under the disadvantage of an exceedingly limited supply of words ill-suited to his purpose, should have occasionally failed to exactly reproduce the sense of his original. But could he not have done, and with far greater facility, what you have done? Could he not have conveyed the idiomatic significance which you claim for *shelóm*, or Syriac *shalom*, by coining a Greek equivalent?

Of his ability to do so there can be no question; of his moral freedom in such respect we shall now inquire. I have here the introductory words of Genesis, first chapter and second verse, which run, *אָמָתְךָ הָרָאָתָךְ*: May I ask you to look how the Jewish company of Seventy, who made the Greek version of the Old Testament for Ptolemy II, translated the three last words of this passage?

Certainly. ‘*Ην δὲ οὐ γῆ ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος.*’

If you will now glance at this work you will observe that the words *ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος* are rendered by St. Gregory of Nyssa *invisibilis et decomposita.*’

Quite so; and this we might take as *invisible and unarranged*; the latter term as opposed to the present cosmic condition of the universe.

Since St. Gregory’s writings for clear and doctrinal statement are held to be unsurpassed by those of any other Father, I think that we may accept this rendering as conveying the correct meaning of the words *אָמָתְךָ הָרָאָתָךְ*.

It would seem so.

Will you now read a translation of the same phrase by a learned company of English and American divines?

‘And the earth was waste and void.’¹

Here we have a contrast between ‘*invisible*’ and ‘*waste*,’ and again betwixt ‘*unarranged*’ and ‘*void*;’ and this contrast may be considered as fairly representing the mind antithesis of the two companies—one with traditions to be considered, the other without.

¹ Holy Bible. Revised Version, 1885. Oxford University Press.

May I ask you once more to read Luke ii. 49, second question?

‘οὐκ ἤδειτε ὅτι ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πατρός μον δεῖ εἶναι με.’

Here is a copy of the New Testament done into Hebrew by two Jewish professors.¹ Will you examine the same passage as rendered by them?

אַל, בְּאַתָּה בְּאַל לְהִיּוֹת בְּבֵית אָבִיךָ.

Do you observe how they turn the phrase, ‘ἐν τοῖς’?

Yes; by בְּבֵית, *in the place*, or *in the house*.

Shall we glance now at how so experienced and erudite a translator as St. Jerome, with his profound linguistic knowledge, gives this same phrase?

He has the exact equivalent, ‘*in eis.*’²

Again, a difference as between one with traditions to be considered and those without.

But what is the object of this investigation?

That will presently become manifest. May I ask do you think it probable that St. Jerome, who, through his rendering of the 83rd Psalm, was familiar with such expressions as ‘the court of the Lord,’ ‘in the courts,’ namely, of ‘Thy house,’ would have known when translating ἐν τοῖς, (Luke ii. 49) had some such word as χωροῖς, τοποῖς, or αὐλεῖος, understood, and hence would have known that the meaning, as in the phrases ἐν τῷ αὐλειῷ τοῦ κυρίου, ἐν αὐλεῖοις σοῦ, was ἐν τοῖς—αὐλεῖοις—τοῦ πατρός μοῦ, in the—courts—of My Father?

I see nothing unlikely in such a thing.

And yet he confined himself to a rigid preservation of the form of the original. ‘*Ἐν τοῖς*’ became ‘*in eis*,’ ‘*πατρός μοῦ*’ ‘*patris mei*,’ the possessive ‘*τοῦ*’ for which the Latin afforded no verbal equivalent, ‘*quae sunt*.’

Yes, that is undoubtedly so.

Now let us return to our company of Seventy and their version of the words טְהָרָה וְתָהָרָה. The care observed by the Jews in their absolute fidelity to the form of the manu-

¹ Salkinson-Ginsburg's *Hebrew New Testament*. Vienna, 1894.

² Mar Rabbula (Peshitta Version), 25-30 years after St. Jerome's translation, turned ἐν τοῖς, (Luke ii. 49), by Syriac *devéith*, *in the house*, or, *in the place*; literally, *that which (is) the house=there where (is) the house*, unless *devéith=baveith*.

script when copying their canonical books is notorious, and seems to be referred to by our Saviour in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. v. 18). The marvellous tales of the separate cells, and the agreement notwithstanding in the renderings of the common text, would seem to have this evidential value, *that they were unanimous in faithfully rendering the form of the original*. But uniformity connotes an unifying influence. Common consent urges authority, internal or external—some law or custom having the force of law. Since there is no suspicion of external pressure, the result seems to be due to some internal influence. The nature of the subject appears to restrict that to one adequate cause: a common adherence to a traditional usage whenever there was question of the transmission of the divine oracles contained in their sacred books.

Then you would account in this way for the difference between their rendering of the text and that of the English and American company?

Precisely; and also for that betwixt St. Jerome and the professors.

But is not this suggested respect for the form of Scripture somewhat exaggerated? Is not the sense of paramount importance?

‘God, Who . . . spake in times past to the fathers by the prophets, . . . in these days hath spoken to us by His Son’ (Heb. i. 1). When Divine Wisdom deigned to speak to men ‘by the mouth of His holy prophets’ (Luke i. 70), and that of His Son, His words were presented to us in a mould of His own selection. On that account that mould shares with the world the dignity of having had a divine origin. It is God’s presentment of His own word, God’s mould wedded by Him to His own utterance, suited beyond all others to His purpose, adapted beyond all others to our needs, a member of an union cemented by God Himself, and hence belonging to a category of which He has said, ‘What God hath joined let not man separate’ (Matt. xix. 6). That mould is preserved to us in the form of words guarded from alteration by the devout and admirable care of those whose privilege it has been to receive and to transmit it.

Then you think that some such view as this influenced both the Alexandrine Jews and St. Jerome in making their translations?

It may well be so.¹ They may also have thought that, just as the pristine forms of the physical universe, when left undisturbed by the hand of man, reflect more truly their exemplars as they lay in the mind of the Creator, so, too, the words of Holy Writ, retained in that mould in which they were first cast by Divine Wisdom, present more faithfully to us His plan and His purpose for our restoration to the state of His constituted children, lost to us by the Fall.

And this view may be quite apart from any consideration as to the claims of Positive Theology for the domain of Inspiration?

Quite apart. Hence we might reasonably suppose, had we no evidence of the fact, that St. Luke, acting likewise under such influence, would rigidly preserve that form of words of the 'multitude of the heavenly host' praising God in which they were reported to him. Morally, then, he was not free to novate, as you have suggested, in order to preserve, and to transmit, a meaning which, while easily perceived in the original idiom, became obscured in the language of translation.

But is there evidence that St. Luke did strictly adhere to the form of words of the hymn as communicated to him?

It would seem so. We have already noticed that the text-corrector appears to have been at work in the very earliest times on the words of the 'angelic host' as recorded by the evangelist, purifying the construction and sense of the lines by substituting *εὐδοκία* for *εὐδοκίας*.

Yes; we observed that at the outset of our conversation.

Later on, we find another copyist—one probably unaware of the previous alteration of *εὐδοκίας*, ignorant, it may be, of the primary idiom, knowing nothing

¹ 'Non adeo me hebetis fuisse cordis, et tam crassa rusticitatis *ut* aliquid de-Dominicis verbis corrigendum putaverim, aut non divinitus inspiratus.' xxvii. ad Massellum.

of the fact that what he was about to do would destroy in the original a very characteristic feature of the letters of that language—in¹ an attempt at contrasted parallelism of that text of which the final word had been altered, ousting in turn the *εν* preceding *ἀνθρώποις*, though found in the best manuscripts.

But is there anything to suggest that this supposition would account for the presence of *εν* in some readings and its absence in others?

Let us see. I have arranged here what remains of the presumably original text of St. Luke after the alteration of *εὐδοκίας* and deletion of *εν*.

<i>Δόξα</i>	<i>ἐν ὑψίστοις</i>	<i>Θεῷ</i>
<i>καὶ Εἰρήνη, εὐδοκία,</i>	<i>επὶ γῆς,</i>	<i>ἀνθρώποις.</i>
Glory	on high	to God
and Peace, good-will	on earth	to men.

You appear to assume in the arrangement of the second half of the couplet that the text-corrector, in the interpretation given to the one event in its results in heaven and upon earth, understood *εὐδοκία* to be not something different from *Εἰρήνη*, but simply an apposition or explanation of that term. Waiving that question for the present, may I ask how your reply bears upon my query?

Its bearing upon your question is this: that, seemingly, St. Luke, by his endeavour to preserve faithfully the form of the original communication in its opposed idiom, so anhellenized his construction as to lay himself open to the correction of purist scribes, the one altering, the other eliminating.

There may be something in this; but, now, since you hold that St. Luke might not innovate, you must likewise be debarred from so doing.

Undoubtedly. There is here, however, question only of what meaning I, whilst accepting the interpretation of the Church, may piously believe the term *Εἰρήνη* conveys. The same field-flower may be to one a commonplace thing, meriting, and receiving, but a passing interest;

¹ *Sacred Literature*, Jebb. London, 1820.

to another it may be a beautiful earth-gem, bringing light, and brightness, and sweetness into life ; to a third, it may be not only all this, but also a revelation of the beneficence, and love, a testimony of the unfailing, tender care and solicitude of his Heavenly Father, accompanying and supporting him under every vicissitude of his earthly pilgrimage. So it may likewise be of a word of Holy Writ.

Then, while leaving the words of the couplet as given in the Greek untouched, you would understand the significance of *Eἰρήνη* to be fullness or completeness of something corresponding to the term 'joy,' of John xvi. 33 ?

Quite so.

Very well. Then before settling the ultimate meaning of the term benevolence, which you set out to do, you must first fix what the something is which will specialize the general term fullness. How do you propose to do this ?

You will remember having defined the expression *filling up*, as used by our Saviour in John xv. 11, xvi. 24, xvii. 6, as adding the complement to what already existed in part so as to produce a state of fullness or completeness ?

Yes, I recollect. We agreed that there was some existent element, perfected by an addition.

The term peace, therefore, is to be considered in this connexion as a compound consisting of two elements : the one generic ; the other specific. If the two elements were known, the method would be synthetic ; if unknown, analytic—the resolution of the compound into its constituents.

Very well. Now what is your procedure ?

To solve first, hypothetically, the case of John xvi. 33 ; next, a case wherein the elements are known ; lastly, the case in question.

Good. Then we take first the ' peace ' of John xvi. 33. If we suppose the primary element of the ' joy ' of the Apostles, as part of the general following of the Messiah, to have been that which they shared in common with the

other disciples, and to which our Saviour refers in the words, ' Happy the eyes that see the things that you see . . . (and the ears that) hear the things that you hear' (Luke x. 23-25), then their joy would receive its second or complemental element, that is, fullness, when they, as the specially chosen (Luke vi. 13), were permitted to hear those other things set forth in the last discourse, and not intended then for the common ear, to which reference is made in the two passages, ' These things have I spoken to you . . . that your joy may be full' (John xv. 11) and ' These things have I spoken to you that in Me you may have peace' (John xvi. 33).

Then you would imply that the term ' peace,' here used, signifies the compound produced by these two elements of joy ?

That is my supposition.

And your next case ?

That of Holy Simeon. St. Luke tells us that this Jewish priest ' had received an answer that he should not see death before he had seen the Christ of the Lord ' (Luke ii. 26). This ' answer,' or, as Holy Simeon himself calls it, ' word,' is the primary existent element of a fullness or completeness that is afterwards to be. In verse 30, chapter ii., Holy Simeon affirms ' my eyes have seen Thy salvation.' Here we have the second element, or addition, producing the state of fullness. Just as we have supposed that the words of our Saviour (John xv. 11) were the complement of those words referred to by Him (Luke x. 23-25), and produced the ' peace' mentioned (John xvi. 33), so, in like manner, the sight of the Divine Infant was the upfilling of the ' answer,' or ' word,' producing the peace of which he speaks, ' Now Thou dost dismiss Thy servant, O Lord, in peace' (Luke ii. 29).

So you would say that just as fullness or completeness (of joy) as to the Apostles meant peace, so, in the case of Holy Simeon, the peace he speaks of is fullness or completeness (of ' answer'), (of ' word ') ; and that, as in the former case, the term fullness takes its distinctive sense through being specialized by the phrase ' of joy,' so, in the latter

case the idea fullness is determined by the phrase of 'answer,' of 'word'?

It would appear so. The 'Now' of verse 39 would seem to refer to a *then*; the then, namely, of the time of the 'answer.' The clause in the second person, 'Thou dost dismiss Thy servant, O Lord,' apparently points back to the words in the third person, 'an answer from the Holy Ghost that he should not see death.' The 'in peace' would seemingly find a suitable correlation in a phrase, in 'answer,' in 'word'; that is, 'in peace,' signifying *in fulfilment*, would determine in 'answer,' in 'word,' as *in promise*, which it intuitively was.

Well, your final step is to fix the notion to be added to the term peace of the couplet.

The words 'And suddenly' (forthwith, thereupon), introducing verse 13, chapter ii., of St. Luke, connect and relate what follows, to the end of verse 14, with what precedes, from verse 9, as part of the one incident. The announcement of the single angel, and the praise of the 'multitude of the heavenly host,' formed but one function. Now, one incident, one function, argues one object common to the two sets of actors. The object of the 'multitude of the heavenly host' was to praise the benevolence of God. The object, therefore, of the solitary angel should be to announce the benevolence of God. But benevolence is a mode of charity, which, as Pope St. Gregory tells us, must needs find its expression in our neighbour (*Hom. in Ev. Secd. Lucam*). The benevolence then in question was clearly none other than that set forth in the words, 'this day is born to you a Saviour' (Luke ii. 11); God's benevolence satisfying the condition laid down by the holy Pope just mentioned in giving *to us* a Saviour. We know, however, from another source (Genesis iii. 15), that this particular *act* of the benevolence of God had existed, as *a promise*, for nearly 5,000 years previous to its realization. Here, then, we have the two elements: the inceptive act or promise, and the perfect act or fulfilment of the promise—peace.

So this would imply that the term peace of the hymn

would have its general signification of fullness or completeness particularized by the added idea of promise, which it really contains, as the translation into substance of what before had existed only in word ?

Precisely.

Then you would understand the second line of the hymn as if it ran, ' And on earth peace (completeness—of promise—) among men of good-will ?

Just so.

Can you now complete your promised interpretation of the term, benevolence, or your definition of the topic of the hymn ?

Certainly. The full theme of the ' multitude of the angelic host praising God ' would be *Completeness (of Promise) of Good-will among Men on Earth.*

So this would represent your prepossession ?

Not quite. There appear to be reasons why we should render *ἐν ὑψίστοις* as beings instead of a locality.

And what may those reasons be ?

Among others, these : Sophocles uses *ὑψίστοις* of Jove, and other writers apply *ὑψίστοι* to the gods. It is apparently requisite in order adequately to represent the facts as recorded ; since the celebration of God's benevolence was proceeding by a ' multitude of the heavenly host ' who were not *in the highest*, but morally on earth near to where the shepherds were keeping the night-watches (Luke ii. 14).

Then you would understand the sense to be ' Glory among the angels to God ' ?

Exactly.

Anything further.

A little. I have already intimated that St. Luke at times used conventional equivalents in rendering the words of the original communication, and that such words did not always convey the presence of the primary. I suggest that this has occurred in the case of the *kai*, introducing the second line of the hymn. As is well known, *kai* is not the only rendering of the *waw* or *wau* that would have been spoken in the Hebrew or Syriac report. Either

וְאֵת וְאֵת or, in Syriac, *w'ál á'r'á*, might be also correctly turned *ἐπὶ γῆς γὰρ*, that is, as you are aware, 'for on earth,' instead of 'and on earth.'

So you would take the word *for*, in place of *and*, as introducing the full topic of the hymn?

Quite so. If we now add to the English the substantive verb, which is rarely expressed in Hebrew or Syriac, and readjust the phrasing, the couplet would stand so:—

'(There is) glory to God among the angels

For (there is) peace (completeness—of promise—) of
good-will among men on earth.'

Then you apparently understand the second half of the hymn to be the complement or explanation of the first half?

Quite so.

And what of the allusion to the event which the lines celebrate?

The words of the theme of the hymn connected, as I have indicated, with the announcement of the herald-angel, would in this sense-form directly refer to the inchoative fulfilment, in the birth of a Saviour, of the pledge given in Eden. The couplet would thus be in harmony with the other recorded angelic utterances you have enumerated. Further, as the topic, Completeness—of Promise—of Good-will among Men on Earth, not only comprises the notion of God's benevolence, but also that of man's acceptability, this form of the hymn would likewise appear to contain, and to be, the first proclamation of that 'accepted time' (Isaias xlix. 8), of which, in the closing words of His recital of the prophecy in the Synagogue at Nazareth, our Saviour makes mention later on as the rationale for His appearance and preaching, 'To proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord' (Luke iv. 19).

A very seasonable chat, Father Joseph. I think that our Christmas Eve has been suitably spent.

I trust that I have not wearied you.

Not at all. My meditation of to-morrow will be none the worse for our talk, and I doubt not but that this review

of your prepossession will help yours. A happy feast, Father Joseph. Good-bye.

J. BOLAND,
Missionary Apostolic.

NOTE

On the probable common origin of *shelóm*, and the equivalents given in the foregoing paper.

VOWEL MODIFN. ROOT ELEMENTS ANALYSIS OF CONSONANT MODIFN.

	Vocalized Root	Vowel Groups	Common Root	Variable Part	Constant Part	Unvocalized Root	Pure Form	Smoothed S Form	Eclipsed S Form
Shelóm ..	1. shel	a. 1, 6	shl	—	—	1. shl	1. shl	—	—
Shalom (Syriac) ..	2. shal	b. 2, 3, 5,	shl	sh	1	2. shl	2. shl	—	—
Salus ..	3. sal	c. 4	—	—	—	3. sl	—	3. sl	—
ὁλοσύνη ..	4. hol	—	—	—	—	4. hl	—	—	4. hl
Haelth ..	5. hal	—	—	—	—	5. hl	—	—	5. hl
Heil ..	6. hel ?	—	—	—	—	6. hl	—	—	6. hl

Progressive modification of aspirate s (sh).

EXAMPLE I.:-

I. (a) *Shufu* becomes (b) *Khufu* } Theban influence on Chamilic
 (a) *Shuf-Ra* „ (b) *Khuf-Ra* } Hebrew.
 II. (b) *Kheva* becomes (c) *Heva* } Latin
 (b) *Kham* „ (c) *Ham* } influence.

EXAMPLE II.:-

I. (a) *Shalomon* becomes (b) *Salomon* } Greek influence.
 (a) *Shem* „ (b) *Sem* }
 II. (b) *Śrón* becomes (c) *Hrón* } Euphonic
 (b) *Śuīl* „ (c) *Húil* } change.

The object of the examples is only to indicate the general mode in which the modifications of an aspirated mute might occur. The intermediate change between (b) and (c) for the same word is not shown.

SOURCES OF IRISH HISTORY—III

OLD IRISH DOCUMENTS CHRONOLOGICALLY ARRANGED¹

Codex Epistularum Pauli Boernerianus, Vol. ii., p. 196; perhaps written by Sedulius, who flourished A.D. 490. Short religious poem of eight lines.

Sanctan's Hymn, ascribed to Sanctan, a Briton, brother of the pilgrim Matoc, and grandson of Muredach Muinderg, King of Ulaid, who died A.D. 479. Sanctan's Hymn may, therefore, be ascribed to the first half of the sixth century. Religious poem, containing no secular references.

Patrick's Hymn, *Faeth Fiada*, or 'the Deer's Cry.' Found in *Liber Hymnorum*, Trinity College MS., E. 42, which MS. is not later than the end of the eleventh or beginning of the twelfth century. Patrick's Hymn is mentioned in the *Book of Armagh*, written in A.D. 807 by Ferdomnach, who died in 845. There are no historical allusions in the *Faeth Fiada*.

Ninine's Prayer is ascribed to the poet Ninine or to Fiacc, Bishop of Sletty, who was consecrated by St. Patrick. The hymn is written in praise of the labours of Patrick, 'Primapstal Herenn,' as the poet calls him.

The *Book of Durrow* is a copy of the Gospels, sometimes assigned to the sixth century. It contains the words (fol. 173r) 'Miserere Domine Naemani . . . fili Neth,' and two imperfect lines of a prayer in Irish.

Ultan's Hymn is ascribed to Columbcille, or to Ultan of Ard Breccan, who died A.D. 656, or to three of Brigid's community, or to Brénainn. The language justifies seventh-century origin. The preface to the hymn contains the words 'Tempus . . . Diarmata meic Cerbaill rig Herenn'—'The time of its composition was that of Diarmait Mac Cerbaill, King of Eire' (died A.D. 565). The preface goes on to say that on the supposition that Ultan of Ardbreccan

¹ Taken from *Thesaurus Palæohibernicus*. Stokes and Strachan. Cambridge Press.

was the author of the poem, it was composed in the time of the two sons of Aed Slane (A.D. 664). The poem is a religious one in praise of St. Brigit.

Broccán's Hymn is ascribed to Broccán Cloen, a disciple of Ultan of Ardbreccan. The preface states the time of composition to have been that of Lughaidh (became king A.D. 483), son of Laeghaire, King of Ireland, and of Ailioll, son of Dunlang, King of Leinster. This hymn, likewise, is in praise of Brigit. There is a reference in line 51 to Cobhthach Cael, King of Bregia.¹ The notes contain references to the King of Leinster, the King of Ui Culduib, his tributary, the King of Ui Censelaigh, and the King of Fotharta Tire in the south of Ui Censelaigh. Also to 'Conn's Half.'

In the *Book of Armagh* are miscellaneous notes on the life of St. Patrick, which Bishop Tirechan is said to have written 'ex ore vel libro' of his (*oite aide*), Bishop Ultan, (died A.D. 656). These notes mention Laegaire Mac Néill 'in quinto regni anno Loiguri Maicc Neill' (fol. 9a, 2), St. Patrick came to Ireland (see also fol. 10a, 1); 'Venit ad Taltenam ubi fit agon regale ad Coirpriticum filium Neill' (fol. 10a, 2); 'Conallum filium Neill' (fol. 10a, 2); 'Perrexitque ad civitatem Temro ad Loigairium filium Neill iterum sed non potuit credere dicens: Nam Neel pater meus non siniuit mihi credere, sed ut sepeliar in cacuminibus Temro . . . Ego filius Neill et filius Dunlinge im Maistin in campo Lippi' (fol. 10a, 2); 'Endeus filium Amolugid sum ego filii Fechrach filii Echach, ab occidentalibus plagis de campo Domnon et de silva Fochloth' (fol. 10b, 1), see also fol. 10b, 2; 'filio Fechach filii Nell' (fol. 11a, 1); 'Finit liber primus in regionibus Nepotum Neill peractus' (fol. 11a, 2); 'duas filias Loiguri, Ethne Alba, Fedelm Rufa' (fol. 11b, 1); 'in monte Nepotum Ailello' (fol. 11b, 1); 'Ego sum macc maicc Cais maic Glais, qui fui subulcus Lugir rig Hirotae' (part of Galway, see T. P. ii., 267 note); 'Iugulavit me fian maicc Maicc con² in regno Coirpri Nioth fer anno c. usque hodie' (fol. 14a, 2); 'qui postea

¹ Died 268 B.C. (O'Flaherty).

² Lugaid Mac Con became king, A.D. 250.

retenuit Assicum sanctum cum monachis suis in Ard Roissen id est hic Raith Congi in Campo Sereth in tempore Regum Fergusso et Fothuid' (fol. 15a, 2); 'perrexit ad Loiguireum et Conallum filios Neill' (fol. 15b, 1); 'babitzavit filios Dunlinge' (fol. 15b, 2); 'babitzavit filios Niorth Fruch itir Mumae super Petram Coithrigi hic Caissiul' (fol. 15b, 2).

St. Caimin's Psalter quotes Josephus.

The *Bangor Antiphonary* was written in Bangor, Co. Down, during the abbacy of Cronan, between A.D. 680-691. It is in Latin, and mentions eleven abbots from Comgall to Cronan, inclusive.

The *Book of Armagh* contains Muirchu Maccu Machthéni's Memoirs of St. Patrick, written in obedience to the command of Bishop Aed of Sletty, who died A.D. 698. These memoirs contain various historical references. ' . . . rex quidam magnus . . . regnans in Temoria, quae erat¹ caput Scotorum, Loiguire nomine filius Neill, origo stirpis regiae huius pene insolae' (fol. 2a, 2); 'His ergo auditis turbatus est rex Loiguire valde . . . et omnis civitas Temoria cum eo' (fol. 4a, 1). Observe that Tara is described as a city (state), 'civitas.' 'Recumbentibus regibus et principibus et magis apud Loiguire' (fol. 4b, 2); 'while the kings and princes and druids were reclining with Loiguire,' who was evidently recognized as monarch. 'Civitas quae nunc Ardd Machae nominatur' (fol. 7a, 2). Observe 'nunc.' Was not Ard Macha the old name? Eamhain Macha. ' . . . contensio ad bellum usque perveniens inter nepotes Neill et Orientales ex una parte . . . Orientales et nepotes Neill contra Ultu acriter ad certamen ruunt . . .' (fol. 8b, 1). Did the Ultu, Ulstermen, acknowledge the supremacy of Tara? It seems doubtful.²

Adamnan's *Life of Columba* is found in a manuscript written by Dorbbéne, Abbot of Iona, in A.D. 713, during which year he died, seven years after the death of Adamnan. In fol. 7a, 2, mention is made of the race ('gente') Mocu

¹ Tara was destroyed in A.D. 561.

² See Mr. John MacNeill's learned articles in *New Ireland Review*, March, 1906, and after.

Neth Corb ; in p. 18a, 'Ainmorius filius Setui et II filii Maic Erce, Domnallus et Forcus' in the same place, 'de rege Cruithniorum, qui Echodius Laib vocitabatur ;' 'Pro hoc populo et Aidano rege Dominum oremus' (p. 18a) ; 'Sanctus Aidanum regem interrogat de regni successore' (p. 18b). Aedan had three sons, Art, Eochaидh Finn, and Domhingart. The first two were slain in war with the Meath men ('Miatorum') ; Domhingart in war with the Saxons ; Eochaидh Buidhe succeeded his brother (p. 18b, p. 19a) ; 'Two other kings, who were called the grandsons of Muiredach, Baitan, the son of Mac Erc, and Eochaيدh, the son of Domhnall' (p. 20a) ; 'Oingus, surnamed Bronbachal, son of Aedh Comman,' 'Aed Slane, son of King Dermit' (p. 21a). King Diarmaid died in A.D. 565, and was the last king that dwelt at Tara. 'Aed, son of Ainmire and Aedan, son of Gabran, met at Druim Cette, A.D. 574' (p. 49b) ; 'The Ui Neill and the Cruithni engage in battle near Dun Cethirn ; Domhnall, son of Aedh, is victor' (p. 50a) ; 'In the war of Roth, Domhnall Breac, grandson of Aédan, devastates, without cause, the province of Domnall, grandson of Ainmire' (p. 108a).¹

The Codex Taurinensis, F. iv. 24, dates from about the beginning of the eighth century. It contains some Irish Glosses on the Second Epistle of St. Peter.

The first scribe of the Wurzburg Glosses is assigned by Thurneysen to about or before A.D. 700. The second scribe was earlier than 800. The third scribe was a little later. The glosses are supposed to be based on a commentary by Pelagius on the Epistle of St. Paul. Pelagius is mentioned several times.

The Codex of Irish Canons of Cambray contains an Irish Homily on Self-Denial. The Irish is very archaic, and dates from the end of the seventh or the beginning of the eighth century.

The Codex Sancti Pauli, preserved in the monastery of St. Paul, in Carinthia, is ascribed to the eighth century by

¹ For these kings see *Book of Ballymote*, p. 49a ; also *Todd Lect.*, vol. iii.

Windisch, to the ninth century by Zimmer, whose view is supported by the nature of the language. But some of the poems are considerably earlier. The first of these is a kind of charm or incantation, partly unintelligible. It speaks of 'warriors of the Feni,' 'oaic fene.' The second is a fascinating little poem about a student and his cat, Pangur bán. The third is 'a riddling poem,' ascribed to Suibne Geilt, a king who is said to have lost his reason in the battle of Magh Rath, Moira, A.D. 636. The poem speaks of Gobban Saer. The fourth item in the Codex is some verses from a poem ascribed to St. Moling, who died in A.D. 697. In the *Book of Ballymote* (p. 256a), the poem is said to be taken from the *Book of Glendalough*, now lost. The poem is in praise of the man who does the will of God. The fifth item is a poem in praise of a Leinster prince called Aedh. An Aedh Mac Diarmata is mentioned in the *Annals of Ulster*, A.D. 713, but it is not stated to what part of Ireland he belonged. The form 'aue' ('Ua,' grandson) disappears from the *Annals of Ulster* about A.D. 760. This form occurs in the poem. Possibly, therefore, the Aedh referred to lived not later than that date. He was the son of a Diarmait, and a descendant of Muredach. Aedh owned 'the lovely Liffey,' 'Liphe ligda,' and was 'a descendant of the kings of the clans of Cualu.'

The *Book of Armagh* contains some additions to the notes of Tirechan in Latin and Irish. The language of these additions seems, on the whole, to represent the Irish of the early eighth century. Mention is made in them of Endae Cennsalach and his son, Crimthan (fol. 18a, 1), kings of South Leinster. Patrick administered baptism to Crimhthan, and the latter was buried in Slébte, Sletty (fol. 18b, 1).

Fiacc's Hymn is found in the *Liber Hymnorum*¹. This hymn is traditionally ascribed to Fiacc, Bishop of Sletty, who was consecrated by St. Patrick (*Book of Armagh*, fol. 18a, 1). It refers, however, to the desolation of Tara, A.D. 561. It must, therefore, be subsequent to that date. Linguistic evidences point to a date not much later than

¹ See on Faeth Fiada above, p. 289.

A.D. 800. The preface to the hymn tells us that Fiacc was the son of Mac Ercha, son of Bregan, son of Daire Barraig, son of Cathair Mor. The date of the last-named is given by O'Flaherty as A.D. 174.¹ The preface tells us, first, that the hymn was made in the time of Laeghaire Mac Neill, and subsequently it states that the time of composition was that of Lugaid, son of Laeghaire. Lugaid became king in A.D. 483.² Laeghaire reigned from A.D. 428 to 463. A note to line 7 of the hymn says that Miluic (Milchu) Mac hui Buain, Patrick's master, was the king of the North of Dal Araide. In lines 19 and 20 we read: 'The peoples of Ireland used to prophesy that a new prince of peace would come to them, that his prosperity would remain till Doomsday, that silent Tara's land would be desolate.' To this we have the note, 'Tea mur .i. mûr sen inroadnaiged Tea ben Ermoin meic Miliid,' i.e., 'Tea mur .i. (that is, a rampart) wherein Tea, wife of Erimor, son of Miled, was buried.' The form 'Temrach,' in line 20, is tenth century. Drs. Stokes and Strachan say, read 'Temro' or 'Temra'—in *Annals of Ulster* the ninth-century form is still 'Temro' or 'Temra.' The note to 'Benna Bairche' (line 29) says 'Bairche, cowherd of Ross Rigbuide, King of Ulster, from him the Peaks are named.' In line 35, we have 'Patraic pridchais do Scottaib,' 'Patrick preached to the Scots,' on which the commentator gives us the familiar legend about Scota, *Fenius Farsaid, Gaedel Glas*, etc. In line 37, we read, 'Maicc Ebir maicc Erimon lotar huili la cisel,' 'The sons of Elber, the sons of Erimon, all went with the Devil (?) . . . until the Apostle came to them.' The Milesian legend is, therefore, as old at least as A.D. 800. 'He (Patrick) preached three score years Christ's cross to the peoples of the Féne' (line 40). 'In Armagh is the Kingdom; long since has Emain been forsaken; Downpatrick is a great church; it is not dear to me that Tara should be desolate' (lines 43-4). On this the commentator remarks at the end of his note, 'nimdil do Patraic agus do Dia,' 'it is not dear to me, to Patrick and to God.'

¹ *Chronological Outlines of Irish History*, Rev. Dr. Hogan, S.J., F.R.U.I.

² *Ibid.*

In the *Book of Hymns* is found Colman's Hymn also. This is traditionally assigned to Colman Mac in Cluasaig, lector of Cork, and is said to have been composed as a defence against the plague which laid Ireland waste in the seventh century.¹ The language of the hymn is very like that of the *Féilire* of Oengus (about A.D. 800). The glossator to the MS. copy in the Franciscan Library, Merchant's Quay, Dublin, says that Dermait ua Tigernan, Bishop of Armagh in 848, added ll. 47-54, and that Mugron, Abbot of Iona, 964-980, added ll. 51-52. The editors of *Thesaurus Paleohibernicus* assign the original poem, ll. 1-37, to the early part of the ninth century. The preface to the hymn, in the Trinity College MS., E.42, tells us that it was composed by Colman Mac Ui Cluasaig in the time of the sons of Aed Slane, Blaithmac and Diarmait, to save himself from the Yellow Plague (A.D. 664). 'For numerous were the men in Ireland at that time, and such was their multitude that they used to get only thrice nine ridges for each man in Ireland, to wit, nine of bog, and nine of arable land, and nine of forest.' 'Only one man in every three was left alive by the plague.' 'The sons of Aed Slane, and Fechin of Fore, and Aileran and Manchan of Liath, and many others fasted together with the nobles of the men of Ireland for the thinning of the people; for scarcity of food had come because of their multitude. Wherefore the Yellow Plague was inflicted upon them, and there died thereof in that year the sons of Aed Slane, and the elders that we have mentioned and many others.' The poem itself is religious in character.

The Codex Vaticanus, n. 5755, contains fragments, with some Irish glosses, the language of which points to the eighth century, though the Codex itself has been assigned to the eleventh century. The nature of the subject precludes historical references.

The Codex Vindobonensis, n. 16, contains some Irish glosses, written in a hand of the eighth or ninth century, on a grammatical work of Eutychius.

The St. Gall Incantations are found in Codex Sangal-

¹ *Annals of Ulster* A.D. 664, 667.

lensis, nr. 1395. They contain a few Irish glosses of the eighth or ninth century. Pagan influence is seen in the words: 'Very sharp is Goibniu's science, let Goibniu's goad go out before Goibniu's goad,' and in: 'I put my trust in the salve which Diancecht left with his family that whole may be that whereon it goes.'

On one of the leaves of vellum which bound the Reichenau Manuscript of Beda were found some Irish glosses in writing of the eighth or ninth century. One of the notes runs: 'Save us from a flood of foreigners and foes and pagans and tribulations; from plagues of fire and famine and hunger, and many divers diseases.'

Codex Palatinus, 68, contains a Latin commentary on the Psalms, with Irish and Northumbrian glosses. It belongs to the eighth or ninth century.

Codex Ambrosianus, C. 301, contains a Latin commentary on the Psalms, probably by St. Columbanus, with some Irish glosses, the famous Milan Glosses, so-called because the MS. is now in the Ambrosian Library at Milan. In MS. 94a, 5; 68c, 15; 46b, 12; 85b, 11, 14; 56b, 33, reference is made to 'Coibre' and 'Mailgaimrid,' who is, perhaps, the man mentioned in *Annals of Ulster*, A.D. 838: 'Scriba optimus et ancorita abbas Bennchair pausavit.' Mailgaimrid and Coibre were obviously commentators on the Psalms.

Codex Taurinensis, F. vi., 2, contains a solitary Irish gloss on St. Matthew, ch. 27, in an Irish hand apparently of the ninth century. Codex Taurinensis' commentary on St. Mark dates from the ninth century.

Codex Bernensis, 258, contains a few Irish glosses—ninth century—on Genesis, Exodus, and Leviticus.

Codex Reginae, Lat. 215, in the Vatican Library, contains some Irish glosses on the Old Testament. Perhaps Johannes Erigena was the author of some of these glosses. The manuscript was written by a Continental scribe in the year 876 or 877.

Codex Sangermanensis, 121 (now MS. Lat. Paris, 12021), is in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris. It may be assigned to the early ninth century. It contains four Irish glosses on canon law.

The St. Gall Glosses on Priscian belongs to the first half of the ninth century. Some of the marginal notes are in Ogham characters. On page 159, we read, 'ruadri adest.' Ruadri was the King of Wales from A.D. 844 to 878. On page 182 we read, 'finguine,' whom Nigra regards as one of the scribes; on page 194, 'We are from Inis Maddoc, Coirbbre and I ;' on page 114, 'A blessing on the soul of Fergus. Amen. I am very cold (Mar uar dom).' The writer or writers were obviously very human. On page 176, 'Uit mo chrob,' 'Alas ! my hand !'; page 195b, 'Ni aermall roscribad inletraimso,' 'Not very slowly has this page been written ;' page 203, 'Maraith sercc cein mardda aithnne a maellecan,' 'Love remains as long as property remains, O Maellecan ;' page 228, 'Is gann membrumm,' 'Parchment is scarce ;' page 217, 'Membrum naue droch dub ó ni epur na haill,' 'New parchment, bad ink, O I say nothing more.' These St. Gall Glosses make frequent reference to Isidore, Bede, Orosius, Ambrosius, Boetius, Cassianus, Hieronymus, Lactantius, and others.

Other fragments of the ninth century are : Codex Augustini Carolsruhani (Carlsruhe), or Glosses on St. Augustine's *Soliloquia*; Codex Augiensis clxvii., nunc Carolsruhanus. This codex of Beda contains some Irish glosses. The chronological references are : Fol. 4n, 'oengusso,' 'of Aengus' (Bishop ?); fol. 15b, 'aed rex hiberniae, moritur,' 'Aedh, King of Ireland, dies.' This Aedh was Aedh Oirdnide, who, in A.D. 797, exempted the clergy from military service.¹ Fol. 17b, "bás muirchatho maicc maile din húicluain maccunois á imda chiarain x anno," 'death of Muirchath, son of Mael Duin, at Clonmacnoise in the tenth year in (lit. out of) St. Ciaran's bed.' This Muirchad was King of the Cinél Conaill. He was deposed in 821, and retired to the monastery of Clonmacnoise, where he died in 831.² Zimmer thinks that the glosses were written about A.D. 850.

Codex Bedae Vindobonensis, in the Royal Library of

¹ *Chronological Outline of Irish History*, by Rev. E. Hogan, S.J.

² Zimmer, *Glossæ Hiberniæ*, p. xxviii; *Thes. Palæohib.*, vol. ii. p. 283; *Four Masters*, A.D. 821.

Vienna, contains some Irish glosses to Beda's *De Temporum Ratione*.

The Codex Canonum Hibernicorum (Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, Parker, 279) has been assigned to the ninth or tenth century.

¶Codex Nanciacensis, Cod. 59 of the Library of Nancy, contains some Irish glosses on *Computus*.

Codex Parisiacus, MS. Lat. 10,400; Codex Parisiacus MS. Lat. 11,411; Codex Latinus Monacensis, and Codex Juvenci, in the University Library of Cambridge, belong to the ninth century. The last-named codex on page 104 contains the words, 'Araut dinuadu.' 'Araut di' is Welsh of which the Irish is 'Oróit do' and 'Nuadu' (=Welsh *Nudd*) is uninflected. 'Oróit do Núadait,' 'a prayer for Nuadu,' who may have been the scribe.

Some Irish glosses to Junius Philargyrius' scholia on the *Bucolics* are found in three MSS., for which see *Thesaurus Palaeohibernicus*, Vol. ii., p. xvii. The Irish is like that of the *Book of Armagh*. On fol. 6b of Cod. Laurent. Plut. xlv., Cod. 14, are the words: 'De Menio vero nihil reperi ut Adamnanus ait' (gloss to Virgil, Ecl. iii., 90). This Adamnanus was very probably the famous Abbot of Iona.

Codex Augiensis cxxxii., nunc Carolsruhanus, belongs to the ninth century, as do also Codex Leidensis, Lat. 67, in the University Library of Leyden and Codex A.138 of the Ambrosian Library, Milan. These three MSS. are commentaries on the grammarian Priscian.

To this same century are ascribed Codex Ambrosianus, F.60, and Codex Bernensis, 363, preserved in the Stadtbibliothek of Berne, and containing Irish glosses to Servius Maurus, Commentary on Virgil, Horace, Ovid, Beda, and other works.

The *Book of Dimma* is an ancient copy of the Gospels, in the library of Trinity College, Dublin. It is not earlier than the ninth century. The book was written by 'Dimma Macc Nathi' for 'Dianchrilde.'

The *Book of Deir*, preserved in the University Library of Cambridge (I. i. b32), contains the Gospel of St. John, with portions of the other Gospels. It belongs to the ninth

century, and contains a solitary Irish petition for 'a blessing on the soul of the poor wretch who has copied it.'

The Codex Evangeliorum Macdurnani, in the Lambeth Library, South London, is considered by Zimmer to be not earlier than the tenth century. It contains an Irish gloss on the Scourging of Our Lord.

The Codex Psalterii Hamptoniensis, in St. John's College, Cambridge, belongs to the end of the tenth century, according to Zimmer. On fol. 39a, we read, 'beltene inndiu .i. for cétain,' 'Beltane (1st May) to-day, i.e., on a Wednesday.'

The Codex of the Royal Library of Munich, Cod. Lat. 14,846, is assigned to the tenth or eleventh century, and consists of a commentary on Donatus, the younger, and a collection of Latin 'sortes,' with some Irish and British glosses.

The Stowe Missal, in the Royal Irish Academy, Dublin, contains extracts from St. John's Gospel, the Missal, an Irish treatise on the Eucharist, and Irish Spells. In the first two portions are seen traces of the hand of the corrector, Maelcaich. They belong to the tenth century; the other portions to the eleventh century or later.

Mael Isu's Hymn is found in the *Liber Hymnorum*, and may be the composition of Mael Isu, coarb of St. Patrick, who, according to the *Annals of Tigernach*, died in 1086. It is a prayer to the Holy Ghost.

The Life of St. Fintan, who died in A.D. 878, may have been written towards the end of the ninth century.

Tomáṣ Ua Nualláin.

Notes and Queries

THEOLOGY

MIXED MARRIAGES IN IRELAND

A MOST important decision on the vexed question of the future standing of clandestine mixed marriages has been issued by the Sacred Congregation of the Council. As a result of the decision clandestine mixed marriages will be invalid in Ireland after next Easter when the decree *Ne temere* begins to bind.

No question connected with the new marriage legislation was more minutely discussed, and no question gave rise to greater differences of opinion amongst commentators of the decree *Ne temere*. The whole difficulty arose out of the excepting clause, 'Nisi pro aliquo particulari loco aut regione aliter a S. Sede sit statutum.' For us, in Ireland, two points were of supreme importance: (1) Did this excepting clause refer to future concessions which the Holy See had made up its mind to grant; and (2) if it referred to past concessions did Ireland, in 1785 and 1887, receive an exemption within the meaning of the phrase 'nisi . . . aliter a S. Sede sit statutum'?

If the clause referred to such future concessions, or, again, if the Irish decrees of 1785 and 1887 contained no true dispensation, clandestine mixed marriages would be invalid in Ireland after next Easter.¹

The whole question has now been discussed by the Sacred Congregation of the Council; and, though the learned Consultor of the Congregation gave it as his opinion that the excepting clause referred to past concessions, and also that a dispensation was certainly granted to Ireland in 1785, the Congregation decided that no exempting

¹ Cf. I. E. RECORD, November, 1907, pp. 521-525.

decree of any kind whatsoever remains in force except the Constitution *Provida*, which was granted to Germany in 1906¹: 'Comprehendi tantummodo Constitutionem PROVIDA; non autem comprehendi alia quaecumque decreta, facto verbo cum SSMo.; et ad mentem.'²

Hence, in future, clandestine mixed marriages will be invalid in Ireland unless it should be otherwise decreed by the Holy See—a view of the case which the I. E. RECORD, almost alone amongst Catholic reviews and commentaries, consistently maintained from the beginning.

ACCEPTANCE OF A STIPEND FROM A PROTESTANT

REV. DEAR SIR,—Is there not some Church legislation which forbids the taking of a stipend from a Protestant, except it be expressly stated that the Mass will be offered for his conversion?

NEW YORK.

The legislation to which my transatlantic correspondent refers is to be found in the decision of the Sacred Congregation of the Inquisition, which was published on the 19th April, 1837:—

Utrum possit aut debeat celebrari Missa ac percipi eleemosyna pro graeco-schismatio, qui enixe oret atque instet, ut Missa applicetur pro se sive in Ecclesia adstante, sive extra ecclesiam manente?

Resp. Juxta exposita non licere, nisi constet expresse, eleemosynam a schismatico praeberi ad impetrandam conversionem ad veram fidem.

In order to understand the meaning of this decision, it is well to cite another decision of the Inquisition which was published on the 12th July, 1865:—

Utrum liceat sacerdotibus Missam celebrare pro Turcarum aliorumque infidelium intentione et ab iis eleemosynam accipere?

¹ Cf. *Analecta Ecclesiastica*, January, 1908, p. 6.

² For the meaning of the phrase *ad mentem*, see *Maynooth Statutes*, Appendix, p. 397. The phrase, 'facto verbo cum SSMo.', makes the decision valid even if it contains an extension of the original law.

Resp. Affirmative, dummodo non adsit scandalum et nihil in Missa addatur, et quoad intentionem constet, nihil mali aut erroris aut superstitionis in infidelibus eleemosynam offerentibus subesse.

It will be noted that in the first decision, which refers to the Greek schismatics, and through them to all baptized sectaries, it is stated that Mass cannot be offered for, nor a stipend taken from a baptized non-Catholic, unless it be expressly understood that the Mass is to be offered for his conversion to the true faith ; while in the second decision, which refers to non-baptized persons, it is stated that Mass can be offered for their intention and a honorarium received, if no scandal be given, if nothing be added to the Mass, and if there be no note of error or superstition underlying their intention. It would seem, then, that a different rule of ecclesiastical law holds in these cases ; and theologians for the most part so interpret the decisions, though there are not wanting some who think that there is only an apparent difference arising from the different circumstances of the two cases submitted for decision. Thus Ojetti¹ holds that private celebration of Mass at the request of a heretic who is not a *vitandus* is not prohibited except when there is some communication in divine things or some scandal which need not be present on all occasions. The common opinion, however, seems to harmonise better with the decision already quoted, so that even private celebration of Mass requested by a heretic is prohibited by ecclesiastical law except there be an express understanding that it is offered for his conversion.

Since this legislation is penal it must be strictly interpreted. Hence Lehmkuhl holds that, apart from scandal or other extrinsic obstacles, Mass can be offered for a heretic who is not a *vitandus*—who has not been publicly and by name denounced as a heretic—if it be requested by another besides the heretic himself, even though there is no stipulation in regard to the offering of the Mass for his conversion. Since the decision speaks of a Mass offered for the

¹ s.v. 'Sacrificium.'

heretic himself (*ut Missa applicetur pro se*) the same teaching would apply to a Mass which the heretic does not ask for himself—which he asks, for instance, for his deceased wife who was a Catholic.

In general terms, a priest can accede to the request of a heretic and accept a honorarium from him, (a) if the Mass is offered for the latter's conversion, or (b) if the Mass be not offered for the heretic himself, but for some other object for which Mass could be lawfully offered, if the request were not made by a heretic. In all cases scandal, superstition, or communication in divine things with heretics must be avoided.

THE HEROIC ACT

REV. DEAR SIR,—By the Heroic Act we are said to give to the souls in Purgatory *all* the satisfactory value of our good works, etc. At first sight this seems simple enough; but when we come to examine the statement in the light of the sacrament of Penance, a difficulty arises.

1. The *parts specialissima*, or personal fruit of every sacrament, is inalienable. Is sacramental satisfaction a *parts specialissima* of Penance? If so—and I have always understood it to be so—the satisfaction made by the penitent in performing the imposed penance cannot be given to the Holy Souls.

2. According to a probable opinion, the prayer, *Passio Domini* elevates the good works—*quidquid boni feceris et mali sustinueris*—of the penitent to the merit of sacramental satisfaction. Hence, in becoming sacramental satisfaction, they not only operate *ex opere operato*, but become part and parcel of the *parts specialissima*, and hence are inalienable. If this be the case, the Heroic Act is not so heroic as it seems, for by it we give to the poor souls only our indulgences, it being impossible to alienate the satisfactory value of our good works. If this be not the case, then the act is truly heroic. For instead of diminishing our debt of temporal punishment we are allowing it to increase, while we cut ourselves off from the possibility of being helped after death by our *friends still living*, so that we shall have to stay in Purgatory till the last farthing be paid. A clear statement of the theology that centres round the Heroic Act would be welcome to 'Inquirer,' as well no doubt, as to your readers generally.

3. The S. C. Indulg., on February 20, 1907, declared that one may revoke this 'vow,' *quando ipsi libuerit* (*Ephem. Liturg.*: July-Aug., p. 508). Does this declaration alter the position of those who before had made the 'vow,' intending to bind themselves *sub levi* or *sub gravi*? How far may the Heroic Act be regarded as a 'vow,' in the light of the declaration of the Sacred Congregation of Indulgences?

INQUIRER.

I. The Heroic Act of Charity is a spontaneous offering, in favour of the Holy Souls, of all satisfactory works performed during life, and of all suffrages which may be applied for one after death. It is a pious custom, but by no means an essential part of the Heroic Offering, to place these works and suffrages in the hands of the Blessed Virgin to be disposed of as she pleases. It is well to remember that the Heroic Act does not prevent a priest from offering the satisfactory fruits of the Mass as the work of Christ for any person, living or dead, for whom the Mass is applied; nor does it prevent a person from praying for the living; nor does it affect the meritorious efficacy of a person's works. It regards merely the satisfactory efficacy (including indulgences) of one's own works performed during life, and the suffrages of the living that may be offered for a person after death. Moreover, the indulgence attached to a privileged altar must be offered for the deceased person for whom the Mass is offered; nor is it against the essence of the Heroic Act to offer satisfactions, indulgences, and suffrages for a particular Holy Soul.

The Holy See has enriched the Heroic Act with many privileges. By a decree of the Sacred Congregation of Indulgences, dated 30th September, 1852, Pius IX determined these privileges as follows:—

I. Priests who have made the Heroic Act of Charity, enjoy a personal privileged altar every day of the year, so that every time they celebrate Mass for the Holy Souls a plenary indulgence is gained for those Souls in particular for whom the Mass is offered. In accordance with the general rules concerning the privileged altar, a Requiem Mass must be said, if the rubrics permit it.

2. All the faithful, who have made the Heroic Offering, can gain a plenary indulgence applicable only to the Souls in Purgatory (a) every time they receive Holy Communion, and (b) every Monday by attending Mass for the relief of the Holy Souls. To gain these favours it is necessary to visit a church and pray there during some time for the intentions of the Holy Father. I may remark that priests do not gain these plenary indulgences by the celebration of Mass.

3. All indulgences, already granted or to be granted in the future, are applicable to the Holy Souls, if gained by people who have made the Heroic Act. This applies both to the clergy and the laity.

II. Having said so much about the nature of the Heroic Act and the privileges attached to it, I can turn to the questions of my correspondent.

1. The sacramental satisfaction is inalienable according to the better opinion. Just as the satisfactory fruit of Baptism and of Martyrdom is inalienable, so, too, the satisfactory fruit of the sacrament of Penance is inalienable, and, consequently, is not transferred to the Holy Souls by the Heroic Act.¹

2. The opinion referred to in connexion with the prayer *Passio Domini*, is certainly probable, at least on account of the great number of theologians who have supported it. On intrinsic grounds, however, the opposing opinion seems to me to be the more probable, because, if the prayer so elevates all the good works of a penitent, it is difficult to see why there should be question in the prayer of the merits of the Blessed Virgin and of all the saints (*merita beatae Mariae Virginis, et omnium Sanctorum*). The true meaning of the prayer *Passio Domini* seems to be indicated by De Lugo,² who says that it simply calls down a blessing on the penitent so that the Passion of our Lord, the merits of the Blessed Virgin and of all the saints, and all good works performed by the penitent himself, will

¹ Cf. De Lugo, *De Sacra. Poen.*, Disp. xxvii., s. i., n. 11; Suarez, Disp. xxxviii. s. ix., n. 3.

² De Lugo, *De Sacra. Poen.*, Disp. xxv., s. i., n. 15.

in their own way fruitfully lead to the remission of sin, the increase of sanctifying grace, and the reward of eternal life.

Granting for the moment, the truth of the other opinion, no serious difficulty would arise in connexion with the Heroic Act, because all these good works, even though so elevated, would retain their innate power of being satisfactory *ex opere operantis*. The fact of being elevated so as to produce satisfactory fruit *ex opere operato*, does not take away their *ex opere operantis* efficacy. Hence the Holy Souls lose nothing because the satisfaction produced *ex opere operantis* would still go to them, and the penitent though gaining satisfaction *ex opere operato*, would lose the satisfaction which the Holy Souls gain.

3. The Heroic Act cannot be looked on as a vow in the strict sense, nor does it bind under pain of sin at all. It is merely an offering for the Holy Souls of all satisfactory works, indulgences, and suffrages offered for one after death. Though to gain the privileges attached to the offering by the Holy See, there must be a permanent offering in the sense that there must have been an intention to allow the offering stand for ever, the Heroic Act can be revoked at any time both validly and lawfully. As for those who, believing that this was required for the Heroic Act, bound themselves under pain of sin, either venial or mortal, they are not in reality bound at all because they made the offering under substantial error as to its nature. Their prevalent intention was to bind themselves only in so far as the Heroic Act required. They could, of course, bind themselves still further, but their motive showed that they did not really intend to do so.

DISPENSATION FROM DIVINE OFFICE ON SUNDAY

REV. DEAR SIR.—Will you kindly in your next issue of the I. E. RECORD offer a solution of the following difficulty re 'Dispensation from Divine Office on Sunday.' The following is the wording of dispensation in our Faculties: 'Recitandi Rosarium vel alias preces, si ob aliquod legitimum impedimentum

Divinum Officium recitare non valeas.' With regard to the dispensation it is enquired:—

I. (1) Does it merely give this privilege of omitting the Office that is proper to the Sunday, that is, the Matins and Lauds, Little Hours, Vespers and Compline of that particular day? or,

(2) May a person omit the Office that he is *accustomed* to say on the Sunday, when he makes use of the privilege of anticipating, that is, the Little Hours, Vespers, and Compline of the feast for the Sunday and the Matins and Lauds of the feast for Monday?

In this second alternative, a priest who, through stress of work, avails himself of the privilege of saying the Rosary rather than the Office on the Sunday, would *only* say the Matins and Lauds of the Sunday Office (by anticipation on Saturday), and then, omitting altogether the Little Hours, Vespers and Compline of the Office proper to the Sunday, and also the Matins and Lauds proper to the Office for Monday, begin, therefore, his Monday Office absolutely from the Little Hours.

II. Another question. Do the words *recitandi Rosarium* require *fifteen* decades of the Rosary or only *five*?

An answer to these questions in dispute would oblige many priests, and especially—Yours sincerely,

J. P.

I. The more reasonable view seems to be that the dispensation commutation, to which 'J. P.' refers, does not extend to the Matins and Lauds of the following day, even though the priest is accustomed to anticipate. It is stated in the faculties that the dispensation is granted when there is a legitimate impediment which is an obstacle to the recitation of the Office; but it would be outside the ordinary usage of language to speak of a legitimate impediment in connexion with a part of the Office in regard to which an obligation does not yet urge and does not encounter any impediment when it does urge. This is the opinion which Father Lehmkuhl holds in a similar case.¹

II. In connexion with the second question, an authoritative decision has already been given for the Formula I.

¹ *Casus Conscientiae*, ii., n. 805, 3.

The Sacred Congregation of the Inquisition gave the following reply, dated 2nd July, 1884:—

VIII. Quid intelligitur per 'Rosarium' in n. 26, Formulae I? An Rosarium quindecim, an vero etiam quinque decadum, et an aliae preces, de quibus in eodem numero, quantitate moraliter aequivalere debeat Rosario?

R. Ad VIII. Intelligi integrum Rosarium, sed relinqu prudenti arbitrio et conscientiae Episcopi, attentis peculiaribus personarum circumstantiis, commutationem in tertiam partem, aut in preces tertiae parti respondentes.¹

Hence, unless the Bishop, in the peculiar circumstances mentioned in the decision, commutes the Office into a Rosary of five decades, the Rosary must be understood as the full Rosary of fifteen decades.

J. M. HARTY.

NOTE.—A correspondent asks if it is necessary to give name and address when sending questions for publication in the I. E. RECORD. Correspondents are expected to send their names and addresses in proof of *bona fides*, and in order to render communication possible if, for any reason, the questions are thought unsuitable for publication.

J. F. H.

CANON LAW

WHEN CLERICS BEGIN TO BE ENTITLED TO THE TEMPORALITIES OF THEIR ECCLESIASTICAL OFFICES

REV. DEAR SIR,—Will you oblige by telling whether a Parish Priest in this country has a claim to the income of his office from the date of his appointment, that is, before taking possession of his parish?

D.D.

Those who are acquainted with the regulations made by the Church with regard to the conferring of ecclesi-

¹ Cf. *Commentarium in Facultates Apostolicas*, Putzer, C.SS.R. Appendix, ii.

astical benefices or offices, know perfectly well that there are two different kinds of canonical institution; one is termed verbal or collative, the other real or corporal. Verbal institution is the act of appointment to an office made by the competent superior by which he confers the necessary title for the acquisition and tenure of the same office; and if the superior is at liberty to appoint any person he chooses the canonical institution is called free, as distinct from the necessary one which takes place when the superior cannot refuse without any plausible reason to appoint the person canonically elected or presented to him by patrons or ecclesiastical or civil bodies enjoying the privilege of presentation to ecclesiastical offices. Real or corporal institution, on the other hand, is the introduction into actual possession of a parish of benefice. Now, some are under the impression that in order to enjoy and use all the rights of an office the first institution, that is, the act of appointment, is exclusively necessary, the real institution being accidental to the benefice and therefore causing, in case of omission, no legal obstacle to the full enjoyment of all rights connected with the office, especially in places where a contrary custom has already abolished the necessity of actual possession. Consequently, they are disposed to conclude that, as in an ecclesiastical benefice the act of appointment is all that is of necessity for its acquisition, the incumbent may claim the temporalities of his benefice from the moment of his appointment independently of the fact when or whether any actual possession ever took place.

However, this is a mistaken impression having no solid foundation in fact and law, and it owes its origin both to a false conception of the effects of verbal institution and to the confusion usually made between actual possession and its external solemnity. It is argued, in fact, that to the complete acquisition of an ecclesiastical benefice it is necessary and sufficient to have in it not only *sui ad rem* but also *sui in re*, and it is commonly admitted that the act of appointment, unlike a canonical election or a pre-

sentation made by patrons, produces both the effects already mentioned. ' Verbali (institutione),' says D'Annibale,¹ ' datur titulus, titulo ius ad rem et cum fuerit acceptata ius in re.' But if it is true that verbal institution not only gives claim to an office, but actually confers it, it is equally true that according to the present discipline of the Church it is not allowed to use the rights acquired with the benefice without actual possession. Only after both verbal and corporal institution ecclesiastical offices are completely and adequately conferred and acquired: ' Ad beneficium ecclesiasticum *adequate* constituendum,' writes Sanguinetti,² ' praeter collationem canonicam *requiritur* eiusdem possessio.' No doubt the necessity of corporal institution in ecclesiastical offices was first introduced by custom,³ but such a general, long-established and reasonable practice has now become a common law, and together with its special and important effects, has been sanctioned by ecclesiastical jurisprudence. De Angelis says⁴: ' Unumquemque de beneficio aut Ecclesia quomodocumque provisum *Canones iusserunt* ut ad beneficium eiusdem possessionem manuduceretur ab auctoritate ecclesiastica et haec manuductio est missio in possessionem.' On the other hand it is not an argument against the necessity of taking possession of benefices in order to make use of their privileges and rights, to quote the example, often adduced, of several countries where investiture or actual possession was never practised, and where ecclesiastics begin to administer their benefices or offices before, and independently of, any formality of corporal institution.

A distinction must be made between possession and its external ceremony. The first is sanctioned by ecclesiastical legislation, the second is only practised by custom, there being no general form of investiture established by law;

¹ D'Annibale, iii., n. 41.

² Sanguinetti, *Jur. Eccl. Inst.*, p. 389.

³ D'Annibale says: ' Possessio est aliquid facti, nihilominus ex receptis moribus ante coeptam beneficii possessionem beneficiarius nec iuribus suis uti permittitur, nec onera agnoscere cogitur.'

⁴ De Angelis, iii., vii., 5; C. 7 *De Instit.* (x., vii.); C. 7 *De off. Archidisc.* (x., i.); and Reiff, iii., vii., 52, writes: ' SS. *Canones investituram seu institutionem corporalem in beneficiis indistincte requirunt.'*

the former is necessary for the actual use of the rights and privileges attached to ecclesiastical offices, the latter may be safely omitted where it was never introduced or was discontinued by contrary custom, a custom which may be perfectly lawful and reasonable on account of the tacit consent of the ecclesiastical superiors and on account of special circumstances adverse to ecclesiastical discipline in some countries where it has been found impossible or difficult to observe external formalities and ceremonies in connexion with some Church functions and also on the occasion of taking possession of benefices. Besides, if the Church law forbids ecclesiastics to take possession of their offices on their own authority without any formal induction made by the superior or any other priest with the superior's delegation, the same law allows clerics to dispense with formalities of actual institution whenever the superior gives them permission to take possession of their offices privately by simply beginning to exercise their rights and fulfil their obligations.¹ Hence Smith tells us that as a rule no installation takes place in the parishes of the United States, that clergymen appointed to parishes take charge of them without any ceremony of induction, and that such a practice was introduced with the tacit consent of the Bishops.² Here he evidently makes distinction between possession and its ceremony, and states that while rectors always take possession of their parishes or missions after having duly been appointed by the competent superior, they do so without formalities of induction, which are the only part of the canonical institution for parishes fallen into desuetude. Here in Ireland also installation to parishes has never been practised, but still parish priests take possession of their parishes

¹ 'Nam quod accedente consensu seu licentia legitimi superioris, valentis tradere possessionem vacuam beneficii, eam capere nullo alio introducente possim fatentur Doctores, eo quod iam interveniat auctoritas superioris.' Reiff, iii., 7, n. 53.

² 'In hisce statibus foederatis rectores missionum sive sint inamovibiles sive non generatim absque ulla institutione reali possessionem sibi arripiunt actualem missionum seu paroeciarum, quas legitime adepti sunt. Haec praxis ex tacito consensu Episcoporum originem duxit.'—Smith, *Comp. Jur. Can.*, n. 355; *Elem. of Eccl. Law*, n. 366.

when they begin to exercise their pastoral office, and possession is an act distinct from that of appointment as the query of our correspondent clearly points out.

We remark in passing that the ceremonies of induction to benefices, wherever they are in use, are different according to different countries and customs. As a rule, parish priests take possession of parishes by entering the parochial church accompanied by the bishop or his delegate, by ringing the bell, kissing the altar, sitting in the pulpit and performing similar acts which only mean the taking possession of the spiritual office, but which bring with them also the possession of temporalities attached to the benefice. In countries where benefices are endowed by the State possession of the fruits of the benefice is acquired by the reception of the document called *Exequatur*.

If possession, therefore, always take place after the appointment to benefices, and if possession produces special effects, necessary to the adequate acquisition of ecclesiastical benefices, we shall briefly see now what these effects are. Two of the effects of actual institution are sanctioned in the 35th and 36th Rules of the Apostolic Chancery, *De annali et triennali possessione*, effects exhaustively explained by Riganti in his masterly commentary on the aforesaid Rules. The 35th Rule enacts that the incumbent of a benefice after a year from his investiture acquires the presumption of the law in favour of the validity of his appointment; thus, if the validity of his title is contested, the duty of proof rests with the plaintiff while the defendant is entitled to remain in his position until the question will be settled *in pectiorio*.

The rule of triennial possession establishes that after three years from the date of the installation the incumbent of a benefice prescribes it; but, as rightly remarks Laurenius, followed by D'Annibale and Wernz, against Pihring, Riganti and others, the effect of that prescription cannot be extended so far as to say that it makes valid a title which was originally void; so that, if not a private individual, at least superiors may *ex officio* institute inquiries as to the validity of appointments to benefices, and, if finding fault

with them, take the opportune measures which may be demanded by different cases. The last but principal consequence of a corporal institution is that, after having taken possession and not before, the holder of a benefice is entitled to the temporalities connected with its spiritual office, as it is from that time he begins to exercise his rights and fulfil his obligations. This rule is founded on equity and common sense, for clergymen receive the emoluments of their benefices on account of the fulfilment of their duties—*Beneficium propter officium*—hence it is only natural and reasonable that a cleric appointed to an ecclesiastical benefice cannot claim its fruits before beginning to discharge the duties of the spiritual office or at least before beginning to be responsible for its administration.

This is the unanimous teaching of canonists¹ who explicitly say that verbal institution alone confers no right to the emoluments of ecclesiastical benefices, and that such a right is an exclusive effect of corporal institution. Wernz, for instance, writes: ‘Effectus institutionis corporalis est ut non solum acquiratur possessio iurum spiritualium sed etiam temporalium officii ecclesiastici.’ Hence he rightly concludes: *Quare clericus provisus a die captae possessionis non antea, fructus novi officii sibi concessi facit suos.*’

ASSISTING AT RACES

REV. DEAR SIR,—I heard some time ago that the *locus vicinus* from which clerics in Ireland will be henceforth forbidden by the new Maynooth Synod Decrees to witness races is computed at a distance between twenty and thirty yards, and that such an opinion originated from Maynooth. Is that a safe opinion, I wonder? Will you kindly favour me with your interpretation of that expression.

EGUES.

The words of the Maynooth Synod Decree referred to run as follows: ‘A publicis equorum cursibus, et ab iis

¹ Cf. Wernz, ii., p. 539 sqq.; Schmalz., lib. iii., tit 7, n. 56; Reiff l.c.; Icard, ii., p. 562; D'Annibale l.c.; Devoti, lib. ii., tit 14, n. 36; De Angelis l.c.; Aichner, p. 292; Santi, iii., 7, n. 29, etc.

e loco quovis vicino spectandis . . . (clericis) prorsus abstineant.' It is enacted in this law that clerics are forbidden not merely to assist at races, but also to look at them from any neighbouring place. Now the question arises: What is that neighbouring place supposed to be, and what the distance covered by the word 'vicinity' in the case?

In the first place we are not aware that the opinion mentioned by our correspondent as to the number of yards designating the distance in question was ever originated or has ever found patronage in Maynooth; and, apparently, there is nobody here who is anxious to be credited with the making of such a pronouncement. As to us we fail to perceive any sufficient and reliable grounds to warrant its reasonableness and safety in practice; and taking into account the circumstances of the case and the aim of the legislators in enacting this prohibitive law we believe that the number of yards mentioned is wholly insufficient, and that this opinion is quite untenable, as it would frustrate the scope of the law and make it perfectly useless in practice. On the other hand, we are not going to indicate any definite distance in order to give an idea of the meaning of a neighbouring site when speaking of races. It would be a vain effort in a matter which largely depends on moral estimation and common sense as well as on different local and customary facts and circumstances; and if it is comparatively easy to determine even approximately a distance which would constitute vicinity to a well circumscribed and definite place, it is not an equally easy task to do the same for a place whose limits are vague and uncertain.

Spectators may be truly said to assist at races even though they are situated at different distances from the locality where the sport takes place, and to define when they cease to be in the locality and begin to stay in its neighbourhood or to draw a line of demarcation between the place and its vicinity is an arduous if not impossible enterprise. It is true that moralists in an apparently similar case maintain the distance to be calculated at thirty or forty yards which constitutes vicinity, and from

which people separated from the body of the faithful hearing Mass in a church may assist at it and fulfil the ecclesiastical precept in this respect ; but besides the fact that they do not exactly define the distance required for that purpose, it must be remembered that, by putting forward such a doctrine, they endeavour to establish, rather than the vicinity, the place itself where people may be considered to form physically or morally one body ; and, moreover, it is also comparatively easy to propound a definite distance for a definite place like a church in order to convey the idea of its vicinity ; to say nothing of the well-known fact that neighbourhood is differently estimated, even for well defined localities, according to different matters and circumstances.

For instance, an approximate place to a parish, where a parish priest may be allowed to reside if failing to secure a decent and suitable residence within the bounds of his parish, is calculated to be at a distance of about a mile from the extreme limits of the parish. The vicinity to a church which would not excuse the faithful to go to Mass ranges from one to three miles according to more or less difficulty of transit and means of locomotion. To give valid absolution to a distant person the vicinity in which he must find himself in order to be morally present is computed at a distance from which the confessor's voice, if raised, could be heard by the penitent, and some establish it at twenty yards or more. These few illustrations tend to show that vicinity in our case does not bear comparison with that usually assigned in any other similar or different matters, as it is always differently computed according to various subjects and circumstances.

However, if we do not even dare mention any definite distance in particular which would be taken as representing a neighbouring site to the locality where races take place, we believe it, at the same time, to be a safe and practical rule to recognize as approximate to races any place or vantage point from which the events can be seen with satisfaction and followed with interest ; for the places where clerics used to go when desirous of witnessing races, were of

that description; and they are now forbidden to frequent those places by being prohibited to see races from the vicinity. In other words, neighbourhood under the circumstances is the distance between the centre of attraction and all those places which used hitherto to be occupied by clergymen when assisting at races, or which clerics would care to go to if inclined to see races. Vague and uncertain as this rule may appear in theory, in practice it is easily applied and followed. We remember hearing of a certain clergyman with sporting proclivities and fond of haunting hunting districts and running after races, who, in order to avoid falling into the meshes of the prohibitive law, used to go to and witness these sports keeping at what he facetiously called *moral distance*; a distance which he easily recognized by experience and practice, but which he could not determine, with accuracy and precision, for all places and circumstances. Now, it is such a moral distance, easily recognized in practice, which under the new decrees becomes not immoral exactly, but unlawful for ecclesiastics to go to for the purpose of seeing races; a distance which constitutes the vicinity contemplated in the statute under notice.

That such a distance or the vicinity to the racing grounds corresponds to the places already described, is proved by the intention of the legislators in framing their law. This new prohibition was not made in order to forbid ecclesiastics to go to races and mingle with the body of the spectators; clergymen never did so as it was already prohibited by the old decrees; but this new addition was made to the law with a view to preventing priests from evading the existing prohibitive law by going if not exactly to the racing grounds, to some place near by, whence they could equally see the sport and take an interest in it. By the prohibition, therefore, of going to the vicinity, clerics are prohibited to go to and stay at that distance from the races where they used to go and stay, namely, to all those vantage points which they frequented and occupied in order to witness and enjoy the spectacle.

It might be objected, we know, that if the word

'vicinity' be understood in the manner already expounded the prohibition to assist at races from it, in practice, amounts to a total prohibition of seeing them from any locality and at any distance, contrary to the wording of the decree. Who cares, in fact, to go and see races at such a distance where he can scarcely catch a satisfactory glimpse of and take interest in the sport? Clerics, if desirous to assist at races, used hitherto to occupy vantage points where they could obtain a good view of the events and enjoy them; if that will henceforth be prohibited, they will altogether abstain from going. Quite so, and we honestly believe that that was exactly the ultimate aim of the legislators; not only because races are a sort of spectacular display frequently connected with serious accidents and temptations of various kinds, especially for those who are prone to evince more than ordinary interest in this kind of sport, but also because it seems somewhat against the dignity of the ecclesiastical state to go to the vicinity of races, to show a lively interest in the proceedings and a keen desire of being as near as possible to the centre of attraction, and still to be obliged to stand aloof keeping at a measurable distance in order to avoid infringing the ecclesiastical law: and we believe that it is not a matter of edification to lay people to see ecclesiastics in the awkward predicament of those who want to combine at once observance and evasion of the law, endeavouring both to obey it and to frustrate its spirit.

It goes without saying, however, that it is forbidden to assist at races even from the neighbouring places only in the case that ecclesiastics go there *ex condicto* as they say; that is for the sole purpose of witnessing races. Hence, if they have to go or remain at a short distance from the races, exclusively or principally for some other reasons, say, because they have there their usual habitation, or because, while travelling, they have to pass by the locality where races take place, it is quite clear that they are not prevented from doing so, and a contrary course would evidently be against the object of the law and foreign to the intention of the legislators.

**TIME AT WHICH IT IS PERMITTED TO BEGIN THE READING
OF THE OFFICE FOR THE FOLLOWING DAY**

REV. DEAR SIR.—Will you kindly say whether it is lawful, even apart from any custom, to begin the reading of Matins and Lauds for the following day at two o'clock in the afternoon?

SACERDOS.

To our knowledge there is no written law laying down the rule that those who are bound to read the Office are allowed to begin the private recitation of Matins and Lauds for the next day two hours after mid-day. The only decree we are aware of, establishing the hour for the beginning of the Office for the following day, is a response of the Congregation of Rites given on the 16th of March, 1876; but the hour designated in that decree far from being 2 o'clock after mid-day or any other fixed time, is described to be the moment when the sun is in the middle of its course between noon and sunset; and as that time varies according to different seasons, so does the hour for beginning the reading of the office for the following day. Here are the words of the decree: 'Privatam recitationem matutini cum laudibus diei subsequentis incipi posse quando sol medium cursum tenet inter meridiem et occasum.'

Some time after the issue of that decree it was doubted whether it was to be so strictly interpreted as to imply a peremptory precept, so that those who begin the reading of the Office for the following day previous to that time would not fulfil their obligation, and would be bound to read it anew in due time. Hence, a question in that sense was put to the Congregation of Rites,¹ but the Congregation declined to solve the question, and simply answered: *Consulantur probati auctores.* Now it is well known that many both old and modern competent authorities maintain that the Decree of 1876 does not contain a precept, but

¹ The question is the following: 'An praedicta responsio ita intelligenda sit, ut ille non satisfaceret obligationi suae qui matutinum cum laudibus vesperie diei praecedentis recitasset priusquam sol medium cursum teneret inter meridiem et occasum. Resp.: Consulantur probati auctores.'—S.R.C., 13 Jul., 1883.

only a permission to begin the private recitation of the Office for the following day at the hour thereby assigned, and that the opinion holding it to be lawful to begin the reading of Matins and Lauds for the next day at 2 p.m. is solidly probable and therefore a safe opinion to be followed in practice. Accordingly, that opinion has been taught and followed, *tuta conscientia*, relying on the teaching of approved authors with the permission of the Congregation.

However, a few years ago after the publication of the new collection of decrees of the Congregation of Rites, this question was raised once more. It was noticed that the Decree of 1883 was expunged from the new collection, and it was feared that the permission to follow the opinion of approved authors in this question had been withdrawn. Hence on the 12th of May, 1905, it was asked of the same Congregation whether the private reading of the Office for the following day might be begun at 2 p.m. The answer was exactly the same as that given on the previous occasion, i.e., *Consulantur probati auctores*.¹ It is clear, therefore, that the permission of the Congregation to follow the opinion of approved authors in this question still holds good, and that their opinion may be safely continued in practice.

This conclusion is true, even apart from any custom in this direction; so that, if in addition to the teaching of competent authorities, there is, in some countries like Ireland, a custom or special privilege of beginning to read the Office for the following day at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, it seems to be quite certain for all practical purposes that such a practice is perfectly safe and lawful.²

S. LUZIO.

¹ 'Utrum in privata recitatione matutinum pro insequenti die incipi possit hora secunda pomeridiana, aut standum sit tabellae directorii diocesani omni tempore. Resp. Consulantur probati auctores.'—S.R.C., 12 Maii, 1905.

² In order to see the grounds on which this opinion is based a few of the many authors who may be consulted are: Salmat, tr. xvi., c. 3, n. 15; Gury-Ballerini, i., n. 1015; Frassinetti, ii., 538; Gennari, i., 763; Buccerioni, *Theol. Mor.*, ii., 59; Genicot, ii.; D'Annibale, iii., 150 not. 32; Ferreres, ii., 65; Sabetti, 576; Ojetti, ii., p. 28, etc.

LITURGY

DISTRIBUTION OF COMMUNION AT PROFESSIONS DURING MASS

REV. DEAR SIR.—In the Ceremonial drawn up and printed for use in the Presentation Sisterhood at Receptions and Professions, there is a direction as to the time of giving Holy Communion to the newly professed, which appears to be altogether at variance with Ritual. The celebrant is directed to consecrate a small Host or Hosts, as required, but is cautioned that the Profession is not to be made till after the *Post-Communion Prayer*, which is followed by the newly professed receiving Holy Communion. This necessitates keeping the small consecrated Host on the Corporal while the priest goes to and fro for the ablution and subsequent prayers; with the same reverences, I should say, as when Exposition is to follow. And after communicating the newly professed he must purify the paten and his fingers. If this is not anti-Ritual, it is certainly very awkward. In the *Pontificale*, as you will see, at the 'Consecration of Virgins' Communion is to be given immediately after the priest has consumed the chalice, and I fear some mistake must have been made when the Ceremonial I speak of was drawn up. I do not know by whom, as there is no approval to copies I have seen. What should be done?—Very truly,

PRESENTATION.

The writer does not happen to have before him a copy of the Ceremonial to which his esteemed correspondent refers, but there can be no doubt that the directions as described are quite out of joint with the modern Rubrical prescriptions. Possibly the compiler did his work some years ago, and in an age when the rules to be followed on the occasion of solemn Professions and Renewals of Vows were not so explicit and defined as they are at present. But, indeed, it would seem strange and unusual, for the most primitive of times, to adopt such a procedure as that mentioned, the unrubrical character of which is so obvious and patent. Our correspondent will be pleased to know that his surmises are quite correct, and that there could be no approval of such an awkward proceeding. There is a General Decree of the Congregation of Rites bearing on this matter, issued in August, 1894, and laying

down minutely the method to be observed on the occasion of Professions and the Renewals of Vows during Mass in all religious communities and congregations. Here are its words and they will be found to be quite clear and explicit on the point raised in the query :—

Celebrans profitentium vota excepturus, sumpto SSMo. Eucharistiae Sacramento, et verbis quae ante fidelium Communionem dici solent, Sacram Hostiam manu tenens, ad profitentes sese convertet: hi vero singuli, alta voce, professionem suam legent, ac postquam quisque legerit statim SSMum. Eucharistiae Sacramentum sumet. In renovatione autem votorum Celebrans ad Altare conversus expectet, donec renovantes votorum formulam protulerint: qui, nisi pauci sint, omnes simul uno praeeunte formulam renovationis recitabunt, ac postea ex ordine SSMum. Corpus Domini accipient. Haec tamen methodus, cum recepta fuerit, in respectivis Congregationum Constitutionibus minime apponenda est. Non obstantibus quibuscumque particularibus Decretis in contrarium facientibus quae prorsus revocata et abrogata censeantur.

This Decree, it will be observed, assumes that Communion is to be administered to the professed at the usual time, and is not, consequently, to be deferred till after the *Post-Communion* prayer. It will be noticed, also, that there is a difference in the practice to be followed at the Profession and at the Renewal of Vows. In the former case the celebrant or officiant stands turned towards the newly professed holding the Sacred Host in his hands and gives Communion to each one on her profession being read singly, while in the latter case the celebrant, having said the prayers that usually precede the giving of Communion, turns towards the altar and proceeds to give Communion only when all the religious have recited the formula. This may be done singly if there are only a few, or collectively if there are many.

A subsequent Decree of the Congregation of Rites, dated 5th June, 1896, declares that the foregoing regulation is binding on all religious of both sexes, who take, or renew, their vows during the celebration of Mass.

USE OF STOLE IN GIVING STATIONS OF THE CROSS

REV. DEAR SIR.—The exercise of the Stations of the Cross will be performed often during the Lent. I am at a loss to know whether I should wear a stole over the surplice whilst engaged in conducting them, and if so, what colour ought the stole be? There is a variety of practice in the matter—some priests using the stole, and some not, so an answer as to the correct usage to be adopted might go far to secure uniformity.

NEO-SACERDOS.

The function referred to is, of course, extra-liturgical, and it will not, therefore, be strange if there are no explicit directions found in the Rubrics about the vestments to be worn during its exercise. An answer, therefore, to the proposed query must be based on analogy, and on the general consensus of opinion among rubricists. Now both these sources favour the use of the stole. For is there not a parallelism between the Stations of the Cross and preaching or processions, and is it not a pretty general rule that the stole follows the surplice which few deny should be worn? Of the rubricists De Amicis—the only one that I have seen who treats of the matter—says the stole should be worn.¹ The practical conclusion seems to be, therefore, that there is no obligation of wearing the stole during the exercise of the Stations of the Cross, but that it is the more proper and becoming thing to employ it, especially if there is any desire to add a little solemnity to the performance of them. As to the colour, if the stole is used it should be *violet* as a rule, except on Good Friday when it ought to be *black* to accord with the spirit of the Church on this day. Should the officiant give a blessing with a relic of the true cross on this day after the Stations, he ought to wear, over the black stole, a cope and humeral veil of violet colour.² Outside Good Friday these latter should be of red colour, or they may be dispensed with and the blessing given in surplice and violet stole.

¹ *Ceremoniale Complete*, vol. i., p. vi., art. 2.

² Decr. S.R.C., 16th January, 1907.

**REGULARS AND CELEBRATION OF ANNIVERSARIES OF
CATHEDRAL CHURCHES**

REV. DEAR SIR,—With reference to the general rule for religious who have a *Kalendarium proprium*, mentioned in your interesting and valuable statement under the heading 'Feast of St. Brigid and Rubrics,' in the I. E. RECORD of May last, allow me to ask the favour of your opinion on the following:—

From some Decrees, June 22, 1895, and July 10, 1896, as I see them referred to, religious with a *Kalendarium proprium*, when keeping the anniversary of the *dedicace* of their own churches, are not obliged to observe the anniversary of the *dedicace* of the churches of the country in which they live. This, I understand, holds good irrespective of time, that is to say, whether the two anniversaries fall on the same day or not. Will you be kind enough to say:—

(1) Whether the same disposition applies to the anniversary of the *dedicace* of the cathedral church, when this anniversary is not observed in a special manner by the secular clergy of the diocese, as is the case in Ireland where the anniversaries of the various local churches with no exception are commemorated *in globo* by one common feast?

(2) Supposing that the above disposition of the general law does not apply, what is the custom and law in Ireland? Did the Irish Bishops, when establishing the anniversary of the *dedicace* of the churches of Ireland, on account of the special circumstances of the country, intend to suppress absolutely and for all, both the secular and regular clergy, the special anniversary of the *dedicace* of the local churches including the cathedral church, thereby leaving no obligation for the above members of Religious Orders and Congregations, when living in the episcopal town or its suburbs, to observe in a special manner the anniversary of the *dedicace* of the cathedral church?

Thanking you in advance,—Yours,

XXX.

The substance of the two decrees mentioned by our learned correspondent is thus given in the index to the collection of authentic decrees of the Congregations of Rites published in the year 1901: 'Anniversarium *Dedicationis omnium Ecclesiarum* tantummodi sui Ordinis Regulares, qui *Calendarium proprium* habent, celebare debent die statuta; et Anniversarium *Dedicationis Cathedralis*, si degunt in Civitate Episcopali, sub ritu duplicis II classis sine octava: non vero *Dedicationem omnium Ecclesiarum Regni*.'

Regulars, therefore, who have a Calendar of their own, and who in accordance with it celebrate the anniversary of the dedication of the churches of their Order on a particular day, are not bound to take any notice of the dedication of the churches of the country with the exception of the cathedral, whose dedication those only who live in the episcopal city are to celebrate as a double of the second class without an octave. This manifestly is on the supposition that the feast of the dedication of the cathedral is held on a different day from that on which is celebrated the general dedicatory feast of the other churches. So much is clear from the question to which the first of the above mentioned Decrees is an answer. Suppose that the general dedicatory feast embraces the cathedral as well as the other churches, then its anniversary must be held on the *common or fixed* day by seculars and regulars alike, and no mention of it should be made on any other day, for this arrangement simply means that the celebration with all its concomitant obligations is transferred from the *dies propria* to a *dies fixa*. With regard to Ireland, the writer has not been able to lay hold of the original indult or concession by which the dedication of *all* the churches of the country is celebrated on the same date, but he has no doubt that the intention and purpose of this arrangement was to extinguish the obligation for seculars and regulars of celebrating the consecration of any church in the country outside this definite day.

Furthermore, it may be questioned whether, when by a special act of the Holy See a definite day is set apart for celebrating the dedication of *all* the churches of the country, it is still lawful to hold the dedication feast of any particular church on its own proper day, without, at all events, an apostolic indult derogating from the general disposition. If the feast of the dedication of *all* the churches of Ireland held on the second Sunday in October includes—as it seems to be the case—the churches of seculars and regulars alike, would it still be lawful for regulars to hold the dedications of their own churches on another day, or for any diocese to celebrate the consecration of its cathedral

on its special day, and this without distinct apostolic licence derogating from the original regulation?

In the beginning of the last century, with a view to reducing the number of festivals, an indult was granted to France authorizing the celebration of the dedication of all the churches of the country on the Sunday after the Octave of the Feast of All Souls. Now it has been authentically declared that this indult applied to regulars as well as seculars, and, moreover, when the General of the Society of the Most Holy Sacrament applied to the Holy See for permission to hold the anniversary of the churches of the Order on their proper days his petition was refused by the Congregation of Rites.¹

Again in 1893² the Bishop of Ardagh wrote to the Propaganda for faculties to fix a day for the celebration of the anniversary of the dedication of his cathedral, and the answer was that it was expedient that he should celebrate the dedication on the second Sunday in October. From all this the presumption seems to be that when the Holy See assigns a day for celebrating the general anniversary of the dedication of the churches of a country, the idea is to include *all* churches without exception, and to restrict all dedicatory celebrations to this day, so that outside it none can take place without very special authorization.

That this disposition of affairs was made in regard to Ireland, the writer is inclined to believe in the absence of clear proof to the contrary. Before bringing these remarks to a close, the attention of readers of the I. E. RECORD might be profitably directed to some of the decisions of the Congregation of Rites regarding the dedication of churches and their anniversaries.

1°. The feast of the dedication of a church is to be regarded as a feast in honour of our Divine Lord.³

2°. The anniversary is to be celebrated as a rule on the day on which the church was consecrated, or on the day

¹ Decr., 31st August, 1867, n. 3157, nov. col.; also 1 Ap., 1905.

² Cf. I. E. RECORD, October, 1893.

³ Decr. 3881.

fixed by the consecrating prelate when there is reason to change from the *dies propria*.¹

3°. Properly speaking it is only consecrated churches whose anniversary feasts are entitled to recognition, but when the anniversaries of the dedication of all the churches of a country, or diocese, or institution, are celebrated *in globo* on the same day, then churches that have been merely blessed solemnly share in the privilege of celebration but only with the rank of *secondary feasts*.²

4°. Ordinarily the anniversary of the dedication of the cathedral is to be celebrated as a double of the first class and with an octave by the local clergy, but without an octave by the other secular clergy of the diocese, and as a double of the second class without an octave by the regulars who live in the episcopal city and suburbs.³

PASCAL CANDLE AND TRANSFERRED SOLEMNITY OF THE ASCENSION

REV. DEAR SIR.—Will you kindly give us the opinion of the I. E. RECORD on the following question, to which we have been unable to find a solution in our authors on the Rubrics:—

The Ascension of our Lord happening in this country not to be a feast of obligation, its solemnity, i.e., High Mass and Second Vespers, is transferred, according to the rule, to the following Sunday. We are at a loss to know whether in this case the Pascal candle is to be lighted at the Mass of the Feast itself, which is only an ordinary Low Mass, and is to be put out after the Gospel, or whether it ought to be lighted at the Solemn Mass of the Sunday following, and extinguished after the Gospel. Some say it ought to be lighted on Ascension Day, because the light, representing our Lord's stay on earth after His resurrection, should disappear on the fortieth day. Others contend that as the Mass of the Feast is transferred, so also ought each part of the solemnity of the Mass be transferred. Therefore, three questions are raised:—

- (1) Ought the Pascal candle be used on the day itself?
- (2) Ought the Pascal candle be used on the following Sunday *in casu*?
- (3) Ought it be used on both occasions?

Hoping to be excused for thus encroaching on your precious

¹ Decr. 2719, 3881.

² Decr. 3863.

³ Decr. 3863.

time, and thanking you in anticipation of your kind attention to the questions mentioned,—I am, Dear Rev. Father,

A SUBSCRIBER.

In the circumstances described by our esteemed correspondent the observance of the Feast of the Ascension of our Lord is transferred to the following Sunday—not as regards the Office and Mass which are to be celebrated on the original day, but as regards what is called the *extrinsic solemnity*. That is to say, the obligation of *feriation*, viz., of abstaining from servile works and of hearing Mass, which is attached to Festivals *de precepto*, is extinguished as far as the people are concerned on the Feast day itself and transferred to the Sunday, so that the double obligation (of Sunday and Holiday) can be fulfilled *unico actu* on this day, on which is permitted the celebration *modo votivo* of the Solemn Mass and, also, of the Second Vespers of the Feast. Now this arrangement is made altogether in favour of the people so that the intention of the Church is not to derogate in any way from the due performance by the clergy (wherever this is feasible) of the ceremonies of the Office for the day. At this ceremonial the Pascal candle should, of course, be lighted and extinguished as usual after the Gospel. This holds even for minor churches.¹ If, however, as seems to be the case contemplated in the query, there can be no ceremony on the Ascension owing to scarcity of clergy or any other legitimate cause, the lighting of the candle must be dispensed with. But, then, the candle is not to be lighted on the Sunday, for the directions of the Rubrics, and all the instructions of the Congregation of Rites emphasize the fact that after the Ascension the Pascal candle is not to be lighted except at the blessing of the Baptismal Font on the eve of Pentecost. The symbolical significance of the Pascal candle would point to the same conclusion. It has a two-fold symbolism according to Liturgists. It recalls the pillar of fire which guided the Israelites during the forty years' wandering in the desert, while it also represents the risen Saviour and

¹ See I. E. RECORD, June, 1907, p. 633.

the illumination of the world by His teaching during the forty days of the risen life on earth.¹ Hence it is extinguished after the Gospel on Ascension Thursday immediately that the words *Assumptus est in coelum* have been read, and with this circumstance its symbolic character, so far as it regards our Divine Lord, ends.

Of the three questions proposed, therefore, the answer to the second and third is negative, while as regards the first, if there is any ceremony on Ascension Thursday, celebrated with a certain degree of solemnity by the clergy, the Pascal candle should be lighted at the Mass, whether it is a Solemn or Low, but if the Mass is private then the candle is not to be lighted, and in any circumstances its lighting after Ascension Thursday does not seem to be contemplated, with the exception already mentioned.

P. MORRISROE.

¹ Leroey, *Manuel Liturgique*, vol. iv., p. 473.

DOCUMENTS

POPE PIUS X AND THE EMPEROR OF CHINA

EPISTOLA

PII PP. X. SINARUM IMPERATORI OCCASIONE CUIUSDAM RECEPTI
DONI.

AUGUSTISSIMO POTENTISSIMOQUE IMPERATORI SINAURM.—
PEKINUM.

PIUS PP. X.

Augustissime et Potentissime Imperator, Salutem et Prosperitatem.

Quibus Nos litteris septuagesimum aetatis annum faustum et felicem Maiestati Suae Imperatrici Sinarum ominabamur, rescribebat perquam humane Imperatoria Maiestas Tua, mirum quanta cum cordis Nostri laetitia. Quod autem praeterea placuit Maiestati Tuae ut oblatum a Nobis munus peramplo ac maxime nobili dono rependeret, fuit id Nobis supra quam dici potest iucundum, fecitque eo vel magis exploratum summam esse Maiestatis Tuae et cum Persona Nostra amicitiam et erga catholicos istos voluntatem. Velit igitur a Nobis Imperatoria Maiestas Tua gratis habere quamplurimas; simul omina excipiat et vota, unde enixe imploramus Deum, ut Te Suamque Maiestatem Imperatricem Sinarum ac universam Augustissimam Domum diutissima iubeat sospitare et incolumitate gaudere.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum, die VIII Iunii MDCCCCV,
Pontificatus Nostri anno secundo. PIUS PP. X.

**BEATIFICATION AND CANONIZATION OF THE VENERABLE
ANNE MARY TAIGI**

EX S. CONGREGATIONE RITUUM.

ROMANA

DECRETUM BEATIFICATIONIS ET CANONIZATIONIS VEN. SERVAE
DEI ANNAE MARIAE TAIGI, TERTIARIAE ORDINIS SS. TRINITATIS
REDEMPTIONIS CAPTIVORUM.

Super dubio: *An constet de virtutibus theologalibus fide, spe, caritate in Deum et proximum; itemque de cardinalibus prudentia, iustitia, fortitudine, temperantia, earumque adnexis in gradu heroico, in casu et ad effectum de quo agitur.*

Mulierem fortem, qualem exhibent sacrae Litterae, idem edidit Christi sponsa Ecclesia, cuius floribus nec rosae nec

lilia desunt (Ven. Beda, serm. xviii, de sanct.). Id autem feminarum genus documento est nullam esse vitae conditionem, in qua ad christianam perfectionem paecludatur iter. Res quum antiquis exemplis tum recentioribus confirmatur, in quibus luculentum illud Ven. Servae Dei Annae Mariae Taigi, quae claustrum vitam cum coniugio ita sociavit, ut eius imitari sanctitatem nemo ab instituto suo alienum existimare queat.

Senis in urbe Etruriae ortum habuit Ven. Dei Serva iv cal. Jun. anno MDCCCLXIX, piis honestisque parentibus. A quibus relinquere patriam coactis ob inclinatam fortunam, Romam deducta est sexennis. Heic, dum pia mater in famulatu est, instituenda puella traditur magistris nomine *Piis* ad S. Agathae Gothorum. In ea disciplina postquam bonis moribus ac femineo cultu instituta est, conspicua paebens futurae sanctitatis indicia, ut suppetias parentibus ferret, apud nobilem quamdam feminam ancillae munus obivit. Cui conditioni tot periculis obnoxiae honestas paeferens nuptias, acceptum parentibus ac sibi virum elegit, prae nobilis familiae famulum, christianis moribus quidem satis imbutum, sed ingenio rudi asperoque, ut occasionem Ven. Annae suppeditarit exercitandae diurnae patientiae. Domesticis intenta laboribus, liberorum christianae institutioni sedulo impigreque consuluit, ceterisque sui status officiis adeo sancte perfuncta est, ut cunctis utoribus ac matribus familias perfectum exemplar exstiterit.

Ad caelestia se in dies magis trahi sentiens, religiosum virum nacta est, a Deo iam praemonitum, qui Ven. Dei Servae pietatis magister esset. Huius hortatu atque annuente coniuge, abiectis elegantioribus vestibus ornatuque omni, habitum suscepit Tertii Ordinis SSmae Trinitatis redemptionis captivorum. Tum vero, coniugali tecto in coenobium quasi converso, ieuniis, cilicio, flagellis afflictare corpus coepit, vitamque ad Christi Crucis adfixi exemplum componens, precationibus et virtutum omnium acquisitioni ferventius attendere, ex qua vivendi ratione nec iniuria illi defuerunt, neque contumeliae neque calumniae; quae omnia intrepido animo pro Christo sustinuit, obtrectatoribus ac vexatoribus parcens iisque bonum pro malo reddere studens.

Tanto in Deum aestuabat amore, ut ipsum vehementer cohibere cogeretur. Nec tamen, quum caelesti illa flamma esset absorpta et lateret abdita in Christo, minus de proximis ac de civili societate meruisse dicenda est. Nam, licet rerum inopia laboraret, nullam occasionem praetermisit, qua egenorum necessitati opitularetur, eademque, vel in publicis vel in privatis calamitatibus, superno lumine illustrata, divinae ultiioni se victimam obtulit, non intermissa prece studens impudentia aliorum cervicibus infortunia propulsare.

Divinis charismatibus ditata saepissime rapiebatur; Eucharistiae sedem per olfactum agnoscebat; Sacras Species a non consecratis gustu distinguebat. Sed inter cetera dona illud plane mirabile per annos **XLVII** experta est, quasi solis ob oculos positi, qua in luce et praesentia et absentia intueretur, mentium latebras et occultissima quaeque perspiceret.

Tot cumulata gratiae thesauris atque virtutibus, vel quum in vivis degeret, sanctitatis fama pollebat. Idcirco frequentissimus ad eam erat piorum conventus ipsius consilia expertum, ad eamque inopem, humilem, proceres Praesulesque confluebant. Multis aerumnis iactata infirmaque iampridem valetudine, extremi morbi doloribus invicta patientia toleratis, tandem anno aetatis suae **LXVII**, *cupiens dissolvi et esse cum Christo*, tranquillissime in ipso obdormivit **vii** idus Iun. anno **MDCCCXXXVII**, prout ipsa praedixerat.

Aucta in dies magis post obitum fama sanctitatis, beatificationis causa penes S. Rituum Congregationem promoveri coepit Probationibus igitur exceptis, ceterisque ad iuris normam exactis, de virtutibus heroicis Ven. Annae Mariae Taigi instituta est actio. Ac primo quidem excussum est dubium in antepreparatorio coetu tertio cal. Septembres anno **MDCCCCIV** apud Rnum. Cardinalem Dominicum Ferratae causae Relatorem; instaurata denuo causa preparatorio conventu, in Apostolicis Aedibus Vaticanis, quinto cal. Iulias anno **MDCCCCV**; denique coram SSmo. D. N. Pio Papa X in iisdem Vaticanis Aedibus, tertio cal. Ferbuarii ineuntis anni, quum memoratus Cardinalis dubium ad discutiendum proposuit: *An constet de virtutibus theologalibus fide, spe, caritate in Deum et proximum; itemque de cardinalibus prudentia, iustitia, fortitudine, temperantia earumque adnexis Ven. Servae Dei Annae Mariae Taigi in gradu heroico, in casu et ad effectum de quo agitur.* Quo super dubio quamvis unanimis esset Rmorum Cardinalium et PP. Consultorum sententia constare affirmantium, nihilominus in re tanti momenti prorogandum de more duxit SSmus. Pater, spatio sibi et iis qui aderant relicto divini luminis implorandi.

Hodierno autem die, Dominica I in Quadragesima, idem Beatissimus Pater, Sacro pientissime litato in domestico sacello, Vaticanam aulam nobiliorem ingressus ac Pontificio solio assidens, ad se accersiri mandavit Rmos. Cardinales Aloisium Tripepi S. R. Congregationi Pro-Praefectum, et Dominicum Ferratae causae Ponentem una cum R. P. Alejandro Verde S. Fidei Promotore meque infrascripto a secretis, iisque adstantibus solemniter declaravit: *Constare de virtutibus theologalibus fide, spe, caritate in Deum et proximum; itemque de cardinalibus prudentia, iustitia, fortitudine, temperantia earumque*

adnexis Ven. Servae Dei Annae Mariae Taigi, in gradu heroico, in casu et ad effectum de quo agitur.

Hoc Decretum in vulgus edi et in Acta S. R. Congregationis referri iussit, quarto nonas Martii anno MDCCCVI.

A. Card. TRIPEPI, *Pro-Praefectus.*

✠ D. PANICI, Archiep. Laodicen., *Secretarius.*

THE VENERABLE JOHN OF MONTE MARANO

EX S. CONGREGATIONE RITUUM

NUSCANA

**DECRETUM CONFIRMATIONIS CULTUS AB IMMORABILI TEMPORE
PRAESTITI VEN. SERVO DEI IOANNI, EPISCOPO MONTIS MARANI,
SANCTO NUNCUPATO.**

Mons Maranus, oppidum olim in episcopalem sedem erectum, Dei Servum Ioannem habuit Praesulem, cuius nomen ad haec usque tempora cum sanctitatis fama per universam Samnii regionem pervulgatur. Eius viæ primordia latent, sed in Monte Virginis prope Maranum ortus atque aetate adhuc florente Cassinensis monachus Ordinis S. Benedicti, dignusque tanti magistri discipulus fuisse traditur. Anno millesimo octagesimo quarto ecclesia Montis Marani suo Pastore viduata, Gregorius VII sa. me. Salerni exul, rogatu cleri populique Maranensis, Ioannem eximiis virtutibus clarum, prius oblatae dignitati reluctantem, postea Summi Pontificis voluntati obtemperantem, illius Sedis Episcopum nominavit, et ad Beneventanum Archiepiscopum consecrandum misit. Novus Episcopus, omnium laetitia et gratulatione, veluti pater exceptus, pastoralis officii sensit onus, humeris etiam angelicis grave, illudque tamen ex communi sententia digne sustinuit. Quae enim sive ad fidei amorisque obsequium promovendum erga Romanum Pontificem, tunc exulem, sive ad perniciosos haereticosque errores a suo grege propulsandos et ad sanam catholicamque doctrinam eidem tradendam, sive ad egenos miserosque sublevandos et ad charitatem cum pietate fovendam atque augendam quomodolibet conferre poterant, solerti studio atque assiduo opere Ioannes adimplevit. Hoc etiam inter cetera memoriae proditum est Dei Famulum operariorum multitudinem cum aqua, eo deprecantem, in optimum vinum conversa, refecisse. Tandem Ioannes post multos exantlatos labores in Dei gloriam et populorum salutem tam in coenobio quam in Episcopatu, Pauli Apostoli monita ad Episcopos fideliter secutus, et virtutibus ac meritis plenus diem obiit supremum 17 Augusti anno 1094. Mortis nuncio per totam dioecesim diffuso, frequentissimus populus ad invisendum venerabile corpus confluxit. Funere solemni pompa

expleto, ipsum corpus sub ara confessionis Cathedralis ecclesiae depositum fuit. Ex eo tempore tanta Dei Famuli sanctitatis opinio, simulque in illum devotio ac fiducia ad auxilium implorandum invaluit, ut cultus publicus ecclesiasticus usque in praesens perseverans et auctus venerando Praesuli adhibitus fuisse perhibeatur. Ad huismodi cultum pertinent imagines Servi Dei splendoribus ornatae, Sancti vel Beati titulus, reliquiae venerationi fidelium expositae cum lampade ardente, atque in publicis necessitatibus et supplicationibus per urbem delatae, preces domi et in templo Ioanni porrectae, sive ad patrocinium impetrandum, sive ad gratias agendas pro beneficiis acceptis, necnon oblationes ex voto et dona pretiosissima. Et quoad festa in eius honorem singulis annis celebranda, synodus dioecesana sub die 16 mensis Augusti an. 1595 suo decreto edixit: 'Tam inventio divi Ioannis, quae celebratur quarta decima mensis Aprilis, quam festum immediate post translationem divae Mariae observentur.' Quae quidem festivitates antiquitus observatae, postquam dioecesis Montis Marani Nuscanae dioecesi adiecta fuit, confirmatae atque auctae sunt. Quod plane constat ex kalendario ad usum dioecesos Nuscanae anno 1873 adprobato, in quo tria recensentur festa pro Monte Marano S. Ioannis Episcopi, sui Patroni praecipui, unum primarium respondens etiam Inventioni, et duo secundaria Patrocinii et Translationis. Quum haec et alia casus excepti documenta et testimonia in tabulis processualibus relata et in Actis Sacrorum Rituum Congregationis exhibita fuerint, instante Rmo. Dno. Alfonso Carfagni, causae Postulatore, nomine etiam universae civitatis Montis Marani et Nuscanae dioecesos, Emus. et Rmus. Dnus. Sebastianus Cardinalis Martinelli eiusdem Causae Ponens seu Relator, in ordinario Sacrorum Rituum Congregationis coetu subsignata die ad Vaticanum coadunato, sequens dubium discutiendum proposuit: *An constet de casu excepto a Decretis sa. me. Urbani Papae VIII?* Porro Emi. ac Rmi. Patres Sacris tuendis Ritibus praepositi post relationem Emi. Cardinalis Ponentis, auditio R. P. D. Alejandro Verde Sanctae Fidei Promotore, tum voce tum scripto, reque mature perpensa rescribendum censuerunt: *Affirmative seu constare.* Die 20 Februarii 1906.

Facta postmodum de his Sanctissimo Domino Nostro Pio Papae X per infrascriptum Cardinalem Sacrae Rituum Congregationi Pro-Praefectum relatione, Sanctitas Sua Rescriptum Sacrae eiusdem Congregationis ratum habuit et probavit, die 2 Martii, eodem anno.

A. Card. TRIPEPI, *Pro-Praefectus.*

✠ D. PANICI, Archiep. Laodicen. *Secretarius.*

NOTICES OF BOOKS

CARDINAL NEWMAN AND THE ENCYCLICAL 'PASCENDI DOMINICI GREGIS.' An Essay by the Most Rev. Edward Thomas O'Dwyer, Bishop of Limerick. London: Longmans, Green & Co. Price, 1s. net.

IN his preface to this essay the Bishop of Limerick explains that it was written originally for a leading Catholic review in London, and that, in consequence of a difference of opinion between the Editor and the writer it was not published in the review, but is now given to the world in the form of a pamphlet. It is always a delicate matter for outsiders to interfere in a dispute of this kind ; and I feel the less inclined to do so as both parties to the difference command my sincere respect and regard. I do not think I could exaggerate the services rendered to Catholic literature in England during the past twenty-five years by the editor in question ; and no commendation of the Bishop of Limerick would come to those who know him so well with any authority from me.

The Editor has been, in my experience, the most careful, vigilant, thoughtful, well-balanced and judicious of the Catholic lay writers who have taken a leading part, in recent years, in the discussion of questions that bear directly or indirectly on the life of the Church. I am sorry to see him in conflict with the Bishop of Limerick, and I venture to hope that the disagreement is due to misunderstanding. In the special circumstances of the case I find it impossible to explain how or why the Bishop's article was not inserted. Even though there should have been some passages in it with which the Editor was not in strict sympathy, it seems to me that when a Bishop so well qualified to deal with questions of the kind as the Bishop of Limerick, comes forward to support and elucidate the teaching of the Encyclical, he should not be refused an opportunity of doing so by anyone who does not claim to be his superior and judge in matters ecclesiastical. And yet I find it difficult to believe that the Editor claims any such privilege.

The main purpose of the pamphlet was to vindicate the teaching of Cardinal Newman against those who said that he was condemned by the Encyclical, or that lawful deductions from his teaching came under its ban. This the Bishop seems to me to have clearly established within the

limits at his disposal. What flaws the Editor discovered in his arguments we are not told, and it certainly does look strange to see a layman sitting in judgment on a Bishop in a matter of the kind. But was it a matter of doctrine or a matter of fact? And if only a matter of fact, was it of such importance as to justify the exclusion of the article?

The Editor is an honourable man and a good Catholic, and I shall be surprised if he does not, on reflection, see and acknowledge that he has made a mistake.

J. F. H.

SOCIETY, SIN, AND THE SAVIOUR. Addresses on the Passion of our Lord. By Father Bernard Vaughan. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1908. Price 5s.

FATHER BERNARD VAUGHAN's addresses have this about them, that you feel a man is speaking directly to you; that he wants to get at realities; that he knows what he is talking about; that his language though homely and forcible is suited to his theme; and that his religious fervour is the fountain from which his enthusiasm springs; People may say what they please of him, but this man talks like an apostle. No Spurgeon, no Parker, no Campbell surpasses him in directness of speech, in practical eloquence. He has all the natural gifts that they have, and all the supernatural advantages they lack. I have met a good many sermon books in my time, and most of them had some good qualities to recommend them; but of none of them could I say what I say of this one, that the reading of it was not in any sense a task but a pleasure.

I am glad the sermons are published; for they will give young priests a splendid opportunity of seeing how doctrine 'ever ancient, ever new' can be brought home to the masses and the classes by those whom Providence has sent to guide them. Not of course that the young priest should proceed to denounce the sins of society in the same fashion and language as Father Bernard Vaughan. A young priest who would take it into his head to do that would make a great fool of himself. Denunciations, moreover, do not come well from inexperienced persons, and I do not ask any youthful pulpit orator to imitate the author of these discourses, even with such modifications as the social condition of his audience would require: what I mean is, that every priest, young and old, can learn from these sermons how doctrines can be made popular, how sin can be


made repulsive, how virtue can be made attractive; how a priest can speak to his people without beating the air, without talking over their heads, without setting them to sleep, without confusing issues and making the teaching of the Church less intelligible than it was before. We had too many sermon books that were growing out of date. A whiff of reality, the touch not of a vanished but of a living hand, the ardour of a Churchman who has the experience, the literature, the science, the history of nineteen centuries behind him, and uses it, turns it, plays upon it, and captivates his audience with it: that is a thing you do not meet with every day. When we do meet it let us not wait until a man is dead to acknowledge it. Father Bernard Vaughan has his critics like everybody else; but they are for the most part croakers who are incapable of doing anything good themselves, and cannot bear to see anyone else do it. He is too theatrical for them, too loud, too fond of playing to the gallery. They cannot forgive him for drawing a crowd, a thing they would be mightily glad to do if anybody thought their music or their *acting* worth a moment's notice. He does it because it draws society! Well, it is not society that is drawn by it in the East End, in the empty room off Commercial road, with its table and its crucifix, in the slums where his critics would find but few armchairs to suit them. There is in these sermons no sounding brass, no blare of the vulgar trumpet, no vapour, no froth, no fleecy cloudbank to serve as a background to a starved idea, no effect of pose or of conceit. The man has something to say, and he says it. It is plain, it is direct; sometimes it borders on the raw: but it is spoken under the shadow of the Passion which gives solemnity and dignity to the whole of it. There is a note of unreality about many of the sermons one reads: reality is the distinguishing note of these. Let the reader judge for himself, and I think he will not regret the experience.

J. F. H.

ANGLICAN ORDINATIONS. By Rev. H. C. Semple, S.J.
Benziger Brothers. Price 1s. 6d.

ALTHOUGH the question of Anglican Orders is settled irreversibly for Catholics, still the question remains a live one among our 'separated brethren.' It is well, then, that Catholics should be acquainted with the history of these 'Anglican Orders,' and also with the chain of events that called forth Leo's solemn declaration. The little pamphlet before us sums up in homely language the main laws and facts of the case.

P. B.



THE PRIESTS OF MARY

SUCH is the attractive title of an Association which, on February 13, 1907, received the approval of our Holy Father Pius X, who on that occasion granted the members the extraordinary favour of a privileged altar every day of the week. On September 15, of the same year, His Eminence Cardinal Vanutelli accepted the patronage of the young Society, and in a memorable letter declared 'that the Priests of Mary who leave at the disposal of her who rejoices in the appellation of *Ancilla Domini* their sacerdotal science, and their Apostolic zeal, will contribute powerfully to exemplify in their lives and in the lives of their people the words of the Holy Writ, *Et natio illorum, obedientia et amor*' (Eccl. iii. 1).

It is now sixteen years since the late distinguished Cardinal Vaughan wrote a very interesting introduction to the fifth edition of Father Faber's translation of the Blessed Grignon de Montfort's *Treatise on True Devotion to the Blessed Virgin*, in which he showed that the writings of the saintly author were free from taint or error, that they were full of peace and consolation, and that they were endowed with light and holiness of an extraordinary kind. His concluding words are worth recording:—

Now that de Montfort has been honoured by the Church by having been raised to her altars and that his *Cultus* has been formally sanctioned and recommended, we feel no doubt but that his influence will greatly extend, and that he will speak, through his *True Devotion to Mary*, to hundreds of thousands,

with a greater persuasion and a sweeter unction than heretofore. In our humble judgment no one can do better than spread the knowledge of this golden treatise on devotion to the Blessed Virgin.

Father Faber, in his preface to the translation so highly recommended by the Cardinal, tells us that 'thousands of souls perish because Mary is withheld from them. It is the miserable shadow which we call devotion to the Blessed Virgin that is the cause of all those wants and blights, those evils and omissions, and declines. Yet, if we are to believe the revelations of the saints, God is *pressing* for a greater, a wider, a stronger—quite another devotion to the Blessed Virgin.'

Are those words prophetic, and, if so, would it not seem that the burden of the prophecy is found in the establishment of an Association of Ecclesiastics bound by solemn promise to preach and practise what he calls 'quite another devotion to our Lady'; and which, in other words, is de Montfort's method that he has so eloquently advocated. It consists in an absolute surrender of ourselves and of all we possess to the Blessed Virgin, in order that through her we may belong altogether, and unreservedly, to her Son. Blessed de Montfort says:—

We must give her (1) our body, with all its senses and members, (2) our soul, with all its powers, (3) the exterior goods of fortune, whether present or to come, (4) our interior and spiritual goods, which are our merits and our virtues, with all good works, past, present, and future, in the order of nature, grace and glory; and this we must do without any reserve of so much as one farthing, one hair, or one least good action.

This constant and ungrudging service contains the great secret of de Montfort's preaching, and the priest who takes it up and bears its sacred burden will do more to honour Mary in a short life than many who have been long in the ministry, and have contented themselves with a few practices and prayers that have been shadow without substance. Of such priests he says: 'They will be of the sons of Levi well purified by the fire of great tribulation, closely adhering to God, who shall carry the gold of His

love in their hearts, the incense of prayer in their spirit, the myrrh of mortification in their body.'

The Priest of Mary is called upon—(1) To live in her company ; (2) to meditate upon her virtues ; (3) to praise her ; (4) to offer the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass with her, and for her intentions ; (5) to consecrate to her all his works. Finally, to be a mediator between Mary and his people.

I. To live in her company. That is, to be in constant communication with her ; to confide all his hopes and fears to her maternal heart. She will thus become the Queen of his soul. She will encourage him to do good, and she will protect him against the machinations of the Evil One.

II. To meditate upon her virtues. He will learn to look upon her as the woman clothed with the sun, crowned with the stars, the moon beneath her feet. The divine mysteries of Creation, Redemption, and the Incarnation ever present to his soul are best learned in the light that surrounds her throne.

III. To praise Mary. The Divine Office which he daily recites as one of the important duties imposed by the reception of Holy Orders is full of her praises. The *Ave Maria* at the commencement of every hour and the anthems that conclude Lauds and Compline remind him constantly of the place the Church has given to her in this tribute of prayer and homage.

IV. To offer the Holy Sacrifice with Mary, and through Mary. The altar is the priest's Calvary. Here he thinks of the terrible words, *Quis ascendet ad montem Domini*, and trembles. When he remembers that Mary is by his side, and that her intercession will help to render him worthy to glorify God, and to rejoice in His Name, he will be consoled and strengthened in the awful Act in which he is engaged.

V. To consecrate all his works to her. The ordinary duties of his calling are in the highest degree meritorious. If they are offered entirely for Mary, and through Mary, they will acquire an increased value and degree of sanctity. In his study, in his house, in his parish, as well as in his church the Priest of Mary will be her apostle. A virtue

will go out to him by which he will be enabled to convert sinners and to sanctify the just.

VI. To be mediator between Mary and the souls of his people. The priest who is thoroughly consecrated to Mary, and lives in close intimacy with her, will enjoy the highest favour of his Queen. He will be assisted by her to extend the reign of Christ in men. Through his hands she will bestow the spiritual alms which she has destined for her poor. She will bring him sinners to convert, the ignorant to instruct, pious souls to conduct on the way of salvation. Zeal and eloquence will be imparted to his ministry. His efforts in propagating devotion to the Sacred Heart, the Blessed Sacrament, and the holy Passion of our Lord, will be rendered fruitful. The due celebration of the Feasts of our Lady, and the many practices which the Church has sanctioned in her honour, will be warmly and faithfully observed and encouraged by him.

His private life will be characterized by a constant dependence on her wishes, even in things that are indifferent, and in token of submission he will leave at her feet the key of his house, the insignia of his dignity, the worldly goods in his possession.

The Priests of Mary, Queen of hearts, are expected to have in view a double object on their enrolment:—

Firstly, to sanctify their sacerdotal life by the practice of the 'Perfect Devotion to Mary,' as taught by Blessed de Montfort.

Secondly, to employ this devotion as a powerful means and assistance to their Apostolate in establishing the reign of Jesus Christ through Mary, both in individual souls and in the body of the faithful.

Its organization has been so framed as to include clerical students as well as priests. It has for its Director the Superior-General of the Fathers of the Company of Mary. It rejoices in the patronage of the Cardinal-Protector of that Order, at present His Eminence Cardinal Vincent Vanutelli. The Director-General will be always at the disposal of the members, and any communication sent to him at 40 Via Dogali, Rome, will be at once acknowledged.

The priest who desires to become a member, after

corresponding with the Director, will select some feast of our Lady. In his celebration of Mass that day he will pray fervently for strength to fulfil the engagement he is about to make with her, and during his thanksgiving the form of consecration to her service, as contained in de Montfort's treatise, will be read. On notification to the Director-General he will receive a diploma, and his name will be inscribed upon the register of the Association. This formality is required to entitle him to a share in all the spiritual favours conferred on the members, prominent amongst which is the concession of a privileged altar every day in the week, according to a rescript dated February 13, 1907.

Such is a very imperfect summary of the Constitution of this admirable Society. It has to a great extent been derived from its official manual, *Les Prêtres de Marie*, published in June, 1907. It can be had on application to the Very Rev. H. M. Gebhard, 40, Via Dogali, Rome,¹ who will give every information on the subject.

To the priests of Ireland a Society honoured with the name of Mary, blessed by the Sovereign Pontiff, dowered with the riches of the Church's treasury, cannot but strongly and irresistibly appeal. They belong to a land whose love for her is still as pure and as fervent as in the far-off centuries when the *Teampoill Muire* was a familiar shrine to every traveller, when *Muire Maccartha* was lovingly invoked in the quaint litanies that still survive the stress and storm of persecution, when the daily salutation was 'God and Mary be with you,' with its touching response, 'God and Mary and St. Patrick.'

To them the words of Father Faber, when recommending de Montfort's *Treatise on Devotion to the Blessed Virgin*, will not come amiss: 'Let a man but try it for himself, and his surprise at the grace it brings and the transformation it causes in his soul will soon convince him of its otherwise almost incredible efficacy as a means for the salvation for men, and for the coming of the Kingdom of Christ.'

THOMAS M'GEOY, P.P.

¹ An English translation will soon be published.

THE ABBÉ CHARLES KEARNEY, D.D. (1762-1824)

HIS LIFE AND SUFFERINGS DURING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

AMONGST the Superiors of the Irish College in Paris there is none whose history is more full of interest and of pathos than that of the Abbé Charles Kearney. Charles Kearney entered the College in 1762, as a pupil of the fifth form, or *classe de 5^{eme}*. Though born in Ireland he was related to several families of Irish origin resident in France, and amongst them to the O'Sheas, being third cousin of Colonel William O'Shea of the French army. But there is no document extant to show to what diocese in Ireland he belonged. In 1772, when Dr. Laurence Kelly made over the new College to the Irish community by a deed of *Donatio inter vivos*, Charles Kearney was a subdeacon, and his name is seventh on the list of those who accepted the donation in due form of law.

Having completed his theological studies he was in due time ordained priest. In 1779 he was promoted to the dignity of Vicar-General of the dioceses of Tarbes, and was preparing to enter on the duties of that office when, by the death of Dr. James Markey, the post of Superior of the Irish College became vacant. Charles Kearney, as one of the most prominent Irish ecclesiastics then resident in France, was proposed to fill the vacant position. But though his talents marked him out for the post, he was not without opponents. In a letter, dated May 29, 1780, he writes to his friend, Dr. Plunkett of Meath :—

Many annoying memoirs have been written against me to the Archbishop. I know the authors of them, but I shall certainly take no notice of them, nor shall I act in consequence. It was said that the house would be lost if I were placed at the

head of it; and that I would be prejudiced against certain provinces, etc.

But in spite of opposition he was appointed Rector of the College early in 1780. He accepted the appointment, he writes to Dr. Plunkett, with the greatest repugnance. The task which awaited him was no enviable one. The letters of his opponents had prejudiced Dr. Carpenter, Archbishop of Dublin, against him. 'I was represented,' he says,¹ 'as proud, distant, tyrannical, full of prejudices,' etc. The financial condition of the College was not prosperous. A considerable sum was due for legal expenses in connexion with the recently-erected College buildings. On account of the dearth then prevailing in France, the cost of provisions was constantly increasing. The revenues of the College were not satisfactory:—

Our revenues [writes Dr. Kearney] are not increasing; the number of the non-paying has been very considerable, and the consequence is that we have contracted debts . . . The charges of the house are great; there is not a burse in it, one or two excepted, that the house does not add something to support the burse. There is, then, a considerable part of the revenue applied to the burses. Another considerable part must be consecrated to make up for the scantiness of the pensions. What, then, will be left for the support of those who pay nothing, and for other charges? I can assure you that the revenues of the house are below the actual charges . . . What ruins us are the pensioners who come here under pretence of paying; the house expects it, and receives others, as it ought to do in consequence, gratis, and thus it finds itself overcharged.²

In spite of all difficulties, Dr. Kearney remained courageously at his post. He lamented at times that unpromising students were sent to occupy family burses. He endeavoured to encourage the spirit of study, and to reward those who carried off distinctions at the University examinations. 'We are now,' he writes, in July, 1788, 'in the midst of our University compositions. We have

¹ Letter to Dr. Plunkett, Sept. 15, 1783. Cogan, *Diocese of Meath*.
vol. iii., p. 95.

² Letter to Dr. Plunkett, June 9, 1788. *Ibid.*, vol. iii., p. 126.

some hopes, but how often have we not seen as fair hopes disappointed. The new regulations about the ages do us a great deal of harm.'

While attending to the duties of his office as Superior of the College, he was no indifferent spectator of the events then taking place in France. Like many others at the commencement of the Revolution, he hoped for good results from the meeting of the States-General.

The States-General [he wrote in 1788] are soon to be assembled. They will decide the contest that exists between the King and his parliament. They will reform some abuses, and put an end to the arbitrary disposal of the finances of the State. They will then be on a better footing. The public credit will be more firmly established, and I am confident the funds will rise wonderfully on the assembling of the States.

But he was soon disabused. A year later he wrote, giving an account of the very dismal situation of the country—' religion lost, impiety triumphing, the sees occupied by schismatic, immoral, irregularly consecrated bishops—the true ones dispersed, persecuted, outlawed, parishes abandoned to wolves.'²

A year later, September 2, 1792, he again wrote:—

The situation we are in is desperate beyond expression . . . As to religion, the Catholic especially is proscribed and all exterior marks of it suppressed . . . All priests that have not taken the oath were taken and locked up in different monasteries and are to be gradually transported.

But Dr. Kearney did not confine himself to deplored the evils he witnessed. As far as in his power he sought to aid the sufferers. A service which he rendered to the ladies of the noble family of Castelbajac, to whom he is said to have been related, is recorded by Myles Byrne in his *Memoirs* in the following terms:—

When the Esplanade or *Champ de Mars* of the military school was ordered to be made by the population of Paris, both men and women went to the work to dig and wheel earth. Abbé

¹ Letter to Dr. Plunkett, July, 1788. Cogan, *Diocese of Meath*, vol. iii., p. 128.

² Letter, July 14, 1791. *Ibid.*, p. 195.

Kearney assisted the ladies of his acquaintance to perform their task, and thereby obtained for them in the evening a civic card, signed by one of the representatives of the people, which at that critical period was one of the causes of saving them from persecution. By showing this card to patrols, and frequent domicile inspectors, they escaped being arrested as suspected persons.¹

As the Irish College, being a British establishment, was under the protection of International law, and hence less exposed to danger, Abbé Kearney allowed many French families to deposit in it their title-deeds and other valuables. When the churches were closed against priests who had not taken the oath of the Civil Constitution, he permitted the people of the neighbourhood to assist at Mass and Vespers in the College chapel. The concourse of people to the services in the College excited the wrath of the revolutionists, and on one occasion the devout worshippers were attacked and beaten as they came out from the College. The disturbance created was so great that it was necessary to apply for military protection.

Abbé Kearney felt a deep interest in the fate of the unhappy Louis XVI. He was on intimate terms with the King's confessor, Abbé Edgeworth, and he joined him and several others in contriving means for the King's escape from prison. Count Lally-Tollendal, in a paper addressed to the Minister of the Interior in 1811, states the fact in the following terms:—

He [Abbé Kearney] joined with Mr. Garvoi, Abbé Edgeworth, Mr. Vauvilliers, Mr. Swinburne, first page of the Queen, and others, in a project for the escape of the unfortunate Louis XVI. A vessel was purchased and waiting at Havre, the boat which was to convey him to it waited long upon the fatal indecision and the still more fatal refusal of that unhappy Prince. They could not or would not take charge of any but the King alone, and the King would not go without the Queen.²

Abbé Kearney's interest in the royal prisoner did not

¹ *Memoirs of Myles Byrne*, vol. iii., p. 200, 1st ed.

² 'Notes confidentielles sur l'administration des collèges Irlandais, Anglais et Ecossais reunis dans tout l'Empire Français adressées à M. le Ministre de l'Intérieur par M. le Marquis de Lally-Tollendal, 11 Mars, 1811.' Archives Nat. MS., H², 2561.

end with this fruitless effort to procure his escape. On the day of the execution of that unhappy monarch he was present, his presence having been concerted with Abbé Edgeworth and known to the King. In later years he gave to Mr. O'Reilly, author of *The Irish Abroad and at Home*, the following account of the tragic scene :—

'I arrived,' said he [Abbé Kearney], 'in the *Place de la Revolution*, before the King, and managed to reach the scaffold just as the carriage in which he sat with the Abbé Edgeworth, and two gendarmes, approached from the *Rue Royale*. The front ranks of the crowd which surrounded the scaffold were principally *sans-culottes*, who evinced the most savage joy in anticipation of the impending tragedy.

'The scaffold was so situated as to provide for the royal sufferer a pang to which less distinguished victims were insensible. It stood between the pedestal on which had been erected a statue of Louis XV (overthrown early in the Revolution) and the issue from the garden of the Tuilleries called the Pont Tournant. Midway between these two points a hideous *soi-disant* statue of Liberty raised her Gorgon head. This situation was chosen in order to realize a conception characteristic of the epoch, and the frantic fiends who figured in it. It insured that the unhappy persons, on being placed on the *bascule* of the guillotine, should, in their descent from the perpendicular to the horizontal, when pushed home to receive the fatal stroke, make an obeisance to the goddess ! Yes, even to that frivolity in a matter so appalling did the monsters directing those butcheries resort.

'For the King this position of the guillotine was therefore peculiarly painful ; for, looking beyond the statue of Liberty, the Palace of the Tuilleries appeared at the end of the grand avenue, and upon it his last glance in this world must have rested.

'Scarcely had the King descended from the coach, when Samson, the executioner, and his aids approached him to make his "toilette," as the preparation of the victim for death was termed. He had a long head of hair confined by a ribbon, according to the fashion of the day. Upon this Samson seized with one hand, brandishing a pair of huge scissors in the other. The King, whose hands were yet free, opposed the attempt of Samson to cut off his hair, a precaution necessary, however, to secure the operation of the axe. The executioner's assistants rushed upon him. He struggled with them violently and long,

but was at length overcome and bound. His hair was cut off in a mass and thrown upon the ground. It was picked up by an Englishman, who was in front of the scaffold, and who put it into his pocket to the scandal of the *sans-culottes*, who, like him, were in the front rank of the spectators. As we never heard more about the circumstance, I suppose the unhappy *Anglais* was murdered. When the bustle occasioned by this incident was over, the King ascended the scaffold. All that followed with regard to him is well known.'

'Is it not true, Abbé,' said I, 'that the Abbé Edgeworth uttered, as the King was mounting the short flight of steps leading to the scaffold those sublime words of encouragement, *Fils de Saint-Louis, montez au ciel?*'

'No,' he replied, 'but while the King was struggling with the executioner and his men, as I have just described, the Abbé Edgeworth recommended resignation to him, adding (and these words suggested possibly the phrase ascribed to him) "You have only one sacrifice more to make in this life, before you enjoy life eternal—submit to it."

'The execution over, Abbé Edgeworth and I were advised to withdraw as quickly as possible. I suppose the illustrious Malesherbes was present to take a last farewell of his royal master and client; for the cloak of his coachman was obtained and cast around Edgeworth under favour of which he retired. Nevertheless he must have been pursued, for he found it necessary to take refuge in a little milliner's shop in the Rue du Bac, whence by a back door he made his escape.'

'And you?'

'I reached home safely, but was subsequently arrested and passed three years in the Temple.'¹

The execution of Louis XVI took place on January 21, 1793. Abbé Kearney continued to reside at the College for some months longer. In May of that year, like his colleague Dr. Walsh of the Lombard College, he was summoned to appear before the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Section of the Pantheon. In October, 1793, all British subjects resident in France were placed under arrest. Abbé Kearney shared the same fate.

He underwent [writes Lally-Tollendal] at various intervals, at his own house, at the Luxembourg, and in the Temple three years detention, including thirty-six (*de cachot*) in a

¹ *The Irish Abroad and at Home*, pp. 223-225. New York, 1856.

dungeon, from which he was told he would come forth only to go to the scaffold. Amongst the documents produced against him were two letters—one from an English colonel, showing the share Kearney had in the project for the escape of the King to England; the other from the Duke de Fitzjames, thanking Kearney for the help he had given to many of his compatriots, who were saved from death and restored to their native land by means of that assistance. What saved Kearney was the remembrance of another assistance, which in his open-handed bounty he had formerly extended to Camille Desmoulins during his education at the College Louis Le Grand.

On recovering his liberty, Abbé Kearney, finding himself without means and without pupils, let the College, Rue du Cheval Vert, for a period of ten years to Abbé MacDermott, who entered on possession, and opened a *pension* or school for young gentlemen. Meantime Abbé Kearney supported himself by giving lessons in private families of rank. But his reputation as a royalist made him an object of suspicion. On the occasion of the attempt made upon the life of the First Consul, in 1800, several royalists were arrested on suspicion, and amongst them Abbé Kearney, who thus gave an account of his arrest :—

‘ I was on my way to my old quarters,’ said he to me, ‘ accompanied by the police agents in coloured clothes, who allowed me to walk before them free. On crossing the Pont Neuf, I saw approaching a former friend and pupil, Matthieu de Montmorency. He drew up, and as I passed close to him said, in an undertone in English (a language I had taught him), “ Unhappy man ! I know whither you are going. Will they never allow you to be quiet.” Now, I had no knowledge—nothing whatever to do with the infernal machine,’ added the Abbé.¹

The innocence of Abbé Kearney soon became evident by the discovery of the real culprits, and he was set at liberty.

At length more peaceful times were dawning, and the French Government authorized the re-opening of the Irish College. But whereas there had been two Irish Colleges

¹ *The Irish Abroad and at Home*, p. 266.

in Paris before the Revolution—the Lombard College, Rue des Carmes, and the Collège des Irlandais, Rue du Cheval Vert—it was decided to re-open only the latter, as the former was in a ruinous condition. At the head of the newly-opened establishment was placed Dr. Walsh, formerly Superior of the Collège des Lombards, and now Administrator-General of all the Irish foundations in France. The new rector was subject to a Bureau de Surveillance, and it was necessary to give an account to that body of the management of the funds of the Irish Colleges since the outbreak of the Revolution.

Abbé Kearney was now placed in a position of difficulty. During the period of the Revolution he had acted on the principle that in extreme necessity the primitive community of goods revives. To save his own life, and that of others, he had been obliged to disburse considerable sums. 'He could not,' says Lally-Tollendal, 'see anyone suffering without opening to him his purse, and when it was empty, that of the College.' Moreover, during the years of the Revolution, the College had been more than once ransacked, papers destroyed or taken away, and thus the documents which would have justified his administration could not be produced. At this juncture Abbé Kearney addressed to Dr. Walsh a letter in vindication of his administration, which it may not be without interest to reproduce. It runs thus:—

MY DEAR WALSH,—You are about to present a report on the financial state of the Irish College. Your report will contribute, according to its tone, either to strengthen or diminish the very unfavourable impression already entertained regarding me.

I think it my duty to lay before you some observations which will, no doubt, be a guide to you, in what you will say or write.

1. If my administration had been confined to receiving with one hand and paying out with the other, the precise sums belonging to each individual, without the obligation of watching over the subsequent use they would make of them, I could not to-day justify myself for having gone beyond my receipts, and having left certain things in suffrance.

But such was not the duty attached to my office. I was

not merely charged with the simple distribution of money. With an income of 40,000 francs from fixed investments, or from the very precarious and very small pensions of individuals, I had in ordinary years to provide for the complete support of eighty students. I had to provide for the outfit and travelling expenses of the bursars coming to Paris and going home.

These disbursements became constantly the more onerous, as I found myself usually entreated to go beyond the sums specified for the above-mentioned cases; and the incoming bursars never waited until the money advanced to their predecessors had been paid back.

French administrators could never understand how impossible it is to escape such embarrassing cases.

When I complained at the Archbishop's, I was told not to open the door to bursars who arrived before their time, nor to admit any pensioners but such as had bankers here to be responsible for their pension. So little did they understand, so little do they still understand our countrymen.

When I entered on administration I had to pay debts due for the building of the house which had only been completed a few years before. Provisions of all kinds, to my great alarm, became dearer every day. In my letters to Ireland, and in my reports to the Superior Major, I never ceased making the strongest remonstrances on the ever increasing disproportion between the receipts and the expenditure.

Abandoned to myself on the one side and on the other, I was obliged to have recourse to the means I had in my own hands, and which the Superior was free to employ in urgent cases. When those resources were exhausted there remained for me no hope but in a partial vacation; which happily the Revolution rendered complete.

2. To judge equitably of my administration they would require to have before them the book of receipts and that of expenditure. They have the former. I showed it to you yourself; so far was I from shrinking from throwing light on the steps you are taking. You admitted that you had not thought of it. In that book is to be seen what the house possessed at such or such a date. On that score there is nothing to be desired.

But the statement of the charges I had to meet, the outlay I had to make, what I paid out—this they have not. They did not ask for it. It would have been impossible for me to produce it. For I have neither register, nor receipts, nor note of hand.

If I had them I, too, could make demands, which would counterbalance those which are repeated every day.

They have, therefore, before them only the former, and the present statement of the property of the house. But they have not what would explain and account for the difference between them.

To condemn me on the apparent deficit, without taking into account the total want occasioned by circumstances as imperious as they were sad, without taking into account, I say, the absolute want I am in of documents, is to warrant the inconceivable supposition that they did not think them necessary in order to arrive at an equitable judgment, or the still more inconceivable supposition that they have forgotten the events which deprived me of those documents.

This is to have less consideration for the position in which I am placed, than I would have expected from anyone who witnessed the Revolution. It is to accuse one who has suffered shipwreck for not having preserved what he possessed when the weather was calm and serene. I was entitled to hope that they would at least have suspended their judgment; and in the doubt, the more serious is the case and its consequences, so much the more does the Natural Law render it a duty to incline to indulgence. *Favores ampliandi sunt.*

3. Equity demands that a line of demarcation be drawn between two periods of my administration, the one before the Revolution and the other subsequent to it. In the month of July, 1789, I submitted my accounts up to the first half of the year 1788. I then rendered an account of the sums expended beyond my receipts, and consequently of the deficit which there may and must have been in the capital. It is not in my power to give the details over again. As to the fact of my having presented my accounts, a fact which has been called in question, and even formally denied, I appeal to the testimony of M. l'Abbé Dargent, who received my accounts, and of M. Meagher, who was present as Procurator of the house; and to that of M. Lavoisier, who must have known the fact in the past. These witnesses are in France, and if I recollect rightly you yourself were present. It seems to me that in accordance with the maxim, *Non bis in idem*, there should be no question of going back on the period anterior to the presentation of those accounts. The Superior Major must be presumed to have taken cognizance of everything, according to the vouchers which he then had, but which no longer exist and to have taken the means to repair the losses which I had no wish, and which I could not conceal from him.

But the period subsequent to the commencement of the Revolution could not be one of reparation.

The extraordinary events should be borne in mind which

followed one another with unprecedented rapidity; events which render conceivable, and excusable, even the most unexpected want of order. Our house in particular felt the most disastrous effects of them. French people themselves, instead of finding therein, as they supposed, a safe asylum for their persons and property, as in a place which the law of nations had till then caused to be respected, saw it pillaged and sacked like everything else.

Then one did not calculate the value of money in comparison with safety, liberty, and life. Is there any Frenchman who does not easily understand what it must have cost certain persons at that time to keep clear of the road that led to the scaffold, to escape being cast into a dungeon, to mitigate the horrors of it when one had the misfortune to be cast therein, to prepare the way and secure an escape from it. Lavishing right and left all the money I could get together to secure my own liberation and that of others, I thought I was fulfilling a sacred duty. I always entertained the hope of being able in course of time to make good the deficit which had become inevitable.

That time has come, and has led you to become the instrument of that interesting operation. The house has risen from its ruins. The establishment has been placed on a firm basis. I rejoice at the good I see done, though I have not been able to share in it. But I ask not to remain buried beneath the old ruins, which it has been impossible to avoid, and not to be obliged to live the victim of unjust accusation. This would be to treat me with greater severity after the Revolution than at its commencement did the Revolutionary Committee, which pursued me with a violence of which there ought not to be another example.

4. If I had paid the debts of the house at the period of Assignats, and you may remember that I tried to do so, they would have no pretext for my removal from the post I occupied. I respect authority and its arrangements, I wish success to the establishment. In my retirement I console myself with the thought that while I was at the head of the establishment I saw discipline and study flourish therein. I earnestly desire to see them maintained. I shall be pleased to learn that such is the fact; and I doubt not but in one way or another you will fulfil the intentions of the Founders.

For myself I desire and request nothing more than to be regarded as one whose appointments have been sequestrated for a time to convert them at length into a pension. Nowhere could I have so strong a claim to a pension as from the funds of a house of which I was the head for several years, and of which I am to day, perhaps, the oldest pupil.

My dear Walsh, you will make whatever use you judge becoming of this letter.

KEARNEY.

August 5, 1807.¹

Such was Abbé Kearney's account of his administration at a period of unparalleled difficulty. The Bureau de Surveillance found a deficit of 50,000 francs, and declined to allow Dr. Kearney a pension. He continued to reside in Paris, supporting himself by giving lessons. His conduct during the Revolution had gained him many friends, and he enjoyed the patronage of persons of rank, and amongst others of the Queen of Holland. A few years passed, and Abbé Walsh, too, was removed by the Minister of the Interior from the administration of the Irish Foundations in France. Lally-Tollendal, who was bitterly hostile to Dr. Walsh, proposed to the Minister a list of persons whom he considered suitable for the post of administrator, and amongst them was Abbé Kearney. But new difficulties arose. While the Empire lasted, Dr. Ferris was appointed Administrator; at the Restoration he was deservedly set aside to make way for Dr. Long. When the latter resigned Ferris once more secured his own reinstatement. But he was soon obliged, in consequence of a quarrel with the Minister of Instruction, to retire. At last the moment arrived when it was possible to make some reparation to Abbé Kearney, and he was reappointed Superior of the College about 1820. Under his government the house began to renew its youth. The venerable rector, now well advanced in years, was full of kindness and of sympathy as in former days. His appearance and character at this period are thus sketched by one who knew him personally:—

Abbé Kearney² was temperate and cared little about what he had to eat or drink himself, though generous and hospitable to his guests, whom he used to entertain whilst at table with many amusing anecdotes as well as with good cheer. He was always gay and good-humoured, never speaking harshly of anyone.

¹ Translated from the original in French, preserved in the Irish College.

² Myles Byrne writes *Carney*; but in the Irish College documents the name is always written *Kearney*.

He was low in stature, well made, with a very agreeable, benevolent countenance, though not handsome. He had very little to live on before he became Superior of the Irish College, and still with that little he was ever endeavouring to be useful to his friends and countrymen. I met him one day with a rather large parcel under his arm ; he told me it was one of his pantaloons he was taking to a poor exile of Erin. He hoped it would fit him, for he was to present him at ten o'clock to a French family where he expected to have him placed as a tutor or preceptor.¹

We cannot better describe the closing scene of Abbé Kearney's career than in the words of the same writer :—

Poor Abbé Kearney did not long enjoy his situation as Superior of the Irish Seminary. After a few days' illness he died in 1825 (*sic*) (1824), much regretted by all who knew him. His funeral service was celebrated in the chapel of the College, where were assembled a great concourse of his countrymen, with members of the French nobility. The Castelbajac family attended and were anxious to have the ceremony executed with all the pomp of the Roman Catholic Church. Ladies were allowed to be present in the gallery of the chapel, and a special permission was obtained to have him buried in the vaults of the chapel ; and after making three rounds of the College court-yard, in the most solemn manner, the procession returned to the Chapel, when the coffin was descended into the vault, and there the remains of the worthy Abbé Kearney lie enclosed in a double coffin, a lead one inside.²

The vault was opened in 1902. Therein rest the remains of four Irish priests : Dr. Laurence Kelly (died 1777), Dr. Michael Cahill (died 1779), both Superiors of the College ; Abbé Donat MacMahon (died 1787), of Seminary du St. Esprit, and Abbé Kearney. No inscription marks the tomb of the latter, but the simple words, 'Kearney. 1824.' No doubt it was intended to place over his remains, in due time, a suitable memorial. But in colleges, generations succeed each other like the spring-tide leaves, and the past is quickly forgotten. No storied monument marks his resting place. May this sketch, at least, of his life and of his sufferings preserve him from oblivion.

PATRICK BOYLE, C.M.

¹ *Memoirs of Myles Byrne*, 1st ed., vol. iii., pp. 199-203. ² *Ibid.*, vol. iii., p. 203.

THE FLAG AT YPRES

HERE is a 'legend' of a blue flag, said to have been carried by the Irish Brigade at the battle of Ramillies, which now rests in the Irish convent at Ypres. This is a sceptical age. People do not believe unless they see; and I wished to submit this blue flag to the test of ocular demonstration. Accordingly, last autumn, I paid a visit to the old Flemish town, 'remote, melancholy, slow,' but not 'unfriendly.' I was hospitably received by the kind and cheerful nuns, who answered all my questions about the flag and the convent with alacrity. 'Can I see the flag?' 'Certainly.' And the flag was sent for. But why is there an Irish convent at Ypres? The story is brief and interesting. I shall tell it as it was told to me.

During the reign of Elizabeth, Lady Percy with Lady Montague and Lady Fortescue and others wishing to become religious women, and being unable to do so in their own country, assembled at Brussels, and founded an English house of the ancient order of St. Benedict. Their numbers increasing, they made affiliations at Ghent, Dunkerque and Pontoise; the former, together with the mother house at Brussels, removed in time to England, where they are known at the present day under the names of Tynemouth, Oulton, and East Bergholt Abbeys of the Order of St. Benedict. The house at Pontoise died out—but before all this in 1665 an affiliation was made, from Ghent, in Ypres, owing to the fact that the Vicar-General of Ghent, having been made Bishop of Ypres, wished to have the Benedictine nuns from Ghent, and so a new house was founded at Ypres, and Lady Marina Beaumont was the first Abbess. In 1682, at the death of the Abbess, Lady Flavia Cary was chosen to be the first abbess of an Irish community, though really the second of the establishment, the house being now intended for the Irish, who had no other place for religious in Flanders. Irish professed nuns from the other houses were sent to compose the community, among whom were Dame Ursula Butler, Dame Joseph O'Bryan, and Dame Joseph Butler. A legal donation and concession of the house of Ypres was made in favour of the Irish nation, and was dedicated to the Immaculate Conception under the title of '*Gratia Dei*'.

In 1686 Lady Joseph Butler succeeded Lady Flavia Cary as abbess. In 1687 James II of England wished to have a monastery of religious women in Ireland, and owing to the fact that the brother of Lady Butler was cup-bearer to the King, he desired she would come over to Dublin and found a monastery (of religious women) under the denomination of his Majesty's own first chief and royal Abbey. All obstacles being removed, Lady Butler came over in 1688, accompanied by some choir dames and Sister Placida Holmes, a convert, to settle down in Big Ship Street, Dublin; leaving the house of Ypres in charge of a few Sisters, to be reserved as a house of refuge in case of an adverse change of times.

When her Ladyship passed by London she waited on the English Queen at Whitehall, in the habit of her order, which had not been seen there since the Reformation. In Dublin she was presented to James II, who received her most graciously, and ordered a royal patent giving them house, rent, postage free, etc. This royal patent with the Great Seal of the Kingdom is yet to be seen at this present day at the Abbey of Ypres; it was dated June 5th, 1689. The intimacy between the royal family and the abbey may be known by the many letters from James II and his two Queens, all of which are to be seen to this very day.

When King William came victoriously into Dublin, 1690, he gave permission to Lady Butler to remain, but she said she would not live under an usurper. He then wrote personally to her to give her an ample pass over to Flanders, which letter is yet kept in the abbey.

The soldiers, notwithstanding, pillaged the monastery, and Lady Butler having first taken care to send back the Irish postulants to their families, prepared for her journey back to Ypres. Sister Placida Holmes, whom she had brought over with her, disguised herself as a soldier to save what she could and place some of the things in safety. After a long and dangerous journey they arrived at last at Ypres, their house of refuge, bringing with them among other things from Dublin some large oak tables which are, to this day, used in the refectory of the religious. The nuns from the other houses who had accompanied her to Dublin returned to their own monastery, and Lady Butler remained alone with four lay-sisters and in the greatest poverty. But she would not give up her work, though the Bishop tried to persuade her to retire to another convent. In 1700 she had the joy of receiving some good subjects, and was able to form a community. In 1723 Lady Xaveria Arthur succeeded Lady Butler, and in the year 1743

Lady Magdalen Mandeville, grand niece of Lady Butler, became abbess. The heroic courage of this religious is evidenced by an incident which happened when she was but a novice. Being ordered by the Bishop to go back to Ireland to make arrangements about some property and to bring some things left by Lady Butler, on her way back she was shipwrecked off the coast of the Isle of Wight, and for forty-eight hours remained on the sea, attached to a plank. She was picked up by a fisherman who attended her wounds, and a week after she had the courage to cross the Channel again. In 1760 Lady Bernard Dalton was chosen abbess. In 1783 Lady Scholastica Lynch became abbess. Later on the incursion of the French troops in the Low Countries rendered her task very hard.

On 13th January, 1793, a band of 40 or 50 armed soldiers came to the monastery, broke down the gratings, and put the seal on church, sacristy and elsewhere. Next day someone informed her that the General-in-Chief residing at Tournai, being an Irishman, might possibly be able to help his country-women, she applied to him, and soon the soldiers were withdrawn, excuses made, and all damage paid for by the commander of the town. In the following year the French besieged Ypres, and the convent being nearest the ramparts was the most exposed, but it passed safely through the most terrible dangers. At last the French entered the town, and from that time all convents were to be suppressed, not excepting our monastery, though the orders for execution were not immediately put into force, by reason of their being in some regard strangers in the country.

In the height of the French Revolution Lady Lynch died, 1799, and was succeeded by Lady Bernard Lynch, her sister. New troubles were coming. They were ordered to leave the enclosure, but were prevented by a violent storm of rain; and the next morning came the news of a change of government, and the Irish Dames remained, and for several years theirs was the only convent existing in the Low Countries. The years which followed were spent in the greatest poverty and want. In 1830 Lady Benedict Byrne succeeded as abbess, and in 1840 Lady Winefride Jarrett began forty-eight years of abbatial dignity, the longest rule which has ever been known.

The abbey, which was falling down, was built up in the Gothic style, such as it is at the present day. In 1888 Lady Scholastica Bergé, native of Tournai, became abbess, and is so still [1907]. The community is now composed of twelve Choir Dames, six of whom are Irish, and seven Lay-sisters, three of whom are Irish. They have always given themselves up to the education of children, though the number of the pupils

may never be above twenty, in order that more care may be taken of each. Young ladies of distinction from many parts of the Netherlands were educated here.

Among the antiquities preserved in the convent are the royal patent of James II and his correspondence, a large border of lace worked by Mary Stuart, a large painted portrait of James II, a church vestment made of the gold horse trappings of James II, and another made from the dress of Archduchess Isabella, representing the King of Spain in the Netherlands, and given by her to the house at Brussels, together with two tapestry arm-chairs which she and Duke Albert had used; the painted portraits of some of the Abbesses, and among them that of Lady Butler; a small English Martyrology belonging to Blessed Thomas More, whose niece was a nun here.

In the little chapel adjoining the convent, I read on the stones beneath my feet the names of those who at one time belonged to the community, and who now lie buried near the scene of their work. The names left no doubt of the nationality of the dead: Madame Butler, Dame Marie Benedict Dalton, Dame Marie Scholastique Lynch, Dame Marie Bernard Lynch, and Marie Benedict Byrne.

So much for the convent; now for the flag. The flag was brought; and it turned out not to be a blue flag at all. Blue was only part of a flag which had been originally blue, red and saffron or yellow. An aged Irish nun who remembered seeing the flag in its original form said:—

‘It was attached to a stick, and I remember reading on a slip of paper which was on the flag “Remerciements Refuged at Ypres, 170 . . .” The flag consisted of three parts—blue with a harp, red with three lions, and yellow. The red and yellow parts were accidentally destroyed, and all that remains is the blue, as you see it, with a harp; and we have also preserved one of the lions. The story that has come down to us is that it was left here after the battle of Ramillies I think, but whether it was the flag of the Irish Brigade, or an English flag captured by them at the battle, I do not know.’

The flag of course—blue with a harp, red with three lions, and yellow—suggests the royal standard of England, with a difference. At the time of the battle of Ramillies the royal standard of England consisted of four quarterings.

On the first quarter was the *fleur-de-lys*; on the second, yellow, with the Scotch lion; on the third blue, with harp; on the fourth, red with three lions. But this (the Ypres) flag had only three quarterings; blue with harp, red with three lions, and yellow apparently without any lion. At the famous battle of 1706, the Irish Brigade was posted in the village of Ramillies. They fought with characteristic valour, giving way only when the French were beaten in another part of the field. The Brigade was commanded by Lord Clare, who fell in the fight. Charles Forman writes in a letter published in 1735:—

At Ramilles we see Clare's regiment shining with trophies and covered with laurels even in the midst of a discomfited routed army. They had to do with a regiment which, I assure you, was neither Dutch nor German, and their courage precipitated them so far in pursuit of their enemy that they found themselves engaged at last in the throng of our army, where they braved their fate with incredible resolution. If you are desirous to know what regiment it was they engaged that day, the colours in the cloister of the Irish nuns at Ypres, which I thought had been taken by another Irish regiment, will satisfy your curiosity.

Mr. Matthew O'Conor, in his *Military Memoirs of the Irish Nation*, says:—

Lord Clare . . . cut his way through the enemy's battalions, bearing down their infantry with matchless intrepidity. In the heroic effort to save his corps he was mortally wounded, and many of his best officers were killed. His Lieutenant, Colonel Murrough O'Brien, on this occasion evinced heroism worthy of the name of O'Brien. Assuming the command, and leading on his men with fixed bayonets, he bore down and broke through the enemy's ranks, took two pair of colours from the enemy, and joined the rere of the French retreat on the heights of St. Andre.

Forman does not state to what regiment the colours belonged. O'Callaghan, in his history of the Irish Brigade, quotes him as saying: 'I could be much more particular in relating this action, but some reasons oblige me, in prudence, to say no more of it.'

O'Conor says that the colours belonged to a celebrated English regiment. O'Callaghan is more precise. He says :—

According to Captain Peter Drake, of Drakerath, County of Meath (who was at the battle with Villeroy's army, in De Couriere's regiment), Lord Clare engaged with a Scotch regiment in the Dutch service, between whom there was a great slaughter ; that nobleman having lost 289 private centinels, 22 commissioned officers, and 14 sergeants ; yet they not only saved their colours, but gained a pair from the enemy. This Scotch regiment in the Dutch service was, by my French account, 'almost entirely destroyed' ; and, by the same account, Clare's engaged with equal honour the 'English Regiment of Churchill,' or that of the Duke of Marlborough's brother, Lieutenant-General Charles Churchill, and then commanded by its Colonel's son, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Churchill. This fine corps, at present the 3rd Regiment of Foot, or the Buffs, signalized itself very much in the action with another, or Lord Mordaunt's, 'by driving three French regiments into a morass, where most of them were either destroyed, or taken prisoners.' But the 'Régiment Anglois de Churchill,' according to the French narrative, fared very differently in encountering the Regiment of Clare, by which its colours were captured, as well as those of the 'Régiment Hollandois,' or 'Scotch regiment in the Dutch service.'

The question may, or may not, be problematical, but it seems to me that what I saw in the convent at Ypres was a remnant of one of the flags captured, according to the authorities I have quoted, by the Irish Brigade from a British regiment at the battle of Ramillies.

R. BARRY O'BRIEN.

AT TÁ LAARS I DTÁOBH CEANNANSA

ST. PATRICK'S CHURCH AT THE FORD OF THE TWO FORKS

IN the brief list of Patrician churches in Bregia given in the *Book of Armagh*, 'Ecclesia Cerne,' the church of Cerne, is given the second place: 'De ecclesiis quas fundavit in Campo Breg, primum in Culmine; ii. *ecclesia Cerne*, in qua sepultus est Hercus qui portavit mortalitatem magnam; iii. in cacuminibus aisse,' etc.—Fol. 10.

The location of this church has not so far been discovered. Archbishop Healy hints in his recent work that it might be discovered in Ardcarne in Co. Meath; it will, however, be seen that its place is amongst the historic hills of Bregh in the townland of Carntown, to the north of Drogheda in the county of Louth. There is a field in that townland in which the faintest outlines of a church may be traced whose name is Killafaddhy, and quite close to it in a neighbouring field a well called Tobberiverky or Tobberiverhy. The well is considered a holy well although until recently it was scarcely more than a mere pool from which cattle were indiscriminately allowed to drink and into which every pollution was allowed to stray. But abandoned as it was, the old name clung to it, and the odour of sacred tradition lingered round it, and the owner becoming ashamed of its condition rebuilt the well and rescued it somewhat from its swampy desecrated condition. There can scarcely be any reasonable doubt that since we have preserved in Carntown the ancient designation *cerne*, that Tobberiverky finds its true Irish form in *Tobair Erci*, St. Erc's Well, and that the word Killafaddhy is the corrupted survival of *Cill Phátriáig*, St. Patrick's Church. In the traditions of the neighbourhood not a trace of St. Erc's memory has trickled down to the twentieth century, and no recollection of St. Patrick's connexion with the spot has survived. However, the preservation of the names of

the well and the field, fortunately reveals a most interesting fact, for it will be found that this church of Carntown is the identical church that St. Patrick is recorded to have founded at the famous *vadum Duarum Furcarum*, the Ford of the Two Forks.

The townland of Carntown is separated on the north from the townland of Ballymackenny, by a small stream which rises towards the west in the hills of Sliabh Bregh, and which in its south-eastward flow forms the dividing line between the two townlands. The Ballymackenny road, which is traditionally said to be the oldest route from Drogheda to the North of Ireland, dips gradually down as it passes through the townland of Carntown, crosses the little stream by Ballymackenny bridge, and rises gradually again on the northern bank as it wends its way through the village of Ballymackenny. The ford at the bridge will be found to be the ancient $\Delta\ddot{\epsilon}\,\ddot{\Omega}\,\ddot{\alpha}\,\ddot{\lambda}\ddot{\alpha}\ddot{\eta}\ddot{\gamma}$. The village and townland of Ballymackenny seem to have taken their name from the saint venerated at the first of December in the *Martyrology of Donegal*. There was a church in this townland dedicated to him, as the following excerpt from the *Black Book of Christ Church* proves¹ :—

The Priory of the Holy Trinity, Dublin, had a cell of three Canons in the diocese of Armagh, endowed with the churches of St. Mary of Drumsalan (where they had their residence and served the church), and Philipstown Nugent, with the chapels of Drummorcher and *Hechmachyne*, and also a wood and two carucates of land, the gift of Philip Nugent, some time before 1288 rectius 1248. But we are told that Albert (who was Archbishop of Armagh from year 1240-1247) desiring to reform the state of religion and considering the situation of this cell from Dublin, did suppress same.

The ruins of Drumshallon church still exist to testify to their former magnificence and importance, and are situate about a mile to the north of Ballymackenny village. The site of the Philipstown church is also identifiable; it stood upon the summit of a noble eminence in the present townland of Philipstown, and the *relg* or cemetery that stood

¹ Vide Archdall's *Monasticon*, p. 461.

beside it is still pointed out. Drummorcher in all probability stood within the confines of the townland now known as Brownstown. There exist in that townland the remains of an old church whose foundation is attributed to St. Patrick, and which is said to have been served by the priests of Drumshallon. There can, therefore, be no mistaking *Hechmachnyne*. Its Irish equivalent is *Teac mic Cainne*, which signifies the Church of St. Mac Cainne, and it undoubtedly stood in the graveyard of Ballymackenny, on the very spot from which the Protestant church of Ballymackenny raises its graceful spire to-day. The St. Mac Cainne from whom Ballymackenny takes its name must be the holy bishop commemorated under the date 1st December in the *Martyrology of Donegal*: 'Dec. 1. Mac Cainne Eps. o atha dha laarg i taobh Cheanannsa :— St. Mac Cainne, Bishop, from the Ford of the Two Forks beside Ceanannus.'

We are driven to this conclusion principally by the fact that the second church in these Meathian districts, credited in the *Tripartite Life* to St. Patrick, is that of *At Óa Laois*. The first church being that of Donough-Patrick, which he measured out for Prince Connall. In the list of churches in the *Book of Armagh*, the church of Cerne, which we have shown stood in Carntown, is given the second place, and evidently the compiler of that list looked upon it as identical with *At Óa Laois*. We have therefore apparently identified the location of the two churches which our ancient authorities attribute to *At Óa Laois*.—St. Mac Cainne's Church and St. Patrick's. The church of Ballymackenny is removed a few hundred yards to the north from the bridge, and the church site in Carntown stands at about the same distance to the south of the bridge.

'But, then, how can the Ballymackenny bridge, or rather the ford there, be accounted as *i Taobh Ceannans*, or 'beside Ceanannus'? All our antiquaries were of the belief that Ceanannus in that sentence in Tirechan, and in the *Martyrology of Donegal*, was intended for Ceanannus in the present county of Meath, and now known as Kells. However, we

think that we can show that there is reason for believing that there was more than one place of that name in the royal kingdom of Tara, and that a second Ceanannus may be looked for beside or near to the Ballymackenny ford.

In the *Annals of the Four Masters* we are told under the year

3991. After Finnailches had been twenty years in the sovereignty of Ireland he fell in the battle of Breagh by Bearnghal, son of Gedhe Ollghothach. It was by Fiacha Finnailches that Dun Chuile Sibrinne, i.e. Ceanannus, was erected. *Wherever his habitation was [placed] Ceanannus was its name.* It was by this king that the earth was first dug in Ireland that water might be in wells, etc.

The sentence 'Wherever his habitation was [placed] Ceanannus was its name,' clearly implies that there was more than one royal seat of his in his kingdom of Meath, endowed with the name Ceanannus. Was there such a spot near Ballymackenny? We think, if we consider the doubts carefully that have perplexed our historians regarding the place of the great National Synod of 1152, that we may have no difficulty in presuming that there was. It is rather extraordinary that the *Four Masters* and the *Annals of Innisfallen*, both venerable authorities, have placed that Synod at Drogheda. A writer in Ware, we are informed, placed the Synod at Mell, which is practically the same as Drogheda. On the other hand, Ware himself says that the weight of opinion favours Ceanannus. Keating, following the *Book of Clonenagh*, placed the Synod at Ceanannus, and Colgan, following Keating, ascribed it to the same spot. Now, if we understand that in the parish of Drogheda there existed a place of that name, a royal hill once the habitation of kings called Ceanannus, we at once, by placing the church of the assembly upon that hill, reconcile the apparent disagreement between the venerable authorities upon our history on this important point, and establish the identification we have made of *Δε τὸ Διοικητόν*.

It is sad that no trace of the ancient designation Ceanannus has survived about Drogheda. But we think,

as it must have been within the parish of Drogheda and quite near to Ballymackenny and Carntown, that the hill in Philipstown townland was the scene of this great assembly. The hill is a noble eminence, a fitting place of abode for the royal ruler of Tara. It is seated amongst the heights of Bregh, and, being 280 feet above the sea level, it rises in kingly grandeur and dominates the verdant country around it. The name Ceanannus is long lost, and no wonder, seeing that as early as the thirteenth century it was known as Philipstown. A church then stood upon its summit which must have been the scene of the great assembly of 1152. There are two wells upon its slopes with Irish names, Tobberapeep, as one of them is called, and the other Tobberamall. This latter name cannot fail to remind us of *Vadum Molae*, the Ford of Mola, which Tirechan shows was not far removed from $\Delta\acute{c}\; \grave{O}\alpha\; \grave{L}\alpha\alpha\grave{r}\beta\gamma$. Everything tends to confirm the identification we have made. We can understand the *Four Masters*, then, and the *Annals of Innisfallen* accrediting the Synod to Drogheda seeing that it was here upon this Philipstown hill, in the parish of St. Peter's, Drogheda, that it was held. $\Delta\acute{c}\; \grave{O}\alpha\; \grave{L}\alpha\alpha\grave{r}\beta\gamma$ is near to it, being only a short mile to the north of it.

We are now in a position to supply an elencha that occurs in the text in the *Book of Armagh*, in which Tirechan defines the position of $\Delta\acute{c}\; \grave{O}\alpha\; \grave{L}\alpha\alpha\grave{r}\beta\gamma$, 'Vadum duarum Furcarum,' he says, 'id est da loarce juxta Cenendas [] jeg.' Where the brackets stand it is evident that some letters are lost, but as the Ceanannus to which he refers was seated in the hills of Bregh the missing link may be supplied, and the complete sentence should read, 'Vadum duarum Furcarum id est da loarce juxta Cenenadas [Sleibhe Br]eg.'

There does not seem to be much difficulty in identifying the St. Erc of Carntown. The compiler of the list of churches in the *Book of Armagh* informs us he is buried here. He must be a different person therefore from the Erc, son of Daig, who was the first to rise amongst the courtiers at Tara upon Patrick's entry into the royal hall. His relics, Murchu Maccu Mactheni informs us, were pre-

served at Slane. The writer supplies us with a further clue to his identification. *Portavit*, he says, *mortalitatem magnam*, which we believe is rendered into English by the vulgar phrase we so often hear amongst the peasantry, 'He brought a long day.' He lived a very long life, and he seems therefore identical with St. Erc, Bishop of Lilcaig and Ferta Feic. 'His age was four score and ten years when he died,' a life sufficiently long even in the days of the sixth century to justify the phrase in the *Book of Armagh* 'Portavit mortalitatem magnam.' In the *Annals of the Four Masters* we find the following entry :—

A.D. 512. Saint Erc, Bishop of Lilcaig and Ferta Fer Feic by the side of Sidhe Truim to the west, died on the second day of the month of November. His age was four score and ten years when he departed. This Bishop Erc was Judge to Patrick. It was for him Patrick composed the quatrain :—

' Bishop Erc,
Everything he adjudged was just
Everyone that passes a judgment
Shall receive the blessing of Bishop Erc.'

In the list of the companions of Patrick, also, his name occurs, and he is described as 'Patrick's sweet-spoken judge.' We may well believe that in the *Four Masters* we have given us in the names Lilcaig and Ferta Fer Feic the extent of the diocese ruled by Bishop Erc. Ferta Fer Feic is to be understood as Slane, and may well be intended to designate the western portion of his diocese, Lilcaig, on the other hand, as it is named first, may be taken as designating the most important portion of it in which he lived and where he was buried. We believe that Lilcaig describes the eastern end of his diocese. No trace of this name, however, has survived.

There are other saints connected with *Δε Λαργ* whose names and memory have been completely lost. It was to this spot Patrick came after the celebration of the Pasch, with the honours of his victories at Tara fresh upon him. 'The Pasch being therefore finished on the next day Patrick came to *vadum duarum Furcarum* and founded a church

there, and left the three brothers there with their sister, viz., Cathaceus and Cathurus and Catnean; and Catnea, the sister who used to milk the deer.' The story of the holy *cailin* Catnea milking the wild hinds was fresh in Tirechan's time for, as he tells us, he heard it from the elders. But the elders of our time have never heard the faintest echo of that story, although indeed in the topography of the district we find reason for believing that it was once noted for its deer.

In Credhe's lament for her lover, translated for us in Standish O'Grady's *Silva Gadelica*, page 122, there occurs very touching reference to the doe of Drumsullen, that very probably is to be associated with this district :—

A woeful note, and O a woeful note is that which the thrush in Drumqueen emits! but not more cheerful is the wail that the blackbird makes in Letterlee. A woeful sound and O a woeful sound is that the deer utters in Drumdaleish! *dead lies the doe of Drumsullen, the mighty st.ig bells after her.*

Drumsullen, we think, is no other than the present Drumshallon. Colgan and Lanigan and Archdall thought that Drumshallon should be identified with Ḍúimhín. But that identification has been clearly shown to be erroneous. And this touching reference to 'the dead doe' seems referable to the district of Catnea, which clearly abounded in deer.

And the saintly Bishop Cethucus of Domnach Sairige was also connected with this church, for it was at *At Óa Laois*, as the *Tripartite* tells us, that he was accustomed to celebrate the little Pasch with Comgilla, commemorating in all probability Patrick's coming there. The church, therefore, was justly celebrated, having had association with so many of Patrick's saintly friends.

There remains yet another legend in St. Patrick's life that was attributed to this district :—

Another time when Patrick was at rest in the end of the night at Tiprad Cernai in Tir Tipraids, the angel went to him and awoke him. Patrick said to him, 'Is there anything in which I have offended God, or is His anger upon me?' 'No,' said the angel, 'and you are informed from God,' added the

angel, 'if it is your desire that there shall be no share for any else in Erin but for you alone. And the extent of the termon of your See from God is to Droma Bregh and to Sliabh Mis and to Bri Airghi.' Patrick replied, 'My debroth truly,' said Patrick, 'sons of life will come after me, and I wish they may have honour from God in the country after me.' The angel responded, 'That is manifest. And God gave all Erin to you,' said the angel, 'and every noble that will be in Erin shall belong to you.' 'Deo Gratias,' said Patrick.

Tipraíd-Cernai is easily identified. It is the townland upon the ridges of Sliabh Bregh above the townland of Carntown known to-day as Tobbera. The local pronunciation of the name brings us still closer to the spelling in the *Tripartite*, for the people of the locality call it Thibbras, i.e., the wells. The district is noted for the number of small streams that bubble up over its surface to form wells. Here, then, on the very spot designated by the angel as the southern terminus of Patrick's See, Droma Bregh, is this messenger from God represented as defining the extent of his territory for Patrick. And these ridges of Bregh appear to have continued to mark the southern limit of the archdiocese of Armagh as late as the Synod of Rathbreasal. For there the archdiocese was reckoned to have extended from Sliabh Bregh, not from the Boyne, as it now does, to Cuaille Cianachta. That remarkable circumstance justifies us, we think, in believing that the country falling between the Drumanna Bregh and the Boyne and extending, as we have remarked, from Slane eastwardly towards Ballymackenny or Lilcaig, was the ancient diocese under the jurisdiction of St. Erc. It will have been remarked, moreover, that in defining the extent of the diocese of Duleek at the same Synod, that its northern front was set down as Sliabh Bregh. Seemingly, therefore, the tract of land under notice or part of it belonged to the diocese of Duleek as lately as the twelfth century.

T. GOGARTY.

SUBJECT AND OBJECT IN KNOWLEDGE AND CONSCIOUSNESS—II

I

IN every science ambiguity of language is a fertile source of misunderstanding. Error is the inevitable outcome of using the same words in different, and often widely divergent senses. And in philosophy these errors are all the more mischievous inasmuch as the subject matter is here of the highest importance. For, philosophy deals with those ultimate issues which determine a man's whole outlook on life: his character, his conduct, his activity, his religion, the whole tenor of his life, must be influenced by what he thinks and believes about his origin, his nature, his place and significance in the universe, his final destiny; about his personal dependence on a Supreme Being, his free will, his immortality: all of which are, *par excellence*, questions of philosophy. It is a primary duty of the philosopher, therefore, to eliminate, as far as he can, all ambiguity from the language he uses. As far as he can—for even had he the best will in the world, and sinned less by carelessness herein than scientists in other departments, he could not eliminate all possibility of equivocation. This is an imperfection inherent in human language; and no instance, I think, in the whole vast field of philosophy has given rise to greater confusion than the use and abuse of the terms *object*, *objective*, *objectivity*; *subject*, *subjective*, *subjectivity*, *subjectivism*.

Anyone who is at all familiar with current philosophical speculations, and especially with the philosophical aspects of religious controversies, will know how unceremoniously these terms are bandied about either as epithets of reproach or as party watchwords. Truth, however, is not discovered by the mere adoption or rejection of this or that particular '-ism.' We must learn first what it is that underlies the '-ism'—and for this end we may need to prosecute some pretty close scrutiny and analysis.

Every act of knowledge or cognition involves something 'known' by that act: we cannot know without knowing *something*; and this *something* we call the 'object,' the 'known object,' the *objectum cognitum*. It is called 'object' because it is *ob-jectum, thrown or cast*, as it were, *before* the knowing agent, the mind. This 'throwing' is, of course, not necessarily to be taken in its literal sense, as applying exclusively to a material thing cast into a place in front of another material thing; it simply means the coming into consciousness, the appearance or manifestation within the sphere of conscious life, of something not already present there: this something which thus emerges into, and reveals itself within, consciousness, may not be a material 'thing' at all, but an abstraction, a relation, a negation,—something which, though not material, we must perforce describe analogically in language borrowed from material 'things.' I may observe here, too, that this account of the 'object' as a something which emerges into the sphere of the knowing mind, implies no theory as to whether the former is wholly or partially created or produced by, or wholly or partially distinct from, the knowing mind itself.

I have just referred to the knowing agent or mind. This, too, is necessarily involved in all knowledge. It seems to me that, constituted as we are, and endowed as we are with the actual mental experience of our own 'selves' from childhood, we cannot think of that mental activity, which we call 'cognition' or 'knowledge,' except as the activity of *somebody* or *something*, of some agent,—which we call 'mind,' and which we refer to as the mental, or conscious, or cognitive, or knowing subject, the *subjectum cognoscens*. I am not here formulating any theory, but merely noting the fact that it seems a necessity of thought on our part to regard the cognitive act as thus implying subject no less than object. 'Subject' is the name we give to the being we thus necessarily conceive to 'underlie' (*sub-jacere*) and support these cognitive states: whatever sort of being this 'mind' may be, whether substance or accident, changeless or ever changing, permanent or tran-

sient, material or spiritual, identical with or distinct from, the 'objects' of which it becomes aware.

II

In mature life we have no difficulty in identifying and locating this 'subject,' and marking it off from 'other' things. Our own individual 'selves' we regard as so many 'subjects' of mental activity and life, distinct really, as beings, from one another and from the rest of the material universe, organic and inorganic. In those conscious, bodily 'selves,' moreover, we may discern, or think we discern, or at all events persuade ourselves of the existence of, a distinction of some kind or other between an element possessed by us in common with the material universe, and which we call the 'body,' and a 'conscious' or 'cognitive' element which we somehow set over against the body, and which we call the soul. But the nature of the relation between these two ingredients of our own being, matter and mind, is not revealed to us in consciousness. We argue and doubt and disagree as to whether they are really one, known from two sides,—a double-faced entity,—or really two, united into one composite itself; and as to whether some of the cognitive activities of this 'self' have not as partial subject the material element, while others are such that they can have as subject only a higher or immaterial or spiritual factor in our composite being.

In other words, no sooner do we reach mature life than we begin to *reflect*, to analyse our beliefs and convictions about our own 'selves' and 'others' into their ultimate data, and to inquire if, or how far, those beliefs and convictions are well grounded. For instance, among other questions we may ask (*a*) about *ourselves*: How have I come to know or be aware of 'myself'? Or can the 'self' I know be my *real* 'self'? For, the real self is the *knowing* self, the self that is the *subject* of the act of knowing; and how can this knowing self be identical with the self *revealed* to it by the act of knowing the *known* or *phenomenal* self that is the *object* of the act of knowing? Or can it be

possible that, in an act of knowing, the *subject* may become and be the *object*? And (b) about 'others' than ourselves we might ask questions such as these: Can it be possible that the 'object' of my knowledge is ever *really distinct from*, or 'other' than myself, the knowing subject? For, if a necessity of thought forces me to regard the act of knowledge as involving a duality of subject and object, I am no less imperatively obliged to regard that same act of knowledge as implying, quite as essentially, an identity or unity or union of *known object* with *knowing subject*. I cannot conceive it possible for me to know an object completely other than, and isolated and separated from, myself. Knowledge implies a relation of union of some sort or other of *object* with *subject*: *cognitum est in cognoscente*, as the scholastics say. But if the known object is in the knowing subject, if the object of my knowledge is *in myself*, a mode or state of my own conscious being, what rational guarantee have I for believing that the 'choir of heaven and furniture of earth' are really other than, or exist independently of, my own mind?

III

Those two groups of questions suggest some of the starting-points from which people often move towards some form or other of what is commonly called by philosophers the system of Phenomenism or Phenomenal Idealism. And it may be well to note here what even idealist philosophers admit: that men are naturally—instinctively we may say, by natural impulse—realists, i.e. believers in the real 'otherness' of material things and in the real abiding existence of these 'other' things as well as of their own 'selves' independently of their transient and ever changing actual conscious states; that Realism has the *jus primi occupantis*, that it is in possession of men's minds, so to speak, prior to idealism; that the latter comes later, being suggested by the reflex, critical analysis of our direct and spontaneous mental beliefs.

Now, the starting point of the philosopher in this work

of reflexion is—*himself* as he finds himself when he begins to reflect. He, himself, with all his opinions and beliefs, is the great standing fact which he sets himself to account for and explain. But, finding that, as I have just said, realism, natural realism—call it even naïve or childlike realism if you will—has been in possession, it would be, I think, very reasonable on his part, very much in accordance with 'sound common sense' in the best meaning of the phrase, if he were to undertake to defend, *judiciously* of course, his inherited patrimony of realism, and to hold on to it until it be perhaps dislodged or disproved by idealism, always throwing the *onus probandi* on the latter side. Not that he should start with a merely blind prejudice in favour of realism, or try to shirk or close his mind to its difficulties, or be afraid to doubt and question and sift—boldly no less than prudently—all of his beliefs that he may find reason so to question. No; St. Thomas doubted as fearlessly as ever did Descartes, but being a better psychologist than the latter, he did not delude himself, as Descartes did, into the belief that he was seriously doubting where doubt was a psychological impossibility; and so must everyone who goes in search of truth bring to the investigation a perfectly open and unbiassed mind. This, however, need not prevent us from taking ourselves for what we are—natural realists all,—and working cautiously *backward* from the *present* state of our individual mental life to our *past* and more elementary mental experiences, and *inward* from our complex cognitions of *other* things to the simpler data, within our *selves*, from which this knowledge of *otherness* was elaborated. And this is the method that has always characterized Scholastic Philosophy: it has ever anchored itself, so to speak, to the rock of Realism, sustaining and defending the *real otherness* of some objects of knowledge as opposed to the '*self*'-ness of the knowing subject.

A standpoint which is partially different from, though not entirely opposed to, the one just suggested, may, however, be adopted. It is reached somewhat in this way. Reflecting on some or all of the questions and problems of

which I have given samples above ;¹ influenced by various facts (or supposed facts) brought to light in tracing *backward* the *past* growth and development of his own individual mind ; considering the vague, undefined, *internal* or 'self' character of his earlier conscious states and the absence of any marked *outer* or 'non-self' reference from them ; and at a loss, moreover, how to conceive that he could possibly know anything 'other' than or 'distinct' from his own 'self' : pondering on these things he may be led to assume, as starting-point for his philosophical investigations, the idealist, rather than the realist attitude, allowing himself to be barricaded as it were by the last-mentioned difficulty within the confines of his own consciousness and refusing to emerge therefrom on the plea that someone—some realist, I suppose—must first build a bridge for him over the abyss that he believes his own consciousness to have cleft between itself and—reality !

But metaphors are often misleading, and they are likely to hamper rather than to help us here. Nor have I any doubt that the impartial observer of these two attitudes just contrasted will feel instinctively that they have much more in common than the metaphors might lead one to believe. The latter or idealist attitude is characteristic of the majority of present-day philosophical systems. I do not say just now that it is erroneous ; for it is not *evidently* so. What is evident, I think, about it is this, that it can scarcely be said to be *initial* in the strict sense of the word. When a man commences to philosophize, i.e. to subject his spontaneous beliefs to the control of reflex reasoning and analysis, he does not find himself naturally in the idealist position : he has got to work himself into it. And the question at once occurs : Is he justified or not, has he been right or wrong, in assuming that attitude or allowing himself to drift into it ?

IV

With a view to some sort of comparison of both attitudes (and their respective issues) with each other, it will be ne-

¹ Vide p. 483.

cessary to attempt an answer to the first question of the first group (*a*) outlined above: How have I come to possess my own present knowledge, or awareness, or consciousness of myself? An analysis of this question will put us in a better position for facing this problem: (1) Whether I am justified in believing (Realism) or in disbelieving (Phenomenal Idealism), or in doubting (Agnosticism) that my sense knowledge reveals to me the existence—and, to some extent, the nature—of a material world other than, distinct from and independent of, my (*knowing* and *known*) self; and this deeper problem still: (2) Whether all this vast material *phenomenal* totality, which reveals itself to me in external and internal sense knowledge as existing in time and space, and which I have instinctively learned to discriminate into two sections, one revealed to me as 'non-self,' the other as 'self,' is identical with, and is in fact, REAL BEING—the *non-self* 'phenomenon' being a real, material universe, the *self* 'phenomenon' being identical with, and none other than, the *knowing* subject, my *real* self (Realism); or whether, on the contrary, this *non-self* world revealed in sense knowledge is a *mere* 'phenomenon' or 'appearance,' while the *real non-self* world remains unrevealed and unknowable; and whether even this 'phenomenal' *self* revealed to me, the *knowing* subject, is also a *mere* appearance while my *real* self—I, the thinking, knowing, conscious, subject—likewise transcend the scope of my own knowledge and remain unknowable (Kantian, Transcendental Idealism or Phenomenism, Agnosticism).

I feel that this summary presentation of possible alternatives cannot be very clear or satisfactory, but it will indicate in a general way the direction in which these alternatives lie; and that, for the present, will suffice.

I feel too, and it may be as well to state it here, that some of the supposed differences between Scholastic Realism and Kantian Positivist Phenomenism are not at all so wide as they are often represented to be; that some of them are more apparent than real, being rather differences in language than in thought; that there is some truth

common to all these views ; that there can be no danger in our candidly giving credit for this common stock of truth to the systems we reject as well as to that we accept, provided we remember that it is just on account of the element of truth they possess that false systems of philosophy are all the more dangerous ; that there can be no danger either in comparing those we hold to be unsound with the one we accept ourselves, in showing how far they agree and where exactly are the partings of the ways : provided we remember that the initial divergences which we may detect, though so small as easily to escape notice altogether, are of supreme importance, just precisely because if they are overlooked or ignored the unsound system which has taken some of these wrong initial steps will easily appear to be very sane and reasonable, and will readily come to enjoy the widespread acceptance accorded in modern times to such systems as Kantism in all its various phases.

v

Reverting now to the question proposed above, it will be needful to recall a distinction already referred to¹ between sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge. The broad line of demarcation revealed in consciousness between these two great sections of cognitive energy, is so manifest to any normal man reflecting on his mental life that it is perceived and admitted universally : what we call our *sense perception* of concrete, individual things and events occurring and moving in time and space either outside or inside what we call our organic, bodily selves, is a very different quality or kind of consciousness from what we call our conception of abstract, universal essences and relations, in their static, unchanging condition. No doubt there are endless theories as to the nature, properties, origin and mutual relations of these two fields of cognitive energy, but that they are really and distinctly there few will venture, I think, to deny.

¹ Cf. I. E. RECORD, April, p. 397.

And the distinction has a more or less important bearing on the question under consideration: How does the individual come to have that knowledge of his own 'self,' of which we find him in possession in mature life?

In a former article,¹ assuming the scholastic view of sense knowledge as being cognition exercised only in and through a material, extended organ, I reached this conclusion: that it is difficult to see how a mere sense faculty thus acting in and through extended matter and intrinsically dependent on that matter as a *com-principium*—a partial, co-operating principle of the cognitive energy,—could, as cognitive *subject*, become aware or conscious of itself as *object* in the very act of perceiving something else as object.² I also pointed out that the *merely sentient consciousness* of their own organic functions and states, which animals are believed to have in common with men, can be satisfactorily explained by the functioning of the systemic and muscular senses, without supposing any one of these latter or any other sense faculty to be endowed with the capacity of becoming concomitantly aware of its own acts, and of itself in those acts. All this I might express briefly by saying that in no act of *sense-cognition* does the cognitive agent—the *subjectum cognoscens* itself—become aware of itself as a *phenomenon*, though it does become aware of *phenomena* which are *de facto* states and modes of itself: meaning by 'phenomenon' whatever is directly revealed in, or becomes direct object of, sense cognition.

VI

But all this does not carry us very far. If it is true it amounts simply to this, that had we sense knowledge *alone* in all probability we should not know ourselves as *knowing subjects*, or as *permanent, substantial 'selves'*, but only in the same way as we are sensibly aware of the ever-changing and intermittent contents and data of external and internal sense perception.

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*, pp. 411-414.

Of course as a matter of fact we do know—or believe we know—ourselves as substantially permanent, knowing subjects, identical with ourselves throughout all transient and remembered states; but this complex mass of convictions about 'self' will be found on analysis to be due to the higher or intellectual forms and functions of cognitive energy—which we shall examine further on—and not to lower or sensuous forms. We have no evidence that purely sentient beings can conceive 'self-ness' or 'otherness,' or apprehend a relation of *distinction* between their own 'selves' and 'others' or a relation of *identity* between their *present* 'selves' and the 'selves' which originally experienced their *remembered* states. Of course it is difficult to speak with certainty about the contents of animal consciousness or to decide what they do or do not know by means of the sense knowledge which alone we believe them to possess. There is between the higher manifestations of sense and the lower activities of intellect the debatable borderland of what is well known to psychologists under the doubtfully appropriate designation of 'animal intelligence'—a domain whose materials are diligently exploited both by those who maintain and by those who deny the fundamental and essential diversity of intellect from sense. I am well aware that there is much that is mysterious and difficult to explain in animal life no less than in human life, on any theory; but I believe that all those 'higher' activities of animal life which are called into play in the *association* of mental states and the manifestations of *memory* can be adequately explained, as they are actually revealed there, without postulating any suprasensible cognitive energy.

But—it will be asked—have not animals memory? And can they not distinguish between 'themselves' and 'others'? But to recognize an event as *past*, or to apprehend 'otherness,' is to conceive an abstract relation; and is not this the highest function of the so-called intellect?

There is ambiguity here. Animals have memory, certainly, and a perception of what we may call the flow of

time, and often an accurate appreciation of time-intervals¹—as of those between their meals, for example—and can locate a concrete, remembered event in the time series just as they locate a visible material object in space; but this does *not* imply that they form any abstract notion of 'past-ness' or 'present-ness.' A concrete object perceived in certain surroundings creates a different quality of consciousness from that created by the same object apprehended in a state of isolation. So, too, an object apprehended a second time—or recalled and represented in consciousness through some association of sensations—presents or produces a *different quality of feeling* from that excited by its first presentation. The animal is differently affected by it, and this difference of feeling—created by familiarity or repetition—sufficiently explains the 'recognition' which constitutes animal memory. The animal represents a 'past' event or a 'familiar' event *differently* from the same event if present for the first time; without, however, having any notion of 'pastness' or 'familiarity' or any other such relation in the abstract. The association of concrete sensuous images will explain these phenomena of animal life without postulating the existence of any formal act of comparing, judging, or relating abstract aspects of things.² Similarly, the animal distinguishes between 'itself' and 'others' merely in the sense that one vast associated group of sensations arising from its own organism affects it *differently* from another vast group coming from without: which difference it translates into action inasmuch as its appetitive and executive faculties are differently moved by these two qualities of consciousness; although the animal never becomes conscious or aware of any such object as a 'difference,' nor ever *knows what a 'difference' is.* It does not, therefore, 'distinguish' between 'self' and 'non-self' in the sense of comparing their various points of agreement or disagreement and

¹ Cf. Mercier, *Psychologie* (6th edit.), vol. i., pp. 300-306; Maher, *Psychology* (4th edit.), pp. 198, 199.

² 'The formal recognition . . . of agreement between a present representation and a past object or state must, on St. Thomas' principles, be deemed an act of intellect.'—Maher, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

apprehending an abstract relation of diversity and distinction or otherness between them.

VII

This question—whether recognition of a past event *as past* involves intellect, or only sense,—gave rise to a scholastic controversy closely analogous to the one I have already referred to¹ concerning the capacity of a sense faculty to become aware of its own acts or states. I should not have gone into it here but for the fact that it throws considerable light on the general question under consideration: How is it, namely, or through the exercise of what particular cognitive energies does it come to pass, that we find ourselves in possession of such a mass of convictions as we do actually possess in mature life concerning the existence and nature of our own selves? A common element in both disputes is the scholastic theory that the proper object of the intellect is the abstract, universal, possible essence, timeless, spaceless, and unchanging; while the proper object of sense is the concrete, individual, actual phenomenon, existing and occurring in time and space and subject to all their individualizing conditions. How, then—the question arose inevitably—can we have an *intellectual* apprehension of our own 'selves'?—or can we really have such an apprehension?—for the real self is singular and not universal, concrete and not abstract, actual and not possible. The answer is that the self undoubtedly possesses these characteristics as apprehended by sense cognition, but that these very characteristics furnish to the intellect—the abstractive faculty—the data for an abstract intellectual concept of this same 'self'-reality. How this intellectual representation is formed is, however, not made clear by scholastic writers.

VIII

The intellectual conception of the 'self' is only a particular case—though one with its own peculiarities—of the

¹ I. E. RECORD, April, p. 399; Maher, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-4.

wider problem: What is the nature and origin of our *intellectual* notions or representations of *individual* beings? That we have not merely a *sensible perception* but also an *intellectual conception* of these latter is inferred by scholastics from the fact that we predicate abstract and universal attributes of them in the mental act of judgment: we form such *singular* judgments as *John is a man*, *this pen is new*; therefore, the subject is in the same sphere of mental comparison as the predicate, or, in other words, we have an *intellectual* notion of it: the assumption being that judgment, or the perception of a relation of identity or diversity between two compared terms, is essentially an *intellectual* activity, and that the terms must therefore be products of mental activity of the same order. Scholastics themselves, however, are not unanimous in explaining the genesis of the *singular intellectual concept*; nor is diversity of view to be wondered at, for the step from sense knowledge to *intellectual* knowledge is more or less of a puzzle to philosophers of every school.¹

St. Thomas argues that we could not make our abstract concepts universal, we could not generalize them, unless we had an *intellectual* knowledge of the individuals with which we compare them, and in which we find them realized. But the roundabout process by which he believes this *intellectual* knowledge (of individuals, whether 'self' or

¹ The Scotists seem to have endowed the intellect with a capacity for *concrete* and *singular*, as well as for *abstract* and *universal*, representations. Cf. De Wulf, *Scholasticism Old and New*, p. 132. Judgment is regarded by Kant not as a comparison of two products of *intellectual abstraction*, within the sphere of intellect, but rather as a union or synthesis of a product of sense with an innate element of the intellect (*a form* or *category* of the understanding, as he called it). Thus, in Kant's system the *intellectual* and *sensuous* faculties meet (through the interposition of a supposed elaborate system of *schemata* of the imagination) *in* the act of judgment; in the scholastic system they meet *prior* to the act of judgment in the process of *abstraction*, wherein the understanding (through the interposition of the much simpler assumed agency of the *intellectus agens*) apprehends in an abstract and static condition the reality already apprehended in the concrete by the sense faculties. But in all systems alike the answer to the ultimate 'why?' of the connexion between sense knowledge and *intellectual* knowledge invariably refers us in one way or other to the fundamental consideration that it is one and the same *Ego*, or soul, or vital principle which is the source of both orders of knowledge in the individual mind.

'other') to be reached, shows pretty clearly, I think, that he has in view not any form of intellectual *consciousness* or *intuition* of the *existence* of the individual but an *inferential* knowledge of its *nature*, a knowledge which the intellect derives from a sort of reflex consideration of the sense-percepts and imagination-images (of the individual things) from which the *specific* and *generic* abstract concepts were derived—'per quamdam reflexionem, in quantum redit super phantasmata, a quibus species intelligibiles abstrahuntur.'¹

The process outlined by St. Thomas in the passages quoted in the footnote, I take to be something like the following: 'I am conscious that I have an abstract, universal idea of *human nature* (for example), of man as a *rational animal*; I am conscious (by the aid of memory) of having apprehended by my senses individual men, but never *human nature in the abstract*; I am convinced, however, that I apprehended this *human nature in the abstract* simultaneously with my sense-apprehension of individual men; but how? I could not have apprehended it were my intellect not stimulated by the action (*species intelligibilis*) of that reality upon it; and that reality, that abstract human nature, could not have acted on it were the former not somehow embodied in the concrete representation of the individual, in the image formed by the sense faculties which are rooted in the same substantial soul as my intellect; hence, I conclude that the object of my abstract idea—*animal rationale*—is realized in each concrete individual apprehended by my senses; I know intellectually *this*

¹ 'Non possemus cognoscere comparationem universalis ad particulare, nisi esset una potentia quae cognosceret utrumque. Intellectus igitur utrumque cognoscit, sed alio et alio modo. Cognoscit, enim naturam speciei, sive quod quid est, directe extendendo seipsum, ipsum autem singulare per quamdam reflexionem, etc.'—*De Anima*, iii., 8, apud Mercier, *Psychologie*, vol. ii., p. 39.

'Anima conjuncta corpori per intellectum cognoscit singulare, non quidem directe, sed per quamdam reflexionem, in quantum, scilicet, ex hoc, quod apprehendit suum intelligibile revertitur ad considerandum suum actum et speciem intelligibilem, quae est principium ejus operationis, et ejus speciei originem, et sic venit in considerationem phantasmatum et singularium quorum sunt phantasmata. Sed haec reflexio completri non potest, nisi per adjunctionem virtutis cogitativae et imaginativae.'—*Q. Un. de Anima*, a. 20, ad 1, apud Malier, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

visible object before me to be a man; I have thus this intellectual knowledge of the individual.

If this be St. Thomas' line of thought, the conclusion it establishes seems to be the fact of an intellectual conviction of the *real existence* (i.e. existence *for the intellect*—‘*noumenal*’ existence) of its own abstract and universal object in an ‘individualized’ condition in the particular *phenomenon* of sense experience: the fact of an inference that ‘this individual phenomenon,’ ‘*hoc aliquid concretum*’ (Aristotle’s *οὐσία πρώτη, substantia prima*, the ‘*sensibile per accidens*’ of the scholastics) must contain and have realized in it the abstract, universal ‘intelligible’ object or *noumenon*, ‘rational animal,’ for example, which is predicated of it in the act of judgment. But this, after all, is merely a discursive or inferential intellectual knowledge¹ that real individuals *must exist*, implying no doubt an abstract concept of *individuality* in general but leaving still untouched the question whether in singular judgments the intellect has any *intuition* of the *individual nature* analogous to its concept of the common, generic or specific nature which it predicated of the former. In other words, I may have an intellectual conviction that in the individual sense-phenomenon there is realized the abstract and universal noumenon, but there remains the difficulty that the intellectual knowledge thus arrived at (of ‘this individual’ as ‘a man’ or ‘a rational animal’) is a knowledge only of the *specific* nature of the individual, and that the present intuition of the concrete individual as such is still *sensible*.

IX

Undoubtedly the sense-percept or imagination-image is there in all its concrete fullness, and so vividly, as a rule, that it occupies almost the whole field of consciousness and leaves but a slender chance of our attending or adverting to any other concomitant mental representation of the

¹ Cf. Cajetan, in his Commentary on the *Summa* (1a, q. 57, art. 2): ‘Non adunantur in intellectu nostro cognitiones singularium sic quod ipse cognoscat singularia, nisi forte *argutive* et indirecte ex admixtione ad sensus.’—*Apud Mercier, loc. cit.*

individual if such there be. Yet, that there *is* there concomitantly with the sense image, an abstract intellectual concept of the *individual nature* (the *essentia atomica* as the scholastics called it) very little reflexion will suffice to show.

For, the abstractive power of the intellect does not stop short at the *generic* or *specific* attributes of the individual sense-datum, at those which this has in common with other similar sense-data ; on the contrary, corresponding to *every* single *peculiar* and *individualizing* feature in this present sense-datum this individual visible man, to his colour, size, figure, posture, clothes, etc., the intellect forms an abstract concept, no less than it does of the *common* or class attributes of the individual ; and thus it forms an intellectual synthesis of abstract notes or attributes each of which individually might be found in other individual men but all of which together form so large and unique a collection that *for all practical purposes* they are found to be realized in only the one single individual, though *being abstract* and therefore *potentially universal* they do not, rigorously speaking, form a '*singular*' intellectual concept : this latter in fact being psychologically impossible owing to the very nature of the process of intellectual abstraction.¹

The scholastics say we cannot comprehend the *atomic* (i.e. *individual*) essences of things but only the *common*, or *general* (*specific* or *generic*) essences by which we classify things in groups ; meaning thereby that all our intellectual knowledge of them is got by a synthesis of abstract notes. And this is true. But there is no reason why our knowledge should stop at any fixed *genera* or *species* : we may go on classifying things, or rather dividing things up, into smaller and smaller groups according as our analysis of the individuals reveals further differentiating characteristics. Thus our intellectual notions of the wider aspects common to *genera* and *species* will precede our richer and fuller ideas of the smaller groups, and our intellectual concept of the

¹ Venn (*Empirical Logic*, 1st edit., p. 175), expresses this view in reference to the *singular term* thus : ' . . . no combination of general names can ever yield anything but what is still strictly a general name, though we may happen to know that here and now we may safely employ it to designate some individual.'

individual will be formed *last of all* (while our sense-percept of the individual came *first of all*) ; and according as our intellectual knowledge thus descends from *genera suprema* to *individuals*, our concepts, while growing gradually narrower in *extent* or *application*, will be growing fuller in *intent* or *implication*, so that the individual 'concept' as it is called will involve in its comprehension a theoretically infinite multitude of notes or attributes.¹

Beyond doubt [writes Mercier²] the intellect has representations of individuals and distinguishes between them. But the individual object as seized by the intellect is formed by abstract notes, each of which is applicable to many individuals, though all combined are applicable to one alone.

And, further, whereas our *sense* knowledge of individuals precedes our intellectual knowledge of generic and specific types, this latter in turn precedes our intellectual knowledge of individuals.

Over and above our sense-knowledge, therefore, we possess each an *abstract*, *intellectual*, *singular*, concept of his own individual self. Whether or how far this concept enters into the constitution of higher or reflex self-consciousness, will be considered in a separate article.

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(To be continued.)

¹ Cf. Venn, *op. cit.*, p. 167 : ' . . . it is of the essence of a true general name to have actual or potential application to an indefinite number of objects. A combination of such names will certainly curtail the range of application, but it can no more restrict us to an individual than successive subdivision of an area can restrict us to a mathematical point.'

² *Psychologie*, vol. ii., p. 38.

THE DECREE 'LAMENTABILI SANE EXITU' AND MODERNISM—IV

In my last article¹ I explained those condemned propositions of the Decree '*Lamentabili*' which deal with the divinity of Christ, His resurrection, and His expiatory death for the sins of the world. In the present article I will bring my notes on the condemned propositions to a close. Nor is it necessary to go at great length into the matter of the remaining propositions. Once the general principles of Modernism are understood it is easy to divine what Modernists would hold about the Sacraments, the Church, and the immutability of dogma. I will confine myself, therefore, to a few brief observations on the propositions dealing with the Sacraments in general, the Sacraments individually, the Church, and Christian dogma.

I.—THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL

The first proposition condemned in the department of the Sacraments is of a general character:—

39. *Opiniones de origine Sacramentorum, quibus Patres Tridentini imbuti erant, quaeque in eorum canones dogmaticos procul dubio influxum habuerunt, longe distant ab iis quae nunc penes historicos rei christianaे indagatores merito obtinent.*

It is not surprising that the Modernists hold that the opinions entertained by the Tridentine Fathers about the origin of the Sacraments, and which, undoubtedly, must have influenced their dogmatic canons, are very different from the views which, they say, justly obtain among present-day investigators, from the historical side, of Christianity. The present-day investigators are the Modernists themselves and rationalist Protestants. The

¹ I. E. RECORD, Jan., 1908.

condemnation evidently falls on the adverb *merito*. It is not implied that one is bound to accept all the private sacramental opinions of the Tridentine Fathers, or to give them the same value as the dogmatic definitions. The statement is condemned that the opinions of the Tridentine Fathers differ widely from the opinions which *justly* obtain among the Modernists; because the Modernist theory of the Sacraments cannot itself be called a *just* or reasonable theory.

The Council of Trent teaches that the Sacraments were all instituted by Jesus Christ.

Modernists teach that the Sacraments originated and developed and multiplied by evolution. Jesus Himself, they say, was the product of evolution. In Him the divine in man reached its highest term of evolution. He was the divine personified, the God-Man. He neither prescribed for the Apostles, they say, nor did He follow Himself any other than the Jewish rule of public worship. He was not, however, opposed to the sacramental principle. He thought the end of the world was at hand, and that He would soon reign in the 'kingdom of heaven.' He 'conceived the kingdom of heaven as a real, external, visible society, where the individual was not alone with God, but went to God in the communion of his brethren; where interior justice revealed itself in works, and where the piety of the heart did not exclude the community public acts of religion.'¹ In thinking that the end of the world was at hand, Modernists admit, Christ was mistaken. He was put to an ignominious death, and He still dwells among the dead. But notwithstanding His ignominious death Christianity survived; and the Sacraments were instituted, they say, by the Apostles and the Church, aided by favourable circumstances and events, as an interpretation of that idea and intention which Christ had of establishing public worship in 'the kingdom of heaven.' This theory is condemned in the following proposition:—

40. *Sacmenta ortum habuerunt ex eo quod Apostoli*

¹ Loisy, *Autour d'un Petit Livre*, pp. 256, 257.

eorumque successores ideam aliquam et intentionem Christi, suadentibus et moventibus circumstantiis et eventibus, interpretati sunt.

The Sacraments—the Church teaches us—were instituted for our sanctification: they confer grace *ex opere operato*. According to the Reformers they serve as memorials of the Redemption and as signs of divine pre-dilection. And, according to the Modernists, their only purpose is to recall to our minds the ever beneficent presence of the Creator. Hence the following proposition has been condemned:—

41. *Sacramenta eo tantum spectant ut in mentem hominis revocent praesentiam Creatoris semper beneficam.*

II.—THE SACRAMENTS CONSIDERED INDIVIDUALLY

To explain, in detail, the teaching of the Modernists about the Sacraments individually, it may not be superfluous to recall again the Modernist teaching about Christ. Christ believed, they say, that the end of the world was at hand; and consequently He instituted neither a church nor sacraments. As He Himself might be considered by the scientist to be the product of natural selection, so by natural selection Christianity survived and triumphed in that terrible ordeal and struggle for existence which followed on the ignominious death of its Founder. Christianity survived and evolved itself into a society, whose peculiar organization and government and laws and worship have arisen, by evolution, like the organization of the civil state.

Then to consider the Modernist account of the Sacraments individually:—

1. *Baptism*.—It was not Christ, they say, that instituted the sacrament of Baptism during His life on earth. Considered historically, it was instituted and made obligatory by the Christian community itself as a rite of initiation into the society, and carrying with it the obligations of the Christian profession. It was suggested to the Apostles by the baptism of the proselyte Jews and by the baptism of

the Baptist.¹ Then—they say—the theory that Baptism was instituted by Christ, that it confers grace, that it imprints a character, originated at a later period. The text, John iii. 5, 'Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost he cannot enter the kingdom of heaven,' is not historic, they say; and the text, Matthew xxviii. 19, 'Baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,' is an addition dating from a later period. The theological teaching about Baptism, they say, supposes a theological system already established, whose doctrines were attributed by the sacred writers to Christ; or it was the expression of the religious sense, not addressed to the mind but to 'feeling,' expressing not mental truth but practical or regulative truth. It will easily be seen, then, why the following propositions were condemned:—

42. *Communitas christiana necessitatem baptismi induxit, adoptans illum tamquam ritum necessarium, eique professionis christianaee obligationes adnectens.*

43. *Usus conferendi baptismum infantibus evolutio fuit disciplinaris quae una ex causis extitit ut sacramentum resolveretur in duo, in baptismum scilicet et poenitentiam.*

The necessity of Baptism arose from a divine law and not from a rule of the Christian community. And the practice of infant Baptism does not mark a further stage of sacramental evolution within the society, carrying with it the differentiation of the primitive sacrament of initiation into two sacraments, Baptism and Penance. Though the discipline of infant Baptism is to some extent subject to and regulated by the laws of the Church, it has not been introduced by natural evolution, nor is the sacrament of Penance a new variety or species thrown off by evolution from the original primitive sacrament of Baptism; both sacraments, Baptism and Penance, were instituted by Christ Himself immediately.

2. *Confirmation.*—The following proposition is condemned: '44. There is no proof that the sacrament of

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 233.

Confirmation was administered by the Apostles ; the formal distinction of the two sacraments, Baptism and Confirmation, does not belong to the history of primitive Christianity.'

Some of the older scholastics held that Christ did not institute all the Sacraments immediately. They were doubtful, especially, about Confirmation and Extreme Unction ; and Alexander of Hales held that Confirmation was instituted by the Synod of Meaux, in the year 845, under a special inspiration or instinct of the Holy Ghost. If this were true Confirmation could not have been administered or known by the Apostles. But since the Council of Trent theologians do not consider themselves free to question the immediate institution of all the Sacraments by Christ. And we know from Scripture, or Tradition, or from both, that the Apostles administered the sacrament of Confirmation ; and that the distinction of Baptism and Confirmation is of divine institution.

The Holy Office, of course, was not concerned with the views of Alexander of Hales and the older scholastics. These views had long since become obsolete in Catholic schools. The Modernist view could be condemned on very special formal grounds ; partly because they deny the historical authority of the great dogmatic texts of Scripture, recognizing in them only practical truth, and partly because they regard Confirmation, like Penance, as in no sense really instituted by Christ, immediately or meditately, as having been developed by natural selection from the primitive sacrament of initiation. In the beginning, they would say, there was, with the Eucharist, only Baptism, which virtually, perhaps, contained the others ; and their formal differentiation and distinction was the work of later evolution and does not belong to the history of primitive Christianity.

3. *The Blessed Eucharist.*—Modernists had not the hardihood to deny, in clear unambiguous words, the doctrine of the Real Presence. Their mode of procedure was the following. Christ died, they said, and, to the historian, remained a dead man among the dead. Still Christianity

survived, and even began soon to receive new developments. Then the Apostolic writers began to conceive Christ—indifferent to the intellectual truth of these conceptions—as immortal in the kingdom of heaven, as risen from the dead, as Redeemer, as the Son of God, as consubstantial with the Father. It was St. Paul, they say, when starting to preach the Gospel to the Gentiles, who originated the theory that Christ died for all, Jews and Gentiles, that He redeemed all, that He offered Himself in sacrifice for all on Calvary. And it was St. Paul, too, they say, who originated the theory of the Eucharistic commemoration of Christ's death.¹ Neither theory, they say, is historical, neither is addressed to the intellect, neither expresses real historical truth, both are addressed to the religious conscience. Then St. Paul's account of the Last Supper influenced the Marcan narrative of the institution of the Holy Eucharist, and through it the account given by St. Matthew. The words, 'This is My blood of the New Testament,' etc., were added by St. Mark to an earlier simpler narrative.²

It is easy to see how this theory would affect faith in the Real Presence. Faith presupposes cognisance of the fact that God has made a revelation. To accept a truth on the authority of divine revelation, we must be certain that God has revealed that truth. But the Modernists strike at the historical truth of the Biblical records of the institution and revelation of the Blessed Eucharist, and consequently make it impossible to accept it with divine intellectual faith.

But there remains tradition, it may be said. Yes, but what kind of tradition? A tradition that Christ really instituted the Blessed Eucharist? No; only a tradition of the theological theory invented by St. Paul, which makes no claim to real intellectual truth, which is said to be addressed to the conscience or to the religious feeling, and to express practical and symbolic truth alone. Hence the Holy Office condemned the following proposition in which

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 237-8.

the historical truth of St. Paul's narrative of the Last Supper is called in question :—

45. Non omnia, quae narrat Paulus de institutione Eucharistiae, *1 Cor. xi. 23-25*, historice sunt sumenda.

4. *Penance*.—The Council of Trent¹ has defined that Penance is a sacrament; that it was instituted by Christ; that it is distinct from the sacrament of Baptism; that the words of our Lord,² 'Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose sins you shall forgive they are forgiven them, and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained,' are to be understood of the power of remitting and retaining sins in the sacrament of Penance, as they have been always understood by the Church. Shall we wonder then that the following propositions have been condemned :—

46. Non adfuit in primitiva Ecclesia conceptus de christiano peccatore auctoritate Ecclesiae reconciliato, sed Ecclesia nonnisi admodum lente hujusmodi conceptui assuevit. Imo etiam postquam poenitentia tanquam Ecclesiae institutio agnita fuit, non appellabatur sacramenti nomine, eo quod haberetur uti sacramentum probosum.

47. Verba Domini: Accipite Spiritum Sanctum; quorum remiseritis peccata, remittuntur eis, et quorum retinueritis, retenta sunt (*Jo. xx. 22 et 23*), minime referuntur ad sacramentum poenitentiae, quidquid Patribus Tridentinis asserere placuit.

It is, therefore, historically untrue that the primitive Church had no conception of the Christian sinner being reconciled to God by the authority of the Church. And though in the early ages the name 'sacrament' was generally reserved to the sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation and the Eucharist, it was not that Penance was considered a sacrament of reproach. Then underlying the Modernist exposition of the sacrament of Penance is the theory that Penance is a natural law or rule of forgiveness developed within the community, and that the dogmas of the divine institution of Penance, of its efficacy *ex opere*

¹ Sess. XIV., Cans. i-iii.

² John xx. 22, 23.

operato, of internal sanctification, are truths of faith (in the Modernist sense) and not of the speculative intellect.

5. *Extreme Unction*.—The Council of Trent has defined¹ that Extreme Unction is a sacrament instituted by Christ and promulgated by the Apostle St. James; that it confers grace, remits sins, and releaves the infirm. Hence the Holy Office has condemned the proposition (48) which states that St. James did not intend to promulgate a sacrament of Christ, and that he did not see in Extreme Unction a sacramental means of grace such as is conceived by the scholastic theologians.

6. *Holy Orders*.—The Council of Trent teaches² that there is in the New Testament a visible and eternal priesthood, with the power of consecrating and offering the true body and blood of Christ, and of remitting sin; that Ordination is a true sacrament instituted by Christ; that there is in the Catholic Church a hierarchy instituted by Christ and consisting of bishops, priests, and ministers. Christ, therefore, we say, instituted the presbyterate and the episcopate. But what is the Modernist conception of the priesthood and of the episcopate? First, they would say, Christ, who expected to reign immediately in the kingdom of heaven, had no thought of instituting the sacrament of the Real Presence, a commemorative sacrament, at the Last Supper. The Christian Eucharistic Supper began, historically, as a social supper commemorative of Christ's last supper with His Apostles. Gradually, however, it came to be conceived by the Christian conscience, by the religious 'feeling,' as a liturgical action, and those who used to preside at the supper began to be considered Christian priests. These theories were not addressed to the mind, nor were they understood to express real intellectual truth. They were addressed to the religious conscience or feeling, and expressed only practical truth. And, similarly, they would say, the episcopate was naturally evolved within the Christian community; the bishops were the elders appointed by the Apostles, not to perpetuate the Apostolate,

¹ Sess. XIV. Cans. 1.-ii., de Sacramento Extremae Unctionis.

² Sess. XXIII., Cans. 1, 3, 6.

but to provide for the overseeing and order of the increasing communities, somewhat in a Presbyterian sense. These theories are condemned in the following propositions :—

49. *Coena christiana paullatim indolem actionis liturgiae assumente, hi, qui Coenae praeesse consueverant, characterem sacerdotalem acquisiverunt.*

50. *Seniores qui in christianorum coetibus invigilandi munere fungebantur, instituti sunt ab Apostolis presbyteri aut episcopi ad providendum necessariae crescentium communitatum ordinationi, non proprie ad perpetuandam missionem et potestatem Apostolicam.*

7. *Matrimony.*—The Council of Trent defines¹ that Matrimony is one of the Seven Sacraments of the Evangelical law, instituted by Christ, and that it confers grace. Hence the Modernist proposition (51) is condemned, which states that 'it is only at a rather late period that Matrimony could have become a sacrament in the Church; for in order that Matrimony could be considered a sacrament the full theological exposition of the doctrine of grace and the sacraments should have preceded.' Matrimony, and indeed all the sacraments, preceded our systematized exposition of grace and the sacraments.

III.—THE CHURCH

The first proposition condemned under this heading is the following :—

52. *Alienum fuit a mente Christi Ecclesiam constituere veluti societatem super terram per longam saeculorum seriem duraturam; quin imo in mente Christi regnum coeli una cum fine mundi jamjam adventurum erat.*

No doubt if, as Modernists teach, the end of the world and the establishment of the kingdom of heaven had appeared to Christ to be at hand it would have been altogether foreign to His mind to constitute the Church as a

¹ Sess. XXIV., Can. i.

society that should last for ages. It is evident from this hypothesis that, according to the Modernists, the Church, as a permanent society, has not been established by Christ ; that it is the term of evolution in the religious order, as the State is the term of evolution in the civil order. Hence, too, the following condemned proposition :—

53. *Constitutio organica Ecclesiae non est immutabilis ; sed societas christiana perpetuae evolutioni aequa ac societas humana est obnoxia.*

Again, holding as they do, that God made no revelation to the human mind, that He instituted no sacraments, and established no hierarchy, Modernists teach that the dogmas, the sacraments, and the hierarchy of the Church, are only interpretations and evolutions of the Christian intelligence, which increased and perfected by external increments 'the little germ latent in the Gospel.' What is the germ latent in the Gospel ? It is the Christian consciousness of duty, the religious movement. And the dogmas and sacraments and hierarchy of the Church are but the inventions of the religious intelligence, indifferent to intellectual truth, devised to cultivate and expand still further the germ of the religious movement. This, I need scarcely observe, is very different from the traditional Catholic theory of development. Hence the condemnation of the proposition :—

54. *Dognata, sacramenta, hierarchia, tum quod ad notionem tum quod ad realitatem attinet, non sunt nisi intelligentiae christiana interpretationes evolutionesque quae exiguum germen in Evangelio latens externis incrementis auxerunt perfecerunt que.*

The next condemned propositions (55, 56, 57) state that St. Peter never even suspected that the primacy in the Church was given to him by Christ ; that the Roman Church was made the head of all the churches by political conditions and not by an ordination of divine Providence ; that the Church is opposed to the progress of the natural and theological sciences.

IV.—THE IMMUTABILITY OF DIVINE TRUTH

Father Tyrrell distinguishes between active and objective revelation. A similar distinction may be made—in a Modernist sense—between active and objective truth, between the truth of the religious movement and the truth of the formulæ in which the religious movement is expressed. Christ, the Modernists say, did not teach a body of intellectual truth applicable to all men and for all time. He initiated a new life, the consciousness of right and the life of filial relationship to God. This life, this truth is identical with man, and is continuously being evolved in him and with him, and thus the development of the religious truth is vital, and not merely dialectical. And the formulæ, in which the progressively evolved phases of this new life are expressed in Scripture and in the creeds, are understood to be true not with intellectual truth, but with the truth of goodness. It will be easy therefore to see that the following propositions express the very essence of Modernism, and why they are condemned :—

58. *Veritas non est immutabilis plusquam ipse homo, quippe quae cum ipso, in ipso et per ipsum evolvitur.*

59. *Christus determinatum doctrinae corpus omnibus temporibus cunctisque hominibus applicabile non docuit, sed potius inchoavit motum quemdam religiosum diversis temporibus ac locis adaptatum vel adaptandum.*

60. *Doctrina christiana in suis exordiis fuit judaica, sed facta est per successivas evolutiones primum paulina, tum joannica, demum helenica et universalis.*

Finally, the remaining condemned propositions assert 'that it can be affirmed without paradox that there is not a chapter of Scripture from the beginning of Genesis to the end of the Apocalypse which contains doctrine identical with the Church's doctrine on the same subject'; 'that the principal articles of the Apostles' Creed have not the same meaning for Christians in modern times that they had for the Christians of the first centuries'; 'that the Church is

unequal to the task of vindicating the ethics of the Gospel because of her obstinate adherence to immutable doctrines which cannot be reconciled with modern progress'; 'that the progress of the sciences requires us to reform our conceptions of God, of the Creation, of Revelation, of the Person of the Incarnate Word, of the Redemption'; 'that the Catholic religion of to-day cannot be reconciled with science unless it be transformed into a non-dogmatic Christianity, that is, into a broad and liberal Protestantism.'

DANIEL COGHLAN.

THE RESURRECTION OF ANCIENT EGYPT AND ASSYRIA

I²

DOUBTLESS many of my readers will have seen, if not in the originals themselves, at least in illustrated books or journals, examples of those strange Egyptian characters such as were sculptured or written on the obelisks, the mummy-chests, and other monuments of that mysterious land. From the days antecedent to Christianity those characters were before the learned world, but yet they were as mysterious in the meaning they were intended to convey as was the Sphinx itself, that other Egyptian puzzle to the learned of all ages. Writings they were known to be; but yet the key to this mysterious writing no one was in possession of, till, just a century ago, it turned up, as if by chance, in the most natural manner possible.

It happened in this way. In 1799, whilst Lieutenant Bouchard, an artillery officer in the French army of occupation, was building the fort of San Julien, at Rosetta, a town on the Delta, he came across a monolith in black granite, ten feet high by three and a half, on which was inscribed writing in three columns—one column of the inscription was in the mysterious Egyptian characters, since called hieroglyphics, the second in cursive characters, evidently a simplification of the preceding, and the third in the Greek characters and language.

Here was a find which might put the world at last in possession of the locked-up literary treasures of this land of mystery. The Greek could, of course, be easily deciphered, and the inscription turned out to be a decree of the priests in honour of Ptolemy Epiphanes, commanding that his statue should be erected in all the temples of the kingdom, and that divine honours should be rendered

to him on his birthday. The learned knew that the writings on the other columns were to the same purpose, but how to decipher them was the question.

Though the Rosetta stone was, through the chances of war, put in the possession of the English, and is to be seen to-day in the Egyptian Hall of the British Museum, in London ; yet it is to a Frenchman that we are indebted for the triumph of unlocking, mainly through it, the treasures of the Egyptian world of letters.

Champollion, a talented young Frenchman, determined to try and solve the problem of the mysterious language of the monuments by a serious study of the Coptic, or ancient Egyptian language. This language remained the vernacular of the Copts—that is, the remains of the ancient Egyptian people—down to the middle of the seventeenth century, and is still the liturgical language of the Monophysites, one of the Christian sects which has lingered in the East from the early days of Christianity.

Noting that certain of the characters in the first two columns were enclosed in a cartouche or parallelogram, thus, () he conjectured that they would represent the name of the king himself. True enough. They responded in number to the letters of the name Ptolemy. A second bilingual monument, in Egyptian and Greek, was discovered, about the same time, in the little isle of Phila, on which was inscribed in cartouche the name of Cleopatra. The same test applied produced the same result. Afterwards a third cartouche, with the name of Alexander, was, in the same way, identified. Here, then, were the characters of three full names deciphered, making in all twenty-seven characters, fourteen of which were different ones. The want of space does not permit me to go further into the process of identification. Suffice it to say, that this plucky Frenchman, in the course of his short life of forty-two years, was not only able to decipher 260 different phonetic characters (the whole number of hieroglyphics deciphered up to the present, including variants, phonetic complements, and determinatives, is between 3,000 and 4,000), but, from his deathbed, he dictated an Egyptian

grammar which has been the basis of all the Egyptian learning acquired in later years.

An early difficulty that Champollion had to meet with and master was that of *homophones* and *polyphones*: that is, the deciphering of different characters representing the same alphabetical sound, and of the same characters representing altogether different syllabic sounds, together with their determinatives; also, the distinction between *alphabetic characters*, *syllabic characters*, and *ideographs*, or characters representing complete ideas. This same difficulty, in a far more complicated form, had to be met with and solved, as we shall see, in altogether different families of languages; and solved in such a manner as to confer everlasting credit on human pluck and perseverance.

And, now, to conclude about the hieroglyphics—for that is the name given to these strange Egyptian characters—let me say that they are imitations of material objects, images of every kind, borrowed from all the kingdoms of nature, and even from the imagination; and that besides the hieroglyphics properly speaking, which are the characters employed in public monuments, there are two other species of Egyptian character, derived from the former, it is true, but yet distinct from them, namely, the *hieratic* and the *demotic*. The hieratic, or sacred characters, are abbreviations and simplifications of the hieroglyphic, and were employed in transactions where a more cursive hand was desired; and the demotic, or popular writing, which is of a later date, and may be said to be the writing of the civil and business life of the Egyptian people.

II

Now let us turn to the *cuneiform character*, that character which obtained in ancient Chaldea, Assyria, and other Eastern countries. Somewhat about the same time that the scholars of Europe were interesting themselves about the discoveries and language of ancient Egypt, Providence willed that a somewhat analogous and, as the sequel proves, a far more important series of discoveries

should be made in the lands subject to the ancient Assyrian monarchs. I say far more important, as regards the authenticating of the teachings of the Bible. For, though Egypt was an important Bible land, since it was the nursing ground of the Jewish people and it was there they grew into a nation, and though, to the last, they preserved traces of their sojourn in the land of the Pharaohs, yet Chaldea was the country of their origin. Nay, the Assyrians may be looked on as the cousins of the Jews. Their fathers had, for a long time, cultivated the same soil, lived the same kind of life, and, to the end, they observed the same customs and habits, and spoke a language almost identical.

And though the religions they professed were different in every point of view, since the progenitors of the Assyrians had fallen into idolatry, yet it was by the design of Providence that the peoples should be preserved side by side almost through their whole national history. From Ur of the Chaldees, the cradle-land of the Assyrians, some 2000 years before Christ, did Abraham emigrate at the command of God, lest the people begotten of him should become contaminated with idolatry.

Moreover, the Assyrians were in close touch with the Jews during the whole course of their history, extending over a period of 1600 years. Not to speak of their interchanges, often warlike, in the earlier centuries of Jewish history, David and Solomon, as we know, made the Euphrates the Eastern boundary of their empire. And scarcely had the separation of the ten tribes taken place, when the Assyrians are called down by God to punish them for their crimes.

Sargon, and Sennacherib, and Theglathphalassur, and Nabuchodonosor, and Assurbanipal, and Baltassar are well-known names in Jewish history. The inhabitants of the kingdom of Israel, and afterwards those of Juda, are carried bodily, the one to Niveveh the others to Babylon, and for centuries the tribes are scattered over the great Assyrian empire. Several of the Sacred Books, such as those of Jonas and Nahum and Judith, of Daniel and Ezechiel, of

Esther and Tobias, are dedicated almost entirely to those peoples. The prophets Daniel and Ezechiel had lived in Babylon, Esther and Daniel in Susa, Tobias in Nineveh.

What treasures, then, of historic and doctrinal lore could not those famous cities unfold? What confirmation of the Sacred Word, discredited by the impious; if, phœnix-like, they could rise from their ashes, and testify to the facts performed, and the life led by those peoples, and their intercourse with His chosen people in the open light of day? But God will not forget His own glory, and the deposit of His Sacred Word which He committed to the keeping of His Church.

Somewhat about the time that the discoveries in Egypt were attracting such attention, discoveries of a far more important character, and in a far wider field, and of a far more enduring interest, at least, for Biblical archæology, were being made on the site of the Assyrian empire. For many years previously, indeed from the early part of the seventeenth century, etchings of a most strange and extraordinary character were found in the ruined cities of ancient Persia; but whether these etchings were freaks of fancy on the part of the architect who raised these monuments, or characters with articulate meaning, was a moot question among the learned.

The first to hazard the conjectures of their literary character was Niehuhr, a Danish scholar who, in the year 1765, copied, with much care, inscriptions found in the ruins of Persepolis, and handed them to the study of the learned. He recognized also that although these inscriptions were all written in characters formed of combinations of arrow-like impressions, they were, nevertheless, representations of three different writings. He recognized, furthermore, that the writing in the first column, composed of forty-two characters, was alphabetical, a recognition which was afterwards admitted to be well founded. But just as in the case of the hieroglyphics of the Egyptian monuments, how to get the key of these mysterious writings was the difficulty.

Similarly, as in the case of the hieroglyphics, the

inquirers took note of the cartouch surrounding the royal name, so, in these characters also, the frequent repetition of a certain word, though not, as in the hieroglyphics, surrounded by a cartouch, led to the conjecture that it meant king. With infinite pains, and after many decades of years of study, the learned world could, as a result, make out just a few words, containing in all twenty or so characters, and this is the language of the writing contained in the first column only. Later on Egypt came to aid in the reading of the cuneiform writing. An alabaster vase found in Egypt in 1762 bore an inscription in four languages, one of which was Egyptian. It was written in hieroglyphics, among which Champollion, many years after its discovery, recognized the name of Xerxes.

The deciphering of the second species of writing advanced more slowly than that of the first; and it was only after determining, with infinite difficulty, a hundred and eleven different signs that inquirers could establish solidly its *syllabic* character. And, even to the present day, many difficulties in the process of deciphering it have to be overcome.

The third species of cuneiform writing was by far the most important, though this was not suspected at first; and in the interest it has attracted it has left the two others in the shade since the secret of it has been penetrated.

Scholars delayed not to conjecture that the third column contained the inscription in Babylonian, and the event confirmed the hypothesis. Independently of the importance of all that attached to the great city of Babylon, we possessed already in Europe a certain number of inscriptions in like characters found on the banks of the Euphrates, which inscriptions awaited translation. The reading of the first and second species of writing, moreover, put students on the way of reading the third; but the multitude of signs disconcerted altogether at first those who tried to decipher them. Besides, complications of a most unexpected kind had been met with in deciphering this species of writing. While labours were going on

in this field of inquiry, discoveries of a most extraordinary kind, and on the most unheard-of scale, were made as Khorsabad and Konyunjik, the ancient Nineveh, upon the very places even where had been written and spoken the language, the writing of which had shown itself so rebellious to the efforts of all the learned to decipher.

Now Nineveh, the wonderful city that had cut such a figure in the early history of the world, about the year 607 B.C. seemed to have unaccountably dropped out of existence, and perished as completely as if it had been swallowed up by the sea. The name of Nineveh is scarcely mentioned even in the classics of Greece and Rome. Xenophon passed near the place where it had shown forth its magnificence, and he had not even heard its name pronounced. Alexander the Great, who wished to make Babylon the capital of his vast empire, did not even suspect, when leading his troops in the neighbourhood of the great deserted city on the banks of the Tigris, that he was near this superb queen before which the proud city on the Euphrates had more than once trembled. Rome established here a military colony: but no Roman suspected what great souvenirs of war attached to the land cultivated by its veterans. 'Nineveh has perished,' says Lucian, 'there remains no trace of it, and no one knows where it had formerly been built.'¹

Furthermore, 'our knowledge upon Assyria,' says Victor Place, 'was enveloped in thick darkness. Outside of the accounts left us in the Bible, the sole contemporary ones of the different empires of Assyria, we find in the ancient historians only rare and incoherent bits of information, or an inexplicable silence.' What was vaguely known in history was that its last king, after a two years' siege by the Medes, seeing his cause lost, set fire to the city, and himself perished, with his wives and concubines, and the city figured in history no more. The name of the king himself descended in tradition under the denomination of

¹ Charron, xxiii.

the foul god Sando, who was worshipped by the Phrygians and the neighbouring peoples.

But while inquiries were being pushed with ardour by Assyriologists on the monuments already put in evidence, excavations on a vast scale had been made by the French Consul, Emile Botha, at Mossoul on the palace of Sargon at Khorsabad, some leagues north of the site of the ancient Nineveh, with the most fruitful results. Fired by the success of the French at Khorsabad, the English Government commissioned Austin Henry Layard, an Englishman of French origin, to make excavations on what turned out to be the palace of Assurbanipal, to the north-east, and of Sennacherib to the south-east of Nineveh itself.¹ Others commenced excavations at Mossoul, the ancient Babylon; at Birs Nimroud, the tower of Nimrod, i.e., of Babel, some six miles south-west of Babylon; at Warka, the Biblical Erech, the holy city of the dead, in Southern Chaldea; at Ur of the Chaldees, the natal place of Abraham; more recently still, at Tell Lot, the Sipherim of the Bible, the capital of the kings of Lagash; at Nimroud Kalak, 'the great city,' by eminence, of the Bible long before Nineveh was built; Kalah Schergat, the city of Assur; and twenty others of those mounds of ruins that stud the plain on either side of the Tigris and the Euphrates;—with the result that we have now in the Museum of the Louvre in Paris alone, nearly two miles of sculptures in relief, and occupying in all 8,000 square yards of surface, all taken from the one palace of Sargon at Khorsabad.

We have those colossal bulls, ten feet high, sculptured in alabaster; those colossal-winged creatures with human heads, which the Prophet Ezechiel seems to have had before his imagination when describing the wonders of the celestial court. We have the archives of the ancient kings of Lagash, a Summeryan city, reaching back to 6,000 years ago, all found in one lot, to the number of 30,000 tablets in terra-cotta, in Tell Lot, by Sayce, in 1894.

¹ No less than twelve palaces in all, of Assyrian monarchs, have been unearthed in ancient Nineveh and its environs.

We have in the British Museum, in London, a series of great halls filled with the spoils of the palaces of Nineveh, and we have miles of inscriptions and bas-reliefs. But most important of all, we have the well-stocked libraries of those ancient monarchs, consisting of some hundreds of thousands of tablets in terra-cotta or baked bricks, containing treasures of knowledge of all kinds, from history, astronomy, medicine, and legal lore down to account books, and even to primers used by the boys and girls when learning the cuneiform writing at school.¹ These books are written in different languages, and with different combinations of characters, though all pertaining to the cuneiform family.

Nor was it the French and the English alone that interested themselves in the discovery of Assyrian and Babylonian art treasures. America, Italy, Germany, Scandinavia, Turkey, and Egypt, all have participated in the spoils of the ancient world, discovered in recent years; some of them, as that of Tell Lot, giving detailed histories of events that occurred some 5,000 or 6,000 years ago.

While the minds of European scholars were occupied with the early discoveries in Nineveh, the attention of the reading world was drawn to the famous cuneiform inscriptions on the mountain escarpment of Behistun. Now, Behistun is a mountain rising like a pyramid, some 1,300 feet from its base, in Kurdistan, on the frontier of the ancient kingdom of Media. On the perpendicular face of this mountain, some 320 feet from the ground, is chiselled in relief the figure of Parius, son of Hystaspes, the second in succession from Cyrus. He is represented standing armed and crowned, with a number of captive monarchs in chains before him, on the prostrate body of one of whom he has planted his foot, whilst with his left hand he rests his bow on the body of the captive. Over the human figures is sculptured the figure of Ormuzd, the god of the Persians; while all around are inscriptions to commemorate no less

¹ The British Museum contains in one lot of over 100 large cases what remains of the library of Assurbanipal.

than nineteen decisive victories gained by the Persian monarch over so many rebels or usurpers of his empire of many provinces.

The inscriptions were known to exist for many years ; but how to transcribe accurately such curious writing, to the amount of 400 lines, at such a height, seemed a task almost beyond human endurance. The name of the man to achieve this feat successfully, as the result of thirteen years of labour, and amidst all sorts of interruptions of a busy life, deserves to go down to posterity as one of the heroes of history. He died only eleven years ago (1897), in an honoured old age, Major-General Rawlinson, having made the rock of Behistun the Rosetta stone of Assyriology.

There are described the victories of Parius, I have said ; not the conqueror of Babylon spoken of by Daniel, but the son of Hystaspes, in his own native Persian, in Susian, and in Assyrian or Babylonian. In this description he calls himself in the Persian and Susian or Median languages, ' Persian, son of a Persian ; Aryan, son of an Aryan.' It speaks well for the prudent policy of this ancient monarch that in the same inscription, written in a parallel column, this assertion of his race is left out, in the Assyrian language, which was spoken by his Semitic subjects, recently brought under the dominions of his predecessors by force of arms.

But to return to the deciphering of the languages. The inscriptions of Behistun were trilingual—Persian, Susian, and Babylonian. The first, Persian, being alphabetical, showed itself most amenable to the process of deciphering, and this was helped by the Egyptian hieroglyphics found on the quadrilingual inscription on the vase of de Caylus, discovered in Egypt, in 1762. The great number of proper names, moreover, found on the Behistun inscriptions, numbering in all ninety, helped considerably in the process.

At the time of these discoveries, we must remember, apart from proper names, we were in possession of only two doubtful Assyrian words preserved by the classical writers, *pandoura* and *narmalcha*, ' royal river,' applied to the Euphrates. We were ignorant of what language was

spoken in Assyria. The first to recognize its Semitic character was Lowenstern, an Austrian, about the year 1845. And to give you an idea of the difficulties Assyriologists had in deciphering it, I may say that only after decades of years of study could the scholars of Europe recognize even three words, king, great, and Sargon, without, however, even to this day being able to pronounce a single word.¹

Now, when studying the Assyrian language, the most important of the group, some very curious and interesting facts came to light. First of all, it was found that the cuneiform characters were originally, like their counterpart in Egypt, and like the Chinese of to-day, hieroglyphic in character, that is to say, they were faithful representations of things in the natural and ideal world. Thus, the word ►▼▼▼, *a fish*, was, in its earliest form, some 6,000 years ago, a true representation of a fish; then, cuneiform-hieroglyphic, thus ◀☒◀; afterwards, for the sake of brevity, it came to be represented thus ►▼▼▼▼, which is known as archaic-cuneiform. This modification appears later on in documents written 1,900 years B.C. Later on a cursory hand, still denominated hidden cuneiform, was adopted, and it eventuated thus ►▼▼▼. These styles give us a clue to the age of the writing. The cuneiform writing itself was the result of a fortuitous circumstance. Thus, in inscribing a hieroglyphic with a chisel, on stone, a couple of blows struck at an angle is a far more expeditious way of producing characters than by a laborious work in relief, or intaglio. Now, two such blows, with a third indenture produced by a prolongation of a line from one of the angles, produces a perfect *cuneus*, a wedge or arrow-shaped figure. A combination of those arrow-shaped figures forms the letter, the syllable, or the ideograph, as the case may be, of the several languages. Hence the name *cuneiform*, that is, wedge-shaped characters.

¹ One of the scholars who has laboured most fruitfully in the deciphering of all three classes of cuneiform writing was a Corkman, the Rev. Mr. Hincks, Rector of Killeagh, Co. Down.

Another interesting fact that presented itself in the process of inquiry was, that whereas the Persian and Susian, i.e., the Arian element, in the cuneiform writing, was alphabetical, or syllabic, the Assyrian, or Babylonian, was not alphabetical, nor yet syllabic, but ideographic, just as our Arabic numbers, 1, 2, 3.

Now, why this remarkable fact? It was only in the course of study that the reason dawned on the inquirers; and it arose from this, that while the words used in the Assyrian language were native to the Assyrians, or Semites, the characters were adopted from the Accadians or Summerians, the former inhabitants of the country of Chaldea, who were descended from Cush, the grandson of Cham. The Cushites, in the earliest times, had overrun these countries, and formed the first great empire, reaching to the frontiers of India. They were arrested, however, in their career of conquest and dominion by the curse of their progenitor, Noah, who pronounced prophetically that they should be the 'slaves of the slaves of their brethren,' the descendants of Sem and Japheth.

Thus, the Assyrian word *Ec*, or *Illa*, 'God,' is not represented in Assyrian by the characters signifying *ec*, but by the Summerian *An*, thus ►►▼, the syllabic character of 'Anna,' the name of God, in Summerian; so that here, in the Babylonian decrees of the Emperor of Persia, which were written in the three principal languages of this great empire (just as to-day the decree of the governor of Babylon are written in the three languages of the empire, Turkish, Persian, and Arabic), we have represented the languages of the three great branches of the human family: the Semitic, in the Assyrian language; the Chametic, in the Summerian and Accadian language and characters; and the Aryan, Japhetic, in the Persian, Median, and kindred languages.

I have said that the difficulties experienced by Champollion in the deciphering of the Egyptian hieroglyphics through the presence of *homophones* and *polyphones*, were met with in a far more complicated form in the cuneiform writings. This will be readily seen when we remember that

the Assyrian characters are not alphabetic ones, like the hieroglyphics, nor yet syllabic ones, but ideographs—characters which represent complete ideas. Thus, the same word or syllable may be represented by many different characters; or, the same character, found in different combinations, may stand for many altogether different words. The use of *homophones* and *polyphones* by the ancient Assyrian writers was one of the chief causes which retarded the work of translating the cuneiform writing in the earlier days of Assyriological studies; and even to the present day it forms the chief difficulty met with by inquirers.

A. M. SKELLY, O.P.

Notes and Queries

THEOLOGY

STIPEND FOR SECOND MASS ON SUNDAY—PUBLICATION OF BANNS FOR MIXED MARRIAGES

REV. DEAR SIR.—May I ask the two following questions:—

1. A curate has two Masses on Sundays. One Sunday he receives a stipendium for the first Mass which he says. Before second Mass the Rector wishes him to say the Mass for a certain intention, and gives a stipendium. Can the curate say the Mass for the intention (*sed pro Deo*), and say, the next day, a Mass for the same intention again, but for the stipendium given?

2. A (Catholic girl) is going to marry B (Protestant). A lives in parish X, B lives in parish Z. Must banns be published in both parishes: (a) if A marries B in parish X; (b) if A marries B in parish Z?

NEMO.

1. 'Nemo' speaks of an urgent Mass, the celebration of which cannot be postponed; and he suggests that the priest, who has received honoraria for both Masses on Sunday, can evade the ecclesiastical law by gratuitously celebrating his second Mass for the desired intention and subsequently celebrating Mass for the same intention in fulfilment of the obligation of justice which the acceptance of the honorarium entailed.

There would be no difficulty in the case if the donor of the honorarium gave permission to have this method adopted; but if this permission has not been obtained it would appear at first sight as if the priest would violate one or other of his obligations—either the obligation arising from the ecclesiastical law which prohibits the fulfilment of two obligations of justice on the same day by the celebration of two Masses, or the obligation undertaken at the request of the donor of the honorarium.

It seems certain, however, that no law is violated by a priest who acts in the way suggested. He does not violate

the ecclesiastical law because, as a matter of fact, he celebrates his second Mass gratuitously. He does not violate the obligation undertaken at the request of the donor, because in the circumstances he can reasonably presume on the permission of the donor. Seeing that the donor of the honorarium gains a Mass by the transaction, he can prudently be looked on as acquiescing in the action of the priest.

2. In the case of mixed marriages, publication of the banns is not permitted by the general law of the Church. In a letter to the Cardinal-Archbishop of Malines, dated July 13, 1783, Pius VI explicitly lays down this doctrine. In Ireland this law is in force.

In some places, however, custom or special enactment permits or orders the publication of the banns in accordance with the prudent judgment of the bishop; but the Holy Office informed the Bishop of Nesqually, in 1874, that the religion of the non-Catholic party is not to be mentioned when the banns are published.

Wherever this custom or special regulation exists, the banns are to be published according to the general rules for the publication of banns, unless the custom or regulation arranges otherwise. Thus, the banns are to be published in the parishes of both contracting parties, no matter in which parish the marriage is celebrated. In England, with which my correspondent is concerned, the banns are published in the parish or district of the Catholic party; and, as I have been informed, they are generally published in the parish or district of the non-Catholic party when the two live in different districts, though there is no express rule to this effect. This custom of publishing the banns in the parish of the Protestant, as well as in the parish of the Catholic, serves the purpose of rendering it more easy to discover impediments and is, consequently, desirable if the banns are to be published at all for mixed marriages.

**DOES RECEPTION OF VIATICUM DURING PASCHAL TIME
FULFIL THE OBLIGATION OF PASCHAL COMMUNION**

REV. DEAR SIR,—An invalid received Holy Viaticum during Paschal time. Did that Communion fulfil not merely the

precept by which the sick are bound to receive Viaticum, but also the precept of Paschal Communion? An answer in the next number of the I. E. RECORD is requested.

PAROCHUS.

The reception of the Viaticum seems to fulfil both obligations, since both have the same end in view. The obligation of Paschal Communion is an ecclesiastical obligation so far as the time is concerned; but so far as the substance of the obligation is concerned it is of divine origin, and is imposed for the sake of effecting an intimate union between the soul and Christ in the Sacrament of the Altar. The same end is obtained by the reception of Viaticum. Hence both obligations are fulfilled by the sick person who receives Viaticum during Paschal time.

**INDULGENCES ATTACHED TO THE FIRST MASS OF A NEWLY
ORDAINED PRIEST**

REV. DEAR SIR.—Are there any indulgences attached to the first Mass which a young priest celebrates after his Ordination? A reply in the May or June number of the I. E. RECORD will oblige.

DIACONUS.

By a decree of the Sacred Congregation of Indulgences, dated January 11, 1886, Leo XIII granted, on the usual conditions, a plenary indulgence to the young priest who celebrates his first Mass, and also to his blood relations to the third degree inclusive who assist at the Mass. The faithful generally, who assist, gain an indulgence of seven years and seven quarantines. 'Concedere dignatus est [Papa], servatis de jure servandis, indulgentiam plenariam sacerdoti primum sacrum facienti ejusque consanguineis ad tertium usque gradum inclusive, qui primo eidem sacro interfuerint; ceteris vero Christifidelibus adstantibus indulgentiam septem annorum totidemque quadragenorum.'

The first Mass here mentioned is not the Ordination Mass, but the first Mass which the young priest subsequently celebrates.¹

¹ Beringer, i., p. 260. Cardinal Gennari, *Questioni Theologico-Morali*, p. 863.

SALE OF INDULGENCED ROSARY BEADS

REV. DEAR SIR,—Kindly say in the next number of the I. E. RECORD whether it is lawful to sell indulgenced Rosaries for the price of the beads. I know that they lose their indulgence when they are sold, but is it unlawful to sell them?

H.

It is not lawful to sell indulgenced articles for the price of the material of which they are made. This is made clear by a declaration of the Sacred Congregation of Indulgences:—

An qui emit cruces, numismata, etc., ut ea distribuat post, quam benedicta fuerint cum applicatione indulgentiarum, possit horum petere pretium ab accipientibus sine culpa, vel sine periculo indulgentias amittendi? An amittatur tantumquando quis sibi eas res proprias fecerit, et iis usus fuerit cum intentione lucrandi indulgentias?

Resp. Negative ad primam partem; ad secundam: Non indigere responsione.¹

J. M. HARTY.

CANON LAW

CURATES AND PROFESSION OF FAITH

REV. DEAR SIR,—An answer to the following query in the next number of the I. E. RECORD will oblige. The recent Maynooth Decrees have changed the custom hitherto prevailing in this country regarding Profession of Faith. By virtue of this change:—

1. Are curates who have never made the Profession of Faith obliged to do so?

2. Is one obliged to do so who has made the Profession of Faith before Ordination, e.g., on obtaining degrees, but has not renewed it after his appointment as curate?

3. Am I right in thinking that the Maynooth Decrees in this matter merely apply to Ireland, the general law of the Church, and that the person mentioned in No. 2, acting upon a probable opinion given by Lehmkuhl (page 187, No. 297) is not bound to make the Profession of Faith anew?

SACERDOS.

1. By general law of the Church curates are not supposed

to make any profession of faith prior to the exercise of their sacerdotal ministry, when they are first appointed to their missions by the diocesan authorities. According to the following words of the Council of Trent¹: 'Provisi de beneficiis quibuscumque curam animarum habentibus,' etc., only those are bound to make profession of faith, who take possession of offices or benefices with care of souls, and not their assistants or coadjutors. 'Eam,' writes Santi,² 'non tenentur emittere qui vere et plene de beneficio provisi non sunt. Tales sunt coadiutores durante coadiutoria et vicarii temporanei.' And Sanchez³ adds that the same doctrine holds good even in the case of those ecclesiastics—for instance, administrators—who completely exercise the pastoral office, but who do not bear its title. The reason is assigned by Reiffenstuel. The Council of Trent, he says, by laying down the disposition that ecclesiastics holding benefices with care of souls must make profession of faith, introduced a new law, a law which is penal in character, and of strict interpretation; consequently it cannot be extended to cases and persons who are not evidently included in and expressed by the words of the Tridentine law.⁴

However, if not by common ecclesiastical law, curates or any other class of persons may be obliged to make profession of faith by particular statutes, either national, provincial, or diocesan, and in this country curates are bound to make profession of faith at the beginning of their missionary work in virtue of the express prescription laid down in the Maynooth Synod Decrees, where we read that amongst those who are ordered to go through that formality are 'Vicarii Parochorum cum primum nominantur ab Episcopo.'⁵

That curates, and in general those who are ordered by

¹ Conc. Trid. Sess. 24, c. 12, De Ref.

² Cf. Santi-Leitner, lib. i., p. 6; Aichner, p. 525, n. 3, not. 5; Wernz, iii. p. 17; Bened. XIV., lib. 5, c. 2, n. 6.

³ Sanchez, in *Decal.*, lib. ii., c. 5, n. 1.

⁴ 'Ratio generalis est quia hi omnes non comprehenduntur sub illis personis quas Conc. Trid. obligavit ad professionem fidei, ut patet ex verbis (Concilii) quae proinde veluti poenalia et novi iuris inductiva ultra personas expressas extendi non debeant.'—Reiff., lib. i., tit. i., n. 166.

⁵ Cf. *May. Syn. Decr.*, p. 49.

the Decrees of the Maynooth Synod to make profession of faith, must abide by this regulation, seems beyond all doubt. Decrees of Provincial or National Councils, as demonstrated elsewhere, are not mere advices free from any obligation as to their observance ; but they are real and strict laws and directive precepts, which are, at the same time, preceptive directions, on account of the obligation they impose as to their execution. Nor can a custom against that decree —a decree already inserted in the old statutes—be alleged as a sufficient excuse for its inobservance ; for this custom, if ever and wherever in existence, was abrogated by the new Decrees ; and this doctrine holds good, as some maintain, even in the case that such a custom was not a general one. It is contended, in fact, that the rule laid down by Boniface VIII,¹ to the effect that a subsequent general law abolishes previous general customs and not particular ones without special mention, applies only to Papal Constitutions, because the Pope alone is not supposed and expected to be cognizant of all particular laws and customs prevailing all over the world, and therefore he cannot abolish what he ignores. This reason cannot be equally urged in case of particular laws and particular superiors, as they, on the contrary, are presumed and expected to know particular practices in their own more or less limited territories. For the rest, the fact that this law has been inserted in the new Decrees in the same way as it was enacted in the old ones, is a clear proof of the intention of the superiors of having it maintained and carried out ; and against such a clear and repeated manifestation of the will of the legislators no custom to the contrary can reasonably be introduced ; and we are at a loss for an explanation why that law, in some parts of this country at least, has hitherto remained a dead letter.

2. The answer to the second question depends on the other, whether profession of faith, once made, may be taken as sufficient for, and therefore may not be repeated on, any other future occasion on which it is prescribed by law.

¹ Cf. Bonif. VIII. in lib. i., tit. i., in vi.

We have no doubt that the reply must be in favour of repeating the profession of faith. In the first place when a law prescribes the repetition of the same act on various occasions, it imposes different obligations, and as many in number as the times prescribed for its repetition. Now if by one act the obligation of making it on all future occasions can be fulfilled, besides the obvious prescription of the law being disregarded, we would have the strange fact that obligations would be fulfilled which are not yet in existence; while, on the other hand, they would be violated when really in existence. Nor is it a useless procedure for the same person to go through the same formalities, if they are to be made for divers matters, and on various occasions and times; especially if they are intended each time to attain a particular end and fulfil a different obligation. Moreover, if, notwithstanding the fact that all priests at least once in their life, on the occasion of their ordination, make profession of faith, the Church still prescribes that ecclesiastics are bound to make it on some other occasions, it proves that it is the intention of the Church to have profession of faith made as many times as prescribed; otherwise such an enactment would be perfectly aimless and superfluous.

This doctrine is confirmed by the positive law of the Church. It is well known, in fact, that those on whom two or more benefices, even of the same nature, are successively conferred, must make profession of faith every time they are installed in a new benefice, in order to comply with the prescription of the ecclesiastical law; and the Congregation of the Council, interrogated about that question several times, always answered in that sense.¹ All canonists, moreover, seem to be unanimous in the holding of this doctrine. 'Toties,' says Deshayes,² dealing with this subject, 'urget haec obligatio quoties nova parochia suscipitur;'² and Bargilliat, on the authority of Barbosa, adds that some canonists believe this to be true, even in the case of a parish

¹ 'Renovandam esse fidei professionem si quis *de novo* in eadem, Ecclesia Cathedrali canonicatum vel dignitatem obtinuerit,' S.C.C. 1 Apr., 1786; 15 Dec., 1866, ad Epis. S. Deodati.

² Cf. Deshayes, *Mem. Jur. Can.*, n. 862; Craisson, n. 2368.

priest who takes back the same benefice he held before, and which he resigned; although on the first occasion he made regular profession of faith.¹ The reason is, writes Tamburini, that the Council of Trent absolutely orders those who take possession of parochial benefices to make profession of faith, and, as it does not distinguish whether or not they had made it in the past, it is not for us to make that distinction ourselves.²

How is it, then, that Father Lehmkuhl³ teaches that those who are bound to make profession of faith can in strictness fulfil their obligation for all future occasions on which the law prescribes it, if they have made it only once in the past? To tell the truth that statement of the eminent theologian came to us as a great surprise. We never knew that this was a moot-point in law, nor even a probable doctrine, because all canonists we are acquainted with unanimously prove, by alleging many reasons and responses of the Roman Congregations, that such a doctrine is positively untenable. However, we believe that Father Lehmkuhl wanted to state the opposite case, viz., that a profession of faith once made may be sufficient, not for *future*, but rather for *past* occasions on which a person, bound by law to make it, failed to fulfil his duty in this respect.⁴ That such is the case, is proved by the two authorities whom Father Lehmkuhl relies upon to support his theory. One of them is Tamburini, and we quoted him above in a passage where he clearly points out that profession of faith must be repeated by the same person on all occasions

¹ 'Imo non desunt qui censeant professionem rursum emittendam esse ab eo qui denuo adipiscitur parochiam quam antea habuerat et dimisit.' Bargilliat ii., p. 23; Barbosa, *De off. et potest. Epis.* alleg. 161, part iii., n. 9; Zallinger, i., 78; Ferraris *v. Canonicatus*, art. iv., n. 47; Aichner, p. 525, etc.

² 'Siquidem Conc. Trid. simpliciter iubet ut provisus de huiusmodi beneficio intra bimestre a die captae possessionis faciat professionem fidei; neque distinguit an haec antea fuerit facta: ergo neque nos distinguere debemus.' Tamburini, tom i., *De Jur. Abb.*, Disp. 8, q. 3, n. 8.

³ I. p. 187.

⁴ This opinion, in fact, is defended as a probable one and a safe doctrine to be followed in practice by Reiff., i., tit i., n. 178; Navarro, consul 12, 41, *De Jure iur.*; Sanchez, lib ii. *In Decal.*, c. 5, n. 6; Castro Palao, Tract i., *De Fide Disp.* i., punct. 16, n. 8: against Barbosa, l.c. alleg. 51, n. 9, etc.

prescribed by law. The other is Sanchez, who writes as follows : 'Si autem fidei professionem publicam dicti (a Conc. Trid.) emiserint alio titulo, ut Doctoratus, quamvis immemores obligationis illius facienda ratione beneficii *antea adepti* satis erit nec tenebuntur eam iterare.'

Everybody can see that this is a quite different doctrine from that which seems to be proposed by the aforesaid great moralist ; because, while, in his case, the strange theory, not in harmony with ecclesiastical legislation, would result that obligations not yet in existence would be fulfilled, and would be disregarded when really existing ; in the other, on the contrary, the commonly admitted doctrine would follow that by one act several obligations already existing can be fulfilled. Only in the latter case, and not in the former, the disposition of the law, that after the taking possession of benefices a profession of faith must take place, would be thoroughly carried out. 'Ratio est,' says Reiffenstuel, after dealing with this case, 'quia talis revera post adeptam pacificam possessionem beneficii emisit professionem fidei : sicutque satisfecit menti. Concil. Tridentini.' This is not a novel doctrine, the same author proceeds to remark, but it is the well-known and commonly accepted teaching that a person may, by the same act, fulfil two or more obligations contracted for different reasons and titles ; thus, for instance, a clergyman by one and the same recitation of the canonical hours may fulfil his two-fold obligation of reading them as a cleric and as the incumbent of some benefice.¹ Taking into consideration external and intrinsic evidence and authority, it seems beyond doubt that the doctrine just expounded is solidly probable and a safe one in practice ; but we would not dare make a similar statement for the opposite case.

Let it be remembered, in fine, that profession of faith, contrary to the teaching of old canonists, is a personal duty, and an act which cannot be made by proxy ; and that Ordinaries cannot, without permission of the Holy See, delegate simple priests of their dioceses to receive and

¹ Reiff., l.c., n. 178.

accept the profession of faith made by those who have taken possession of benefices.¹

3. As to the third question : *Provisum in 1° et 2°.*

**PENALTIES INCURRED BY THE VIOLATORS OF THE DECREE
'QUEMADMODUM'**

REV. DEAR SIR.—The head of a religious community is desirous to know what are the penalties to be incurred by the transgressors of the Decree *Quemadmodum*, issued by the Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, December 17, 1890, and given amongst the documents of the Appendix to the Maynooth Synod Decrees, page 265. In that Decree, which concerns the manifestation of conscience, the appointment of extraordinary confessors, and the frequency of going to Holy Communion, especially in religious houses, under No. VII. it is stated that the violators of the dispositions therein contained are subject to the penalties threatened, *contra superiores Apostolicae Sedis mandata violantes*. There is no specification of those penalties; what are they? I have failed to find them elsewhere.

CONFESSOR.

The article of the Decree referred to is of the following tenor : 'Eadem Sanctitas Suā insuper mandat omnibus et singulis Superioribus generalibus, provincialibus et localibus institutorum, de quibus supra, sive virorum sive mulierum ut studiose accurateque huius decreti dispositiones observent sub poenis contra Superiores Apostolicae Sedis mandata violantes ipso facto incurrendis.'

It is no wonder if 'Confessor' has failed to discover the penalties he wants to know of, which are alluded to in the above-quoted words of the Decree *Quemadmodum*, for the reason that, to our knowledge, there is no special law in the criminal legislation of the Church, determining the number of penalties and the quality of punishments to be incurred by religious superiors who disregard Papal laws in general. Nor is there any official and authoritative declaration of the Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, elucidating this last portion of the Decree, and pointing out the penalties therein referred to, although quite a number of authentic

¹ S.C.C., 9 Feb. et 17 April, 1728; S.C.E.E.R.R., 14 April, 1890; *App. Mayn. Syn. Decr.* pp. 27-29.

responses were issued for the interpretation of the same document soon after its publication.

In default, then, of a positive law or explicit declaration of the Roman Congregations we must have recourse to private doctrinal interpretations based on presumptions and general principles of ecclesiastical legislation.

Commentators on the Decree *Quemadmodum*, while at one in asserting that there is no existing Church law threatening penalties against superiors of religious communities who violate enactments of the Apostolic See in general, are not quite unanimous in their views as to the particular penalties indicated in the Decree under notice. There are in this respect two main interpretations made by experts; one is by Cardinal Gennari, and the other by Father Pius from Langogne, O.F.M.C., their opinions being shared by almost all other canonists who deal with this subject.¹

Cardinal Gennari, a most eminent scholar amongst the members of the Sacred College, and a recognized authority on canonical matters, contends that if the penalties referred to in the Decree *Quemadmodum* are not found in the general legislation of the Church, it is to be concluded that the Congregation wished, by these words, to indicate the special punishments, if any, sanctioned in the Constitutions of each particular community against those religious superiors who fail in their duty to observe Papal Decrees regarding monastic Orders.² The learned Capuchin, Father Pius from Langogne, on the other hand, himself a canonist of great repute, living at present in Rome and lending his valuable and incessant assistance to various Congregations of which he is an esteemed Consultor, commenting on this Decree maintains that the penalties in question are those established by Papal Constitutions against religious superiors in matters similar in character to that of the present Decree. Amongst Papal dispositions of that nature, the most famous of all are the Decree of Clement VIII, March 13, 1599, and

¹ Amongst the authors who wrote *ex professo* on the Decree *Quemadmodum*, besides Cardinal Gennari and Father Pius from Langogne, may be mentioned Adigard S.J., Lehmkohl, S.J., Maynard, O.P., Bastien, O.S.B.

² Cf. *Monit. Eccl.*, vol. viii., p. 64.

the other of Clement X, March 16, 1675. There we find enumerated the following punitive measures : Privation of dignity and office, incapacity of obtaining them in future, and perpetual privation of active and passive voice. These are the penalties, he concludes, to be incurred by superiors of religious families who violate the dispositions of the Decree *Quemadmodum*.¹ Much more so, adds Bastien,² following the same opinion, because special constitutions of religious communities do not, as a rule, contain any prescription of this kind and for this purpose.

Personally, we incline to share the first opinion which seems more in accordance with the canonical rules of interpretation. In fact, we are dealing here with penalties and with penal and odious laws which demand a strict interpretation ; hence it is uncanonical to extend them from one case to another, however similar in nature, and to apply to the Decree *Quemadmodum* penalties established in other decrees for kindred matters or cases. So, rightly says Putzer,³ who confirms this doctrine, ‘ *Poenae in superiores Apostolicae Sedis mandata violantes in iure communi non inveniuntur sancitae, et in poenis non valet extensio a casu ad casum.*’ Moreover, according to the second opinion, it would be necessary to collect all punishments threatened against religious superiors by the Roman authorities by all laws of similar nature to that of the present Decree, and apply them to the violators of the *Quemadmodum* ; but who can, in reason, admit such a doctrine considering that penalties of that kind are so numerous in quantity and varied in kind ? It seems reasonable, therefore, to conclude that, until a decision to the contrary is given by the Roman Congregations, the penalties threatened in the Decree *Quemadmodum* are those established, if any, in the special Constitutions of different Orders against religious superiors guilty of infringement of Papal laws.

¹ Testo e commento del Decreto *Quemadmodum* del P. Pio da Langogne, Versione del S. Acquaviva.

² Cf. Bastien, *Directoire Canonique*, etc., n. 390, not. 2.

³ *Comm.*, etc., p. 457, n. 2.

CONCERTS IN THE CHURCH

REV. DEAR SIR.—In some parts of this country it is customary to hold concerts in the church, in aid of charitable and pious institutions, or in order to raise funds for the completion of churches, and to pay the debts incurred for their erection. Is that custom lawful? Is it not against church immunity to use it for a profane purpose?

A PRIEST.

No doubt performances of all descriptions not in connexion with ecclesiastical functions cannot take place in the church. They are at variance with its sacred character; for a church once dedicated to divine worship by blessing or consecration, cannot be converted into a profane place. But the question is whether the concerts which we are dealing with are in every sense profane performances, so as to be numbered amongst those profane acts which cannot be made within sacred walls. It is contended, and we believe on reasonable grounds, that performances of that sort, such as concerts held with the view to the raising of funds for charitable institutions, or for the completion of a church, are not altogether profane in character, although not strictly religious, and that, indifferent by themselves, they partake of the religious and pious nature of the purpose for which they are held, and of the charitable work they are meant to serve; hence the use made of the church on those occasions may with truth be said to remain pious and religious. 'Et tunc,' says Bargilliat, 'ratione caritatis et religionis usus adhuc pius dici potest.'¹

Again, according to the Council of Trent, *musica* performances cannot take place in the church, if the music to be played on those occasions is entirely profane; and canonists explain that music is, or becomes profane when,—apart from other intrinsic reasons which must be taken into consideration and precautions which must be adopted—it is performed in the church only for recreation' sake and amusement, because only then is the sacred place converted into a profane one such as a theatre or music-

¹ Cf. Bargilliat, ii., p. 307.

hall. Santi writes : ' Ex Trid., Sess. 22, De observ., etc. . . . prohibentur fieri in Ecclesiis musicae profanae, quae nempe *ad solam recreationem* ordinantur.'¹

Moreover, in many a case it may be through necessity that the church is resorted to, in order to hold concerts, there not being in the locality any available or suitable place for that purpose, and, on the other hand, there being a very pressing need of raising funds for the charitable and religious objects already mentioned. 'Quod non licitum est in lege necessitas facit licitum,'² taking especially into consideration that ecclesiastical superiors at present all over the world, and even in Rome, permit that churches be used in solemn occasions even for acts which are not strictly religious, nor very urgent or necessary, such as academical disputations, distributions of prizes, and the like.

Finally, concerts of that kind can with more reason take place in the church wherever a custom in that direction is already in existence, and where people consider them as not against the sanctity of the house of God ; but, at the same time, it is quite plain that a custom of that sort should not be introduced wherever not prevailing yet, as it might easily degenerate into an abuse and convert the abode of prayer into a place of amusement and recreation. In any case when circumstances make it imperative for ecclesiastical superiors to grant permission for having concerts in the church, care and precautions must be taken that nothing will happen disrespectful to the sacredness of the place, and that in the music to be rendered nothing, as the Council of Trent says, ' sive organo sive cantu lascivum aut impurum quid miscetur.'³

S. LUZIO.

¹ Santi-Leitner iii., p. 459.

² Reg. III., Decr.

³ Conc. Trid. Sess. 22, *De Observ.*, etc. ; Wernz, iii., p. 446 sq. ; Coll. *Lac.* iv., col. 30, p. 175 ; Leo XIII, 'Regolamento per la musica sacra,' 6 Jul., 1894 ; Pius X, 'Motu Proprio,' 22 Nov., 1903.

LITURGY

SAYING MASS WITHOUT A SERVER.—INDULGENCES

REV. DEAR FATHER,—1°. Is a priest who says Mass solely out of devotion, justified in celebrating without a server, and without the presence of any other person? I heard Bishop Lynch, of Charleston, once say, that whenever Pius IX granted the faculty to priests to celebrate *Sine Ministro* he always expressly stipulated that somebody must be present, besides the priest. In the faculties granted to the Bishops of the United States it simply says *Sine Ministro, si aliter celebrare non possit.*

Again, should the practice of saying Mass in private chapels, without a server, the nuns making the responses, be tolerated, in cases where it is very easy to get a regular server. Should a priest, who is making his thanksgiving after Mass, be obliged to serve the Mass that follows, rather than have the nuns serve it as far as they are allowed?

When several priests are saying Mass at the same time in a small church or chapel, should all of them recite the prayers in a low voice, or should the priest who is celebrating at the High Altar follow the rubrics in regard to voice, and the others speak in subdued tones. Again, should the priest who is celebrating at the High Altar recite the prayers after Mass with the people in the usual way, in a loud voice, and the others say them in a low voice with their servers, or should all say these prayers in a low voice?

Are the people allowed to choose any of the Masses which they wish to hear, and to pay no attention to the signals for the other Masses, or should they follow, at least externally, the Mass at the High Altar? Should the bell be rung at all the Masses in the usual way, or only at the High Altar?

2°. Can you tell me where I can find a list of the Sundays and Feast Days on which a Plenary Indulgence can be gained by all the faithful, on the usual conditions of Confession, Communion, and visit, and prayers for the intentions of the Holy Father. I have consulted Beringer, Maurel, Grimaud, Massi, and other authors without success. They do not seem to have arranged Indulgences of this kind by themselves. I think it would be useful to pastors to know just on what days throughout the year Plenary Indulgences may be gained by those who do not belong to any Confraternities; so that they might be able to announce these days in the church.—Yours sincerely in Christ,

L.

The following principles, about which most Moral

Theologians after St. Liguori are practically unanimous, will help to solve the difficulties that present themselves to priests who have sometimes to say Mass without the services of the recognized clerk.

1°. It is generally agreed that the obligation of having *some* Mass-server is grave. Therefore it is only when the necessity is relatively serious that a celebrant could feel himself at liberty to proceed alone. The ordinary exceptions are (1) necessity of consecrating the Viaticum, (2) necessity of affording either the people, or the celebrant himself, an opportunity of complying with the precept of hearing Mass, (3) necessity of completing the Holy Sacrifice after the server had departed.

2°. The necessity which would justify a celebrant in saying Mass with a server who cannot make the responses need not be at all so great as that which is required to dispense with a clerk altogether.

3°. In no circumstances may a female be employed to minister at the Altar by serving the wine and water, etc.

4°. It is lawful, in certain cases, to avail oneself of the services of a woman for giving the responses from without the sanctuary. There would be very little difficulty if, in addition, there was a boy to do the ministrations. But even where the priest has to do these himself, he is justified in saying Mass out of mere devotion, when there is no one but a female to make the responses. This is Lehmkuhl's teaching,¹ and it is based on the Decrees of the Congregation of Rites. In 1893, the Congregation seemed to restrict a priest's liberty to say Mass in these circumstances to a case of more or less serious necessity, but in a subsequent Decree of March, 1899, it sanctioned the lawfulness of saying Mass with a nun to answer, when a suitable server could not be easily had. Of course there must always be some difficulty about procuring the services of a proper person, else there could be no justification in departing from the clear injunction of the Rubrics of the Missal. Coming now to the questions of my esteemed correspondent.

¹ *Casus Conscientiae*, ii., p. 156, ed. 1907.

Apart from the recognized exceptions and from a special Indult a priest is not free to say Mass without *any* server, but he may avail himself of the services of a female subject to the conditions stated. When he has a special Indult, he should observe its exact tenor whatever it is. The faculties referred to do not seem to require the presence of anyone but the celebrant himself. At the same time as the interpretation of these is often a matter of some delicacy it would be safest to ascertain the prevailing custom and follow it. The ministry of a female in serving Mass is permitted only when there is some necessity. Hence, if without any trouble or inconvenience a regular server can be had, he should be procured. While it would be very laudable for a priest who has just celebrated to serve a Mass immediately following the task could not be laid on him as a duty, and hence if he is unwilling to give his services, a female might be requisitioned as explained.

When several priests say Mass at the same time in a small chapel they, should recite the prayers in a low tone so as to avoid mutually distracting one another, but the priest celebrating at the High Altar, assuming that there is a congregation, should say the prayers in accordance with the Rubrics, making himself heard by the people in regard to those parts that are to be recited in a loud tone of voice.

Per se persons are free to assist at any one of the Masses that may be going on simultaneously in a church, but there may be reasons why they should select that which is said at the High Altar. If it is a Sunday or Holiday, and the Mass at the principal Altar is the regular Parochial Mass at which there may be an instruction, they would, of course, be bound to assist at it. Should any persons, however, for a legitimate reason, elect to assist at a Mass celebrated at a side Altar, they ought to concentrate all their attention on this Mass to the disregard of what is going on at the High Altar. During the Elevation and the distribution of Communion at the High Altar, the bell should not be rung at the side Altars, but outside these cases it may be rung but very slightly so as not to attract the attention of those assisting at the principal Mass. That the bell is to be rung

at all these private Masses is gathered from the analogy of what is proper when the Holy Sacrifice is offered up in a private oratory the celebrant and server alone being present.¹

It will be a matter for much surprise if my Transatlantic correspondent does not find the list to which he refers in some of the official *Ordos* or Directories drawn up for the priests of the United States. The *Ordo recitandi Officium Divinum*, and the Directory compiled for the use of the Irish priests, both contain a list of the Sundays and Festivals throughout the year on which Plenary Indulgences may be gained by the faithful generally on the usual conditions. Many of the Prayer-books published in some countries have also similar information, but the official *Ordo* or Directory would be a much more reliable guide. Records of indulgences accorded by *general grants*, that is to the faithful indiscriminately, will be preserved naturally in the ecclesiastical archives of the countries to which they have been given. It will be found, however, that all these concessions provide for the gaining of indulgences by the general body of the faithful on the following occasions: First Sunday of each month, principal Feasts of our Lord, viz., Nativity, Circumcision, Epiphany, Easter Sunday, Ascension, and Corpus Christi, and the principal Feasts of the Blessed Virgin, viz., Conception, Nativity, Annunciation, Purification, and Assumption.¹

But there may be privileges granted to one country as regards these indulgences which are not enjoyed in others.

PRIVATE EXPOSITION OF THE BLESSED SACRAMENT

I

REV. DEAR SIR,—Would you kindly state the conditions under which 'private Exposition' of the Blessed Sacrament may be given? What ceremonies are to be observed in carrying out the function? If a number of people be present in the church during Exposition, lasting, suppose, for an hour, may the *Tantum Ergo* be sung and the blessing be given at the close

¹ S.R.C. Decr., 3638, ad iii.

² Vide Maurel, *Manuel of Indulgences*, p. 90.

as at Solemn Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament? Private Exposition is rare as far as I know in Ireland, though common enough, I believe, in other countries.

P. C.

In the October issue of the I. E. RECORD for the year 1906, a few observations were made incidentally about *private* Exposition of the Blessed Sacrament. These shall now be gladly amplified in deference to the wishes of our esteemed correspondent, and a succinct explanation of the following points will presumably exhaust all that need necessarily be said.

1°. What is meant by *private* Exposition? It consists simply in opening the door of the Tabernacle so that the pyx or ciborium, covered with its veil, can be seen within by the faithful who assist at the devotion. It is expressly forbidden to take out the ciborium and expose it. '*Penitus interdicitur sacram pyxidem ob privatam causam extra tabernaculum efferi, ac relatam sub umbella collocari.*'¹

2°. What ceremonies are to be employed for the occasion? A Decree of the Congregation of Bishops and Regulars² prescribes at least six candles. This is also the custom in Rome. On the altar there should be a corporal and the key of the Tabernacle, and on the credence table a humeral veil and a book for the prayers. At the proper time the Officiant issues from the sacristy, vested in surplice, stole, and biretta, preceded by a thurifer and two clerks with torches.³ Arrived at the altar he gives away his biretta, genuflects *in plano*, and kneels on the lowest step for a short time. Then he rises, ascends the predella, opens the Tabernacle, genuflects and, having drawn aside the inner veil and brought forward the ciborium so that it can be easily seen, genuflects again and descends laterally *in planum*, where he kneels as usual. The Blessed Sacrament is now incensed, and the prayers proper to the occasion are said. At the *Genitori* of the *Tantum Ergo* the incense is again used. Having chanted the *Deus qui*

¹ Benedict XIV, *Inst.* 30, n. 16.

² 9th Dec., 1602.

³ Benedict XIV, *Inst.* 30, p. 323.

nobis, etc., the Officiant assumes the humeral veil, goes up to the predella, genuflects, draws forth the ciborium and places it on the corporal. To give the blessing he takes the ciborium in both hands—the left, covered with the veil, being under the base, and the right covering the ciborium with the other extremity of the veil, and grasping the knob of the stem—and makes the sign of the Cross as he would with the monstrance. The ciborium is laid upon the corporal and at once placed in the Tabernacle but near the door which is left open during the Divine praises if they are to be recited, and if they are not, it is put into its proper place and the Tabernacle is closed with the customary reverences. The officiant having come to the foot of the altar genuflects, receives his biretta, and returns to the sacristy as he came out. This is the full ceremony as it is practised in Rome and in Continental churches. But all that has been described is not essential. The torch-bearers, for instance, may be dispensed with, without any great reason, and in this event two large candlesticks with lighted candles may be placed at either extremity of the lowest step of the altar. The incense may be similarly dispensed with. There is no obligation of using it. Indeed it seems to be more in conformity with general practice not to use it unless where the celebrant wears the cope.¹

3°. Is the Bishop's permission necessary for this Exposition? In the issue of the I. E. RECORD already referred to it is stated that though the ciborium may be exposed in this manner without any authorization, sanction should be had for giving the blessing. This opinion seems to require modification unless it be said that the practice of *private* Exposition, being very unusual in this country, it would be at least proper to consult the Ordinary before introducing it into any place, as otherwise it might be regarded as an innovation. At all events there is no formal sanction required for it in Rome, as the following extract from the *Ephemerides Liturgicae*² shows: 'Rectores Ecclesi-

¹ De Amicis, *L'Esposizione e la Benedizione*, p. 31.

² An. vii., n. 9.

arum possunt sine ulla licentia episcopi, data opportunitate et cum debita moderatione, pluries in eorum Ecclesiis, eodem licet die, et Sacramentum in pyxide exponere et cum ea benedicere populo.' How many persons should be present to justify a private Exposition cannot be so easily determined. Some authorities used to hold that a priest could open the Tabernacle out of mere personal devotion, and pray before the Blessed Sacrament for some time, but this view has been condemned by the Congregation of Rites.¹ But more of this anon. The blessing with the ciborium may be given in the circumstances contemplated in the query, and, in general, at the conclusion of any function the custom of blessing the people in this way, as is done in many churches abroad, may be tolerated.²

II

REV. DEAR SIR.—Kindly enlighten me on the following points. Benediction of the Most Blessed Sacrament is an act of public worship, and hence requires the presence of, at least, a small congregation. How many persons are necessary to make up this congregation (1) in a public church, (2) in the oratory of a convent or college? Would the same rule apply when, for example, during the holidays, a smaller number would be residing in the convent or college?

JUNIOR.

It is not easy to give a definite answer to this question, as a good deal depends on circumstances. A larger congregation might be expected in some places than in others, and there are occasions on which, in addition to the Officiant and his altar-boys, the presence of a very small number of worshippers might justify the Benediction ceremony. Here is what Father de Amicis in the Manual already quoted (p. 542) says on the point: 'Circa il numero de' fedeli presenti vuoi per la benedizione solenne, vuoi per la non solenne, nulla e' stabilito; e l'instruzione de *Monitor Ecclesiastico*³ che richiede un numero di persone maggiore per l'esposizione e benedizione del Santissimo con l'ostensorio, e minore per

¹ Vide Van Der Stappen, iv. 174.

² S.R.C. Decr., July, 1894; November, 1895.

³ Vol. viii. p. 1.

l'esposizione con la semplice pisside, non ha alcun suffragio presso i rubricisti.' There is, then, no fixed rule either for *public* Exposition with the Monstrance, or for *private* Exposition with the Pyx or Ciborium.¹ In practice, since a priest is not bound to calculate on the number of persons who may be present, he may feel justified in giving Benediction with the Monstrance on all occasions for which it is authorized, provided that there are *some* worshippers present besides the altar boys. In Convents, of course, a much smaller number, relatively speaking, would be sufficient.

P. MORRISROE.

¹ The words *private* and *public* are to be taken in reference not to the number present but rather to the method of Exposition adopted.

DOCUMENTS

LETTER OF POPE PIUS X TO THE SPANIARDS OF CATALONIA.

EPISTOLA

QUA PIUS PP. X LAUDAT CATHOLICOS CATALAUNOS OB UNITATIS EXEMPLUM IN FIDEI IURIBUS TUENDIS.¹

DILECTO FILIO NOSTRO SALVATORI TIT. SS. QUIRICI ET IULITAE S. R. E. CARD. CASSANAS Y PAGÉS EPISCOPO BARCINONENSIMUM BARCINONEM.

PIUS PP. X.

Dilecte Fili Noster, salutem et Apostolicam benedictionem.

Editum nuper a Catalaunia unitatis exemplum in tuendis fidei catholicae iuribus, admodum quam multa Nos delectatione perfudit, eo scilicet nomine, quod in causa religiosa, id est quum de roganda adversus libertatem sacrarum consociationum lege consilium proferretur, Catalauni omnes tametsi studiis forte civilium rerum segregati, consensione mirifica obstitere, monueruntque palam potiorem in eorum animis religioni locum esse quam partibus, viresque in eis nulla ratione posse disiectas existere ubi fidei momentis discrimen immineat. Omnino

¹ Eñus Card. Secretarius Status Pontificiam hanc epistolam ad Eñum Episcopum Barcinonensem transmisit, ex parte sua a dñs :

Eñ e Rm Sig. mio Ossm.

Nell'intento di tributare una meritata parola di lode ai cattolici di Catalogna per la nobile e generosa azione di unanime protesta spiegata non ha guari contro i noti progetti di legge sulle associazioni religiose, ed allo scopo altresì di eccitare i cattolici delle altre provincie spagnuole a farsi promotori in somiglianti circostanze, di movimenti collettivi ispirati alla bella condotta dei Catalani, è piaciuto al Santo Padre di dirigere all'Eminenza Vostra un suo venerato documento. Io mi affretto a rimetterle la Pontificia ed importante lettera, e non dubito che Vostra Eminenza vi troverà insieme con i suoi fedeli, alto conforto per lo zelo dimostrato nell'anzidetta occasione e vorrà anche darle pubblicità perchè se ne giovino gli altri Vescovi e fedeli di Spagna, all'uopo di procurare la stretta unione dei cattolici, massime nelle circostanze di elezioni amministrative e politiche alle quali prudentemente allude un periodo, che merita di essere posto in rilievo, della lettera stessa.

Profitto dell'occasione per rinnovarle i sensi della profonda venerazione con cui Le bacio umilissimamente le mani e mi prego raffermarmi.

Dell'Eminenza Vostra

Roma, 5 Marzo 1907.

Eñ e dñ servitore vero

R. Card. MERRY DEL VAL.

2 M

istam catholicos decere arbitramur significationem religiosorum sensuum. Nobis vero ideo etiam e re consolatio non defuit, quia tradita plus semel a Decessore Nostro Leone XIII fel. rec. et a Nobis documenta, per eam occasionem vidimus fideli studio servata, singulari vobis consecuta utilitate. Id nunc superest unum, ut quae, memorato tempore, in Catalaunia et alibi est edita actio, similibus in adiunctis edatur assidue, neque istic solum, sed apud universos Hispaniae populos, nulla posthabita religiosae rei protegendaem opportunitate, tum si quis ab inimicis impetus instet, tum si postulent tempora ferri pro singularum administratione civitatum aut pro regni regimine suffragia. Hisce certe pactis constabit, persentire Hispaniam, p[re]a qualibet civilium sectatione rerum, avitae religionis vim, eiusque legitima et salubria commoda omni ope et consentanea voluntatum sinceritate provehere. Ad comprobandum eventu spem, tuae ne cesses navitatis opem conferre, quam caeteros Hispaniae Episcopos sua, ut antea, alacritate esse cumulaturos pro certo confidimus: simul laudem habeto, vere meritam, episcopalis diligentiae tuae, testemque dilectionis Nostrae Apostolicam benedictionem excipias, quam tibi propensissimo animo in Domino impertimus.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum, die IV Martii anno MCMVII,
Pontificatus Nostri quarto.

PIUS PP. X.

**BEATIFICATION AND CANONIZATION OF THE VENERABLE
BONAVENTURE OF BARCINONE**

ROMANA SEU BARCINONEN.

**DECRETUM BEATIFICATIONIS ET CANONIZATIONIS VEN. SERVI DEI
FR. BONAVENTURAE A BARCINONE, LAICI PROFESSI ORDINIS
MINORUM, CONDITORIS S. RECESSUS S. BONAVENTURAE DE
URBE.**

Super dubio: An, et de quibus miraculis constet in casu et ad effectum de quo agitur.

Medias inter veteris Urbis ruinas contemplanti surgentem e Palatino colle Recessum, a S. Bonaventura nuncupatum, adhuc resonare videntur Isaiae verba LI, 3, *Consolabitur Dominus omnes ruinas eius, et ponet desertum eius quasi delicias, et solitudinem eius quasi hortum Domini.* Hoc Franciscalium domicilium, quasi testimonium christianaे humilitatis victoriā referentis super ethnicum fastum, non insignem doctrina virum conditorem iactat, sed religiosum sacris nullis Ordinibus

initiatum, nullis pene imbutum litteris, Ven. Dei Servum Bonaventuram Gran, ab eo divinitus datum, qui *vocat ea quae sunt tanquam ea quae non sunt*.

Ortus in oppido Riudoms prope Barcinonem VIII cal. Decembr. an. MDCXX parentibus humili genere, Ven. Dei Servus èa vitae innocentia pueritiam transegit eaque pietate praefulsit, ut angeli speciem praeseferret. A patre compulsus ut uxorem duceret, paruit quidem, sed obedientiae meritum cum virginitatis flore coniunxit, illibatam cum annuente coniuge, tamquam cum sorore, vitam traducens. Èa brevi vivis erepta, desiderium quo iamdiu aestuabat explens, Franciscalium Institutum amplexus est, quod ante instauratam unitatem Reformatorum vocabatur. Per varia eius Ordinis coenobia humilioribus functus officiis, eminenti sanctitate ac singularibus gratiae donis omnium in se admirationem concitavit. Actus vehementi studio instaurandae inter suos Apostolicae vivendi formae, sacros Recessus, in quibus rigidius perfectiusque vivendi genus coleretur, in provincia romana, non sine multis contentionibus ac laboribus, varios exstruxit, in quibus hac ipsa in Urbe celeberrimum illud, quod a Doctore S. Bonaventura nomen accepit. Ubi postquam plures ex institutis a se Familiis sanctissime rexit atque aptissimis legibus fulcivit, *dilectus Deo et hominibus*, praesertim romano populo, cui exemplis et prodigiis spectaculo fuerat, intemeratae vitae cursum absolvit III Id. Septembr. an. MDCLXXXIV, aetatis suae quarto supra sexagesimum.

Haec licet fuerit viri sanctitas, et quamvis eidem illustrandae signa et miracula non defuerint, nihilominus inscrutabili Dei iudicio factum est ut Beatorum caelitum honores ei serius decernerentur. Itaque post Decretum approbationis virtutum a sa. me. Pio PP. VI editum XVIII cal. Septembr. an. MDCCCLXXV, de duobus miraculis, quae per Ven. Dei Servum a Deo patrata ferebantur, accurata inquisitio peracta est, tabulaeque iudiciales a SS. Rituum Congregatione recognitae ac probatae sunt.

Horum primum accidit sub annum ferme MDCCXC in oppido Riudoms. Maria Padrell, ex vicina urbe Maspuiol equo vecta redibat; quum hic, repentina canis incursu exterritus, dorso insidentem excussit, circumvolutaque eius pedibus habena, eamdem iactare et raptare miserrime coepit. Ereptam, suique vix compotem domum delatam statim ut chirurgus inspexit, eiusque dexterum crus vidit dire sauciatum, pedem autem diffractis nervis pene avulsum a tibia, nullam esse salutis viam nisi in celeri amputatione declaravit. In ea rerum desperatione Maria ad Ven. Bonaventuram conversa, cuius reliquiam circumferre consueverat, eius opem cum lacrimis implorare coepit.

Vix absoluta prece, sanatam se illico sentiens, lecto descendit, reiecto neptis auxilio ad eam accurrentis, ac firmo liberoque gradu, dum vixit, ambulavit.

Alterum contigit miraculum anno MDCCCX in eodem oppido Riudoms. Rosa Maso et Puigdengolas, puerum enixa, post aliquot horas gravissimo insultu correpta est, quem medicus epilepsim iudicavit. Nihil proficientibus remediis, aegrota in horas ruebat in peius, donec in lethale *coma* incidit. Iamque rigentem omnique sensu destitutam qui aderant veluti mortuam deflebant, et qui ad eam efferendam opus erant apparebant. Admovetur a parocho Ven. Bonaventurae reliquia, cuius contactu aegrota revocatur ad vitae munia, lectoque desilit plena valetudine pollens.

De utroque miraculo Apostolica auctoritate confecta sunt acta, annis MDCCXXV et MDCCXXVII. Eorum agnita et probata validitate, instaurata est actio cum diligenti inquisitione, primum in antepreparatorio conventu in aedibus Revmi. Cardinalis Dominici Ferratae causae Relatoris, octavo cal. sextiles superioris anni; rursus in praeparatorio ad Apostolicum Palatium Vaticanum decimo sexto cal. Februarii volventis anni; tertio denique in generali coetu, habito octavo cal. Maii eiusdem anni coram SSmo. D. N. Pio PP. X; quo in coetu ab eodem Revmo. Cardinali Dominico Ferrata propositum est dubium: *An, et de quibus miraculis constet in casu et ad effectum de quo agitur.* Suffragiis Consultorum et PP. Cardinalium constare affirmantium exceptis, SSmus. Dominus a supremo suo edendo iudicio abstinuit, monuitque praesentes ut in re tam gravi caeleste lumen efflagitarent.

Tandem hodierno die, Dominica III post Pascha, Idem SSmus. Dominus e domestico sacello, ubi Sacrum pientissime litaverat, nobiliorem aulam Vaticanam ingressus ac Pontificio solio assidens ad Se accersivit Rmos Cardinales Aloisium Tripepi S. RR. Congregationi Pro-Praefectum et Dominicum Ferratae causae Relatorem, una cum R. P. Alexandro Verde S. Fidei Promotore, meque infrascripto a secretis, iisque adstantibus solemni Decreto sanxit: *Constare de duobus miraculis; de primo: Instantaneae perfectaeque sanationis dexteri pedis Mariae Padrell, pessime lacerati; de secundo: Instantaneae perfectaeque sanationis Rosae Maso et Puigdengolas a gravissima eclampsia puerperali.*

Hoc autem Decretum publici iuris fieri et in SS. Rituum Acta referri iussit, pridie nonas Maii anno MDCCCCVI.

A. Card. TRIPEPI, *Pro-Praefectus.*

✠ D. PANICI, *Archiep. Laodicen., Secretarius*

ROMANA SEU BARCINONEN

DECRETUM BEATIFICATIONIS ET CANONIZATIONIS VEN. SERVI DEI

FR. BONAVENTURAE A BARCINONE, LAICI PROFESSI ORDINIS
MINORUM, CONDITORIS S. RECESSUS S. BONAVENTURAE DE
URBE.

Super dubio : *An, stante approbatione virtutum et duorum
miraculorum, TUTO procedi possit ad solemnem eiusdem Ven.
Servi Dei beatificationem.*

Divino consilio factum videtur ut, dum praesens aetas plurimis gloriatur doctrinis et litteris, in quibus Franciscana etiam, uti vocant, studia non ultimum locum obtinet, catholica Ecclesia virum proponat Beatorum Caelitum honoribus exornandum, qui Patris Assisiensis indolem suavissimam referens, facere magis quam dicere assueverit, exemplique plus quam doctrina christiana perfectionis incrementa curaverit. Haec nempe, quae derideri solet, iusti simplicitas, Ven. Dei Servum Bonaventuram potentem effecit ad iacula fundamenta celsissimae sanctitatis, iuxta Doctoris Augustini sententiam (Serm. X, de verb. Dom.) : *Cogitas magnam fabricam construere celsitudinis? de fundamento prius cogita humilitatis.*

Piis nulloque censu parentibus ortus Ven. Dei Servus anno MDCXX, non minus animo quam agro colendo adolescens operam dedit. Mox, Deo monente, Francisci Patris Institutum professus est, vilioribus addictus officiis. Brevi tamen patuit quam altus humili sub specie lateret animus, quanta coenobitae sanctitas esset, quanta obscuri hominis vis fiduciam omnem in Deo collificantis, etsi rudis ac pene litterarum expers, rigidioris disciplinae conditor exstitit, constituitque in romana Reformatorum provincia Recessus, quibus ipsem praefuit, auctor idem et legifer et moderator. Inter eos praecipius ille numeratur, qui a Palatino clivo adsurgit et a S. Doctore Bonaventura nomen habet; quem locum, quum multi sancti viri coluerunt, tum potissimum Leonardi a Portu Mauritio apostolatus effecit memorabilem. Atque hic, ubi propter eminentem virtutem et plane singularia dona poterat de se ipse affirmare : *tanquam prodigium factus sum multis* (Ps. LXX); hic, ubi plurimi habitus est et conquisitus a clarissimis ex omni ordine viris, a PP. Cardinalibus atque ipsis a Summis Pontificibus, ita ut ei convenienter verba Ps. LXX : *Quoniam non cognovi litteraturam, introibo in potentias Domini, hic Ven. Dei Servus, quasi turtur in nido ubi ponat pullos suos,* beata fine quievit III Id. Septembr. MDCLXXXIV.

Aucta post obitum Bonaventurae sanctitatis fama et prodigiis confirmata, agitata causa est, serius illa quidem propter

publicarum rerum in Hispania conversionem, et super duobus miraculis actio instituta, de quibus SSmus. D. N. Pius PP. X Decreto diei vicesimi quarti mensis Aprilis mox elapsi constare edixit.

Unum supererat iuxta S. huius Fori statuta inquirendum, utrum Beatorum Caelitum honores Ven. Dei Servo Bonaventurae, Tuto decerni possent. Itaque in S. huius Congregationis generali conventu habito coram SSmo. D. N. octavo cal. Maii labentis anni, Rmus. Cardinalis Dominicus Ferrata, causae Relator, dubium proposuit: *An, stante approbatione virtutum et duorum miraculorum, Tuto procedi possit ad solemnem Ven. Servi Dei Bonaventurae a Barcinone beatificationem.* Quamvis vero Rmi. Cardinales et PP. Consultores unanimi suffragio Tuto fieri posse respondissent, Beatissimus Pater mentem suam aperire distulit, praesentes adhortatus ut effusis precibus divinam opem implorarent.

Hodierno autem die, Dominica III post Pascha, salutari Hostia devotissime oblata, ad Vaticanas Aedes accivit Rmos Cardinales Aloisium Tripepi SS. RR. Congregationi Pro-Praefectum et Dominicum Ferratae Relatorem, una cum R. P. Alexandro Verde S. Fidei Pomot oremeque infrascripto Secretario, iisque adstantibus edixit: *Tuto procedi posse ad solemnem Ven. Servi Dei Bonaventurae a Barcinone beatificationem.*

Hoc autem Decretum evulgari, in Acta SS. Rituum Congregationis referri, Litterasque Apostolicas sub plumbo de beatificationis solemnibus in patriarchali Basilica Vaticana, ubi primum licuerit, celebrandis expediri iussit, pridie nonas maias anno MDCCCCVI.

A. Card. TRIPEPI, *Pro-Praefectus.*

✠ D. PANICI, Archiep. Laodicen., *Secretarius.*

INSTRUCTION OF THE SACRED INQUISITION ON MODERNIST ERRORS

INSTRUCTIO S. R. ET U. INQUISITIONIS AD R̄MOS LOCORUM ORDINARIOS FAMILIARUMQUE RELIGIOSARUM MODERATORES.

MONITA CIRCA MODERNISTARUM ERRORES.

Recentissimo Decreto *Lamentabili sane exitu* diei 3 iulii c. a. ab hac S. Congregatione S. Romanae et universalis Inquisitionis iussu D. N. Pii Papae X, notati atque proscripti sunt praecipui quidam errores qui nostra aetate a scriptoribus, effrenata cogitandi atque scrutandi libertate abreptis, sparguntur, et altioris scientiae fuco et specie propugnantur.

Quum autem errores occulti serpere, et, quod maxime luctuosum est, incautos animos, iuvenum praesertim, occupare soleant, ac semel admissi difficillime radicibus ex animo ebellantur immo, etiam eradicati, plerumque sponte sua repullent, opportunum visum est Eminentissimis et Reverendissimis Dominis Cardinalibus, in rebus fidei et morum una mecum Inquisitoribus Generalibus, Decreto supra laudato monita quaedam adiungere, quibus plenius et efficacius attingatur finis quem S. Sedes in reprobandis erroribus sibi proposuerat, consequendum.

Memores igitur imprimis sint ad quos pertinet, necessarium esse ut sive in Seminariis clericorum saecularium et studiorum domibus Religiosorum, sive in Universitatibus, Lyceis, Gymnasiis allisve educationis collegiis vel institutis a iuvenum institutione omnino removeantur moderatores atque magistri qui damnatis erroribus infecti cognoscuntur vel eorum suspecti merito habentur.

Necessarium pariter erit interdicere, praesertim Seminariorum alumnis ac universim viris ecclesiasticis, ne nomen dent libellis periodicis quibus neoterici errores sive aperte propugnantur sive latenter insinuantur, neque quidquam in eis publici iuris faciant. A qua regula non deflectant, etsi aliquando gravis ratio aliud suadet videatur, nisi de consensu Ordinarii.

Consultum postremo erit sacram ordinationem differre vel etiam prorsus denegare iis qui, quod Deus avertat, neotericis erroribus imbuti essent, quos non ex animo reprobarent atque reiicerent.

His autem pro zelo, quo erga gregem sibi creditum animantur Ordinarii, illa adiicere non omittant consilia ac remedia quae pro ratione locorum et circumstantiarum opportuna iudicaverint ad zizania penitus ex agro Domini ebellenda.

Datum Romae, ex aedibus S. O. die 28 Augusti, 1907.

S. Card. VANNUTELLI.

NOTICES OF BOOKS

THE CAUSES OF POVERTY. By Callaghan M'Carthy, B.A.
London : King & Son ; Dublin : M. H. Gill & Son.

FOR the Economist, the Industrialist, and the Socialist, this book should afford very interesting reading. The author goes to the root of things. In endeavouring to account for the pretty widespread poverty that obtains in the world, he examines the offices discharged by mankind with its various activities and organizations, and by nature with all its complex elements and forces. He then marshals in array the evil agencies that obstruct and retard the operations of these causes, and so arrives at an explanation of the deficiency of their actual output of good as compared with their powers of productiveness. In a final chapter he applies these principles to the circumstances by the United Kingdom, and draws inferences as to the extent and causes of its scarcity.

The trend of the book is philosophical rather than practical, but its perusal cannot fail to set one's mind a-thinking over very deep problems that affect the well-being of humanity.

A. P.

PRAELECTIONES DE LITURGIIS ORIENTALIBUS. A.
Maximiliano, Principe Saxoniae. Tomus Primus.
Friburg, etc., Herder. 5m.

THIS is the first of a projected series of volumes on the Eastern Liturgies. It consists of lectures delivered on this subject in the University of Friburg, in Switzerland. The author is Father Maximilian, the well-known Prince of Saxony, who surrendered his high estate for the humble calling of a priest, and for some years exercised the ministrations of this office among the Catholic poor of London. The plan of the work is to deal in the first place with the Eastern group in general, and then to take up each branch of the wide-spreading tree and trace its growth, expansion, and the lines of its development. In the introductory portion the author speaks of the areas in which the Eastern liturgies are used, their authenticity, their recognition by the Church, their earliest manuscripts and language, and the broad characteristics that distinguish them from the Western families : he then deals specially with the liturgy in use among the Greeks and Slaves, dwelling upon

their places of worship with their sacred vessels, vestments, and books, their hierarchy of ministers, and the order of the celebration of their festivals. He complains of the poverty of the authentic information that prevails in regard to many of the points touched upon in these pages, but he makes diligent use of such recognized sources as Renaudotius (*Collectio*), Daniel (*Codex Lit.*), Denzinger (*Ritus Orientalium*), Neale, Littledale, Swainson, etc. The fact that the volume is a compilation of lectures intended for students possibly precluded the more frequent citation of authorities which is always desirable in works of this kind and which ever conveys the idea of critical and careful scholarship, and to the same source may also be attributed the easy and decided Anglican turn of the Latin sentences. To those interested in the rites still used by Easterns in communion with the Holy See the book may be usefully commended. The great publishing house of Herder has, as usual, done its work in most approved style.

THE LAW OF CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE. According to the Teaching and Discipline of the Catholic Church. By the Rev. Arthur Devine (Passionist). London : R. & T. Washbourne.

MISPLACED alliances and unions contracted for life by persons who fail to appreciate the gravity of their responsibilities are sources of the greatest misfortune to the individual, the family, and society at large. The sordid revelations of the Divorce Court, to which undue and unsavoury prominence is unhappily given in many of our daily papers, sufficiently show the enormous extent of the domestic unhappiness and social evils which spring from the profanation of the marriage state. Even among Catholics perverse notions often prevail about the dispositions with which this sacred state should be entered into so that lifetimes of bitterness and sorrow are spent where everything should be peace and happiness. The book under notice will prove very useful in dispelling these erroneous ideas, in instructing Catholics about their duties when about to contract marriage, in diffusing among those outside the Church a knowledge of her teaching on this sacrament, and in providing pastors of souls with a complete fund of information on everything which they require to know for the safe guidance of their flocks in regard to this sacred contract. Here in the compass of some 360 pages, we have a careful treatment of the various portions of the Matrimony Tract—betrothal, Marriage as a contract and sacrament, its obligations, indissolubility and unity, the

impediments prohibitive and diriment, dispensations, and the validation of invalid marriages. All these sections are handled with the skill of a master, who knows his subject and estimates exactly the amount of knowledge that will be useful for his readers. What will enhance considerably the value of Father Devine's latest work is its thorough 'up-to-dateness.' Only a few months have elapsed since the important Decree *Ne Temere* (which has completely revolutionized existing legislation), emanated from the Holy See (August, 1907). Yet in these pages will be found a thoroughly critical commentary on the new Regulations. In his explanation of the various provisions of the Decree the author follows Cardinal Gennari, but recognizing that there are many knotty points of interpretation which will be cleared up only by authentic decisions of the Council, he has arranged with the Publisher to have inserted as an Appendix in future copies of the book each enactment bearing on the Decree as it shall be issued by the Holy See. Already it has been decided (vide I. E. RECORD, March, 1908, p. 300), that the vexed clause, 'nisi . . . aliter sit statutum,' embraces only one exception, namely, that made for Germany by the Constitution *Provida*, in 1906. But doubtless other extensions will be made in course of time for other countries, and these our author will call due attention to as he proposes.

The publishing is done by Washbourne, and leaves nothing to be desired.

P. M.

THE CHRIST THE SON OF GOD. A Life of our Lord Jesus Christ. By the Abbé Constant Fouard. London: Longmans, Green & Co.; Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son, Ltd. Price 6d. net.

THE celebrated Life of our Lord by the Abbé Fouard has long been regarded as the standard work on the Life of Christ. The French original quickly went through several editions, and demands were made from many countries that the work should be translated into the vernacular. The English translation was entrusted to a competent scholar, and as a result the beauty of the French has been well preserved in the English version.

The Abbé Fouard was Professor of Theology in Rouen, and for years had devoted himself to the study of the early years of Christianity. He was a man of deep and critical scholarship as his works on Origins of Christianity clearly prove. But what was equally important in a man preparing to write the Life of Christ, his faith was strong and untouched by the vagaries of

modern criticism. Not that he had not followed closely the controversies about the authenticity of the Gospels and the value of their testimony regarding the works of Christ, but rather that his own good sense had taught him that these disputes should be relegated to their proper places, the notes or the Appendix, and that they should not be allowed to spoil the text of the work.

The English translation was, however, too costly to be bought by the ordinary faithful. The need of a cheap edition was felt by many, but apparently the different societies for the diffusion of Catholic literature through the British Islands felt themselves unable to undertake the task. Messrs. Longmans & Co. have courageously undertaken the responsibility, and we should be surprised if they be not more than satisfied with the success of their venture.

The whole text of the English translation has been preserved in the popular edition. The Notes and the additions dealing with the modern controversies and literature on the Gospels have been wisely omitted. The book is printed on good paper, and the type is clear and distinct. In many matters one may well imitate the methods of one's adversaries, and seeing that the Rationalist Press has learned the value of cheap editions it is well that the defenders of Christian doctrines should fight them with their own weapons. No better book could be recommended for general reading by the faithful than the Abbé Fouard's Life of Christ. It were well if a copy were to be found in every Catholic home in Ireland, and we are sure that if the popular sixpenny edition were brought under the notice of the people a copy would soon be found in every household. The publishers, Messrs. Longmans & Co., London, and Messrs. M. H. Gill & Son, Dublin, deserve our warmest congratulations and gratitude.

J. MACC.

TRINITY COLLEGE AND THE TRINITY COMMISSION. By Rev. Daniel Coghlan, Professor, Maynooth. Dublin. 1908. Price 2s.

MANY people in this country have been accustomed to regard Trinity College with feelings of awe and reverence. Vague ideas about the nature and value of University education and University culture are in the air; and not a few individuals in Ireland, transferring the theoretical to the practical, have not been slow to associate Trinity College with the highest type of University training and culture. The Trinity College Degree

was to their minds the genuine stamp of learning, and all other educational establishments in this country were little better than hedge-schools.

The publication of the Report of the Trinity College Commission ought to have opened the eyes of those who prate about University culture in Ireland. It has torn the veil from Trinity College, and exposed the workings of this model institution. It has shown from the evidence of the Trinity Professors that their College with its immense revenues, its well paid staff of Fellows and Professors, its 'liberal ideals,' and its liberal methods has no claim to rank as a University unless indeed in the extent of its endowments and in its cleverly devised schemes for securing extravagant fees from its graduates. We have no hesitation in saying, that apart altogether from its anti-national policy and regarded solely from the point of way of education, nowhere else in the world except in Ireland would such an institution be allowed to monopolise the Higher Education of a nation.

But the Report of the Trinity College Commission was accessible only to a limited number ; and very few even of those who procured the Blue Book had leisure or perseverance enough to wade through its pages. For this reason the publication of Dr. Coghlan's book is exceedingly opportune. Dr. Coghlan has taken great trouble in examining the Report of the Commission. He has studied it carefully, and has embodied the results of his studies in a *brochure* which, both from the point of view of size and price, will enable all those who are interested in the question to get a good idea of the machinery and working of Trinity College. The value of the book is enhanced by the fact that Dr. Coghlan invariably quotes the authorities for his statements, namely, the evidence given by one or other of the Trinity authorities in their examination before the Commission. It contains, therefore, an account of Trinity College, not as it appears to prejudiced outsiders, but as it is seen by men who have made their studies there, who have since risen to the position of Fellows or Professors, and who have, therefore, no reason for exaggerating the imperfections of their *Alma Mater*. Their statements and admissions cannot be denied or explained away ; and at this particular juncture it were well that all those interested in University education in Ireland should procure a copy of Dr. Coghlan's book, and make themselves acquainted with the work of an institution that arrogates to itself the rank of Ireland's University. It were well, too, if they should keep the work in their libraries for further use, because even though the scheme introduced by

Mr. Birrell become law, we shall be surprised if the country has said the last word about Trinity College.

The first chapter in Dr. Coghlan's book, namely, 'The Two Ideals,' was first written in reply to those friends of Trinity College, who in opposing Mr. Bryce's scheme declared that it was utterly impossible to combine in the one University such different ideals in education as those of the Irish Catholics and of Trinity College. Dr. Coghlan has no difficulty in showing that two such bulwarks of Christianity as the Provost and Dean Bernard are hardly consistent in worshipping God in the chapel while approving of His being banished from the lecture room, nor are they more consistent when in their anxiety to secure Catholic recruits they promise that the lectures shall not be offensive to the Catholic faith. It is characteristic of the Protestant 'liberal' ideal that the *Irish Times* refused to publish Dr. Coghlan's reply.

He next deals with the revenues of Trinity College, and few even amongst the experts in education matters are aware of the facts brought out at the Commission regarding the revenues of the College. Trinity is in receipt each year of the large sum of £93,000, about £56,000 of which seems to be income from State endowments. Dr. Coghlan was well advised in placing these two chapters, 'The Two Ideals' and 'The Revenues of Trinity College' in the beginning of his book. Most people will say that an annual income of £93,000 is amply sufficient to carry out the most liberal ideas of University education; and yet, we think, that after the perusal of the remaining chapters of Dr. Coghlan's book—'The Governing Body,' 'The Junior Fellows,' 'The Arts Course,' 'The Medical and Divinity Schools,' etc.—few, even the best friends of Trinity, will contend that the College has reached the level of a good Secondary School.

Many of our readers will be very much interested in the study of the Divinity School of Trinity College. Unfavourable comparisons have so often been made between the Catholic clerical education in Ireland and that given to the clerics of the Irish Episcopalian Church at Trinity, that Dr. Coghlan's treatment must be read with interest by both friend and foe. The Catholic students of Divinity have been branded as peasant boys, sent from the plough to the College, and from the College to the country without education, culture, or refinement. Yet when we examine the question in the light of the evidence given at the Commission, we find that the Divinity students of Trinity College are drawn from such a poor class that they are dispensed from payment of the double fees insisted upon in case of all

the other professional students. The full Arts Course of the College is four years, but the Divinity students are allowed to begin their Theological studies at the end of the second year. For the next two years he is allowed to combine the Arts Course and the Theological Course, and at the end of his four years he is dubbed a B.A., and receives his *Testimonium* for Ordination. Besides it is to be noted that he may not have resided in the College for lectures during half of that time.

How different from the course of training prescribed by the Catholic Bishops of Ireland for their Theological students at Maynooth. A student entering Maynooth must have already passed his Matriculation examination at the Royal University ; he must continue his Arts Course for three years and receive his B.A., before he is allowed to begin his Theological Course. Four full years are then given to Theology, and if a student wish to secure the Licentiate he must continue his studies for another period of two years. And still in spite of these facts there are some people to be found, even amongst our own, who speak of the superior education of the Church of Ireland clergyman.

Furthermore, Dr. Coghlan proves very clearly from the mouths of the Trinity witnesses, that the College has no claim to rank as the University of Ireland. It has steadily set its face against the study of the Irish language, literature, history, and antiquities ; it has done nothing to promote the material welfare of the country, it draws its students only from the small Ascendancy gang, and not from the Irish nation as such ; and it educates these students mainly for exportation to England or the Colonies. The Provost indeed, admitted this fact, but in reply he emphasized the fact that there are two nations in Ireland, not one, as most people seem to suppose. Trinity College is supported mainly from the robbery of the one for the benefit of the other.

There are many other points in the book, such as 'The Arts Course,' 'The Medical School,' 'Trinity College and Research,' with which we should like to have dealt, but space does not permit. We refer our readers to Dr. Coghlan's work for a full treatment of these questions. The last chapter, 'Modernism and the University Question,' supplies an able refutation of those who have so recklessly asserted that the late Papal Encyclical has in any way limited the freedom of Catholic scientists and University professors. We earnestly recommend the book to our readers. They will find it at once instructive and entertaining. It is well brought out, and the price is very moderate.

J. MACC.

LECTURES AND REPLIES OF THE MOST REV. THOMAS
JOSEPH CARR, D.D., ARCHBISHOP OF MELBOURNE.
Published by the Australian Catholic Truth Society,
Melbourne. 1907.

THE Catholic Church of Australia has the advantage of possessing in the See of Melbourne one of the most learned theologians and one of the most skilful controversialists in Christendom. He is a man whose words were always few, but well chosen and to the point. He has in the course of his very fruitful apostolate felt obliged on many occasions to take up the challenge of the enemies of the Church who abound in Australia, and defend her doctrines and teaching against all sorts of imputations and charges, correcting errors, refuting falsehoods, solving difficulties, explaining theological truths and historical episodes in a manner that has won the admiration even of his enemies.

The 'Catholic Truth Society' of Australia has now collected these lectures, essays, and replies in a fine octavo volume and presented it to the public at a moderate price.

We welcome the volume both for the sake of the author, the beloved and illustrious prelate, who reflects such credit on his native land and on the Church, and for the contents which will be found most valuable and instructive by all Catholics, and particularly by priests who have to minister in the midst of innumerable sects in any part of the world.

The subjects of primary importance dealt with are: (1) The Church and the Bible; (2) Primacy of the Roman Pontiff; (3) Origin of the Church of England; (4) Church of England and the Catholic Church.

These are not only lectures; they are learned and profound treatises which go to the very heart of the questions and treat them with rare learning and skill.

But besides the learning of a more recondite kind which might be expected from one who was a master in theology, there is in every one of these treatises something new and fresh which gives it actuality and brings it up to date. The Archbishop's reading covers a vast area, and extends into regions where his opponents ought to be at home. Yet they are no match for him. With a stately dignity and an unfailing politeness he carries conviction with him, and if he had to leave the case to a jury, no unprejudiced jury could give the verdict against him.

We need say no more. As a work of popular theology this is the best book we have met with in recent times. We con-

gratulate his Grace on having accomplished so useful and meritorious a task in the midst of his administrative labours, and we trust that he may long be spared to guide and rule the great Church of Melbourne, to reflect honour on the Church of Australia and the Church of St. Patrick.

J. F. H.

THE FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY OF SOCIALISM. Arthur Preuss. Freiburg and St. Louis, Ma. : Herder. 1908.


MR. ARTHUR PREUSS is not remarkable for his calm judgment or unprejudiced attitude in matters of ordinary controversy ; it could scarcely be expected that he would divest himself of all bias in a work of this kind. His association of Father McGlynn with Henry George shows that he has not entirely done so. And yet this is the work of Mr. Preuss in which we have noticed least of the 'cloven foot' and most of the sound thinker and controversialist. The part of his work that deals with private property is very well done. The author shows himself quite familiar with the teaching of Leo XIII on the subject he deals with ; and on no sounder authority could he rely.

J. F. H.

LA FRANCE ILLUSTRÉE. Journal Hebdomadaire, Littéraire, Scientifique. 40 Rue Lafontaine, Auteuil, Paris.

WE have received several recent numbers of *La France Illustrée*, with a request to bring it under the notice of the Irish clergy. We do so with all the greater pleasure as an old and faithful friend of Ireland, M. Nemours Godré has recently been appointed editor of the journal. One has only to look at the *Graphic*, the *Sphere*, the *Illustrated London News* to recognize that England is a Protestant country. The success of *La France Illustrée* and its splendidly artistic appearance helps still to stamp France as Catholic in spite of its recreant Government. There is no illustrated paper in France to compare with *La France Illustrée*. It is simply superb. We should like to see it introduced into Catholic libraries, and, where possible, into Catholic homes. Of course it is only well-to-do people who could afford to get it for their private use (it costs 30 francs a year) ; but it would certainly be more suited to a Catholic family circle than the English illustrated papers that are so often to be met with. The interest M. Nemours Godré takes in Ireland is proved by his works on O'Connell and on Parnell, and by his numerous articles on Irish affairs in the *Univers* and the *Verité Française*. We sincerely hope his venture will be a great success, and we should be delighted to see him get some assistance from Ireland.

J. F. H.



BOSSUET ON THE DRAMA

THE drama has been attracting a good deal of attention in Ireland of late. Our new Gaelic writers feel themselves called upon to fill up an acknowledged gap in our National literature. On the fringe of the Gaelic Revival we have the so-called Anglo-Irish or Celtic school, whose productions, written in English, consist of more or less faithful pictures of Irish life in old times as well as in our own day. This latter school has not succeeded in keeping clear of morbid modern influences ; and though much more familiar with the technique of the stage than are the new Gaelic dramatists like Dr. Hyde and Father O'Leary ; though, moreover, they have occasionally reached a high level of literary and dramatic excellence, yet, as a rule, their plays are more or less exotic, uncongenial, and often give violent shocks to the feelings that are deepest and most tender in the Irish heart. Still, with all their faults, the plays of the Yeats and Synge school must be regarded as infinitely superior to the pieces that form the stock-in-trade of the so-called Dublin stage. The immense popularity of those latter among the Catholic population of Dublin forms a serious and an urgent problem ; nor is the difficulty of the problem lessened by the fact that those plays are advertised from day to day, and puffed from week to week by newspapers that are read without suspicion and without offence in many Irish Catholic homes—newspapers, indeed, which are regarded as the sturdy champions of Catholic interests.

For all those reasons it will, doubtless, be of interest to hear the views that Bossuet entertained in regard to the French stage in the days of Corneille, Racine, and Molière. Those views are to be found in his treatise, *Maximes et Réflexions sur la Comédie*. The occasion of the writing of the treatise was as follows.

In the year 1694 a French dramatic writer called Boursault, brought out a collection of his plays. To secure it against adverse criticism on the score of morals, he published in the volume a preface written by Father Caffaro, a priest of the Theatine Order in Paris. In this preface Father Caffaro made a gallant attempt to prove that to read, write, or witness the performance of plays was, as a rule, a very innocent way to spend one's time. Of course he made the usual proviso that the plays in question contained nothing against good morals. He further contended that the French stage of his own day fulfilled this condition. He concluded that it was no sin to go to the play.

The uproar that ensued went beyond anything that the author or the Father had anticipated. The pulpits of Paris resounded with denunciations of the luckless preface. Theologians without number refuted it. The Archbishop of Paris suspended the unfortunate Father, and compelled him to issue a public retraction of his scandalous opinions. Bossuet, foremost in every controversy, could not remain an inactive spectator. He wrote a private letter to the Father pointing out the error of his ways. The Father, terrified by the storm he had brought about his ears, wrote a humble, not to say an abject apology to Bossuet, in which he admitted that his experience of the theatre was limited in the extreme, and that he had no notion of the tremendous interests that were at stake.

Bossuet was satisfied so far as Father Caffaro was concerned. But his friends and advisers told him that something ought to be done to repair the scandal which the diffusion of such pernicious views throughout French society could not fail to give; and they put before him the universal opinion that he was the man to do it. Accordingly,

he expanded the letter he had sent to Father Caffaro into the *Maximes et Réflexions*. In regard to the style of this work, nothing need be said except that it is worthy of the master of French prose. For perfect command over the resources of Christian wisdom; for dignity and a certain somewhat sombre grandeur; and, above all, for trenchant logic, it is worthy of a place beside the *Variations*, the *Histoire Universelle*, and the *Oraisons Funèbres*. Its kinship with the last-named work is most marked. Bossuet, like Newman, loved to dwell upon the vanity of this world, with its thrones and empires, with its Rocroi victories, and its schemes of statecraft. 'Vanity of vanities, and all is vanity.' And yet this same fleeting show is the enemy of God; and the drama, says Bossuet, which is its image, is a play within a play, an evil dream within a dream, which too faithfully discovers the guilty secrets of the human heart.

Father Caffaro's minor premise was the statement that the plays of Corneille, Racine, Molière, etc., were so pure and innocent that the most scrupulous virtue could find nothing objectionable in them. Bossuet is astonished at such a declaration—coming, too, from a priest who ought to know the meaning of words. Where, he asks, can one find a collection of obscenities and impieties, of gross jests and equivocations and intrigues, to equal the comedies of Molière? It is not for us in this life to pronounce judgment on those who have already appeared before another tribunal: but the fearfully tragic death of this unfortunate author on the boards, whereon he had been taking part in one of his own plays, may in all charity and prudence be regarded as a judgment and a warning.

In those comedies virtue is always made to look silly and vice to look innocent and attractive. What young mind can resist those treacherous invitations to enjoy to the full the warm and genial sunshine of youth, to drain the full cup of youthful passion? Listen to the young lovers who envy the careless life of the birds of the air that have no conscience, no religion, no strong bonds of duty to tie them down. It is all very well to say that you

want to hear fine music and poetry : the poet and the musician are only the servants of human passion that set off to advantage its dangerous and pernicious charms. We all know that this is the view that Quinault, our great composer of opera, holds in his riper and maturer age, and that he is weeping tears of penance for the harm he conceives he has done to souls : whereas you, priest or monk or whatever you call yourself, tell him that his penitential exercises are uncalled for, and that the calling he has abandoned is an innocent one ! Music, poetry, scenic accessories woo and win the soul to the lips of sense ; they distract it and take it off its guard, and leave it exposed to the poison of evil thoughts and emotions.

After all, says Father Caffaro, it is only indirectly and *per accidens* that evil thoughts are excited by good plays. On the contrary, Bossuet answers, there is nothing more direct, nothing more essential to the success of a play than such excitement. Take, for example, Corneille's masterpiece, 'The Cid.' In that play the poet represents to us the love of Rodrigue for Chimène. Will you really enjoy the play if your heart is not moved, if your pulse is not quickened in sympathy with the hopes and fears, the joys and sorrows, that change and succeed each other according as the prospects of the lovers' passion being gratified are bright or gloomy ? The first principle of successful play-writing and of successful acting is to interest the spectator ; if the spectator is not awakened and excited by the human passions that are shown on the stage, what will be the result ? Weariness, disgust, *ennui*. The play will be hissed off the boards. *Aut dormitabo aut ridebo*. The heroes of the theatre are intoxicated with the love of beauty or of fame ; the poet sets them and their infatuation before us with intense vividness as far beyond the appearances of everyday life as the ideal is beyond the real. And the human heart of the spectator is a sensitive and delicate instrument upon whose leading chord of sympathy the poet plays as he will by this vivid and more than life-like representation of human emotion.

You may say that one's interest is centred in the plot :

we want to see how it will all turn out in the end. But no story will win your interest unless you are first interested by the characters that take part in it. Again, these very plots themselves, as worked up and arranged by the poets, are nothing but the history of the triumphal march of vice and worldliness over the ruins of virtue and piety. Finally, the plots of the great dramas of the world, in Greece and in England, were already known in popular legend and story to everybody who sat down to witness them. No, it is the characters, their passions, and the deeds and words that those passions inspire, that interest the spectator. Accordingly, to say that passionate excitement in the bosom of the spectator is not the direct and formal object of the dramatist is to contradict the fundamental principles and rules of his art. It is childish to say that history tells us worse tales and paints worse characters than any dramatist has ever imagined: for bad historians we shall set in the same category as the playwrights who try to make vice look innocent and pleasant, and good historians will always paint their Neros and their Cencis in their true colours.

St. Augustine¹ tells us that he used to visit the theatre in his unregenerate days. In that chapter he tries to account for the emotions he experienced while he witnessed the performance of tragedy. Why do we take delight in the horrors and woes of the olden time? Why is our pleasure measured by the abundance of our tears? It comes, doubtless, of that vein of friendship, of love and sympathy and pity for our afflicted brother men. But to what, says the saint, does this go? To what does it rush headlong? 'Into the torrent of boiling pitch, into the vast whirlpool of filthy lusts into which it is wilfully changed and turned, degraded and cast down from its heavenly serenity.' We love the theatre because it gives us the very image, the food and the enticing charm of our own bad passions; we see it with our eyes, we feel it in our hearts. And thus this same love for the drama is but another symptom of

¹ *Confessions*, bk. iii. cp. ii.

the deplorable weakness of the heart of man. This mad enthusiasm for the stage tells of the hunger, the weariness, the incurable *ennui* of hearts that are without God in this world ; for our hearts were made for God and in Him alone can they find rest.

What do you say of indecent pictures and statues ? Will you discourse about 'Art for Art's sake' when you know that it is not Art but something else that brings the throngs to your galleries ? But what is dead canvas or cold marble compared with the living men and women who move in the enchanted fairyland of the theatre, where beautiful eyes shoot swift and burning darts of passion, where real tears are shed, where soft and tender, or lofty and majestic accents of real emotion fall in rhythmic cadence of entrancing melody from the lips of heroes and heroines who walk the stage in grace and majesty ? For the actor and the actress, too, must play their parts well if the play is to be saved from failure. And so they must exercise the utmost force of their imagination to recreate and realize and live through those scenes of passion that they want to portray to the life. Nor will they neglect the sad resources of their own past experience : and therefore they will search their memories for thoughts and feelings that would have wrung from their eyes bitter tears of sorrow had they borne in mind that there is a God above and a hell beneath their feet.

Your sensible playgoers, forsooth, discount all this ; they make due allowance for the weakness of human nature and the strength of human passion, and they will not allow themselves to be conquered by such folly. But this same weakness appears on the stage as the essential attribute of heroism, and the varied hues of beauty clothe it, and there is a halo of nobility and of glory around it, and it assumes the very form and aspect of virtue itself. Otherwise the spectators are not interested, their passions are not flattered, and the essential end of drama is missed.

Take another aspect of the question. Consider the profession of actor or of actress. What Christian mother would allow her daughter to go on the stage ? Does not

Christian instinct tell her that innocence cannot live in that corrupt atmosphere, and that the stage is a school of vice ? And will you sneer at this healthy instinct of the simple Christian soul ? *Apropos* of this, in a recent number of the *Grand Magazine* an unsuccessful actress attributed her failure on the English stage to her respect for the elementary decencies of life. The discussion that ensued left the general impression that she had not overstated the case. The severe view has been held as a rule by all professional moralists. In Elizabethan England, as in ancient Greece, women were never allowed on the stage : the modern practice seems to have begun in the time of Charles II and Louis XIV. Sir Henry Irving, on the other hand, held that his profession was a perfectly safe and even an honourable one for men and women who are able to find their way about.

What Christian father would allow his daughter to listen to the sirens of the stage who gloat over their illicit amours and infamous conquests ? The grossness of the spectacles of decadent Rome is absent from our drama. That drama is an image of the world, and it shows the manners and morals of the *ancien régime*. Writing on that topic Burke said that vice then was devoid of half its malice because it was shorn of all its grossness. These words, however, are somewhat extravagant. The refinement of vice, the expenditure of intellectual force in devising ways and means of sin, only adds to the guilt. The devil himself is able to assume the form of an angel of light and to quote Scripture when it suits his purpose. And indeed Satan is probably as refined a sinner as any polished courtier of Paris or of London : is his sin less by reason of its refinement ? Grossness would repel and disgust even shallow and superficial minds ; but suggestion, equivocation, double-meaning language are safe and sure means of carrying poison into the soul.

As Satan can quote the Word of God, so we find his dupes and disciples doing the same. They recite the text which tells us that all earthly beauty is but a copy of a divine and perfect beauty which exists in a better world

than this ; and they will quote the words of St. Paul to the effect that marriage is a great mystery. This is all very well : but do dramatists, actors, audiences, ever dwell upon such ideas ? Would a play succeed in which nothing was said or done except what would help to bring out the sacredness and the mystery of marriage ? 'Tis a difficult and a delicate subject for a St. Liguori to discuss ; do you seriously maintain that the dramatic poet is competent to handle it ? Christian morals, Christian virtue, the Sacraments and all such topics belong to a higher and more spiritual and rarefied region of thought than the heated and murky atmosphere of the playhouse. The average moral tone of any crowd is low : indeed there is a strange imbecillity of our nature shown in the tremendous influence which a crowd exercises upon the conduct, the views, the very thoughts of its members. For one thing it tends to reduce all its members to the same low level of morals. And it is down to this low level that the dramatist and the actor must play if they wish to win the applause and the support of playgoers. Grossness can never be far away from the stage. You use fine words to hide away ugly realities ; but those *belles passions* that are the stock-in-trade of all theatres, what are they but the shame of rational nature, the empire of false and perishable beauty, a tyranny that degrades the dignity of one sex, flatters the silly vanity of the other, and makes both the willing slaves of sensual passions ? Bossuet goes even further than this, and indeed one might be justified in suggesting that there is a slightly Manichaean strain in his language which is somewhat jarring and unpleasant. Probably the hot blood of France stood in need of the restraint of strong language ; and maybe the older generations of Irish priests that are so frequently criticised to-day for the severe tone of their ethical teaching knew what suited their congregations and their penitents at least as well as their critics did. Bossuet sums up by saying once more that the stage is the image of the evil world in which there is nothing but the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life.

Father Caffaro appealed to his own experience as a

confessor and spiritual director of playgoers, and as a student of the drama. In the former capacity he discovered that even the most scrupulous consciences found nothing to shock them in the theatre. As a reader of plays he declared that he never met anything really bad. Obviously, said Bossuet, you have never got a real view of the conscience of an actress or of an actor. And if they by virtue of their calling itself must needs live in sin, what are we to say of the co-operation of those who pay at the door of the theatre the price of another's degradation? What are we to say of the evil example which your so-called scrupulous folk give to their simpler brethren who hold sounder views about the morals of the playhouse? Let us come to the point. It is conceivable that there are some men of exceptional coldness and dryness of nature to whom the softer passions make no appeal; but the average man is not of that sort, and no man has a right to assume that he himself belongs to this rare class. For no man is secure against those passions until death has cooled them for ever in the chill of the grave. What such an imaginary stoic would do out of mere indifference, we all ought to do by conscious effort: for this is the meaning of carrying one's cross, crucifying the flesh and the lusts of it. And this is a hard and a painful struggle.

The inclination to choose the soft and sweet and pleasant things of this world, to pamper the body and give it its fill of pleasure, is hidden deep and far down in the core of every human heart. It is our duty to watch lest those secret fountains break forth in the torrent of boiling pitch that St. Augustine speaks of. Every little sensual indulgence is like the tampering of the mischievous boy with the breakwater of Holland, and tends to bring on the catastrophe. Every little indulgence at the same time throws a film over the spiritual eye by means of which our watching against the catastrophe has to be maintained. Your worldly men, your men of gallantry and pleasure about town, are doubtless scrupulous about the point of honour; but they witness the play without any scruple, because their conscience is not the delicate spiritual instrument it

ought to be. Their conscience is the drowsy eye of the animal or natural man that looks and sees not. They are not reliable witnesses in regard to the dangers and the difficulties of the spiritual life. Their virtue is the virtue of the *beau monde*, it is the wisdom of this world ; but it is not the virtue of the Gospel.

All this may apply *mutatis mutandis* to the reading of plays also, though of course dead cold print cannot have the awful power and influence of living, speaking, acting human beings. And if you tell me that those views of mine, pushed to their logical conclusion, would send all men into the desert, because the world itself, every street, every house, every church is full of dangers, I answer that this is no reason for inventing an artificial danger in which all other dangers are concentrated and intensified. If the wicked world itself is a dangerous place, then we need no concentrated living picture of all its most fatally alluring charms.

The laws allow the theatre to exist. That is true ; but human laws are not a sufficient rule of life for Christians. Human legislators can take cognizance of overt acts and words alone ; but God sees the heart of man, and forbids evil thoughts and desires. The laws of the Church on this subject can be easily ascertained. In the old Rituals we find that actors were driven from the Communion rails as public sinners ; that they were branded with an *infamy* which kept them out of the ranks of the clergy ; that they were refused sacramental absolution unless they promised to abandon their profession, and this refusal persisted till the hour of death ; and they were refused Christian burial when they died. The powerful influence of Louis XIV himself could not procure for Molière more than the barest semblance of Christian burial.

The mind of the Church on this subject may be further ascertained from a consideration of what seems to be the exceptional legislation regarding the clergy. Let us consider the reasons and motives that the Church assigns for this exceptional legislation. In a canon of the Third Council of Tours priests are commanded to keep away

from certain kinds of musical and spectacular entertainments, 'Quia per aurium oculorumque illecebras turba vitiorum ad animam ingredi solet.'—'Through the allurements that flatter the ear and the eye, the rabble of vices usually finds its way into the soul.' The expression 'rabble of vices' admirably hits off the nature of the danger. No enormous crime of any sort is contemplated. There is a collection of imperceptible, semi-conscious inclinations, petty feelings of sensual delight that soften and enervate the soul and open up the heart to the sensual life. Such is our corruption that apparently innocent amusements of a sensual kind forms a devil's bait to lure us into sin. What, then, if words, music, and scenery are full of the living fire of acknowledged sensual passion itself? What of the immense and mighty combination of allurements and excitements of the stage? What of the influence of sympathy between actor and spectator, between one spectator and another? What of the lowering and degrading influence of the crowd? All this obviously applies to laymen as well as to priests.

The writings of the Fathers are another source from which we can learn what the Church thinks on the matter. Most advocates of the drama have been somewhat posed by the attitude of the Cyprians and the Augustines and the Chrysostoms. They have tried to persuade us that the Fathers had in mind the gross obscenity, the idolatry, the wanton destruction of human life that characterised the shows and spectacles of Rome and Carthage. Indeed a Christian preacher nowadays would expose himself to contempt and ridicule if he quoted the Fathers on the subject of the drama. But let us calmly examine the reasons and the arguments which they put forward against the drama of their day: let us see whether they do not come home with almost equal force to the drama of our own times.

In regard to the question of grossness, enough has been said. Moreover, it may be at once admitted that our modern duels and murders on the stage are not so degrading and brutalising as the real butchery of the gladiatorial games: though it may be questioned whether young ardent

spectators do not learn pernicious lessons from the quarrels and the slaughters of dramatic heroes. Idolatry also is gone. The goddess of Love is not now worshipped with religious rites. But consider whether the mocking heathen sceptic, who burned his handful of incense before the altar of Venus, is at bottom a worse sinner than the Christian, who sacrifices conscience, filial piety, religion itself, on the altar of frail and perilous beauty, and looks for no reward except that which levels him with the brutes. Let us come to the arguments of the Fathers.

The passage already quoted from the *Confessions* of St. Augustine represents a whole catena of testimony that might be cited in regard to the darker aspects of the question. All the Fathers who treated of the subject were well aware of the dangers of unregulated sympathy, and developed a regular psychology of the playgoer, an outline of which has been already given above. The following are further features. The playhouse is a place of fearful distraction and dissipation of spirit, for it contains the most complete and elaborate scheme that man has devised for taking and keeping his mind off the stern realities of life. It shows forth, as has been said, a concentrated and living image of everything in the world that appeals to man's lower nature, and wins his mind from God. Its pleasures are those of Dives ; its triumphs are the pomps that we renounced at Baptism. Our Lord said that we ought to pray always. This implies at the very least a self-control that always preserves a fund of seriousness in the very hours of recreation, and a constant readiness to turn our hearts to God.

In the glare and glitter of the theatre, in the storm of passion that rages in the bosoms of actors and spectators, amid the tumult and fury of the applause that rewards every triumph of worldly emotion, who could preserve even the minimum of Christian self-control and seriousness ? No ! one tragedy alone should be ever before our minds and the terror and the pity of it are able to purge our passions far better than any wild dream of pagan poet : and that is the tragedy of Calvary. And if you need recreation you

may find it at your own fireside, in the company of the innocent and the pure, or in silent contemplation of the loveliness and the grandeur of nature. If a complex civilization has created in your soul a taste for pleasures of a less simple and primitive sort than those, you must never at all events lose hold of that seriousness that is the basis of Christian manhood. This is how the Fathers spoke to the men of their day. Have their words no message of warning for the giddy and frivolous men and women who throng the theatres of Paris? Let us honestly and gratefully accept the teaching of these, the best students of the book of the Cross.

From the Fathers of the Church the transition is easy to the divine Plato. In the days of Bossuet, too, France was ready to listen to the wisdom of the noblest Greek of them all. Descartes had brought Aristotle into complete and final contempt among Frenchmen ; and we know that Aristotle's zeal for truth rendered him unduly emphatic at times in his refutation of Plato. We shall find that Bossuet was so sure of his ground that he ventured to treat St. Thomas Aquinas himself in somewhat cavalier fashion on account of his adhesion to the peripatetic philosophy. Malebranche, with his *Vision en Dieu*, and Fénelon, with his *Quietism*, were the outward evidence of a tendency among the higher types of French intellect towards mysticism and idealism. Such a tendency was probably known to Bossuet when he appealed to the pagan master of all mystical and ideal systems.

In his ideal republic Plato would allow neither comedy nor tragedy. His reason was that the drama as it actually exists makes its appeal to the animal part of our nature at the expense of reason. To our shame be it said that the Greek tragedy is infinitely superior to that of Catholic France ; even Protestant England has in this respect soared far higher than the eldest daughter of the Church. Yet not merely the Fathers of the Church, but Plato, a heathen, would not allow the sublime drama of his native Greece to have a place in a community of upright and virtuous citizens. What evil or misfortune of this life is worthy

of the tears and lamentations of a good man ? For such a man death itself ought to have no terror. Yet what are the themes of tragedy that strike and wound our feeble souls, except these same woes and misfortunes and deaths of heroes ? So spoke the heathen who never heard the words of Christ. As to comedy it is the device of idle men who want to live by pandering to the childish and frivolous desire to find a comic and laughable aspect in all things. The profession of actor, a mere imitator of other men, who are often notorious criminals, is in itself a degradation of our nature. What would Plato say of a stage that allows women to degrade themselves in this way ?

These principles are carried still higher in the same *Republic*, in a discussion as to the worthiness of the fine arts in general. Taste is quite as much a matter of emotional satisfaction, of pleasurable excitement as of critical discernment. Now is there not a sufficiency of objects that appeal to this emotional and irrational side of our nature, without any artificial (or, if you will, artistic) multiplication of them ? Your artist himself must needs possess something of Divine detachment, if he would not be allured and overpowered by the very forms and colours which he gives to mere clay. In all earthly beauty there is an element of grossness, and artist and spectator alike are of kin to this grosser clay and, all unconsciously it may be, their poor feeble hearts are won by its treacherous appeal. It matters not whether the artist's work be a poem, a picture, a statue, or a spectacle in which a living Herodias walks upon the stage : the appeal is always made to that which is low and base in our nature, to that which we should always strive to bring down and hold in bondage to reason.

Now the artist cannot afford to ignore the opinions and feelings of the great world from which he expects his reward in fame or in money, or in both. And once more be it said, the average moral tone of the world is low. On the other hand, the artist loves his tools, his materials, his finished work ; above all he loves his art itself. His art literally becomes a religion to him. In those exalted

moments, which he calls his moments of inspiration, the commonplace conventional notions of morality seem to him unutterably trivial, stale, and dull. He assumes a privilege because of his genius, and he degrades that genius to flatter and pander to the base passion of those whom he nevertheless regards as mere clods of clay. Thus he promulgated his dogma of Art for Art's sake. His genius enables him to preach this doctrine of the brutes with terrible effect. He speaks, says Plato, with a louder voice than the laws. 'Let me make the songs of the people,' said Fletcher of Saltoun, 'and I care not by whom their laws are made.' Accordingly, said Plato, wise men have always suspected the poets, and indeed all artists; and in the ideal commonwealth there can be no place for them:—

Therefore, O divine Homer, and majestic *Æschylus*, and teacher Sophocles, forth from this State of mine ye must depart and find a home elsewhere. Well I know that ye can weave a tale to draw the boy from his game and the old man from the chimney-corner. Well do I know thy charms, O divine Poesy, but virtue is dearer than even thou art to me. Hard it is to pass from ye, oh divine Bards, and it is crowned ye will go forth with my prayer that some wiser man than I am may be found who will prove to me that ye are worthy to tarry here.

The wise men of old would banish all poets, because their voice was louder and their appeal was stronger than that of mere human wisdom; shall we allow them to drown the voice of Christ, and make a jest of His Cross?

Coming now to Aristotle, we find that in this as in other matters he likes to quarrel with Plato. 'Plato is my friend, but a disputation is dearer to me still.' Into his definition of tragedy he introduces the curious statement that the passions of terror and pity which it excited are purified or purged by being excited. There, says Bossuet, spoke Sir Oracle, and let no dogs bark. Indeed among his disciples themselves there is a confusion of tongues and a scandalous want of agreement in answering the hard question as to how you purge a passion by rousing and raising it to the frenzied heights of tragedy. At all events, Aristotle is here writing speculatively on the

theory of the drama. In his practical works on ethics he is in substantial agreement with Plato. He says that the young ought to be kept away from the theatre altogether ; no seriousness or elevation of thought in the dramatist can have a good effect on souls that are so susceptible of passionate excitement, and so little under the guidance of reason. The treacheries, and hatreds, and loves and murders of the drama must needs leave a dark stain on the youthful imagination which is of itself sufficiently prone to evil without any artificial stimulation.

This view of Aristotle was borne out a century ago in Germany when Schiller's terrible play, 'The Robbers,' sent crowds of young men out on the highway to practise the noble profession of Dick Turpin. Now Aristotle ought to have borne in mind that most men remain childish all their lives, in so far as the domination of passion over reason is concerned. How few ever grow to the full dignity of rational and self-controlled manhood ! As to the softer passions, Aristotle is quite as explicit and as emphatic as his master ; the animal must be chained and starved, and not pampered and let loose. Other maxims are scattered through his ethical writings that have a direct bearing on the matter in hand. Thus : 'A man likes to do what he sees done by others, or what he hears described as done by them.'

After hearing the Church, the Fathers, and the wise men of heathendom, perhaps you will appeal to the Word of God itself. You say that the Bible says no word about tragedy or comedy, about stage or actor. This is the silly method of heretics who have searched the Scriptures and never once found such words as Pope or Transubstantiation. Then the Jews, to whom the inspired writings were first given, had no drama in the modern sense, and therefore did not stand in need of explicit warning. The only part of the Bible that resembles the drama is the Canticle of Canticles ; it is instructive to remember that the youth of the Hebrew nation were not allowed to read it or hear it read. Coming to the point we find that the Word of God gives us the principles and the maxims that enable us to

test the ethical character of the drama; and our best expounders of Scripture—Cyprian, and Chrysostom, and Augustine—have used the very words of the Bible in their denunciations of the theatre. For the drama holds the mirror up to corrupt and fallen nature, not to correct and amend it by the spectacle of its own deformity, but rather to delight and satisfy and flatter it. It is an image of the world. What did Christ say of the world: 'He that loveth the world is an enemy of God'; 'The world hateth Me and it will hate you also because you are My disciples.' 'Love not the world,' says St. John, 'for all that is in the world is the lust of the flesh and the lust of the eyes and the pride of life.' And yet you go to the theatre to see this enemy of God clothed by a genius that is almost superhuman, in a splendour and a glory that transform it into an angel of light.

Finally, Father Caffaro appealed to the scholastics, and especially to St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Antonine. He quoted a very remarkable passage which occurs in the *Summa*,¹ and which has been quoted for a similar purpose by the author of that noble work, *Mores Catholici; or, Ages of Faith*.² The latter writer considers the passage as of supreme importance in the history of the drama, though he suggests that the notion of an innocent and virtuous stage is little more than a dream of the pure hearts of that golden time. As Bossuet goes minutely into all the topics that St. Thomas discusses under the question, it will be necessary to give some notion of the context. The question is entitled, *De modestia, secundum quod consistit in exterioribus corporis motibus*, i.e., 'Exterior modesty, outward decency, becoming deportment.'

The first article inquires whether those names stand for a real virtue. The second asks, *Utrum in ludis possit esse aliqua virtus*, i.e., 'May the games that we play be virtuous?' And St. Thomas goes on to make theology out of sport; unlike the fine gentlemen of France who were so tremendously edified by the *Lettres Provinciales*, and then

¹ 2.2. Q. 168, 3 ad 3.

² Bk. viii., c. iii

showed Europe how to make sport of theology. The third article discusses the sinfulness of excessive indulgence in play ; while the fourth, to the extreme horror of our stern French moralist, points out how one may sin by not playing enough.

The important passage occurs in the third article. According to his custom St. Thomas sets down the difficulties that may be urged against his own view first of all. One of them is as follows :—

It would seem that players (*histriones*) above all go too far with playing ; for playing is the business of their lives (*vitam enim suam ad ludendum ordinant*). If excess of play could be a sin, then surely such folk must be in a bad state ; those also sin who employ or pay them, for this is to encourage and to favour the vices of others. This, however, seems to be false ; for we read in the life of St. Paphnutius that it was revealed to him that a certain player (*joculator*) was certain to go to Heaven when he died.

The answer of St. Thomas is interesting. He first refers us back to the preceding article in which he had shown that recreation is necessary for human nature, especially in the social state. He proceeds :—

Whatever is really useful for the purposes of social intercourse may be taken up as a lawful calling. The office of player or entertainer is calculated to comfort, amuse, and cheer us up (*ordinator ad solatium hominibus exhibendum*) ; accordingly it is not of itself wrong or sinful. Nor do players live in sin so long as they keep within due bounds, and avoid evil words and bad conduct in their entertainments, and choose suitable times for them. It is quite true that they profess to do nothing for other men except to amuse them. Still they do many serious and virtuous deeds for the benefit of their own souls, and for the love and glory of God ; for instance, they pray, restrain their passions, direct their intention, and sometimes even give alms to the poor. Those, moreover, who pay them, merely give them their just reward and do a just action. Of course if a man squanders his means on such folk, or if he gives anything at all to those whose entertainments are sinful, he is himself a sinner. ‘ It is a dreadful vice to give your goods to such men,’ says St. Augustine, ‘ unless the poor fellows are very hard up indeed. Feed the man

who is dying of hunger ; whoever refuses to do so when he is able is guilty of murder.'

Bossuet, like a good pleader, uses everything that can help his case. First of all, he doubts whether the *histriones* that St. Thomas talks of were actors in the modern sense. There was no regular drama in St. Thomas's day. The word, he thinks, stood for something in the nature of a jongleur, clown, flute-player, fiddler, Punch and Judy showman, something like the sad fellows who, clad in motley raiment, twist themselves into weird shapes, and address droll remarks to passing donkeys to the immense amusement of the country folk who frequent our towns on fair days. Between such street buffoons and the actors of Paris there is a wide difference ; their silly performances cannot be compared with the infamies of the French stage. What would St. Thomas say of the latter form of amusement ? Bossuet finds some things worth quoting from this very part of the *Summa* in favour of his own view. Thus, one condition that St. Thomas lays down for lawful recreation is, *ne totaliter gravitas animae resolvatur*, i.e., 'let not the seriousness that befits a Christian be ever totally dissipated.'¹ Who could observe this rule in a Parisian theatre ? Again² : 'It is far easier to sin by excess than by defect in the matter of amusement ; for, as Aristotle remarks, recreation is the mere spice of life and a little of it suffices, just as meat does not require much salt.'

In the second article (*in corp.*), St. Thomas concludes as follows :—

'Et ideo circa ludos potest esse aliqua virtus quam Philosophus, eutrapeliam nominat ; et dicitur aliquis eutrapelus a bona conversione quia scilicet bene convertit aliqua dicta vel facta in solatium ; et inquantum per hanc virtutem homo refracnatur ab immoderantia ludorum, sub modestia continetur.'—There is a virtue that regulates play, and Aristotle calls it eutrapelia ; a man is said to possess this virtue when he possesses the happy knack of turning his phrases and ordering his conduct in such a way as to give pleasure and comfort to his neighbours.

¹ Art. ii.

² Art. iv.

Recreation of this sort is a rest from mental labour, just as sleep is a repose from bodily toil. But mental rest does not consist in total oblivion. *Quies mentes in delectatione consistit.* It is found in allowing the mind and its weary companion to dwell upon light and pleasant ideas, words and deeds, in kind words, in the innocent jests and laughter of the social circle.

‘Remissio animi fit per ludicra verba et facta-verba et facta in quibus non quaeritur nisi delectatio animalis et vocantur jocosa.’—Folk who have no merry word of their own to say, and will not pay the cheap tribute of a laugh to the jokes of the good fellows they meet, are the bane of social intercourse. ‘Ill autem qui in ludo deficiunt nec ipsi deciend aliquod ridiculum et dicentibus molesti sunt’—they are a nuisance. ‘Quia moderatos aliorum ludos non recipiunt, et ideo tales vitiosi sunt et dicuntur rudi et agrestes’—they are sad dogs, indeed, and men call them coarse and uncultured boors.

These little amenities of social intercourse thus constitute a moral virtue in the opinion of St. Thomas, and he calls it *eutrapelia*, *jucunditas*, affability. The same thing is expressed by such words as politeness, good-breeding, good-fellowship (in the better sense of the term), *urbanité*. French moralists who prefer St. Francis de Sales and Fénelon to Pascal and Bossuet refer to it under the title of *les petits virtus*.

Bossuet, however, will not have it at any price. There is a certain slyness in his method of attack upon this poor kindly little virtue of *eutrapelia*. He opens his Greek Testament at random, as it were, and happens upon Ephesians v. 4. In that passage St. Paul is giving a list of vices that ought not to be named among Christians. Among them he finds mentioned this very *eutrapelia* itself. He must have crowed just a little at this point. But he proceeds, calmly remarking that St. Thomas did not bother much about the Greek. By the way, it is a fact that St. Thomas himself wrote a commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul: so Bossuet looks out for his explanation of this passage. In the Latin Vulgate the word in question is rendered *scurrilitas*, and the Rheims version follows its

usual course and calls it 'scurrility.' Either rendering is rather hard upon the alleged virtue of Aristotle's imagination. Bossuet prefers to call it *bouffonnerie* in French ; this accords with Kenrick's more modern English 'buffoonery,' and with the Protestant Authorized and Revised 'jesting.' So far for the word. Now for the comment of St. Thomas :—

'Scurrilitas, id est verbum joculatorium per quod volunt inde placere aliis ; dico autem vobis quia omne verbum otiosum quod locuti fuerint homines, reddent rationem de eo in die judicii.'—Scurrility, that is, jocose language, spoken with a view to please and amuse other people ; 'but I say unto you that every idle word that man shall speak he shall render an account of it on the day of Judgment.'

Bossuet is really anxious to see this reconciled with the passage already quoted from the *Summa* : he is not able to do it. Then there is St. Chrysostom, heir of the very spirit of St. Paul, who, moreover, knew his Greek and his Aristotle as well as most men. What does he say ? First of all he agrees with Aristotle himself in his derivation of the word *eutrapelia* : it implies a facility in turning oneself in every direction like a weathercock. He pities the poor benighted heathen that can find anything virtuous in such levity and want of ballast. St. Thomas, to be sure, was but an indifferent Grecian, like Shakespeare and other worthy men. But St. John Chrysostom is a safe guide. And he proceeds as a Christian teacher to tell us that not God but Satan is the author of games ; and he reminds us of the Jews who, at the very foot of the mountain, sat down to eat and drink and rose up to play.

All this is formidable enough, but there is worse to come. Take the terrible language of our Saviour about idle words, or the still more terrible text : 'Woe to ye who laugh, for ye shall weep.' The Fathers, Greek and Latin, are unanimous in taking these words in their strict literal sense : life is too serious for idle jests, time is too precious, the danger of damnation is too real. What think you now is the worth of the Pagan giddiness called *eutrapelia* ? 'We laugh,' says the *Imitation*, 'when we have much better

reason to weep for our sins and for the dangers that beset our souls.'

My opinion [says St. Ambrose] is that we ought to avoid all jokes ; though they may be sometimes innocent and pleasant enough, yet they are alien to the ecclesiastical rule of life. You never find them in Holy Scripture ; how can we, taught by Holy Scripture, lawfully make use of them. It is only the wise men of this world, who are fools in the sight of God, that allow their use.

Now all this severe doctrine of the Fathers did not escape the keen eye of St. Thomas ; and by his manifold distinctions and conditions he reconciles it with his own teaching quite easily. The worldly philosopher whom St. Ambrose had in his mind was Cicero, who very sensibly said in his book on Oratory that a public speaker would be justified in enlivening his discourse with a harmless joke or two provided the business on hand were not too serious, and the speaker preserved his self-respect. In like manner all jokers and funny people ought to attend to the time, place, and other circumstances. Scripture itself tells us that there is a time for laughing as well as a time for mourning. St. Ambrose, therefore, probably means that jokes are out of place in the Christian pulpit. Bossuet placidly reminds us, however, that this interpretation is to be taken with a grain of salt, as St. Thomas was not always quite accurate in such matters. The title of the work of St. Ambrose in which the passage occurs is *De Officiis Ministrorum*, which may be rendered, 'On the duties of Clergymen.' This would leave room for the opinion that the saint meant to say that ecclesiastics ought never be funny. 'Tis a pity Bossuet had no sense of humour : perhaps he was too witty, too French for that saving gift. This doctrine of his would hit a lot of folk very hard, from him of Watergrasshill down to him who in mythical Kilronan, still awaits the coming of another 'New Curate ;' nor would it please the bard who inquired,

Why leave the gaiety
All to the laity ?
Why can't the clergy be Irishmen too ?

Returning to the passage from the Epistle to the Ephesians, it will not be difficult to show that St. Thomas does not contradict himself. In the *Summa* he lays down three conditions that must be observed if sport is to be innocent. First, it must not consist of words or deeds that are sinful or hurtful in themselves. The amusements of the people of Ephesus, who lived at the very confluence of two corrupt civilizations, the Greek and the Asiatic, were not likely to fulfil this condition ; and even Christian converts might sometimes allow themselves to listen to the scurrilities and obscenities of Aristophanes and the horrid tales and hymns of Phrygian mythology.¹ The second condition already quoted is, *ne gravitas animae totalite resolvatur* ; and the third, also already quoted, is that sports and recreations be adapted to all the circumstances of time, place, persons, etc. It is not quite decisive, therefore, to say that St. Paul condemns *eutrapelia* : we must try to find out what this word meant to the minds of the Christians of Ephesus. It probably meant no more than the superficial politeness and up-to-dateness of the smart set of the Greek cities. Bossuet himself was an accomplished courtier ; but his good breeding differed from the *bon ton* of the *beau monde* as the reality differs from the imitation. Real politeness is founded upon Christian charity, sincerity, and truth ; so says St. Thomas.

The Christian gentleman shows by words and deeds that he really loves his neighbour as himself, and he does to others what he would have them do to him. Worldly politeness, however, is shallow and insincere ; it is not the self-revelation of a regenerate heart in which God's love and grace have been diffused by the Holy Ghost. It is a device by means of which ambitious or lustful or avaricious worldlings try to accomplish their nefarious schemes. St. Paul accordingly denounces the wolves in sheep's clothing, the hypocrites, the smooth and oily gentlemen of his day, whose jests were never very innocent or pure. The contemporaries of St. Chrysostom, whom he contemplated in his commentary on this passage, were probably worldlings

¹ Fouard, *St. Paul, his Missions.*

of the same kind. We cannot suppose that the saint commits himself to a wholesale condemnation of this virtue of urbanite ; for he himself tells us that St. Paul made use of it in Galatians iv. 12. St. Thomas thinks that we ought to take the words of St. Chrysostom as referring to those who spend too much time at play, and especially to those who indulge in sport for its own sake and make it an end in itself. Whereas all recreation is intended by God as a preparation for future labour, and no worldly employment of time can be lawfully set up as the final goal of human effort. Scripture tells us that there are men who regard life as a game and a comedy. Fools and wastrels of that kind are the object of St. Chrysostom's condemnation.

In an earlier part of the treatise Bossuet had pointed out the difference between the unreal virtue of worldlings and the genuine virtue of Christians. He ought to have borne this in mind when he came to treat of the ethics of sport and recreation. Not every kindly or pleasant thing that is said for the purpose of putting men in good humour is an idle word ; nor is it sinful to do one's little part towards brightening and cheering up this dull grey world of ours. If God's word bids us be sad and weep, it also tells us to rejoice. St. Paul tried to be all things to all men. If Bossuet found words like those in the *Summa* he would probably treat us to a very sapient and a very French observation about the lamentable folly of trusting in Aristotle. As already remarked Frenchmen of Bossuet's day were in no mood to give fair play to Aristotle or his Christian followers.

When Father Caffaro had gone thus far in his pleading he concluded that legitimate and even instructive recreation like the drama could be allowed during Lent and on Sundays. Bossuet had little difficulty in disposing of such a notion, and showing how alien it was to the spirit of the Church. In the abstract the drama may be innocent and harmless, and, under proper control, it may be helpful to religion and virtue. The mysteries and moralities of the Middle Ages and the 'Athalie' and 'Esther' of Racine, are cases in point. Bossuet also refers to the dramatic exercises

that closed the scholastic year in Jesuit colleges, and mentions a few restrictions that would astonish us in Ireland to-day. For instance, these plays were always in Latin, there were no female characters, and no love affairs were referred to in the most distant way. But in practice it is impossible to keep the theatre under proper control. Dramatic and histrionic talent will not submit to any censorship; and when men have once acquired a taste for the theatre considerations of religion and morals will weigh very little with them. St. Charles Borromeo tried to purify the drama of his time; his utter failure convinced him that it is an immense and appalling evil, a relic of the bad old days of heathenism that brings down the wrath of God on modern men as the sins of former times brought it down upon Sodom and Gomorrah.

Finally, the play can never shake off its innate worldliness. The very virtues of its heroes and heroines though they bear the names that we find in the Gospel, are nevertheless worldly and merely natural. But we are called to a higher state, and qualities of a more divine order ought to adorn our character. And if we are anxious to see those qualities in action let us read our New Testament and the histories of the followers of Christ in all ages. Let us contemplate the one sublime drama of history—the Life and Death of the Son of God. All history itself assumes the form and shape of a most interesting and instructive drama to a mind that has learned to look out upon the world from the safe and sure standpoint of faith. ‘All the world is a play and we are actors.’ ‘Tis shadowy and unreal in itself; ‘tis a mockery, a delusion, and vanity of vanities. Yet its background is eternity, its characters are the children of God, its plot is the scheme and the plan that have been in God’s mind from eternity. Let us not take the shadow as a reality in itself. Let not the shade of a shadow, the dream within a dream, which we call the drama, ever distract our minds and turn them away from the awful and eternal Realities.

P. FORDE.

A MIRACLE AND APOLOGETICS

THE question of the miraculous, always one of paramount importance to the student of Christian Apologetics, has in recent years in a special way aroused the attention of both Catholic and Protestant divines. The number of articles alone, on one or other aspect of the question, in French and English magazines of the year that is past, would be a matter, I am sure, for a large folio volume. What has especially called forth this closer investigation of the problem in our day is, on the one hand, the extraordinary progress that is being made in the domain of the physical sciences, and on the other, of course, the intimate connexion which is always understood to exist between the nature and the proof of a miracle and the foundations of Christianity.

It is an indisputable fact that the discussion of the miraculous borders closely on the realm of the physical sciences. A miracle has always been put forward as an effect occurring in the physical order capable of being witnessed as any ordinary phenomenon. It is claimed for it that, like other physical effects, it is capable of being subjected to a critical investigation, whether historical or scientific, and as a result of being pronounced miraculous on its own intrinsic merits. The connexion of the problem, therefore, with the advancement of the physical sciences is manifest. On the other hand, it is not less clear that the Christian religion is inseparably bound up with the notion of the miraculous. Not to mention the numerous miracles which make up so much of the Gospel story, the resurrection of Christ, the greatest and most wonderful of miracles, will always enter as an essential to the full concept of Christianity. In saying this I am not unaware of the fact that writers are to be found nowadays who have denied it, and who still persist in calling themselves Christians. Nay, have not some actually essayed to write

the story of Christ's life from which all notion of the miraculous is rigidly excluded? But as well might they have attempted to write the life of Napoleon Bonaparte omitting all mention of his battles, or of Sir Isaac Newton eschewing all reference to his scientific discoveries. This is simply to falsify, to deface the whole life and teachings of Christ. It is to cut away the foundation upon which the pillar of the Christian revelation is raised. If Christ wrought no miracles then the Sacred Scriptures, the oracles of His teaching, are untrustworthy, untrue. If the resurrection of Christ is merely a pious invention or a mythicised hallucination, then our religion has been founded on an error. Miracles are not merely the external accessories of Christianity, leaving the essential teaching untouched, and therefore capable of being rejected at will as those innovators would have us believe. They are inserted in the doctrine itself, partaking of its very essence. The believing Christian, then, be he Catholic or Protestant, can have no sympathy with such views as the following, no matter what the good intentions or *bona fides* of the writer: 'Christianity is immortal, it has eternal truth, inexhaustible value, a boundless future. But our popular religion at present conceives the birth, ministry, and death of Christ as altogether steeped in prodigy, brimful of miracle, and *miracles do not happen*.'¹ This will be sufficient to show the vital connexion of our discussion with the domain of Christian Apologetics.

On this whole question my interest was chiefly aroused by a careful perusal of two rather dissimilar publications, which recently came into my hands. One is a new edition of a rather old book, formerly said to have been written by a distinguished prelate of the Church of England, and now issued by the Rationalistic Press, entitled, *Supernatural Religion*, the other a series of articles in recent numbers of *Les Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*, from the pens of the distinguished writers M. Le Roy and Abbé le Bros. The former of these works examines a miracle—adversely of course—from the view-point of the Christian revelation,

¹ Matthew Arnold, *Ritual and Dogma*, Preface, 1883.

the latter calls the current notion of a miracle to account from the view-point of the physical sciences.

A short critique of these two works will, I am sure, not be devoid of interest to the readers of the I. E. RECORD, while it will afford me an opportunity of placing in clearer perspective certain interesting and pertinent points of Catholic teaching. In this paper my remarks will be confined to the book entitled *Supernatural Religion*.

The claim of Christianity to be a religion divinely revealed is the very important problem which the writer of this bulky volume proposes to himself for investigation. I do not know who the author is, the book does not reveal his identity. As I said, at one time rumour had it, in fact it was generally stated in the public Press, that it was the work of a certain Bishop of the Church of England, but since Dr. Lightfoot's able vindication of that prelate's name, no one any longer gives credence to the rumour. On its first appearance the book seems to have created quite a sensation. The mystery of the unknown author captivated the public mind, the unstinted praises of reviewers still further stimulated the curiosity, with the result that a sixth edition of the book was speedily called for. With Rationalists it still continues to be regarded as a sort of classic, as may be inferred from its frequent and varied editions, and the copious references to it in any of the most recent outputs of the Rationalistic Press.

The purport of the work is professedly to undermine our contention for the supernatural character of the Christian religion. A startling and presumptuous effort, one may be inclined to say, yet it is one which this writer claims to have accomplished, as he naively tells us in his prefatory statement. The foundation upon which the whole structure of the work is securely laid is thus briefly stated in one of the opening passages of the book :—

In all points Christianity is emphatically a supernatural religion, claiming to be divine in its origin, superhuman in its essence, and miraculous in its evidence. It cannot be accepted without an absolute belief in miracles, and those who profess to believe the religion while they discredit its super-

natural elements, and they are many at the present day, have widely seceded from ecclesiastical Christianity.

Then he proceeds by a multiplicity of arguments—some original, some as old as Methusalem—to prove the incredibility, the utter impossibility of the miraculous, and when this has been established, apparently to his satisfaction, allows the reader to draw the evident conclusion. This completes the first part of his work; the second, and by far the greater, is devoted to the Christian miracles in detail, viz., a critical investigation of the various documents vouching for their occurrence in which their evidential value is claimed to be disproved. One might fairly ask, if the author's reasoning in the early portion of his work fully convinced himself would not the second part be wholly superfluous? Such, however, is the order of the work, and I find no apology for the apparent lack of logical sequence. For this latter investigation the author's competency was long ago ably shown up by Dr. Lightfoot and other writers, and as a result, much of the vaunted scholarship that was originally claimed for it began slowly to disappear—at least from the minds of Christians. Neither Dr. Lightfoot, however, nor any of those Christian writers to my knowledge have addressed themselves to the author's objection to miracles advanced in the early portion of the work. Perhaps it is because they are, many of them, in substance but a repetition of difficulties long ago replied to in the hand-books of theology, perhaps because the second part of the work was chiefly pointed to by the reviewers as evidence of the alleged scholarship of the writer. Howbeit, even here the author possesses to some extent the charm of novelty, and much of his reasoning will repay examination. With this part of his work I shall be chiefly concerned in the following pages.

What, then, of the initial assumption of the writer which is, as it were, the *raison d'être* of all the succeeding pages of his work, viz., that 'Christianity cannot be accepted without an absolute belief in miracles.' The opening

remarks of this paper sufficiently indicate that we are here quite in agreement with the author, convinced, moreover, that this is the only logical position for one who styles himself a Christian. With the underlying hypothesis, however, which the writer elsewhere states explicitly, that the proof from miracles is the only one that avails, and that consequently need be considered in an investigation into the divine origin of Christianity, we are not prepared to agree, unless indeed a miracle be taken in an unusually elastic sense. The wonderful propagation of Christianity in the face of difficulties apparently so insurmountable must surely be considered, the sublimity and purity of its teaching and its admirable adaptability to the spiritual needs of man will certainly appeal to many, while its happy blending with the teaching of the Old Testament, of which it is in reality the fulfilment, and the harmonious working of the whole, as one grand system for the spiritual and moral elevation of the race, is a proof to others of its supernatural origin exceeding all the force of isolated miraculous occurrences.

Perhaps, however, the author's notion of a miracle would embrace all those, for at times he seems to identify or confuse the idea of a miraculous occurrence with that of the 'supernatural,' or rather with anything that would postulate the interference of the supernatural. Even Cardinal Newman gives the title of moral miracles to those facts which I have enumerated; so, too, perhaps the author. But except in this loose unusual sense of the word, we cannot quite agree in his assumption, that the proof from miracles is the only one demanding consideration in an enquiry into the credentials of the Christian religion. In fact, neither on the nature of a miracle nor its peculiar efficacy as a proof of revelation, are the views of orthodox Christians quite in harmony with those to which the author of this work would feign commit them. Hence does it become necessary to make first a brief statement of Catholic teaching, emphasizing at greater length the points towards which the writer levels his attack. From this, I hope, will appear more intelligibly the precise nature of his

difficulties, and how far his reasoning is at variance with the test of the truth. Under the two headings, viz., the nature of a miracle, and the evidence necessary and sufficient to establish the truth of the miraculous, the author's line of argumentation will, I think, be suitably unfolded, and with these, accordingly, I propose to deal.

What, then, is a miracle? The idea of a miracle at once suggests something that is extraordinary, inconsistent with the ordinary run of things, out of joint with the order which we see around us. It presupposes, then, a certain order of things established, things acting according to certain laws; it implies a deviation from them. The thing done is seen to be a sort of anomaly, and for that very reason is calculated to excite our attention, our surprise, hence miracle, *miraculum, mirari*. This, however, is not all. Unlike the things that happen ordinarily, we are left to inquire what has produced this, and our surprise is increased if we cannot find the cause. We go to the man of science, and if he explains it to us as a natural occurrence, well and good: we bow to his superior knowledge. But if at first he stands dumbfounded, and then tries to pass us off with bluster—that the thing is inexplicable, impossible—that we must have been deceived—is our surprise diminished? No, we go back again, the circumstances are recalled, the possibilities of our own deception re-examined. The case, say, was the raising of a dead man to life. The man was dead, nay, corruption had already set in. Several were witnesses of it as well as I. Now he is alive; *there* certainly is no room for deception. Dead men do not rise again by the ordinary laws of nature, that I know myself, and science cannot explain to me that any extraordinary law has intervened; nay, the fact is directly against all its conclusions. The cause, then, is uncertain, and as far as mere science can say, it is unknowable.

This is one aspect of a miracle—the physical aspect—as it might appear to an atheist or materialist, viz., a visible effect occurring in the physical order, whose cause science cannot explain. For my present purpose it does

not matter whether such a thing as I have described ever occurred or not, only that if it did there you would have the physical aspect of a miracle.

But this falls far short of the full idea of a miracle in the Christian sense. To define it, as the English divines do whom the author quotes, as a mere 'violation of the laws or visible order of nature,' or 'an effect whose cause is unknown,' is but to take a very partial view of it, which does not at all convey the idea corresponding to it in the Christian mind. Inseparably bound up with the notion of a real miracle is the idea of God. It is always conceived as an interposition of Him. We do not offer it as a proof of His existence—that is always presupposed, assumed as proved in a discussion of the miraculous. Our author indeed considers this initial assumption quite unwarrantable, maintaining that our idea of God is had solely from the contents of the supposed revelation whose existence we are trying to prove ; but we reply that whether our present knowledge of the existence of such a being is had from the supposed revelation or no, our reason at least convinces us of the truth of the assumption—in fact would compel us to believe it whether the story of the supposed revelation were proved true or false.

Here is not the place to enter into the proofs for the existence of God. Suffice it to say that the *fact* is demanded by reason, as well as the existence of the essential attributes which we predicate of Him. Reason postulates Him as the first cause of everything, the Creator, the Conserver, the last End of all things, and of man in particular, the apex of his creation. These things indeed are assumed in the discussion of the miraculous, but only in the sense that reason has already proved them to be true. A miracle, therefore, may be defined as a sensible effect produced by God, which exceeds all the laws of matter. The cause is thus really not unknown, and there is, in consequence, no solid grounds for the ambiguity which the author of *Supernatural Religion* avails himself of. We know from reason alone that God is the author of all creation, of all the laws that operate in nature ; but in the case of a miracle

it is more than this: He interferes 'here and now'; this special effect is due to His immediate intervention. It may be unsolicited, it may be at the prayer of one of His servants, it may be by delegating power to one of His creatures, to act 'here and now' in His name, but for a true miracle a special interposition of His divine Providence will be always required. This is its distinctive characteristic. If, then, a supposed miracle can be shown to have been due to merely natural causes; if it can be shown to have been the work of some intermediary spirit, supposing such to exist between God and man, there is no miracle in the true sense. A true miracle transcends the laws of matter, and is the work of God alone. But how, asks the author, are we to know that a certain effect exceeds all the laws of matter? We do not know all the laws of matter. Perhaps this occurrence which we proclaim a miracle is due to some unknown law which may yet be discovered, and therefore may be quite within the compass of nature. Is it not an undoubted fact (the author insinuates) that many of the marvels of electricity, magnetism, and the occult sciences—e.g., hypnotism and telepathy—which to us are perfectly natural, would have been deemed incredible by our immediate ancestors? how much more in the superstitious and unenlightened era when Christianity first appeared? Perhaps it is to a knowledge of these sciences by astute individuals, or an unconscious application of their principles by deluded mystics, that many—if not all—of the so-called miracles of the Church are to be referred.

Before replying to this, let me state that there are four factors always considered by theologians when offering the criteria for establishing and verifying the miraculous, viz., the historical occurrence, its nature, its cause, and the end for which it is worked. First we learn of the *facts* of the occurrence, and our information on this score is to be had from witnesses, of whose trustworthiness we must be assured. Then we are to carefully consider the *nature* of the occurrence, and see if it may not be explained by natural means. For instance, a man may have been

seriously ill with a fever, or suffering from an ulcer, and suddenly regain his health. Such an event might occur in the ordinary course of things, but the wonder lies in the manner of its happening. It is so sudden, so entirely different from the ordinary way that it could not, we eventually say, be due to a single force, nor any combination of forces acting together; we are, then, naturally led to conclude that another and a higher agency must have intervened. Can hypnotism and telepathy give us an explanation of effects such as these? Do their advocates claim that the working of them is quite within their province? Most certainly if they do the millennium has arrived. But this, even if it were a fact, would not at all suffice. Even these sciences have their principles which must always be applied, and if we have no evidence that they were, rather have every evidence that they were not, this proffered explanation of the Christian miracles loses very much of its plausibility. Besides, the province of those sciences extends only to certain cases, primarily of the nervous system, which are but one small class of the miracles of Christianity. There are miracles, for instance, which, *prima facie*, exceed all the forces of nature—the restoration of life to the dead, of sight to those born blind. That effects such as these are beyond the efficiency of natural laws must be admitted as unreservedly by the scientific expert as by the untutored rustic. While discoveries in optics and chemistry may, if I may say so, have accounted for a host of apparent miracles of another class, they have made no approximation to an explanation of effects such as these; on the contrary, they are altogether opposed to their principles.¹ There are surely some things which science knows for certain, and one of these, I aver, is that she will never be able to give life to a dead man.

Next we inquire into the *cause* of the occurrence, and as I have stated, all the circumstances are here examined, and we must be able reasonably to say that it is *God* acting 'here and now,' either directly or by special delegation,

¹ In our critique of the articles of M. Le Roy we shall see more of this.

through the instrumentality of one of His creatures. If we can reasonably explain the effect as due merely to preternatural agency—to the devil, or a good angel acting on his own account—then it cannot be claimed a true miracle. It lacks the sign-manual of God, the necessary stamp of the miraculous. In this connexion what he considers an insuperable difficulty against the Christian miracles is urged by the author, time and again, in the work before us. Wonders and miracles, he says, are attributed in Sacred Scripture (and the fact, he says, is admitted by all Christian writers, *sic*) to the agency of the Evil Spirit. Where, then, is the evidential value of our miracles in favour of the divine origin of Christianity, seeing that the author of them is admittedly uncertain? They can have no such value, for man himself is so ignorant of the unseen world that he will never be able, from the miracle alone, to determine the agency by which it was performed. It is useless, he says, to argue that this may be known from the nature of the doctrine supposed to be revealed; this is reasoning in a circle. The revelation is known by the miracle, the miracle by the revelation.

Now this brings us to the fourth criterion by which theologians discern the presence of a miracle, viz., the end or object for which it is wrought. We know that the ordinary mode of God's action is through the laws of nature, and that, moreover, He will not interfere with the working of those laws, except for some grave cause. A true miracle will always tend to His own greater glory, and the edification and instruction of man in one or other of the divine attributes. The essential attributes of God, and one's own innate perception of right and wrong, are each discoverable to man's unaided reason. Hence we have here at once a wide criterion for distinguishing a true miracle from a 'lying wonder.' Nothing contrary to the essential attributes of God, or to man's natural sense of right, can have the approval of a true miracle. Therefore, when I hear of a wonder wrought in favour of a doctrine which I find to be repugnant to my idea of the attributes of God, or to my innate sense of right, I cannot be accused of arguing in a

vicious circle when I say that no true miracle has occurred.

I do not, however, claim the converse of this to be true. The fact that a truth said to have been revealed is consonant with my reason does not establish the genuineness of the miracle, just as the fact of its being above my reason does not warrant its rejection. The devil, we say, might transform himself into an angel of light, and work his 'lying wonders' even in favour of the truth—with the ulterior motive always of afterwards leading people astray. Yet even in this case, though speculatively the admission might seem to entail some difficulty, it can hardly ever do so in practice; least of all, does it affect the miracles under consideration—those wrought to establish the divine origin of Christianity. While, ordinarily, there will not lack signs to indicate the agency by which a certain wonder is performed, as the character of the persons connected with it, the purpose for which it is wrought, etc., there can be no question of the devil's agency when the worker of the miracle invokes the power of God, or acts in His name, as did our Lord in the miracles of the Gospel. Whether the existence of the devil might be known by reason independent of revelation or no, this much in any case reason does tell us, that there must be a limit to his power. The devil, too, is a creature, and his power, as of all other creatures, comes from God. While not denying, then, his capacity to be an agent in the hands of God for the working of a true miracle, we do deny that a wonder with all the appearance of a true miracle wrought in the name of God and as a testimony of the divine origin of a certain truth, could possibly emanate from the devil acting of himself. What we know of God—even by our unaided reason—compels us to believe that he would not permit us to be thus inevitably deceived.

Our author next proceeds to discuss miracles in their relation to the order of nature. Passing over the expressions of his 'worser nature' for the English divines, whose treatment of this aspect of the question he estimates as little less than 'a bundle of contradictions, ambiguities,

and unwarrantable assumptions,' the difficulties which he urges may be reduced to two: first, the self-contradiction on the part of God, involved in the suspension or violation of the laws of nature; secondly, the lack of evidence which would be sufficient to prove that such a violation has ever really occurred. The first of these he involves somewhat in this way. The various distinctions commonly made by theologians to show that a miracle is not contrary to the laws of nature, are little more than quibbles temporarily made to avoid such a difficulty without a particle of foundation in fact. For instance, to say that a miracle is 'above nature,' 'beyond nature,' and not 'contrary' to nature, is really tantamount to saying that they are neither natural nor unnatural phenomena—which is absurd. Again, the distinction between the 'laws of nature' and the 'laws of the universe' is purely imaginary, devised to suit an emergency, and really beyond our intelligence, which knows only of the laws of nature. Finally, the supposition of the divine design of a revelation by which a miracle is said to become 'part of the universe,' and therefore neither an 'anomaly' nor an 'irregularity,' is the result of a foregone conclusion in its favour, and is not suggested by any antecedent probability—is in fact derived solely from the contents of the supposed revelation itself. Thus does he tear to shreds the beautiful fabric woven by our English divines, and then lie back exultantly in the evident persuasion that their claim is convincingly disproved.

In my explanation of the nature of a miracle I have partly anticipated the author's difficulties in this connexion, and to what I have said there I have very little to add. Prescinding from the useless verbal distinctions which the author so gladly seizes upon to cast ridicule on the doctrine, the whole difficulty appears to rest on a misunderstanding of our conception of the laws of nature. Are the laws of nature of themselves necessarily immutable things, or are they not, as in our philosophy, the result of a free act of the Creator, who might have made them entirely different, had it so pleased Him? The existence of an infinite, intelligent, and free Creator, is, as I have

said, a necessary postulate for any discussion of the miraculous; is not this a question of His freedom? We do not maintain that miracles are an after-thought, and therefore a sort of contradiction on the part of God. Rather, we maintain, that as the idea of a revelation entered into the original design of creating the world, so, too, did its natural counterpart, the idea of a miracle.

If, then, as we contend, the laws of nature, which were also part of that original design, were made subject to these extraordinary interferences which God arranged for His own wise ends, how can we in our claims for the miraculous, be accused of making God contradict Himself? This, of course, presupposes that there was a divine design of revelation, which assumption our author elsewhere considers quite unwarrantable, and as explained by Christians altogether incredible—in fact, contrary to reason and morality. Here it is not opportune to enter into the question of the necessity and reasonableness of revelation, nor on a defence of the doctrines contained in the Christian revelation. Suffice for our present purpose to say that granted that design, the occurrence of a miracle as the means of proclaiming its divine origin becomes reasonable and therefore involves no contradiction. Nor does our doctrine, thus explained (despite the insinuation of the author) interfere with the certainty and progress of the physical sciences; nor is it out of joint with the harmony and beauty of the physical order. Did we claim that a miracle was a natural occurrence, due solely to the ordinary laws operating in nature, there might be reasonable grounds for this assertion. But, claiming as we do, the divine intervention to account for a certain effect inexplicable by the natural forces operating in the case, do we not, on the contrary, as it appears to me, bear the highest testimony of the permanency of the law? The constancy and regularity of the laws of nature, and the beauty and harmony of the universe arising therefrom, means, if I understand it aright, nothing more than that the same cause, acting in exactly like circumstances, always produces a like effect. We do not say that the certainty of the law is

interfered with when a counteracting cause is interposed, as, for instance, with the law of gravity when I raise and hold a weight, and hold it at a distance from the ground; neither should we say so, methinks, as even John Stuart Mill avers, 'when there is a direct interposition of a being who has power over nature, in particular of a being whose will being assumed to have endowed all the causes with the powers by which they produce their effects, may well be supposed able to counteract them.'

The next point, in which the author is interested for several pages, is the evidence necessary and sufficient to prove the existence of miracles, and with this fortunately I need only be very brief. The evidence in question is, as we all know, human testimony. The necessary character of that evidence, which we hope to examine more fully in our next critique, is thus happily summed up by Dr. March in one of the Westminster Lectures:—

It is the same kind of evidence by which scientific men witness to the existence of some newly discovered star or comet, the same kind of testimony by which all the facts of history and the daily occurrences of life are established. The proof may be more rigorous and searching in the case of the miraculous, but the nature of the testimony is identical. The witnesses of the miraculous as to any other event must be men in the possession of unbiassed faculties and senses—men without bias, with no ulterior motive to serve in affirming or denying—men who are trustworthy, honest, and capable of observing that which comes under their senses. They need not necessarily be able to understand or explain or draw any inference from what they see, any more than the observer of a comet may be able to explain its nature, or say why it is in a particular part of the heavens. All history and human experience are based on such evidence.

Now, against the possibility of this evidence in the case of the miraculous, the author revives and dresses up for us the old difficulty of Hume; against the actuality of it he elaborately sets up a pile of what he considers counter-evidence emphasizing the superstitious character of the Jewish people, the comparative ignorance and crude

superstitions of the early Fathers, the permanent stream of miraculous pretension down the centuries, the patent absurdity of many of the so-called ecclesiastical miracles—all rendering the actuality of miracles, if not absolutely improbable, at least very suspicious indeed.

We are all of us familiar with the argument of Hume. It has been examined so frequently by writers on this subject, and found wanting, that it is quite unnecessary to go over it in detail. Even a logician, as John Stuart Mill, who certainly will not be accused of any exceptional leanings towards the miraculous, after a careful analysis of the whole argument, will credit Hume with having established nothing more than the following very harmless conclusion: 'That no evidence can prove a miracle to anyone who did not previously believe in the existence of a being or beings with supernatural powers, or who believes himself to have full proof that the character of the being whom he recognizes is inconsistent with his having seen fit to interfere on the occasion in question.' The author's final chapters on what he styles the 'silly superstitions of the Jews and the early Christians'—with the avowed aim of emphasizing their untrustworthiness as witnesses to the miraculous—is much more interesting reading. He confidently assumes—as indeed the English divines do whom he cites—that the age of miracles is past; but from quite a different standpoint. With him it is the progress of 'rationalism' that has at length dispelled those delusions, so much so, that the few who still cling to this relic of a bygone age are quite beneath his notice. He does not here intend to put the miracles of the Gospel in exactly the same category of post-Apostolic times, but he insinuates so much, and endeavours to prove it in the second portion of his work; unless this were established, of course, his whole efforts would be fruitless.

Here manifestly is a wide topic for discussion, which I cannot hope to do justice to in the space now at my disposal. It would in itself be subject-matter for an interesting and extensive paper. I must now be content with a few brief statements which may indicate the extent

to which it affects our doctrine, as well as the lines upon which a more exhaustive treatment might be given.

In the particulars recorded of the early Church, for which the evidence is not sufficiently convincing, no one is bound to believe, I take it, unless the miracles have the express sanction of the Church itself. For many of those related we all know there is not convincing evidence ; many indeed are of such kind that of their nature they could not well be expected to command one's assent. We have only to glance through the 'Early Lives' of some of our Irish saints to be convinced of this. Without meaning any irreverence, I should say that some are foolish, some silly, very many wrought without any apparent laudable object. I have already emphasized the criteria which Catholic theologians put forward as indicating the presence of a true miracle, and I feel perfectly satisfied that very many of those to which I refer would not stand the test. But while freely granting all this, there are many other miracles—apart altogether from the miracles of the Gospel—for which we have the clearest and strongest testimony, and in accepting which, on their merits alone, we strongly protest against the charge of showing ourselves unreasonable. It would be altogether without my province to show that any particular miracles accepted by the Church or Christians generally, as genuine, fully conform to the test laid down for a true miracle : the author has not in this connexion specified any such miracle. Suffice it, then, to say that—apart from the miracles of the Gospel, which are admittedly on a higher plain, and those to which the Church has explicitly given her sanction and for which she is ready to produce her evidence—no Christian is bound to pin his faith to any particular miracle or set of miracles of any age, place, or persons, of whose occurrence he has not first convinced himself by a careful examination of all the attendant circumstances.

Catholics, however, do not admit that the age of miracles is past. They may not be as frequent as in the early Church ; there is not now the same reasons for their occurrence. The infant Church had to show itself everywhere

as the work of God, and God's signal interposition was everywhere necessary and forthcoming to show that the work was His. Now, the existence and history of the Catholic Church itself is the standing miracle, and has no necessity to call upon God so frequently as in its infant days. But from time to time we have the clearest evidence that He still mercifully intervenes. Such evidence is recent and capable of the minutest investigation. Our author, presumably, has never heard of the miracles of Lourdes. No: they, too, are altogether antecedently incredible, and therefore could not have occurred. Strange, here and now in the full blaze of modern progress and modern science, we have those miracles occurring on the testimony of many of the experts in medicine and science, while our friend sits calmly in his study, and coolly upbraids them as falsifiers and deceivers; as though he alone, forsooth, were the constituted arbiter of truth and rationality.

MALACHY EATON.

CATHOLIC APOLOGETICS UNDER LEO XIII AND PIUS X

I

JOURNALISTIC excursions into the domain of Apologetics are not usually characterized by accuracy of judgment or solidity of argument. Writers whose talents are daily exercised on the scandals of society, the squabbles of politicians, the intrigues of diplomatists, cannot be expected to discuss at a moment's notice the deeper problems of human thought; in matters where,

A Hair perhaps divides the False and True;
Yes; and a single Alif were the clue,—

they cannot be expected to distinguish things that ought to be distinguished, and to confound things that ought to be confounded. Yet living as they do in an age when everyone must have an opinion on everything, they dare not be silent about those fierce doctrinal tempests that are sweeping over the face of Christendom. It was not surprising, then, that the Encyclical *Pascendi dominici gregis* should have drawn from multitudes of critics who had no means of seizing the strong points of the controversy with which the Encyclical dealt, unreal judgments and rash predictions. Non-Catholics, as might be expected, exaggerated for their own purposes the destructive policy of the Pope. Rome, we were told—as we have ever been told—was blind to the intellectual needs of the time, she was appealing to St. Thomas, not realizing that modern philosophy had shattered the bases of Thomism; she was thinking of David of Dinant and of Siger of Brabant, not knowing that Kant and Spencer have come to stay. What could be more significant than that while Aquinas wrote for the students that flocked to the University of Paris, and not for the illiterate barbarians that crowded into the schools

of Alcuin, Pius X saw no safety for his subjects of the twentieth century in any intellectual views different from those formulated in and for the thirteenth century by St. Thomas? Was not such an avowal the clearest proof that Roman Catholicism was a decadent creed, a *Bauern religion*, incapable of attracting or of retaining educated and cultured minds.

Criticism of this kind is undoubtedly an effective method of creating and of fostering ignorant prejudices: it has the additional advantage of being exceedingly offensive. But what a crushing refutation do not the pages of history inflict on these discourteous assailants of Papal reform. Peter

is no recluse, no solitary student, no dreamer about the past, no doter upon the dead and gone, no projector of the visionary. He for eighteen hundred years has lived in the world; he has seen all fortunes, he has encountered all adversaries, he has shaped himself for all emergencies. If ever there was a power on earth who had an eye for the times, who has confined himself to the practical, and has been happy in his anticipations, whose words have been facts, and whose commands prophecies, such is he in the history of ages, who sits from generation to generation in the Chair of the Apostles, as the Vicar of Christ and the Doctor of His Church . . . In the first centuries of the Church all this practical sagacity of holy Church was mere matter of faith, but every age, as it has come, has confirmed faith by actual sight.¹

The truth is, that with the exception of those who may be roughly classed as students of Apologetics, few, whether among Catholics or non-Catholics, are aware of the depth or breadth of the principles laid down in the speculative Encyclicals from the *Aeterni Patris* to the *Pascendi dominici gregis*. The reason is obvious. The majority of Catholics have but a superficial acquaintance with the vagaries of disbelief and of unbelief; the majority of non-Catholics have equally vague notions of the teachings of belief; in consequence, both parties are incapable of taking a just view of documents which condemn only what is false in modern

¹ Newman, *Idea of a University*, p. 13.

thought and uphold only what is irrefutable in traditional positions. What is worse, this unpreparedness of mind leads to a misinterpretation of the attitude of the Popes. The late Encyclical is a case in point. The Holy Father was obliged to emphasize so strongly the incompatibility of Modernism with Catholicism, that some have come to regard His Holiness as more or less averse to those advances in Apologetics made under the patronage of his illustrious predecessor. That such is not the case is clear to anyone who has read his directions for the reform of Italian Seminaries. However, the most convincing proof of the doctrinal consistency of Leo XIII and of Pius X, as well as of the constructive tendencies of their Encyclicals, is afforded by reviewing the progress of Apologetics during their pontificates.

In attempting such a retrospect, I shall follow Thomistic methods: in his Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle,¹ St. Thomas tells us that to face a difficulty in all its magnitude is the first step to its solution; and in the Summas, the Commentaries, the Opuscules, the Angelic Doctor set forth in their strongest light all objections to his theses. Feeling, then, that the radical differences between the scientific outlook of the medieval and of the modern worlds are thought to be insuperable obstacles to that revival of scholastic Apologetics advocated by Leo and by Pius, I shall begin by stating, as fully as my limits permit, these differences.

II

All those tangles at which friends and foes of Catholic Apologetics are so impatiently pulling have been occasioned by the bewildering changes wrought in our ideas of nature and of man by the advances of the modern world in Science and Philosophy and History. The ancients fashioned for themselves a cocoon-like universe comprising a few thousand years of time, a few thousand miles of space, and a few millions of living beings; and in their interpre-

¹ St. Thomas, in III. Met. lect. 1.

tation even of that little world, they made mistakes.¹ They had no idea of the opaqueness of masses of invisible air, and they believed that the dome of blue was a solid roof ; they did not see the vapour rising from the streams and seas, and they believed that this solid roof supported inexhaustible quantities of hail, of rain, and of snow ; they had no means of calculating the distance of the stars, and they believed that they were tiny lamps fixed in the firmament above the clouds and below the heavenly ocean ; they did not feel the rotation of the earth on its own axis, and they believed that the sun rose in the east and set in the west. Nor were their ideas of the earth less primitive than their ideas of the heavens. They had not the slightest doubt but that the world known to Adam was in every feature the world known to them. They never suspected that the everlasting hills and the unfathomable abyss might be children of time : knowing as little about the building of mountains and the shaping of continents as about the extinction of faunas and of floras, they believed that some four thousand years before the birth of the Redeemer, the world, as they knew it, had, at God's command, suddenly leaped into being. A day came when most of these venerable views had to be abandoned. The voyage of the 'Victoria' round the world (1522) opened the eyes of Copernicus, and forthwith Ptolemy was dethroned in the schools of astronomy. Aristotle's Physics did not outlive Ptolemy's Astronomy : while Kepler was perfecting the theories of Copernicus, Bacon was writing the *Novum Organum*. And since these pioneer days, legions of loyal and patient workers have spent their lives at the study of natural science, with the result that worlds never dreamt of by the ancients, have been discovered in the heavens and on the earth.

In the first place, modern astronomy has brought to light facts that, were it not for rigorous verification, would be incredible. To hear that the dome of blue and the movement of the sun are optical illusions disturbs us little,

¹ Faye, *L'Origine du Monde*, pp. 13, 18 ; Paris, 1896.

while to be rid of the thought of incalculable fountains of water, poised, however skilfully, over our heads, is a positive relief. But who does not feel unsettled when he tries to grasp the illimitable tracts of space made known by the correction of the ideas of the ancients regarding the stars. The stars seem smaller than the sun? Yes, because the nearest—save one, Alpha Centauri—is a million times, and the farthest of them, nine hundred and sixty-five million times, more distant from us than the sun. Yet the sun is ninety-two million miles away! The sizes of these remote bodies are on a par with their distances: Arcturus, for instance, has a volume equal to a million suns such as ours. Yet our sun has a volume a million and a half times greater than that of the earth! Nor are the numbers of the stars less astounding. Although only one hundred and twenty-five thousand were known at the beginning of the nineteenth century, over thirty millions were known at its close.¹ Astronomers have endeavoured, with doubtful success, to bring home to us these distances and magnitudes; according to Faye, a cannon ball if hurled from the earth with a uniform velocity of five hundred metres a second—that is, more than 1,118 miles an hour—would take nine and a half million years to reach the nearest star, and eighteen thousand millions of years to go from one end of the known universe to the other; according to Ball,² an electric current if sent from Bethlehem at the moment of our Saviour's birth at such a rate as would take it seven times round the world in a second, would not, in spite of the number of seconds that have elapsed since that first Christmas night, have yet brought the good news to the most distant stars. For good or for ill, therefore, the little universe of the ancients is gone. Nature's unfathomable magnitude is an undeniable fact: the most tranquil sky is a surging sea of seething particles of subtle matter; while behind and beyond it are vast interstellar spaces, strewn with gigantic masses that are ever sweeping with

¹ Faye, pp. 180, 181. Different astronomers give different calculations: I have followed Faye's calculations everywhere.

² *Home Messenger*, Dec., 1907.

frightful velocities round shining and darkening suns. What the ancients thought a paltry, statical universe has turned out to be an immense mechanism of innumerable world-systems in varying stages of ever-recurring growth and decay, whirling ceaselessly and aimlessly in endless cycles.

And when we turn from these starry worlds to this insignificant globe of ours, fresh disclosures await us. The graves have given up their dead : from out the rivers and mines and mountains have come the remains of animals and of plants strangely different from those that now people the earth. These fossils are, it is true, a fruitful source of capricious speculation, but they are also irresistible proof of continual past change in the earth's surface, and faunas and floras.¹ The geographical distribution of land and water, the climatic conditions of heat and cold, the animals and plants, were formerly other than they are at present : the continent of Europe was once represented by a group of islands ; the United Kingdom was once buried under ice-sheets of enormous thickness ; atlantosaurs, plesiosaurs, deinosaurs, lepidodendra, sigillariæ, calamites, and other large families of plants and of animals that are now extinct once flourished. These facts are but typical selections from that mass of geological discoveries which goes to prove that the earth was gradually prepared for man's habitation. How long was this work of preparation going on ? Physicists have attempted to solve the problem by calculating the age of the sun : the sun cannot have been radiating heat at its present rate for more than ten million years, according to Tait ; for more than fifteen million years, according to Faye ; for more than one hundred million years, according to the late Lord Kelvin. But geologists finding these large figures insufficient, have repeatedly pointed out the arbitrary nature of the data on which such calculations are based.² It would seem, then, that science can tell us

¹ Archibald Geikie, *Geology*, pp. 243, etc., 396, etc., 338, etc.

² Guibert, *Les Origines*, pp. 12, 163, 164 ; Paris, 1902.

nothing definite about the age of the earth ; it does, however, in the person of its most accredited representatives, demand enormous periods of time for the formation of the fossiliferous strata.

Equally unexpected information regarding the past history of man has been discovered : primitive states of society have been laid bare, old worlds have been disinterred ; the beginnings, the wanderings, the fortunes of bygone as well as of existing generations, have been retraced. Among these various contributions to human history, the traces of prehistoric man, and the monuments of the extinct civilizations of Assyria and Babylonia are particularly interesting to the apologist.

That man existed in early quaternary, if not in late tertiary, times, cannot be gainsaid : Haeckel's *homo alalus* is a myth, Linnæus's *homo sapiens* a reality.¹ Hatchets, harpoons, arrowheads, rude engravings of stags and mammoths have been dug out of the quaternary cave deposits and drift ; and though human skeletons have not always been found beside these remains, portions of several skeletons have been already recovered from the same strata. But what is most startling is that competent and impartial anthropologists assure us of the existence, even in these far off days, of race varieties.² If that be so, these men of quaternary times are not primitive : students of the problem of differentiation of races will allow that natural conditions of life and of climate, even though reinforced by rare cases of spontaneous variation, must have been at work for a long time before they resulted in such characteristics as distinguish the skeletons of the different races. In spite of their significance, however, these remains of prehistoric races are meagre and uninteresting when compared to that wealth of historical evidence which has been recently unearthed in Assyria and Babylonia.

Fifty years ago all that was known of these West Asiatic empires was legendary ; to-day, thanks to the labours of

¹ Quatrefages, *L'Espece Humaine*, p. 110 ; Baillière, 1880.

² *Ibid.*, p. 218.

archæologists, many important phases of their history are better known to us than certain epochs of Grecian and Roman history.¹ Tablets and rolls and cylinders, statues and temples and palaces, tell the tale of empires that had closed their political, social, and literary history long before the rise of heroic Greece and regal Rome. Fresh workers are daily bringing to the surface new data, but all that has been discovered and all that is being discovered goes to show that before 3000 B.C. these western peoples possessed complex liturgies, rival schools of astronomy and of philosophy, and extensive literatures dealing with religion, history, and mathematics. The evidence is irresistible: the names, the deeds, the features of those who lived at that early time have been preserved for us in the engravings of contemporaries; their skill is shown in temple and in palace; their science is testified by their magnificent libraries. Now empires are not built in a day: the establishment of strong political and religious organizations, the acquisition and development of scientific and artistic ideals demand time. We are not surprised, then, to find that the engravers and sculptors of Assyria and of Babylonia are familiar with distinct human races: their paintings and their statues setting before us the peculiarities of different human types are incontestable proof of the lapse of centuries between the contemporaries of these artists and the first representatives of humanity.

These proofs of the antiquity of man, coming into prominence as they did at the height of the controversy on evolution, led to the multitudinous speculations of ethnologists, anthropologists, philologists, and sociologists. It is not possible within the limits of this paper to point out all the difficulties raised by these new sciences. Neither is it necessary; most of them are unimportant; those that are serious are so, not on intrinsic grounds, but because of their connexion with those two departments of knowledge which deal with the supreme issues in apologetics—modern philosophy and historical criticism. In treating, then, the

¹ *The Catholic Encyclopædia*—Assyria, Babylonia.

difficulties raised by these two sciences, we shall be neglecting nothing that is fundamental.¹

The problem of ancient philosophy was that of essence, the problem of modern philosophy is that of knowledge. What is the worth of human knowledge ; what is its source ; what are its credentials ? These questions have provoked all the intellectual conflicts of modern Europe. Intellects of acknowledged power have faced them century after century, with but little result : each thinker has propounded a solution that was for a time regarded as a brilliant success, and was later recognized as a failure. Out of all this confusion has emerged only one centre of agreement. The master minds of modern Europe have unanimously proclaimed that man does not know with certainty anything except the picture presented by consciousness : whether that picture be wholly produced by external realities and so expresses in terms of mind these realities ; or whether it be only partially produced by these external realities and so has no more resemblance to these realities than Hamlet's soliloquy has to the lips of the reciter ; or whether it be totally independent of external realities and so results solely from the internal evolution of a mysterious world-generating spirit—they are not agreed. The only absolute certainty is the existence of states of consciousness : both Descartes and Berkeley outstepped the limits of sane affirmation, the one in affirming a world matter, the other in denying it. Such is the main trend of modern philosophy. A few thinkers of the sanguine type by abandoning, as they boast, all fruitless brooding over the problem of knowledge, have escaped the taint of solipsism. Scientific discoveries have, in their eyes, shattered the central truths of all idealistic philosophies : the personality of God is irreconcilable with the acceptance of the self-subsisting world known to students of modern physics ; the immortality of the soul is hopelessly

¹ Similar reasons account for the absence of any reference to Evolution ; as Father Boedder points out in his *Natural Theology* (pp. 133, 134), any credible theory of evolution raises no philosophical difficulties ; many Catholics, however, maintain the insufficiency of the proofs advanced by evolutionists for their views.

contradicted by the most solid truths of anthropology and cosmology ; the freedom of the will has been disproved by destructive doses of facts from the arsenals of comparative physiology and evolution. Nature, as Lucretius wrote, does all things of herself, 'without the meddling of the gods,' is in fact herself the only god. The material universe is in its origin, its growth, and its maintenance independent of anything outside or above itself ; life and sensation and thought are products stumbled on during the process of the evolution of the vast mechanism, and are perfectly explicable as happy collocations of the eternally moving atoms : sunsets and earthquakes and pestilences, flowers and birds and beasts, saints and sinners and simpletons are all so many inevitable and accidentally different manifestations of the all-embracing, impersonal *Anima Mundi*.

Critical examination of the problem of knowledge in philosophy had led in history to criticism of the sources of history.¹ But while one may sum up the results of other sciences, it is advisable to vindicate the claims of historical criticism before setting down its results : the difficulties arising from such results are real only for those who acknowledge the scientific claims of historical criticism. To find language innocent enough for such a vindication is a delicate matter : worthy people have been frightened out of their wits by the crimes of its professed adherents, and have come to regard it as 'some kind of modern black art.' Still, *abusus non tollit usum* ; charlatans have ever exploited new sciences. Historical criticism is neither wicked nor mysterious : its aim is trustworthy information about the past, recovery of the words that were really spoken, and of the events that actually took place ; its method is the employment in the interpretation of historical data of that natural prudence which every balanced mind exercises in the perusal of the daily newspaper, the only difference being that the serious critic is most careful at every stage of the process as he knows that a single

¹ Father Desmedt, S.J., *Principes de la Critique Historique* ; Battaini, *Il Metodo negli Studi Storici*.

error at any stage would interfere with the value of all his conclusions. It is worth remembering, also, that nothing is left to the whim of the individual in all these laborious researches: the canons of evidence are as precise and as exacting as the canons of syllogisms.¹ That such critical investigation of the sources of history is wanted hardly needs proof. In the first place, innumerable scribes of all degrees of fitness and unfitness have been instrumental in transmitting to us ancient documents; thus, in the very endeavour to procure a reliable text, the student is face to face with the accumulated risks of centuries. And when he has recovered from the variant readings a fairly reliable text, how is he to wrest the secrets of authorship, of meaning, of competency, of sincerity from his document? History is full of forgeries, of plagiarism, of delusions: the Proto-evangel of James, the Gospel of Thomas, the Gospel of Nicodemus, the Gospel of Peter, etc., are palmary instances of such crimes in circumstances where they are least becoming. Now no one pretends that hagiographers have had a monopoly of literary vices: in all ages literary fabricators have evinced extraordinary skill and audacity; in all ages passion and prejudice have led the insincere to impose upon others, the sincere to impose upon themselves; in all ages, *alles factishe ist schon theorie*, and where cherished hopes and deep convictions pull one way, witnesses both to facts and to the interpretation of facts have succumbed to mythopœic temptations. In the face of such evidences of human frailty, serious students cannot accept the statements of any writer until they have submitted his testimony to rigorous cross-examination: just as we gauge the accuracy of a newspaper statement by comparing it to those of other newspapers, by analysing the mentality of the writer, by reviewing it in the light of antecedent and of consequent facts, so the scientific student of history estimates the value of the contents of ancient documents, by seeking their confirmation or denial in contemporary writings, by weighing the opportunities and the motives

¹ Father Desmedt wrote this book to prove the existence of such canons of evidence, p. 2. Cf. Battaini, pp. 14, 15, etc.; pp. 23, etc.

of their authors, by tracing causes and effects in the sequence of events—a process that can be attempted only by one who has a thorough knowledge both of the age in which the events happened, and of the age to which their writers belong.

And while it is difficult, though necessary, to examine in this way documentary evidence, the difficulty and the necessity increase when there is question of reducing to their 'original elements of facts and romance' that source of historical information known as oral tradition. Oral tradition is typically represented in the popular 'newspaper, with its party spirit, its thoroughgoingness, its resolute avoidance of shades and distinctions, its short, highly charged, heavy-shotted articles.' Admiring or disapproving, the multitude is in both cases extreme; admiring and so weeping hysterical tears, disapproving and so foaming at the mouth. True, there are at all times calm and self-controlled minds scattered through the crowd: experience proves, however, that the few are, except at rare intervals, heedless of, or unequal to, the duty of exercising wholesome restraint on the passionate likes and dislikes of the many. And thus it comes to pass that oral tradition gives us too often travesties of fact and perversions of character: it has made Gautama and Mohammed rivals of the Incarnate Word; it has made Tiberius the tutelary genius of every corner of Capri; it has made Alexander the benevolent founder of every building in Alexandria; it has made Virgil the successful city governor of Naples, and Ovid the great saint of Sulmona.¹ Nor is it more impartial in our time. The following paragraph written by an Englishman about Englishmen might *mutatis mutandis* be applied to the oral traditions of every nation under the sun² :—

Matthew Arnold found the window of the English soul opaque with its own purple. The Englishman had painted his own image on the pane so gorgeously that it was practically

¹ Father Delahaye, S.J., *The Legends of the Saints*, pp. 18, 19.

² C. K. Chesterton in Introduction to Arnold's Essays: Dent. Cf. also Newman's Lecture on English Protestant Tradition.

a dead panel ; it had no opening on the world outside. He could not see the most obvious and enormous objects outside his own door. The Englishman could not see (for instance) that the French Revolution was a far-reaching, fundamental, and most practical and successful change in the whole structure of Europe. He really thought that it was a bloody and futile episode, in weak imitation of an English General Election. The Englishman could not see that the Catholic Church was (at the very least) an immense and enduring Latin civilization, linking us to the lost civilizations of the Mediterranean. He really thought it was a sort of sect. The Englishman could not see that the Franco-Prussian War was the entrance of a new and menacing military age, a terror to England and to all. He really thought it was a little lesson to Louis Napoleon for not reading *The Times*. The most enormous catastrophe was only some kind of symbolic compliment to England. If the sun fell from heaven it only showed how wise England was in not having much sunshine. If the waters were turned to blood it was only an advertisement for Bass's Ale or Fry's Cocoa. Such was the weak pride of the English then. One cannot say that it is wholly undiscoverable now.

The Englishman has no monopoly of weak pride, no monopoly of coloured windows ; oral tradition everywhere is in the main a chaos of prejudices. How is the historian to find the needle in this stack of hay, save by weighing oral tradition in the balances of critical judgment ?

Historical criticism, then, has a mission : it alone rescues us from that historical pyrrhonism which rejects adequate testimony to inconvenient facts, and from that historical obscurantism which admits indiscriminately all convenient facts. Both these attitudes are either weak or immoral : to refuse to eat anything is one sign of lunacy or of obstinacy ; to eat grass and mortar is another and no less convincing sign of lunacy or of obstinacy. Historical criticism by enabling us to know what documents have stood the test of impartial investigation enables us to avoid both credulity and incredulity. It is true that its methods are fallible, and open to all kinds of mistakes. But so are all scientific methods. It is true that its rigid application will lead to unsettlement of opinion. But so did the application of the theories of Copernicus. It is

true that its conclusions will rob us of the pleasure which other generations took in the historical romances of writers of the school of Clarendon and Macaulay. But truth is surely worth the surrender of the beautiful. 'We murder to dissect': but not even an antivivisectionist can object to this scientific separation of the chaff from the grain in the records of the past. The losses of the present will be more than redressed by the gains of the future. Historical criticism is an effort towards fuller truth in the province of history, and will in due time yield an abundant harvest of authenticated knowledge. Whatever, then, be the difficulty involved in the criticism of the sources of history, whatever be the disturbance caused in received views of past events, whatever be the betrayal of truth perpetrated consciously or unconsciously in the name of historical criticism, students of history think themselves justified in looking on such criticism as the only effective means of avoiding slothful acquiescence in the *ipse dixits* of ancient writers, and in comparing opponents of the new science to those sheep in the fable that, in order to save themselves from the wolf, jumped down the precipice.

But if our intellects are attracted by the logic of such pleading, our consciences are startled by those results of historical biblical criticism which have attracted most attention. In the field of Old Testament criticism, the fashionable theories are the Evolutionism of Wellhausen, and the Pan-Babylonianism of Winckler.¹ According to Wellhausen, the Israelites were in the beginning worshippers of stones and trees and wells and ancestors like all Arabian nomads; in the time of Moses they worshipped Jahve as the tribal god of Israel, supreme indeed, yet co-existing with, and permitting, the worship of lesser divinities as gods of the storm, gods of the harvest, etc.; in the time of the Prophets, and then only, they began to worship

¹ Rev. P. Boylan, 'Evolution and Assyriology,' *I. T. Quarterly*, 7 Jan., 1907; Lemonnier, O.P., *Revue des Sciences Phil. et Theol.*, Jan., 1907, pp. 133-144. In Jan., 1908, Père Lemonnier tells us that Cheyne, the English critic, has developed in *Traditions and Beliefs of Ancient Israel*, a new theory of Pan-Jerahmeelitism! Cf. pp. 148, 149.

Jahve as the one, true, omnipotent God of ethical theism. According to Winckler, the Israelites were in a broad sense monotheists from the beginning : the religion of Abraham was a modification of the astral monotheism of ancient Babylon ; the religion of Moses was a further intensification of the monotheism universally prevalent in the East in his day ; this monotheism was gradually improved upon after the death of Moses, and became universal, ethical, monotheism prior to the time of the prophets ; Amos and his successors were not founders of monotheism, they were merely expounders of the already existing monotheism. Nor are the famous theories of New Testament critics less subversive of received views : here Strauss and Baur, Holtzman and Harnack, are leading names. Strauss on philosophical rather than on historical grounds, though professedly on both, explained the miraculous portions of the Gospel history as the unintentional creation of the Christians of the second century ; Baur transferred to the first Christian communities the anti-Pauline bias of an heretical romance of the second century—the Clementine Homilies—and on this principle assigned the Gospels to the second century ; Holtzman and Harnack have been compelled by deeper study of the evidence to acknowledge that in laying down such extravagantly late dates for the Gospels both Strauss and Baur dealt too recklessly with broad and unquestionable facts ; they are not on that account any nearer than these were to an admission of the central truth of Christianity—the divinity of Christ. Holtzman finds in the grave spiritual crisis of the Jordan Baptism, with its products of subjective visions and of earnest belief in the Messiahship, the key to the heroic but blundering career of a soul of exalted moral purpose—‘ of a Socrates, a Gotama, and a Swedenborg all in one.’ Harnack distinguishes between the Easter faith and the Easter message : the Easter message of the empty tomb rests on the reports of disciples who had searched too hurriedly and on enthusiastic visions that multiplied with the spread of their reports ; the Easter faith is the belief ‘ that the Crucified One gained a victory over death, that Jesus Christ has

passed through death, that God has awaked Him to glory and life, that death is vanquished, that there is a life eternal,'¹ not that a Word Incarnate rose on the third day.

III

Such are the ways of looking at the problems of Apologetics which are forced upon us to-day: in selecting the field of discussion the apologist has no choice. Can this statement of the case against the ancient faith be met, as Leo XIII and Pius X have commanded it to be met, by loyal attachments to the methods and principles of St. Thomas? Many are doubtful. For them, the apparent immensity and eternity of the universe, the unexpected discoveries of geology and of archæology, the paralysing considerations arising from closer study of the problem of knowledge, the alarming results reached by an incredulous generation in its jealous scrutiny of biblical documents, are *prima facie* proof of the intellectual insufficiency at the present time of any system of Apologetics, however logical and irrefragable, that was fashioned and finished in prescientific and unquestioning days. One of these opponents of scholastic methods of Apologetics has presented their case in the following terms² :—

I am comparing in my own mind religion made thus familiar—the religion of medieval days—to a firelit cottage at night enclosing a sailor's child. The blinds are down, the darkness is shut out, the flickerings of the hearth give a friendliness even to the shadows in the farthest corner. The child sees everything intelligibly adjusted to its needs. If it is hungry, there is food for it in the great mysterious cupboards; and when it is tired, it knows that there is a room above, where a pillow of rest awaits it, to be reached by a narrow stair. We (of to-day) are like such a child who having taken its cottage for the world, suddenly opens the door, and finds itself on a (stormy) night confronted by all the stars and by all the thunderings of the sea. Will these reproduce for us the order found indoors? Will these realities of the Universe provide us with a new home,

¹ *What is Christianity?* pp. 161, 163.

² Mallock, *The Veil of the Temple*, p. 214.

which, compared with the cottage of (medieval) Christian miracles, will be a palace? Or will they leave us roofless, with no home at all? That's our question, in general terms, isn't it?

It is also the question which has been put in particular terms in the preceding pages. We shall see in a future paper what answer Catholic scholars have given it under the guidance of Leo XIII and of Pius X.

JOHN O'NEILL.

SUBJECT AND OBJECT IN KNOWLEDGE AND CONSCIOUSNESS—I

Jam, ut a philosopho exordiamur, philosophiae religiosae fundamen-tum in doctrina illa modernistae ponunt, quam vulgo *agnosticismum* vocant. Vi hujus humana ratio phaenomenis omni-ino includitur, rebus videlicit quae apparent eaque specie qua apparent; earumdem praeter-gredi terminos nec jus nec potestatem habet.¹

‘KNOWLEDGE’ is one of those terms which the philosopher never ventures to define. He takes for granted, and rightly, that there is nothing nearer or more familiar to us than the act or process or state which the word denotes. To define it would be superfluous, even if it were possible to get any clearer or simpler term than itself by which to define it. ‘Knowledge’ is most intimately present, in some phase or form, to every conscious being in all his conscious states. It is implied even in those states of consciousness which are mainly appetitive or emotional, for in them, too, the conscious being is aware of something and that *awareness* is ‘knowledge.’ In fact ‘consciousness’ itself is a less simple term than ‘knowledge.’

The former term is usually understood to denote either *reflex* (or *self*-) consciousness—which is simply that special kind of knowledge we have when we reflect on our own mental operations, and make these the object of our thought,²—or *direct* consciousness, which, as we shall see presently, is either identical with knowledge simply or is an inseparable characteristic of knowledge.

The mental phenomenon, then, to which the words ‘knowledge,’ ‘knowing,’ ‘cognition,’ ‘cognitive,’ all refer,

¹ Encyclical *Pascendi*, on Modernist Errors.

² The term ‘thought’ has the same wide and simple meaning as ‘knowledge,’ unless when it is used in the narrower sense of ‘intellectual knowledge’ as opposed to ‘sense perception.’

is perfectly familiar to us all ; there can be no mistaking their reference. But to say that this whole phenomenon is so familiar to us as not to gain anything—except, perhaps, obscurity—from an attempt at definition, is not at all to imply that we know all about it, or that it will not admit of analysis. In fact, the very contrary is nearer to the truth. It may seem a paradox, but it is none the less a fact, that we know but little about this same mental act of knowing. If proof of this were needed we might merely point to the many errors in current philosophical and religious speculation, which have their origin in defective, inaccurate, one-sided theories about the nature, scope and meaning of the very familiar mental activity which we call 'knowledge'¹—among them the *Agnosticism* and *Phenomenism* referred to in the passage quoted from the Papal Encyclical *Pascendi*, at the head of this article. A brief examination of the most salient characteristics in the process of cognition will help us to understand and appreciate the significance of such unsafe and erroneous views.

II

1. And it may be well to call attention first of all to the fact that philosophies usually recognize in some form or other the distinction between two great orders or grades of knowledge : sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge. With some minor differences as to where exactly the line of demarcation is to be drawn between them, philosophers are also pretty well agreed in referring to the former, or sense group, the perceptions of the external senses, the functions of the imagination and the associations of concrete sense images involved in memory as manifested in the brute creation ; while they refer to the second, or intellect, group such functions as abstraction and generalization or the formation of abstract and universal ideas,

¹ The word 'knowledge' is used in these pages to denote, not the mental product or result, but the act, of knowing,—as synonymous with the act of 'cognition'—however imperfect or rudimentary this may be, as in our earliest sense impressions.

the perception of relations, judgment, inference or reasoning. In the main the distinction is a sufficiently broad one, and easy to apprehend. Perhaps it could not be better conveyed than by observing that in all forms of sense knowledge the known object reveals itself to consciousness as something which is concrete, individual, spatial and temporal ; while for the intellect the object is ever abstract, universal, spaceless and timeless. For my present purpose at all events these tests will suffice for recognizing the distinction. I intend to deal in this article mainly with sense knowledge.

III

Beginning, then, with external sense perception as the simplest form of knowledge, I ask myself the question whether it involves or reveals in consciousness¹ a *duality*—a distinction between sentient *subject* and felt *object*?

A simple appeal of the individual—in mature life—to the testimony of his own consciousness will not enable him to answer the question off-hand. For, in the ‘complex consciousness of an educated white man,’ as someone has called it, we may very easily, in fact almost inevitably, mix up what is mere (and often erroneous) inference with what is really *given* to us in any present act of sense perception. We therefore need to be cautious. Of course in mature life, reflex consciousness, aided by experience and memory, enables us somehow or other to set over the ‘self’ or knowing subject very clearly against the ‘non-self’ or ‘other,’ as known object. But all this is extraneous to the question ; and we must try to disentangle sense perception pure and simple from these superadded functions of intellect. That even in mature life the cognitive energy is sometimes so completely engrossed in the ‘object’ as to leave the sentient subject oblivious or un-

¹ It is one thing for an act of sense perception (or of knowledge generally) to *reveal* in consciousness the duality in question, another thing for it to *involve* such duality. The latter may conceivably be proved even though the former be incapable of verification. The former chiefly will be dealt with in these pages.

aware of himself—is clearly manifest from what happens in our perception of unusually exciting external events, such, for instance, as the finish of some well contested race in which the spectator may happen to have a supreme interest.

But, taking any normal act of simple external sense perception—a man looking at a house, for example—how far does the direct consciousness involved in such an act make him actually aware of 'himself seeing' as well as of the 'house seen'? Students of psychology will remember the question so often discussed since the days of Aristotle: Whether an external sense faculty, such as that of vision, can of itself suffice to make the sentient subject aware of its own act, aware that it is seeing, or whether for this an additional internal sense faculty (called the *sensus communis*) is required, whose special function would be to make the sentient subject aware of the operation of each external sense, such as that of vision, whenever the latter acts? The difficulty underlying the dispute was of course this: that a sense faculty, being organic, and functioning as it does only in and through the extended matter of the sense organ, is *incapable of reflecting* on its own act (e.g., of seeing), and consequently incapable of making the sentient subject aware that he is actually seeing; but (so some psychologists argued) a man seeing a house must be conscious that he sees it; and hence even to become directly conscious of the object of an external sense (the house, for example) an internal sense, distinct from the external, is needed.

We refer to this dispute not so much for its own sake as on account of the light it will help to throw on what is called *direct* sense consciousness and on the question of our awareness of a distinction between *subject* and *object* in every act of knowledge.

The argument just given, first asserts a principle—that no cognitive energy exercised in and through an extended, material, sense organ, can *reflect* or be therefore *self-conscious*—a principle which involves a great many assumptions that can be merely touched upon here.

If *self*-consciousness involves a complete *reflexion* or bending back of the cognitive energy on itself—a making the *subject* the object of the cognitive activity—and if it is difficult to conceive how any, even the simplest, most immaterial energy can thus double back, so to speak, on itself, it is certainly far more difficult to believe that any energy of *extended matter* can so reflect on itself and become *self*-conscious. We are familiar with the conception of one material thing acting on another, of material energy being *transiens* not *immanens*, but that a material agent could act on itself, that in the exercise of any material energy there could be a complete identification of *agens* and *patiens*, all that we know about matter forbids us to believe.

Now, assuming for the moment (as the argument does) that matter and its energies are realities independent of consciousness, there is a certain amount of justification for conceiving *cognitive* energy of the *sense* order after the analogy of other material energies whether organic or inorganic—for cognitive sense energy, too, is in some way *material*, being intrinsically dependent on the material, extended sense organ in and through which it is exercised. But it would be a mistake to forget that our *immediate* acquaintance with the exercise of cognitive energy (whether sentient or rational) in our own conscious acts of knowledge is at least just as direct and intimate as is our acquaintance with the non-cognitive activities of the bodies of the material universe; or to allow the information we may obtain by careful introspection to be overshadowed or discounted by mere *analogical inferences* from the nature of non-mental, to that of mental, activity. I do not mean to say that we are not justified in arguing that because the world which sense knowledge reveals as its object is a material, extended world, therefore the proximate active principle whence that knowledge springs must be material and organic; or in arguing from the analogy of material energies that because that principle is organic, therefore it probably cannot *reflect* or be *self*-conscious; but I do think that, in determining whether or how the knowing

subject becomes conscious or self-conscious in the act of knowing, we must depend almost entirely on introspection and be on our guard against pressing analogies drawn from material activities too far.¹

IV

If now, in the next place, we refer back to the argument about our conscious act of seeing the house, and note the assertion made in the minor premise—that ‘a man seeing a house must be conscious that he sees it’—this latter statement will be easily admitted to be ambiguous. If it merely means that he must be aware of the house as known object, then it is the special duty and function of the sense of vision to make him so aware, and there is no warrant for the conclusion that any further faculty is needed for such direct sense perception. But if it means—as from the context we may be sure it does—that in order to directly perceive the house by the sense of vision he must not only (1) become aware of the house as seen object, but also (2) become aware of the *actual functioning* or *working* of the organic, visual faculty, then it is open for us to deny that the direct perception of the house necessarily involves the second factor (2), maintaining that a sentient being can know or perceive an object directly without any *consciousness* proper, that is, without any awareness of anything else *besides* and *concomitantly with* its direct awareness of the perceived object (*conscire*:

¹ Some suggestive thoughts on this subject will be found quoted by Father Maher, S.J., in his *Psychology* (4th ed., pp. 245-7), from the German philosopher, Lotze. Defending the supra-sensuous character of the mental process of comparison or judgment, the latter writes: ‘It is quite true that to those who start from the circle of ideas common in physical mechanics, there must be something strange in the conception of an activity, or (it is the same thing) of an active being, which not only experiences two states, *a* and *b*, at the same time without fusing them into a resultant, but which passes from one to the other and acquires the idea of a third state, *c*, produced by this very transition. Still this process is a fact; and the reproach of failure in the attempt to imagine how it arises after the analogies of physical mechanics, falls only upon the mistaken desire of construing the perfectly unique sphere of mental life after a pattern foreign to it. That desire I hold to be the most mischievous which threatens the progress of psychology.’

to know something *together with* or *simultaneously with* something else).

No doubt, in the normal and mature external perception of sentient beings, animals and men alike, there is that awareness of the internal, subjective, sentient organism itself, over against, and distinct from, the perceived external object. But that this subjective awareness is *essential* to the direct perception of the external object merely, or even that as a matter of fact it always accompanies the latter, we have abundant grounds for denying. A careful study of the growth and development of sense perception in children and animals from birth onwards through the earlier stages of life, has shown pretty conclusively that sense perception begins as a confused awareness of a vague, voluminous *continuum*, revealing no distinction between extra-organic objects and the organic self or subject.¹ And when, later, this distinction does begin to reveal itself, when the child begins to grow aware of its own organic, active, perceptive, feeling, living self, as distinct from an 'other' or external world, there is no reason to doubt that it reaches this direct knowledge of its own organism *partly* by means of those intra-organic senses the nerves of which pervade and permeate the whole organism, and which give rise to that mass of feelings included under the titles of 'Common Sensibility,' 'Vital Sense,' 'Organic Sense,' 'Systemic Sense,'—feelings of hunger, thirst, circulation, respiration, good or ill condition of health, and so on,—and *partly* by the muscular sense which makes the child aware of the *functioning* of its members and organs *including that of its external sense organs.*²

V

If, then—to refer once more to the argument given above—when the man perceives the house he has *de facto*

¹ Cf. Maher, *op. cit.*, pp. 106, 107, 130, 151.

² How the combined senses of touch and sight enable the child gradually to set the external world of material objects over in opposition to its own extended organism, we need not here examine in detail, as we are concerned just now with the knowledge or awareness of the *Ego* in sense perception. For a discussion of the process referred to see Maher, *op. cit.*, chap. vii.

a sentient awareness of his own vital act of seeing, and therein also of himself the vital, sentient subject, concomitantly with his awareness of the house, he owes that former awareness to the working of the systemic and muscular senses which have for their special function to reveal the organic states and activities of the sentient subject.

Were we indeed to hold (*a*) that a sense faculty can never make us aware of its own direct object unless we are made simultaneously aware of the working or functioning of that faculty itself, and (*b*) furthermore that this latter awareness can never be given us *by* that faculty itself (since it cannot *reflect*), but demands the aid of a second (internal) sense faculty to do so—then indeed we should be hopelessly involved in the impossible supposition of an infinite series of such faculties in order ever to become aware of anything: a difficulty which annoyed Aristotle and some of the scholastics.¹ This difficulty is usually met by admitting that in normal external sensation we are at all events *de facto* aware of *subject* as well as of *object*, and by denying that this awareness involves the use of another faculty; because, although 'No sense can have a reflex knowledge of its own states . . . this does not prevent a sense from having concomitantly with the apprehension of something affecting it an implicit consciousness of its own modifications.'²

But it would also be possible to meet the difficulty by maintaining, as against the first assumption (*a*), that we can be sensibly aware of an external object without being simultaneously aware of ourselves in the act of perceiving it and that if we are so aware of our act it is by means of the muscular and systemic senses. These latter make us aware of our existing, living, acting selves, *as their proper object*,—not implicitly and concomitantly as their subject.

This latter answer accounts, I think, satisfactorily for the data of *sense* consciousness as it is called—the sense knowledge of self—without the assumption involved in

¹ For the whole dispute in question, cf. Maher, *op. cit.*, p. 93; Mercier, *Psychologie* (6th ed.), vol. i., pp. 236-248.

² Maher, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

the other answer: that a sense faculty apprehending something affecting it can be implicitly and concomitantly conscious of its own modifications. It is not self-evident that such an implicit, concomitant sense consciousness is either (1) a fact, or (2) a possibility.

VI

That it is not the way in which *de facto* sentient beings first come to an awareness of *themselves*, there are abundant grounds for believing. In the sensory *continuum* of child-consciousness, in which—to use the picturesque language of a modern psychologist¹—the ‘baby assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin and entrails at once, feels it all as one great blooming, buzzing confusion,’ this whole chaotic feeling makes the child directly aware, without distinction or duality, of what it afterwards gradually realizes (through repeated experience and association of impressions of touch, sight, etc.) to have been very much of self mixed with very little of non-self. There was here at first a direct awareness of a vague, chaotic, objective totality, then a gradual discrimination between one part of this directly perceived totality as ‘self,’ and another part as ‘other’ or ‘non-self.’ In no single act throughout the whole complex process of sense development does it seem necessary to assume that there was given—in addition to awareness of the object revealed, be that object a mode or condition of the ‘self’ or of the ‘non-self’—a further concomitant awareness of the sentient agent as *subject* then and there eliciting the act. In the early stages of sentient consciousness everything that falls within the infant’s awareness is, if I may so express it, merely *felt* rather than *perceived*, or is a mere *sensation* rather than a *perception*. That is to say: the sense data appear all *one* with the infant itself and are not distinguished by it as ‘other’ than or ‘distinct from’ itself. They are, therefore, all *subjective* in the beginning, not in the sense of being perceived or known as ‘self’ or ‘subject’ concomitantly

¹ James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i., p. 488.

with the knowledge of anything else as 'non-self' or 'object,'—for the 'self' perceived in those early stages by systemic and other sensations is as truly an 'object' of those early perceptive acts as the external world is of later ones,—but in the sense that the infant does not at first apprehend any portion of the sense data as 'other' than itself. It first becomes aware of 'objects' as 'other' than itself when the senses of touch and sight reach that stage of development at which the child begins to localize objects of touch at the surface of the organism and objects of vision beyond the latter. The *first duality* that *emerges into sense consciousness* I believe to be that of *the known sentient organism itself* in contrast to *the known extra-organic, external world*: a duality between two *extended, material objects* of sense perception.¹

VII

Previously to the time of this conscious discrimination there was of course revealed in consciousness—in fact, from the very commencement, as soon as the senses of passive pressure and active resistance and the sense of vision began to operate—the all-important element of *extension*. But that this vague awareness of *extension*, given from the beginning in the earliest feelings of sight and touch, carried with it the feeling of *otherness*, I confess myself unable to see.

In the simplest percipient act [writes Father Maher²], which directly reveals extension there is given an immediate apprehension of 'otherness' at least in the sense of *extra-mental*. Extension . . . is at all events not an attribute of simple mental modifications. It is opposed to the subjective conscious act . . . There is thus an *ultimate duality* in our consciousness at least in this signification that some of our faculties are capable of apprehending extension, and extension thus apprehended necessarily stands opposed to the unextended mind.

¹ Not that any 'sense' judges either class to be 'other' than the other class, or perceives any *abstract* relation of 'otherness': it merely perceives each class *differently*, registering such different impressions as will give the *intellect* grounds for *judging* or *interpreting* them as *different* from one another, as 'self' and 'not-self,' as partially different (living, sentient, —inert, senseless) yet partially the same (material, extended, etc.).

² *Op. cit.* p. 106.

With this I find it hard to agree. The mental modifications that reveal extension are not 'simple' nor 'unextended.'

In the direct apprehension of extension, there is no 'opposition' or 'duality' revealed in consciousness, for this apprehension has only *one* object—the extended object. There is no doubt an ultimate duality *implied* in it, as in all knowledge, that of *subject* and *object*. This opposition of object to subject is the only 'otherness' involved: *objectivity* rather than *otherness*. Extension is an *object* of which the child becomes aware, just as tastes, smells, and sounds are: and all these it feels in more or less vaguely *different* ways because they awaken *different qualities* of consciousness; but that is all. The *abstract* relation of *otherness* is not an object of sense perception at all, but of intellect interpreting or judging the data of sense. That sensations of sight and touch by revealing *extension* necessarily revealed *otherness* at the same time to the infant consciousness, it is not at all necessary for us to believe under pain of falling into Phenomenal Idealism—the philosophical theory which denies to the extended, material world, revealed in sensation, any reality other than, distinct from, and independent of, the consciousness of the sentient being in which, and to which, that world is revealed. What we must maintain as a necessary alternative to the latter view is this: that sensations of extension,¹ through the senses of touch and sight, are of such a character that they must *always* have carried with them the data for that 'otherness' of which we later on became aware, at the period—too remote to be remembered—when we gradually discriminated between our own organic selves and the rest of the material world. That is to say, we *argue* (against the phenomenal idealist) that there must have been given us from the commencement of our sentient life, in and through the functions of sight and touch, not merely the consciousness of an extension purely subjective and without any data or grounds for our afterwards differentiating it into *one* portion identical

¹And possibly other sensations; some sensations of sound, for example.

with our conscious, organic selves and an 'other' distinct from those selves,—an extension such as the idealist will readily admit—but, more than this, that there must have been given us the consciousness of *such an extension as* we afterwards convince ourselves *must have essentially involved this otherness*, this duality¹ between the conscious, organic self and the external, material universe.

VIII

There are various arguments which it is not my concern just now to urge, in defence of the trustworthiness of external sense perception and of the soundness of the plain man's *realistic* interpretation of its testimony, as against that of the phenomenal idealist; but, so far as I can see at all events, these arguments are in no way dependent on the assumption that the sense perception of extension 'necessarily reveals a duality or opposition between the *simple* subject of consciousness and the *objective* material reality';² and this assumption itself is one which, I fear, is open to very grave objection.

When the 'subject of consciousness' lays down his hand gradually—palm and fingers extended—on a table, for example, where does the *simplicity* come in? The conscious state has for its content a distinctly *extended* 'datum' and it reveals nothing else. The state itself is *one*, a *continuum*, but *simplicity* is something more than *unity* or *continuity*. Running through *all* conscious states of a conscious being there is revealed a *unity of consciousness* in which all are centred and to which all are referred; but when there is question of *sense* consciousness it must be maintained against the ultra-spiritualism of the Cartesian philosophy that the *extended* character of the *object* of sense perception demands that the immediate vital *subject* of the percipient act be of a cognate, i.e., *extended*, *organic* character. It was precisely because Descartes fell

¹ See footnote p. 398 above: duality between self and non-self may be *involved*, even though not *revealed*, in rudimentary sense perception.

² Maher, *op. cit.*, p. 103. (Italics mine.)

into the error of supposing the Mind—the proximate subject of all conscious, even *sentient*, life—to be *simple* or *unextended*, in exaggerated opposition to *extended* Matter, that he could never offer any satisfactory account of sense perception. It is no wonder that 'the majority of non-Catholic philosophers since the time of Descartes assume that the unextended mind cannot have an *immediate* apprehension of extended reality in any form';¹ for that a purely spiritual principle, devoid of all relation to extension and of a different order of being from whatever exists in, and is affected by, space, can directly perceive extended, material reality—is not, perhaps, impossible, yet certainly not easy to believe. If, however, sensation be recognized to be, what it really is, the connecting link between Mind and Matter; if Mind as the proximate subject of the perception of Matter be regarded as most intimately and really united with, and extended in, a material organ; if, that is, the Scholastic be substituted for the Cartesian view of sense perception; then the mystery of the conscious perception of Matter by Mind is considerably lessened though not altogether removed.

But if, as the scholastics rightly teach, the Soul, as *sentient*, acts only in and through the extended organism which it substantially 'informs,' it is, in that capacity, *one* indeed and *continuous* throughout—which suffices to explain the unity of sense consciousness—but cannot be said to be *simple*;² nor can *Mind*, as the principle of

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

² And if the soul, as proximate subject of *sentient* conscious states, partakes of the extension of the material organ and is thus made cognate with, and capable of becoming conscious of, a material, extended object, it would be obviously futile to attempt to base an argument for the *simplicity* of the human soul on the supposed 'simplicity' of all (even *sentient*) conscious life: a mistake into which some eminent scholastics have been betrayed,—no doubt by the unconscious influence of Cartesianism. Cf. Mercier, *Psychologie*, i., pp. 232, 233; ii., p. 260; Maher, *op. cit.*, pp. 466, 467. The latter, arguing against the empirical account (given by Mill, Bain, and others) of the generation of our perception of extension and space from primitive purely subjective, non-spatial sensations, writes thus (p. 105,—italics mine): 'If the mind knew only its own *simple* subjective modifications, our present cognition of material objects would be impossible. No aggregation, composition, or fusion of mental states which *individually do not present any element of extension*, could produce the notion of extension.' This argument is simply unanswerable as compelling the empiricist to admit

sentient life, be accurately described as 'the *unextended conscious subject*, the unity of my psychical existence, viewed apart from my body.'¹ Consciousness reveals to realist and idealist alike² a 'unity of . . . psychical existence,' and this we may all agree to call Mind; but the distinction between Mind as '*conscious subject*' and the '*Extra-Mental World*' or '*all material reality*, including *both* my own body and the extra-organic universe'³—is a distinction at the knowledge of which we arrive only by reasoning. It is, moreover, a distinction which asserts a duality of a highly ambiguous and controversial character. And if it ever does come into consciousness—which is the important point to be examined presently—it must not be confounded with the other duality (between the organic self and the non-self material world) which, as we have seen, does come even into sense consciousness at a comparatively early period.

IX

There is a danger, which is not always successfully avoided, of confounding (a) the last-mentioned consciously revealed duality with (b) the reasoned opposition between a 'simple' or 'non-spatial' and an 'extended' or 'spatial'

that some element of extension was given us from the beginning in some of our sensations (those, namely, of sight and touch). But, since these latter mental states *do* present an element of extension in consciousness, *they at least* cannot be described as 'simple' or as revealing 'a duality or opposition between the *simple* subject of consciousness and the objective material reality'? Perhaps the 'duality or opposition' supposed to be here 'revealed' is none other than the duality of subject and object which is commonly conceived to be implied in *all* knowledge? But, then, this latter is just as really implied in the act by which the intellect understands the highest abstract truths as it is in sense knowledge.—*Vide infra* in text, p. 410.

¹ Maher, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

² It is important to bear in mind that the ultimate conscious data from which realist and idealist alike set out must be assumed to be the same, and are, of course, *de facto* the same, for *all* normal minds. Cf. Rickaby, *First Principles*, p. 269.

³ And likewise 'God and the universe of pure spirits'—to be strictly exhaustive (Maher, *op. cit.*, p. 104)—i.e., all reality except Mind as '*conscious subject*,' which suggests the question: Does the mind become conscious of itself as *subject*, or is the distinction between *subjectum cognoscens* and *objectum cognitum* not merely inferred by reason from cognitive experience generally, but revealed directly in cognition?—*Vide infra*, p. 411.

reality, and also (c) with the opposition, which some philosophers contend to be real, others to be fictitious, between 'subject' and 'object' in any and every act of cognition whatsoever.

Arguing against those philosophers who with Mill and Bain think that in the beginning of sentient life conscious states were mere subjective, non-spatial sensations, Father Maher rightly says :¹ 'we must deny *in toto* that sensations, muscular or any other, viewed in themselves as purely subjective, non-spatial feelings, could ever by any process of addition or transformation be worked up into an apparently extra-mental world.' This proves the empirical view of the genesis and growth of our perception of space—as we experience it in mature life—from originally *non-spatial* feelings (such as those of smell and sound) to be untenable. But this opposition (b) between such non-spatial or simple data and spatial or extended data, in consciousness, is not the same as (a) the opposition revealed in mature sense knowledge between the organic self and the rest of the extended material universe, nor yet with (c) that wider opposition between all mind as subject of knowledge and everything revealed to mind as object of knowledge.

After an idealist had admitted both (a) and (b) as data of consciousness, the realist would still have to prove, as against him (1) that the 'otherness' of the extra-organic universe (as distinct from the *organic Ego*) implied in (a) is real and not merely fictitious; and (2) that the 'otherness' of the sentient organism itself, revealed in the spatial or extended data in (b) (as distinct from the *mental subject* or unitary seat and centre of cognitive life in the organism) is also a real distinction and not merely a mental demarcation between two sections of the conscious or cognitive mind.

X

I must now call attention to the fact that I have been assuming so far that the sentient being becomes conscious

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 115.

of itself only *as object* (revealed through the systemic and muscular senses in no essential respect differently from the way in which the external senses reveal *their* objects). But I have not been unmindful that, whatever about animals, men at all events—who possess cognitive energies of a higher order—can and do become convinced (by what complex processes I do not here inquire) of their permanent existence *as subjects* of thought or cognition ; and I believe that it is owing to the peculiar difficulty of separating the influence of intellect from that of sense in an analysis of our own sense cognition, that we often attribute to the latter what is really due to the former. That in mature life we are cognizant of 'a duality or opposition between the . . . subject of consciousness and the objective material reality,'¹ no one will deny—though the nature and significance of this cognition are very variously and very divergently interpreted ;—but that this duality is revealed in 'an immediate apprehension of extension' I am not so ready to believe. So, too, the assertion that 'otherness at least in the sense of *extra-mental*' is given in 'the simplest percipient act which directly reveals extension,'² must be denied if understood to mean that a consciousness of real otherness, or real duality or distinction, between two *objects* of direct sense cognition, is so given ; for the percipient act under consideration has not two objects but one. But I think that in these and other similar passages in which Father Maher refers to this duality between 'conscious subject' and '*extra-mental* world,'³ he has in mind not a direct knowledge which the conscious subject acquires from regarding itself *as object* by a distinct act (as, for example, of any of the 'organic' or 'systemic' senses), but rather that sort of implicit concomitant awareness of its own modifications, which he supposes a sense faculty to be capable of having whenever it perceives any object affecting it. Two questions have been already raised about this assumption.⁴ To the first—whether *de facto* it is in

¹ Maher, *loc. cit.* (p. 103) *supra* p. 407.

² Cf. *supra*, p. 405.

³ Cf. *supra*, p. 409.

⁴ Cf. *supra*, p. 404.

this way of 'concomitance' that sentient beings actually become aware of their own existence?—I have submitted some reasons in favour of a negative reply.

XI

The second question—whether it is *possible* for a *sentient* being to become thus aware of itself *as subject* while it is becoming aware of (itself or) something else *as object*?—is a particular case, so to speak, of a wider question, hinted at above,¹ about the nature of cognition in general: whether, namely, what we are forced to think of as the 'subject' of a cognitive act, the '*subjectum cognoscens*,' can ever be a *real being, really identical with the object* of that act, the *objectum cognitum*; or whether, on the contrary, this 'subject' is not always a mere *mental fiction*, a necessary fiction if you will, a logical necessity of thought, but still, for aught we know, *a fiction*: a question of the most profound importance in the criticism of Kantian phenomenism and agnosticism; for it is none other than the question of the validity of Kant's distinction between *phenomenon* and *noumenon*, between the *Ego* revealed in our conscious, mental life—the 'phenomenal' *Ego*—and the 'noumental' or 'real' or 'transcendental' *Ego* which gives unity to the manifold elements of consciousness; or, to put it in another way, it is the question of the knowability or unknowability of the *Ego* as a *Real Being*.

Any attempt to answer this larger question would carry us too far afield besides being out of place at the end of an article on sense knowledge. Neither do I feel in a position to give any decided or confident answer to the narrower question. Had we any direct, introspective view of sense life and its functions *apart from intellectual life*, the analysis would be easier. But, unfortunately, into the mental states of the *purely sentient* beings of the animal kingdom we have no direct view; and in our own mental states which *do* fall under direct intuition, sense data and intellectual data

¹ Footnote 3, p. 409.

are so inseparably intermingled that the process of discriminating between these latter must needs be of a delicacy to demand cautious handling.

XII

If the consideration that 'No sense can have a *reflex* knowledge of its own states,' 'does not prevent a sense from having concomitantly with the apprehension of something affecting it an implicit consciousness of its own modifications,'¹ perhaps there are other considerations that do prevent this. At all events it is not without its difficulties. Were a sense faculty capable of such concomitant awareness of itself, this awareness could not be the result of any cognitive energy elicited by that same sense faculty and having for its 'known object' that sense faculty itself; for this would be exactly that *reflexion* of which sense cognition, because organic, is held to be incapable. If, therefore, a sentient being becomes aware, by sense cognition as distinct from any higher form of knowledge, of the activity of any sense faculty of his, he must reach that awareness by some other sense faculty (such as the muscular and systemic senses),—for the simple reason that all sentient cognitive energy is, *ex hypothesi*, exercised only in and through a material, extended organ which cannot reflect. But perhaps it is through a *special* consciousness-producing energy, elicited by *the soul* acting directly and immediately and *independently of any faculty* in the sense organ (which the soul 'informs' and animates), that this 'awareness' is produced? Perhaps; but thus to make the substance of the soul *immediately operative*, is to abandon the Scholastic theory that the soul acts always and only *per potentias*, through faculties; while to ascribe to the soul, in the sense organ, a special faculty of perceiving (without the aid of another and distinct material organ *ad hoc*) the sentient activities of that sense organ, would be simply to abandon the view that a *purely sentient* faculty can become aware of its own functions

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 403.

and to explain this awareness by calling in the aid of a higher, supra-organic, supra-sensible cognitive energy elicited by the soul somehow or other independently of any material organ.

These are some of the difficulties which appear to me to be involved in any attempt to explain how a sentient being, all of whose cognitive energies are assumed to be organic, could possibly become aware of itself as subject in the very act by which any one of its sense faculties would become aware of its own appropriate excitant as object.

XIII

Some of the considerations submitted in these pages may help us to discern more clearly the part played by the higher or intellectual powers of the soul in reflex consciousness ; in generating our belief in the permanent and substantial reality of the human 'self' or 'person' ; in proving, against Phenomenal Idealism, the reality beyond consciousness, and the real distinction or 'otherness' from consciousness, of a material world ; and in satisfying us, notwithstanding the doubts and misgivings and over-estimated difficulties of the Kantian philosophy, that *phenomenon* leads to *noumenon*, that Reality reveals itself in the former as well as in the latter, that the latter really reveals itself to us as well as the former, that it is knowable by the human mind and that the last word of true philosophy in reference to it never has been and never can be Agnosticism.

P. COFFEY.

(To be continued.)

Notes and Queries

THEOLOGY

THE NEW MARRIAGE LEGISLATION: SPONSALIA—CELEBRATION OF MARRIAGE—FORMALITIES OF REGISTRATION

DURING the past months I have received many letters, concerning the new marriage legislation, for publication in the I. E. RECORD; but it would be impossible to publish all of them in the space at my disposal. So my correspondents will, as I hope, permit me to reply to their questions without giving the texts of their letters. Of these letters some refer to sponsalia, others to the celebration of marriage, and others again to the formalities of registration which follow the celebration of marriage.

I

SPONSALIA.—I. What parish priest is the authorized witness of sponsalia? The text of the decree *Ne Temere* says: 'Ea tantum sponsalia habentur valida et canonicos sortiuntur effectus, quae contracta fuerint per scripturam subsignatam a partibus et vel a parocho, aut a loci ordinario, vel saltem a duobus testibus.' Is the parish priest here mentioned the parish priest of the place where the sponsalia are contracted, the parish priest of one of the parties, or any parish priest who happens to be present? I do not think that any parish priest who happens to be present is the official witness of sponsalia, because there seems to be no reason for drawing a distinction between the parish priest and the Ordinary, and the Ordinary of the place is the one mentioned in the decree. For the same reason it seems that the parish priest of the place where the sponsalia are contracted and not the parish priest of one of the contracting parties is to act as official witness. Both these points are confirmed by the analogy of the marriage contract, of which the parish priest

of the place is the authorized witness. Nor does it seem to be necessary to have the permission of the parish priest of one of the parties, because though this is ordinarily required for the celebration of marriage in a strange parish, no such permission is mentioned as necessary in connexion with sponsalia.

2. Have sponsalia contracted without the required formalities any force in conscience? Undoubtedly, as in the past so in the future, accidental obligations may arise from invalid sponsalia. Thus an obligation of charity might arise from unlawful intercourse; or by reason of fraud or any unjust means employed by one of the contracting parties an obligation of justice might arise. Again, the necessity for formalities does not arise in connexion with an unilateral promise of marriage, since the decree *Ne Temere* expressly states that it speaks of the *mutual* promise of marriage. Nor does a mutual promise binding merely in fidelity require these formalities for its validity, since such a promise does not constitute sponsalia. So there is necessity for formalities only in connexion with the mutual promise of marriage which binds in justice, and of an obligation of justice which arises from that promise as such.

It seems to be certain that no obligation of this kind arises from sponsalia contracted without the necessary formalities. In the first place, the end of the law shows the truth of this teaching. The decree says: 'Docuit enim experientia satis quae secum pericula ferant ejusmodi [clandestina] sponsalia: primum quidem incitamenta peccandi causamque cur inexpertae puellae decipientur; postea dissidia ac lites inextricabiles.' These are the evils to be avoided, and everybody can see that if the obligation in conscience remains, even though the canonical effects of sponsalia are removed, the real difficulty of clandestine betrothals remains. In the second place, the reply of the Sacred Congregation of Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs to the Bishops of South America, dated 5th November, 1901, removes all doubt about the matter: '*Affirmative, seu esse invalida etiam in foro interno.*' In

the third place, no serious authority, so far as I know, holds that the obligation in conscience remains.¹ In his tract *Le Mariage et Les Fiançailles*, Dr. Boudinhon held that the obligation in conscience remains, but in his more recent notes in the *Canoniste* he has changed his view, or, at least, has made his words not bear the meaning which they apparently conveyed to his readers. For these reasons it seems certain that at least no obligation in *justice* arises from clandestine sponsalia as such. Nor does even an obligation in fidelity seem to spring from them, because the obligation of fidelity is dependent on the obligation of justice. As I have already stated, the case would be different if the parties intended from the beginning to undertake merely an obligation of fidelity, because then this obligation would in no way be dependent on an obligation of justice. It is almost needless to add that the law is not retrospective, so that sponsalia contracted without the formalities before next Easter will be valid *in foro externo* and *in foro interno*.

3. What formalities are essential for the validity of betrothals? Only the formalities mentioned in the decree *Ne Temere* are essential. These are that the mutual promise be in writing, that the written document be signed by the contracting parties, and that the witness or witnesses sign the document. The official witness is the Ordinary of the place or the parish priest. Unofficial witnesses may be any persons having the use of reason. If the official witness sign the document his signature is sufficient; if there be only unofficial witnesses two at least are required. In the case of those contracting parties who are unable to write an additional witness is necessary, both in the case when the official witness and in the case when only unofficial witnesses sign the document; and the fact of inability to write must be mentioned.

Hence it is not necessary to mention in the document anything about the conditions required for a valid contract of sponsalia; nor is it necessary to give the dates of sponsalia or marriage. The betrothals can be

¹ Cf. Card. Gennari, *Breve Commento*, p. 19.

contracted *inter absentes*, and the witnesses need not be present at the moment when the parties enter the contract or sign the document. If the witnesses are sure of the authenticity of the signatures they can sign their names as bearing testimony to the validity of the signatures. Nevertheless, it is obvious that, for convenience sake, it is well to have the document signed by the contracting parties in the presence of the witnesses ; it is desirable also to have mention made of the dates of sponsalia and future marriage ; the place where the sponsalia are contracted would also be usefully mentioned in the document ; and so too would the addresses of the contracting parties and witnesses. The following form certainly suffices for the contract of betrothals :—

We, the undersigned, promise to contract holy marriage with each other on or before the.....day of.....19....

In testimony whereof we affix our signatures on this the..... day of.....19....., in the Parish of..... in the Diocese of.....

Name.....

Address.....

Name.....

Address.....

Witnessed
by

{ Name.....
Address.....
Name.....
Address.....

CELEBRATION OF MARRIAGE.—I. Are administrators and curates valid witnesses of marriages ? Administrators, in the strict sense, being delegated *ad universam curam animarum*, can validly assist at marriages within their own territories, since delegation *ad universam curam animarum* implies, according to numerous decisions of the Roman Congregations, the faculty of doing the work of a parish priest in matrimonial affairs. The decree *Ne Temere* makes the same teaching clear and certain : ‘ Nomine parochi . . . venit . . . qui legitime *praeest* parochiae canonice erectae.’

Not merely the parish priest in the strict canonical sense but also the administrator who is delegated *ad universam curam animarum* legitimately presides over a parish. Moreover, according to the decree, Rectors in places like England where there are no canonically erected parishes are parish priests in the sense of the decree *Ne Temere*, yet these are merely delegated *ad universam curam animarum* in their districts. Curates, however, do not come under the designation of parish priests as defined by the decree, since they do not preside over the parish. They can be, and in this country frequently are, delegated *ad universitatem causarum matrimonialium*, and then they can validly assist at marriages within their territories, though they must exercise their power in subjection to the parish priest so far as lawfulness is concerned.

2. Can administrators give general delegation to assist at marriages? They certainly can give delegation in particular cases, but it is controverted whether or not they can give general delegation. Gasparri, whose opinion is undoubtedly safe in practice, says that any priest who is delegated *ad universam curam animarum* can give general delegation: 'Delegatus ad universam animarum curam certe protest subdelegare ad assistendum vel uni tantum matrimonio, vel matrimonii in genere; nam est parochus in sensu decreti Tridentini.'¹ The opinion of Gasparri is confirmed by a decision of the Sacred Congregation of the Council, dated 12th September, 1874: 'An oeconomus curatus, vacante parochia, ab Episcopo constitutus in vim dispositionis Conc. Trid., Sess. xxiv., c. xviii., possit alium sacerdotem delegare ad omnia officia, vel ad aliquos tantum actus? Affirmative ad primam partem, nisi obstet voluntas Ordinarii.' Until, then, a decision appears to the contrary, an administrator can give general delegation to assist at marriages, unless the Ordinary has taken away this power from him.

What has been said of administrators does not hold of curates who may be generally delegated to assist at marriages. The teaching is sufficiently safe in practice

¹ *De Matrimonio*, ii., n. 945.

that these, being delegated *ad universitatem causarum*, though not *ad universam curam animarum*, can give subdelegation in particular cases; but there is no authority for holding that they can give general subdelegation. The Ordinary can, of course, grant them this power, but until he does so they can give only particular subdelegation.

3. Can a parish priest given general delegation to assist at marriages 'to several priests, e.g., to all his curates and to some members of a religious community in his parish'? This question was suggested by the text of the decree *Ne Temere*: 'Parochus et loci Ordinarius licentiam concedere possunt alio sacerdoti determinato et certo, ut matrimonii intra limites sui territorii adsistat.' It will be noted that the phrase 'determinato et certo' refers not to marriages but to the delegated priest, and excludes delegations such as were formerly given when a parish priest told the contracting parties to select any priest in the world whom they pleased. It does not exclude particular or general delegation to priests who are determined either personally or by their position. Thus it does not prevent parish priests from giving general delegation 'to all his curates'; nor does it prevent him from giving general delegation 'to all priests living in a religious community'; nor does it exclude general delegation 'to some members of a religious community,' if there are means at hand to distinguish those who receive the power from those who do not. Again, it does not invalidate delegation given to 'x, and, in his absence, to y,' because the priests are determined and certain in this case. Neither does it apparently exclude delegation given 'to any one of the curates attached to Cathedral x,' the individual to be selected by the contracting parties, because in this case there is question of selection between well determined priests.¹

4. Is *active* assistance of the parish priest or his delegate necessary for the validity of the marriage? In the past mere passive assistance at the marriage was quite sufficient for validity, but the decree *Ne Temere* has substantially

¹ Cf. Card. Gennari, *Breve Commento*, p. 29; Boudinhon, *Le Mariage et les Fiançailles*, p. 79; *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, March, p. 144.

modified the old law on this point. In future active assistance will be absolutely necessary for validity. This is sufficiently clear from the wording of the decree: 'Dummodo invitati ac rogati, et neque vi neque metu gravi constricti *requirant excipiantque contrahentium consensum.*' A priest who follows the Ritual fulfils the conditions required by this clause.

5. Has any change been made by the decree *Ne Temere* in the manner of assistance at a marriage so far as the unofficial witnesses are concerned? No change of any kind has been made in regard to the assistance of these witnesses. In whatsoever way they validly assisted at marriages in the past, they will validly assist in the future.

6. When the decree *Ne Temere* speaks of the Ordinary of the place in connexion with lawful assistance at marriage, what is meant by place? Is it the parish or the diocese? This question arises out of the anomaly of having up to the present only parochial as distinct from diocesan domicile and quasi-domicile. In many quarters, this state of affairs was felt to be most inconvenient, especially in connexion with the *proprius episcopus* of an ordinand; and most likely in the codification of Canon Law which is at present under consideration this matter will find a satisfactory settlement. Has the decree *Ne Temere* already introduced a change in connexion with the marriage laws, so that, for instance, residence of a month in a diocese, though not in any one parish, will be sufficient to make a person subject to the Ordinary of the place so far as lawful assistance at marriage is concerned? Arguing from the phrase 'in loco matrimonii,' Cardinal Gennari concludes that this change has been introduced. 'Locus' mentioned in connexion with the Ordinary in canonical phraseology means 'diocese,' a fact which gives probability to the view of the eminent Cardinal. Father Ferreres and many other commentators hold the view that 'place' still means what it has hitherto meant in matrimonial affairs, viz., 'parish.' Till a definite decision is given we are safe in following the opinion of Gennari who had a great deal to do with the drawing up of the new legislation.

7. When is residence lost so that a person who, by reason of a month's residence in a place, became the subject of the parish priest or the Ordinary ceases to retain that state of subjection? Formerly two elements were necessary to acquire a quasi-domicile in a place, the intention of residing there for a certain length of time and actual residence; and the quasi-domicile remained till both elements were lost. Even though the intention of residing in the place for the stipulated period were withdrawn, the continuance of actual residence in the place would suffice to retain the quasi-domicile. Theologians held that the actual residence continued until the person left the parish—not the house—for the last time. Hence they maintained that a servant lost his or her quasi-domicile, not at the moment when he or she left the master's home, but at the moment when departure from the parish took place. There seems no reason for saying that the same rule does not hold in the new legislation; so that actual residence is lost, not by leaving the home for the last time, but by departing for the last time from the parish. There will in the future be difficulties in connexion with change of residence as there have been in the past, but these difficulties will affect not the validity but the lawfulness of the celebration of marriage. Seeing that in case of necessity a parish priest can in the future assist in his own parish validly and lawfully at the marriage of another's subject, it seems only reasonable to say that so long as there is reasonable doubt as to whether a person has relinquished a domicile or quasi-domicile, the parish priest of that domicile or quasi-domicile can lawfully assist at the marriage.

III

FORMALITIES OF REGISTRATION.—I. Are the names of both parties to be entered in the Baptismal Register? The names of both parties are not of necessity to be entered in the *same* registration in the Baptismal Register. The decree *Ne Temere* speaks in an entirely different way of the registration in the Marriage Register and of the

registration in the Baptismal Register. Of the former it says: 'Celebrato matrimonio, parochus, vel qui ejus vices gerit, statim describat in libro matrimoniorum nomina conjugum ac testium, locum et diem celebrati matrimonii ;' whilst of the latter it says: 'Praeterea parochus in libro quoque baptizatorum adnotet, conjugem in sua parochia matrimonium contraxisse.' Hence it is not necessary to mention the names of both contracting parties in the same registration in the book of Baptisms ; the marriage of each of the parties must, however, be noted in its proper place in connexion with his or her own baptism. At the same time it would evidently be desirable to make a full entry of the marriage—of both contracting parties, of the date of marriage, and of the place of marriage—in each registration. This method would prove beneficial, by making investigation into the state of freedom of people more easy, and by giving at least three full marriage registrations, one in the Marriage Register, one in the Baptismal Register for the husband, and one in the Baptismal Register for the wife. If both contracting parties were baptized in the parish in which they are married, one full registration of the marriage in the Baptismal Register seems enough until properly arranged registers come into use, reference being given to the date of birth of both parties.

2. Must the parish priest register the marriage not only in the Marriage Register, but also in the Baptismal Register, if the parties were not baptized in his parish ? It is clear from the decree that the Baptismal Register referred to is the Baptismal Register of the parish in which the parties were baptized. The decree expressly provides for registration in the two distinct cases: when the parties were baptized in the parish in which they are married, and when they were baptized in a different parish. Moreover, the end of the law is to provide registration of marriage in connexion with registration of baptism, so that a parish priest can easily find out the state of those who were baptized in his parish.

3. When the person to be married brings a letter of

freedom from the parish priest in whose parish he was baptized, is the parish priest in whose parish the marriage takes place still bound to send notice of the marriage to the former parish priest? He is still bound, because the decree speaks absolutely of the obligation of sending notice of the marriage to the parish priest in whose parish the parties were baptized. There being many a slip between the cup and the lip, the reason for this provision of the law is evident.

4. When the decree states that registration must be made 'immediately,' what is meant by 'immediately'? The decree gives no definition of 'immediately.' This is a detail which the decree leaves to the prudent judgment of the Ordinary. The custom of registering the marriage before the parties leave the sacristy is worthy of commendation.

5. If people choose to get married outside their own parish, must their own parish priest register the marriage in his parochial Marriage Register? There is no mention of such registration in the decree *Ne Temere*. Only in connexion with registration in the book of Baptisms does the decree speak of any registration outside the place of marriage. It is indeed stated that the place of marriage must be mentioned in the Marriage Register, but that does not prove that marriages contracted *outside* the parish must be registered in the parochial register; the fact that the article of the decree speaks of the obligation being incumbent on the parish priest even when his delegate assists at the marriage shows that the registration intended is that which must be made by the parish priest of the marriage. At the same time it would obviously be useful to have a registration of marriage in the Marriage Register of the parish to which the parties belong, at least when the parties were baptized elsewhere.

6. If marriage takes place in a church which belongs to a religious community, and which is not a parochial church, who is responsible for the registrations? The parish priest of the place, or his vicegerent, is responsible. He must register the marriage in the parochial registers. He can get the necessary information from the priest who

assists at the marriage in his name, or from an authenticated register kept in the church in question. Of course if he himself were to assist at the marriage there would be no difficulty about this information.

7. Who is meant by the phrase 'qui ejus [parochi] vices gerit'? Is it the delegate who assists at the marriage, or is it the administrator who takes the place of a parish priest? It is the administrator, or rather the priest whom the parish priest leaves in charge of matrimonial affairs during his own absence or infirmity. In the text a distinction is made between the parish priest and his vicegerent on the one hand, and on the other the delegate who assists at the marriage. Hence the person responsible for the registrations is the parish priest or, in his absence, the priest who is in charge of the matrimonial affairs of the parish. Though retaining responsibility, he can appoint a delegate to make the entry in the register.

8. How is notice of marriage to be transmitted to the parish priest of the parish in which the baptism of the contracting parties took place? It can be sent directly to the parish priest, or it can be sent through the episcopal curia. Since the decree does not specify the curia, the parish priest of the marriage can select the episcopal curia either of the place of marriage or of the place of baptism.

J. M. HARTY.

CANON LAW

MODIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONS OF RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS MADE BY DIOCESAN SUPERIORS

REV. DEAR SIR.—In my parish there is a convent of nuns belonging to a religious Congregation. The diocesan superior has come to the decision of modifying some of their constitutions, which seem a little antiquated, in order to bring them into line with the requirements of the present age, and to make the work of the nuns more useful to the people of this district. Can he do so on his own authority?

N. A.

Whether a diocesan superior has the power of altering the constitutions of a religious Congregation, say, by abolishing

some of them and enacting new ones, thus imposing on the members of the community different and sometimes additional obligations, depends entirely on the kind of Congregation whose constitutions demand amendment as well as on the quality and quantity of the innovations to be introduced. If there be question of a religious Congregation already approved by the Holy See and of constitutions which have obtained Papal approbation, it is clear that a diocesan superior cannot interfere with that religious Congregation generally, and with its constitution in particular. If he wants to make alterations in the rules and government of such a community it is indispensable for him to have recourse to the Holy See and obtain the necessary power of doing it; which is usually conceded under the condition that the religious community has to be consulted, and must agree to the modifications to be introduced in the renewed constitutions. The reason is quite evident. When the Pope approves of a Congregation and its constitutions, exercises the *affectio manuum*, as they call it, he thereby reserves to himself all powers over it, and makes, at the same time, that institution non-diocesan in the canonical sense of the word. On the other hand it is reasonable that the new obligations of the amended constitutions should be willingly undertaken by those who will afterwards be bound to observe them.¹

If, on the contrary, the Congregation whose constitutions have to undergo modifications, is a purely diocesan one, that is, a Congregation which never received formal approval from the Holy See, a diocesan superior may introduce some changes in its constitutions, slight or otherwise, according to different circumstances; but he has to bear in mind that in order to exercise such a jurisdiction a reasonable and urgent cause is required, and moreover, that he is empowered to do so only in case that all the houses belonging to the same Congregation are established within the limits of his diocese, for in case that some

¹ The *Const. Conditae*, p. 2, n. 2, says: 'Immutandi constitutiones utpote quae probatae a S. Apostolica nemini Episcoporum ius datur.'

branches of the same diocesan Congregation are founded in different dioceses, one special diocesan superior is not allowed to modify the constitutions of the whole Congregation without the permission of the Bishops in whose dioceses the houses of the same institution are established, nor can he change them even for the community or communities existing in his own diocese; because he would, in the first instance, encroach on the jurisdiction of the other diocesan superiors, and would cause, in the latter case, the great inconvenience of introducing diversity of discipline into the various religious communities belonging to the same Congregation.

Here it might be asked: In order to make innovations in the constitutions of a diocesan religious Congregation is the consent of the members of the community necessarily required? A distinction is to be made. If the modifications in question are of minor importance, and do not substantially change the nature and scope of the Congregation; or if by those alterations in the constitutions some new dispositions are introduced which are in reality a development of the existing rules, imposing, for instance, additional work and obligations which are deemed necessary for the execution and exact fulfilment of the constitutions already in existence, a diocesan superior may—*volentes nolentes* the members of the Congregation—modify their constitutions; in the contrary case the consent of the community is necessarily wanted. The reason is quite plain. Members of a religious Congregation when taking their vows, expressly pledge themselves only to the observance of the constitutions in existence—constitutions which they experienced during the period of their novitiate—and implicitly promise also to carry out any additional new rules calculated to be necessary for the thorough execution of the obligations already assumed; hence they can be compelled to observe them, but they are not bound, nor can they be compelled to observe obligations which they never, either implicitly or explicitly, undertook in professing their religious state. No doubt they are bound, in virtue of their vow of obedience, to obey the commands

of their lawful superiors, but this obedience is always understood to be—*secundum regulam*—and not beyond or against it.¹ Hence, writes Vermeersch, if in effecting those substantial changes the authority of the diocesan superior is necessary (according to the *Const. Conditae*, p. 1, n. 5), it is not stated that it is sufficient, for the *ius acquisitum* of the members of the community must be safeguarded and their consent therefore is to be asked for and obtained.² In case that a reform of the constitutions of a religious Congregation is imperative, and its members decline to accept them, a way out of the difficulty may be to dissolve the existing Congregation and reconstitute it on new lines; but it must be remembered that, according to the present discipline of the Church, in order to establish a religious Congregation, even a purely diocesan one, the permission of the Holy See is indispensable.³

BLESSING OF POLLUTED CHURCHES AND CONSECRATION OF CHURCHES BURDENED WITH DEBTS

REV. DEAR SIR,—Allow me to ask you the following two questions:—

1. A church which was only blessed has been profaned and it requires a new blessing. Can a priest bless it without the Bishop's delegation? The Roman Ritual (tit. viii. c. 18) expressly states that the Ordinary's delegation is necessary; while Bened. XIV. (*De Syn.*, lib. 13, c. 15, n. 2) says the contrary.

2. We have built a church here and now we wish to have it soon consecrated; but, unfortunately, we have not succeeded yet in paying the debts incurred for its erection. Can the church be consecrated under these circumstances?

DUBIUS.

I. It has been a matter of controversy whether the Bishop's delegation is necessary for a priest to *reconcile*

¹ St. Bernard says: 'Is qui profitetur spondet quidem obedientiam non tamen omnimodam sed determinatam secundum regulam. Solum quippe id posse a me exigi arbitror quod promisi.'—*Epis. ad Dec.*, i.

² Cf. Vermeersch, *De Inst. Relig.*, i., p. 61, n. 98; ii., p. 155, n. 102. Also Battandier, *Le Congr. Relig.*, p. 2-4, sq.; Nardelli, *Le Congr. Relig.*, n. 54; Bastien, *Com. in Const. Conditae*, p. 43.

³ S.C.E.E.R.R. in Montis-Pessul., *Missioner*, etc.; Act. Conc. Am. Latinae, *Motu Proprio*, PP. X, 16 Julii, 1906.

a church—as they express it—which was only blessed and afterwards polluted; and the more common opinion was against the necessity of such a delegation. This opinion was grounded on the fact that blessing of churches is a mere sacerdotal function, and not reserved to the higher authority, and that, consequently, it can be performed by a simple priest without any special permission of the superior. Moreover, the decree of the Congregation of Rites of 1626, which lays down all the necessary and detailed instructions for that blessing, does not make any mention of the delegation in question; on the contrary, the chapter 'Si Ecclesia,' *X. De Consecr. Eccl.*, which deals also with this matter, seems to suggest the opposite doctrine when stating that a profaned church ought to be blessed as soon as possible to prevent ecclesiastical functions from being suspended or interrupted. 'Acqua protinus exorcizata lavetur (Ecclesia) ne divinæ laudis organa suspendantur,' that is, says Pihring,¹ under those circumstances it is not of necessity to wait for the Bishop's permission in order to bless the church. And they explain the express injunction of the Roman Ritual as to the necessity of that delegation by saying that such a rubric of the Ritual is only directive and not preceptive;² so that, concludes Quarti: 'Non requiri licentiam Episcopi ex praecepto sed ex decentia.' Besides, external evidence for the support of this view of the question was not wanting, as many and competent authorities such as St. Alphonsus, Benedict XIV, Pihring, Devoti, and others maintained it in their works.

On the other hand, some other Canonists and Rubricists, following the express injunction of the Roman Ritual (tit. viii., c. 18.) 'Ecclesiae violatae reconciliatio per sacerdotem *ab Episcopo delegatum* fiat hoc modo,' etc., insisted on requiring the Bishop's delegation for that

¹ Pihring in tit. 40, lib. iii., *Decretalium*.

² Card. Gennari writes: 'Onde fa d'uopo conchiudere che quella Rubrica del Rituale è solo direttiva, non già precettiva; e però a rigor di diritto si può fare a meno della delegazione del Vescovo trattandosi della riconciliazione di una Chiesa solamente benedetta.'—*Monit. Eccl.*, vol. xv., p. 278.

purpose, there being no conclusive evidence that this rubric of the Ritual is only directive; while a few others, Scavini,¹ for instance, following a middle course between the two opposite opinions, dispense with the aforesaid Bishop's delegation only in case of urgency for the blessing of the polluted church, and in case of difficulty or delay in getting the superior's permission.

All these different opinions naturally created diversity and uncertainty of practice; so that the Bishop of Nola, in order to be sure as to the line of practice to be followed in this matter, asked of the Congregation of Rites whether a priest could bless a profaned church without the Ordinary's delegation, and the answer was in the negative, with the injunction that the prescription of the Ritual must be observed.² Hence, independently of what may be held in theory as to the directive or preceptive nature of the rubric of the Roman Ritual in this connexion, in practice it must be followed and carried out by express order of the Congregation of Rites.

II. As to the second question, to our knowledge there is no special law bearing on the point raised by our correspondent. Gratian devotes an entire Distinction of his Decree to this subject of consecration of churches, and brings out all the various points connected with it, except the one we are at present dealing with, and so does Gregory IX, in the third book of the Decretals. Nor is there an explicit mention and clear solution of the question at issue in any either old or recent canonical work we are acquainted with. However, taking into account some special enactments of the Church indirectly bearing on this question, and looking at the common practice in this respect prevailing all the world over, we are of opinion that it is against the discipline of the Church and at variance with the spirit of ecclesiastical legislation to consecrate a church still burdened with debts.

¹ Scavini, lib. i., tract iii., n. 620; Bargilliat, ii., n. 1281.

² 'Utrum simplex sacerdos possit iure suo Ecclesiam benedictam, ubi violata fuerit, reconciliare sine ulla Ordinarii delegatione?' *Resp.* 'Negative, et servetur Rituale Romanum, tit. viii., c. 18.'—S.R.C., die 8 Iulii, 1904.

It is quite clear, in the first place, that here it is not question as to the validity of the consecration. Once the proper matter and form have been used for that purpose by the competent minister a church is always validly consecrated, and it remains so as long as it is morally speaking the same as it was at the time of its consecration. On the other hand, such a consecration appears to be, under the circumstances, unlawful because according to ecclesiastical discipline a church, once consecrated, cannot be turned into a profane place and diverted from its religious purpose and use, hence it is not allowed to consecrate it as long as there is reasonable fear or probable danger of its being converted into a profane place.¹ Now a church, before being exonerated from its debts, is not entirely free from that danger, especially in places where the law of the land has no provision or regard for the privilege of Church immunity. Moreover, it is certain canonical doctrine that a church cannot be consecrated before securing sufficient financial means for the maintenance of divine worship and the support of the clergy connected with it. 'Cum non sit Ecclesia, nisi de dote ei provisum fuerit, consecranda,'² and it is contended that a church still in debt has not made yet, and cannot make, sufficient provision for that endowment, as it is bound, absolutely speaking, to satisfy first and above all the claims of justice and to devote all sums of money collected or received to the extinction of the debts. This doctrine is in accordance with the Imperial Roman legislation, adopted by the Church. In fact, on the authority of Gonzalez, we know that Leo the Emperor, Nov. 14, obliged those who were responsible for the erection of churches without endowment, or their heirs, to make provision for it, and to make such a provision only after paying the debts out of the assets.³ If, therefore, the endowment necessary for a church cannot be

¹ Cf. Reg. ii. in vi. ; c. 2., lib. iii. in vi.

² Cf. c. 8, tit. 40, lib. iii.

³ 'Si ultra plures reliquerit, in succedentes liberos connumeretur Ecclesia et accipiat deducto aere alieno quantum quisque acceperit.'—Gonzalez in c. 8, tit. 40, lib. iii., Decr., c. *Cum sicut. De Cons.*, tit. 40 ; c. 2 et c. *Cum secundum 16, De Praehendis.*

constituted before the payment of debts, and if, on the other hand, that endowment is of necessity for the consecration of churches, it seems to follow that a church still in debt cannot be lawfully consecrated ; and it makes no difference whether the endowment of a church or, in general, the necessary means for the maintenance of divine worship and the support of the clergy consist of real property or voluntary contributions of the faithful.¹

This is, in fine, the general practice in this respect all the world over ; a practice which is a proof of the common opinion of the unlawfulness of the consecration of churches under those circumstances. Smith, writing of the United States, says : ' *Apud nos Ecclesiae . . . progressu temporis consecrantur quando aere alieno immunes evaserunt.*'²

WHETHER EXTRADIOCESAN PENITENTS CAN BE DISPENSED FROM THE GENERAL LAW OF FASTING

REV. DEAR SIR,—The Bishop of this diocese has empowered confessors with the faculty of dispensing the faithful from the Lenten laws of fasting. Now, the difficulty presents itself, whether in case of persons coming to confession from another diocese, the confessor may validly dispense them from the fast by reason of the above faculty, irrespective of the manner in which dispensation from the fast may be obtained in the other diocese ? I do not speak of cases in which a mere declaration is sufficient. If the confessor cannot validly act, and he is aware that a number of persons come from the neighbouring diocese, does there seem to be any, though awkward, obligation of asking each one who asks for a dispensation from the fast whether he is from this diocese ? Some think that the confessor can act as in the case of episcopal reserved sins, but the cases seems to differ as a particular law differs from a general one

A few words on the matter will be gratefully received.

ANCEPS.

Apart from special powers which Bishops may have in connexion with the matter of dispensing from the fasting law, it is generally admitted that, by virtue of a common

¹ Cf. *Glossa in c. 8, h. t., lib. iii.* ; *Abbas, c. 8, h. t.* ; *Pirhing, ibid., n. 6.*

² *Smith, Comp. Iur. Can., n. 914.*

and well-established practice, and on account of the tacit consent of the Holy See, Ordinaries may dispense, in particular cases, their subjects from the general law of fasting, as well as from other general Church laws of the same nature, such as abstinence, observance of feast days, etc. Again, it is also a common opinion, and to us a certain doctrine, that Bishops may use that power of dispensing from the fast in favour of *peregrini* who, for just motives, may want such a dispensation.¹

This power of Bishops to dispense both their subjects and non-subjects is a quasi-ordinary jurisdiction and attached to their office; consequently, it may be delegated for one or a few instances or for all occurring cases. That being the case, a delegated power of dispensing from the fasting law, and that of absolving from sins reserved by Bishops, stand on the same footing.²

Now, if a Bishop can dispense from the fasting law both his subjects and *peregrini*, and may grant that power to others, his delegate, who receives it without any restriction and in a general way, may likewise exercise it in favour both of the subjects and non-subjects of the delegating superior. For, a delegated power of that kind is of a favourable character, and admits of a wide interpretation; the result being that, unless the superior himself puts limitations to it, it can be extended to and exercised in all cases in which the superior himself can use it. 'Facultas dispensandi,' writes Wernz (i., 125) 'generaliter data . . . cum sit favorabilis et praeter ius concessa, latam admittit interpretationem.'

ASSISTING AT HORSE RACES

REV. DEAR SIR.—In reference to the very able exposition of the Decrees of the late Synod of Maynooth regarding the attendance of clergymen at races in this country might I be

¹ Cf. St. Alph., 158, iii., 262; Bargilliat, i., n. 23; Bouquillon, *Inst. Theol. Moral.*, n. 223; D'Annibale, i., 231, not. 8; Wernz, i., 123, not. 166, etc.

² D'Annibale, after having written of the episcopal power we are dealing with, concludes: 'In his omnibus dispensat (Episcopus) velut Ordinario iure suo. Nam potestas cohaeret officio, ideoque etiam per alios, i. 231, not. 13. (Haec potestas) in universa mandari potest, 72. n. 16.'

permitted to urge a point which seems to have escaped the notice of the writer?

In the former Decrees the clause relating to this matter is: 'A publicis equorum cursibus . . . prorsus abstineant,' while in the Decrees of the recent Synod it is laid down, 'A publicis equorum cursibus *et ab eis quovis loco vicino spectandis* . . . prorsus abstineant.'

Now the interpretation—and the universally recognized interpretation—of the Statute of 1875 was that the priests should not mingle with *the crowds on the race-course*. If they kept a respectable distance from the crowd they were not acting in contravention of the law.

If the clause *a cursibus equorum prorsus abstineant*, forbade only mingling with the crowds, the same interpretation should be put upon it in the new Statutes; and, therefore, when in the new Statutes it is added *a quovis loco eis vicino spectandis*, the obvious meaning is any place adjacent to the crowd. In other words it forbids the clergy to be present on any place that is *vicinus to the crowd*, and not, as your learned correspondent contends, *vicinus to the race-course*. Might I ask for a reply to this question in the April number of the I. E. RECORD?

C. M. J.

Our correspondent's argument is based on the supposition that by the prohibitive law of assisting at races in this country, clergymen are forbidden to see them only in the case that they mingle with the crowds; so that, if ecclesiastics, when assisting at races, keep at a respectable distance from the body of the spectators they do not act in contravention of the law; and he draws the conclusion that the new addition to the existing law, ' *et ab eis quovis loco vicino spectandis*', makes it unlawful to assist at races only from places adjacent to the crowds, but it does not forbid clerics to see horse races from any other locality along the race-course.

We say at once that we cannot accept the interpretation of this law presented by our correspondent, because we do not see our way to admit the correctness of the premises of his argument, nor the validity of his conclusion. In the first place, we cannot consent to accept 'crowds' as the correct translation of the Latin expression *cursus equorum*. The words of the Decree are: 'A publicis equorum cursibus

... prorsus abstineant,' and, if we mistake not, here it is not forbidden to avoid the crowds assisting at races, but, on the contrary, it is forbidden to avoid horse races themselves independently of the crowds; hence that prohibition, so understood, extends to any locality, even along the race-course, from which clergymen, although far from the crowds, may be truly said to assist at races.

It is a first principle of interpretation of laws that their words must be explained just as they stand, and according to their usual and natural meaning, and we have no doubt that our explanation of the Decree renders the obvious and natural meaning of its words. Nor is there any legal inconvenience arising from the plain meaning of the words of the Decree to justify one in putting on them an unusual and contorted sort of interpretation. The prohibition is clear enough and perfectly absolute, and it does not make room or give any indication for the restriction that assisting at races is forbidden to clerics only in case that they mingle with the body of the spectators, and one versed in the interpretation of laws would instantly say: 'Ubi lex non distinguit neque nos distingueremus.'

On the other hand, it is not an argument against our explanation of this Decree that an almost general custom has interpreted it in the manner expounded by our correspondent. We are the last to deny the value of a custom as a law interpreter, because we are aware of the maxim of law, *Consuetudo est optima legis interpres*; but when the legislator himself explicitly repudiates the interpretation of his law made by custom, and corrects it as a mistaken one, then the customary interpretation is of no avail. This is exactly what has happened in our case. The very addition of the expression, *et ab eis*, etc., made to the existing law is a palpable proof that the legislators, being cognizant of the interpretation of their law made by custom, deemed it a mistaken one, and desiring to bring it into conformity with their intention, which constitutes the real meaning of the law, they corrected the customary interpretation by saying that it is not sufficient to avoid

mingling with the crowds in order to observe the prohibitive law of assisting at races, but it is also necessary to abstain from going even to those places which, although far from the crowd, used to be frequented by clerics in order to see races ; as the prohibition regards the witnessing of the sport itself, independently of the fact whether they mingle or not with the body of the spectators.

If that be so, and if we take also into consideration that there are other reasons for this prohibition far more important than that of avoiding to mingle with the crowd, and that the new addition to the existing law would be rather meaningless were it made for the sole purpose of making ecclesiastics change the place where they can go and assist at a sport which the law itself enjoins on them to avoid ; we can hardly believe that clergymen will be justified in going to see horse races if not from the vicinity of the crowds, at least from any other locality adjacent to the race-course.

So far we have given expression to our personal opinion, an opinion which we have always held and will hold until the superiors make a declaration to the contrary ; but, at the same time, we cannot prevent that in the matter of interpretation of a law ' *Unusquisque in suo sensu abundet.*'

S. LUZIO.

LITURGY

DISPOSAL OF CHALICE WHEN CELEBRANT HAS TO 'BINATE'

REV. DEAR SIR,—Will you please supply an answer to the following questions :—

I. Instead of the method quoted in O'Callaghan for disposing of the chalice at the first of two Masses, said by the same priest on the same day in different places, may any one of the following be adopted :—

(a) To carefully exhaust the *reliquiae* of the Sacred Species, and purify the chalice (with water alone, of course) after the distribution of Holy Communion ; then arrange the chalice as on ordinary occasions, and take it to the sacristy after Mass ?

(b) To exhaust the *reliquiae* after the last Gospel, and put the chalice, unpurified, into the tabernacle, whence it is to be taken and used for Mass next morning ?

The inconvenience connected with the purification of the

chalice after the last Gospel is that where there is a congregation the people are kept in suspense, waiting for the prayers said after the priest descends from the altar. A further advantage of this method would be that thus a desirable moment would be afforded the communicants for thanksgiving before attending to the sermon which is now to be given.

II. When should the prayer *Quod ore sumpsimus*, and the prayer *Corpus tuum*, be said at this first of two Masses when—as is usually the case—Communion is given, and what is the order up to the *Post-Communion*.

III. When at a second, or only Mass, Communion is distributed to a number of the faithful, should the priest, on returning to the altar, receive from the chalice, before purifying it, any *reliquiae* of the precious Blood that may have collected during the distribution of Holy Communion?—Faithfully yours.

A. C. C.

The faculty of bination is a singular privilege, and outside the case of the Nativity—which is referred to, as it were, incidentally¹—the case does not seem to be contemplated in the general rubrics of the Roman Missal. No wonder, then, if there is some confusion among Rubricists as to the precise procedure to be followed when a priest says two Masses on the same day either in the same or in different churches. By way of prelude to observations on the query proposed it may be of interest to note that the use of two chalices for two Masses said by the same priest on the same day, no matter where, was expressly forbidden by a Decree of the Congregation of Rites, in the year 1815, which ordered that the chalice used at the first Mass should be carried unpurified to the place where the next Mass was to be said.² This awkward arrangement had its manifest inconveniences and, accordingly, a question was asked in 1857 if the use of two chalices might be permitted and, if so, how was the purification of the first chalice to be performed most reverently. To the first question the Congregation of Rites replied in the affirmative and as a reply to the second an *Instruction* was issued setting forth in detail what was to be done when the

¹ *Vide De Defectibus Missae*, tit. ix., n. 4.

² *Vide* I. E. RECORD, 1894, p. 410.

chalice was to be purified by a *celebrans jejunans*. This *Instruction*, which was amplified in the following year, 1858, is now incorporated as an Appendix to the Roman Ritual, and is declared to be obligatory in the sense, presumably, that where a chalice is to be purified in such circumstances as are mentioned the method prescribed should be adopted. There is nothing said in reprobation of the old method, which may therefore be still followed wherever it is found convenient.¹ There are also in the Roman Ritual, annexed to the foregoing *Instruction*, directions as to what should be done when the same chalice is used for two Masses said in the same place. These directions are based on the authority of eminent Rubricists and their insertion in the Ritual shows that they are, to a certain extent, authoritative and obligatory.

1. Now as to the question proposed. The first alternative method suggested differs from that described by Father O'Callaghan in his excellent treatise on the Ceremonies of the Mass, and also from the *Instruction*, in that it anticipates the purification of the chalice, recommending that it should take place after the distribution of Communion rather than at the conclusion of the Last Gospel. In the face of the Decree of the Congregation of Rites this change cannot be adopted as it is in conflict with the directions given. There is here not a question of balancing the advantages or disadvantages of a peculiar system, but a point of positive legislation which must be obeyed. As it has been said, the *Instruction* is regarded as obligatory for the special circumstances for which it was issued.² Moreover, the Congregation, it may be assumed, had good reasons for selecting this time for the purification. The conclusion of the last Gospel marks the end, in the strictly liturgical sense, of the Holy Sacrifice, while the Communion of the faithful is something more or less incidental, sometimes long and often so short as not to allow the scattered drops of the consecrated wine to collect at the bottom of the chalice.

¹ Van der Stappen, *De Mis. Cel.*, p. 339.

² *Vide De Herdt, Prak. Lit. Sac.*, i., p. 362.

Coming to the second alternative, it seems to be convenient and is pretty commonly employed. Therefore it should not be rashly condemned without, at all events, sufficient cause.

Now there does not seem to be any well grounded objection to it. The Instruction of 1858 does not apply to the case for there is no question of purifying the chalice. There is no difficulty about putting an unpurified chalice into the tabernacle any more than there is of putting an unpurified ciborium,¹ and the reverence for the relics of the sacred species is adequately consulted for. In my opinion, therefore, this method may be continued until at all events it is condemned by the intervention of proper authority. If the unpurified chalice is being put into the tabernacle, this should be done after the last Gospel, and though this is not generally recommended, the propriety of completing the Sacrifice as far as possible would suggest that before being put in the chalice should be carefully exhausted.

It is curious to observe the difference in the details prescribed when a chalice is to be purified by a priest who has to say a second Mass and when a chalice is to be left unpurified after a first Mass. In the former case (1) it is to be covered with the pall immediately after the consumption of the precious Blood, as is done usually when Communion is to be distributed and (2) it is to be drained carefully before the water is put in for the purification : ' *Quod nullomodo omittendum est, quia sacrificium moraliter durat, et superextantibus adhuc vini specibus, ex divino precepto compleri debet*,'² In the other hypothesis, it is to be covered not with the pall but with the paten, while there is no direction about exhausting it before putting it away in reservation for next Mass.³ Why this difference it is not by any means easy to see. The pall would be just as safe as the paten to cover an unpurified chalice, and there is as great necessity for completing the Sacrifice in

¹ *Vide Decree S.R.C.*, 15 September, 1815; *Schoben, De Cer. Mis.*, p. 107; *Van der Stappen, De Cel. Mis.*, p. 337; extract from *Zualdi apud O'Callaghan*, p. 167.

² *Instr. Jam cit.*

³ See *Roman Ritual, loc. cit.*

one case as in the other. Strangely enough, Martinucci directs, as regards the first of the Masses said consecutively on Christmas Day at the same altar, 'Deinde' (i.e. after the celebrant has said the *Quod ore sumpsimus*, with hands joined on the Altar), 'patenam pallae, hostiam patenae superimponit.'¹ It seems useless, then, to endeavour to account for these seeming anomalies, as well as for the discrepancies existing in rubrical authorities on some other minor details on which the law of the liturgy is not sufficiently explicit and one should rest content as long as what he does is not contrary to express legislation or contradictory of some liturgical principle.

2. It seems a matter of indifference when the prayer *Quod ore*, etc., should be said in this case. Ordinarily it is said while the celebrant is receiving the wine for the first ablution, but as there is nothing corresponding to this in the circumstances contemplated, it may seem more proper to say the prayer on having laid the chalice on the corporal and covered it—with the corporal if it is to be purified, and with the paten if it is to remain unpurified.² The hands should be joined during the recital. Communion is then distributed with the usual ceremonies and afterwards the *Corpus tuum Domine*, etc., is said while the fingers are being purified, after which the chalice is dressed according to circumstances and the Mass continued.

3. De Herdt says in regard to this point: 'Si in fundo calicis unitae vini species reperiantur sumi possunt, sed non debent, ante vini infusionem.' There is, then, no obligation in the matter, and each one is free to do as he pleases. Here it may be remarked that, according to some theologians, minute drops of the sacred species retain their consecration when mixed with any quantity of wine, at least of the same species.³ The same is not true of course of water, the addition of which in excess destroys the substance of the wine, and therefore restores the consecrated elements to their connatural condition.

¹ *Manuale Ceremoniarum*, ii., p. 134.

² *Vide Roman Ritual, loc. cit.*

³ Cf. Schober, p. 104.

INDULGENCES

REV. DEAR SIR.—In connexion with 'The Holy Rosary Crusade' established at Syon Abbey, Chudleigh, Devon, there is a Beads given with an Indulgence attached of 60,000 years for five mysteries. This Indulgence, with a trifling correction, was declared some years ago in the I. E. RECORD to be authentic. Will you kindly state if the Constitution *Officiorum ac Munerum* withdraws this Indulgence? In the Decree of the Congregation of Indulgences, Rule 5, quoted in the New Statutes of Maynooth, Appendix, page 358, it is stated that all Indulgences of 1,000 years and upwards are either apocryphal or withdrawn.

A COUNTRY PRIEST.

The authenticity of the indulgence mentioned in this query has already been submitted to criticism in the pages of the I. E. RECORD for March, 1896. The conclusion then arrived at was favourable, but the arguments and reasoning used to establish this contention were very subtle and altogether of a negative character. There was one important fact that was not fairly met and it was the exclusion of this indulgence from the revised Summary approved by Pope Pius IX. This list was based on that of Innocent XI, which contained the indulgence. Why, then, was this indulgence omitted from the authentic Summary of Pius IX, unless it was intended to suppress it? That this was the motive of the omission must be accepted in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary. At all events, if this singular and unique indulgence was not already cancelled, it certainly comes under the ban of the recent legislation of the Congregation of Indulgences embodied in the general Decree of 1899. In this document nine rules are laid down for discerning spurious indulgences from those that are genuine. Now the rule referred to runs: 'Apocryphae, vel nunc prorsus revocatae, sunt omnes Indulgentiae mille vel plurium millium annorum, quocumque tempore concessae dicantur.' In a commentary on this rule in the *Acta Sanctae Sedis* there is a reference to the ancient practice of the Holy See which was to be very sparing in the concession of large partial indulgences. Up to the fourteenth century these rarely

exceeded twenty years, and, continues the commentator, if in later years there existed an indulgence of an excessive period of years its authenticity was gravely suspect, so that, 'Si aliquod dubium de quidem hujus generis indulgentia extare posset, nuper Decreto hujus S. Cong. omnes indulgentiae mille vel plurium millium annorum sunt revocatae: *it ut hodie ne una quidem admitti possit.*'¹ The authority of this statement is undoubted. Made as it is in what may be regarded as the official organ of the Congregation it possesses an almost authoritative character. The ninth rule given in the Instruction referred to would also exclude this indulgence from the authentic list. In his work on Indulgences, which is the fullest and most reliable published, and which has the approbation of the Congregation of Indulgences itself, Beringer says in reference to this extraordinary indulgence: 'L'Indulgence de 60,000 ans et d'autant de quarantines, que le Pape Innocent VIII aurait accordé à la confrérie du Rosarie avait été déjà intentionnellement supprimée du sommaire approuvé par le Pape Pie IX en 1862, bien qu'elle eut été admise dans le catalogue approuvé par Innocent XI, en 1679.'² The author of this work was himself Consultor to the Congregation of Indulgences for some years, and may therefore be supposed to have some knowledge of the *stylus curiae*. Hence, until there is a positive declaration to the opposite emanating from the Sacred Congregation this indulgence, foreign as it is to the usual practice of the Holy See, excessive in its magnitude, and excluded from the official lists, must be held to exist no longer.

The Circular, therefore, of the Holy Rosary Crusade, which was probably issued some years ago, needs revision and unless it is evident beyond all doubt that this indulgence still holds the field, it should be erased from the recorded list. It is only, of course, as members of the Confraternity of the Holy Rosary that Associates of the Rosary Crusade are entitled to these indulgences, with

¹ Cf. Appendix to Maynooth Statues, 1900, p. 362.

² *Les Indulgences*, i., p. 143, ed. 190

the exception of the invocation said to be specially indulgenced.

REQUIEM MASSES

REV. DEAR SIR,—Kindly explain the extent of the privileges of those *Requiem* Masses called *Anniversaria late sumpta* as regards celebration, prayers, etc., and oblige,

AN ENQUIRER.

Anniversaries in the wide sense are those solemn Masses *de Requiem* which are celebrated by religious Communities, Chapters, or any other pious Sodalities whatsoever, in behalf of their deceased brethren once each year on a day that is either fixed or selected according to convenience. This day need not be the anniversary, strictly so called, of the death or burial of any one of the deceased members, and hence the name. Under this denomination would come the solemn *Requiem* Mass that is celebrated annually in many dioceses for the deceased clergy, and often held in connexion with some one of the Conferences. To the same class would also belong the Masses permitted during the Octave of All Souls *pro omnibus defunctis*. It differs, therefore, from an anniversary in the strict sense which, if said *ex petitione viventium*, must be held on the exact recurring day of death or burial, or which, if celebrated *ex titulo fundationis*, must be on this day or some one determined in the testamentary dispositions of the founder or arranged for by his heirs.

1. Privilege as regards celebration: That these Masses may enjoy any privilege they must be either *solemn* or *cantatae*. This condition being fulfilled they may be said on days occupied by festive Offices of simple double rite. They are excluded on Sundays, privileged ferials, vigils, and octaves. As has been said the day for the celebration of them each year need not be fixed or determined permanently, but if it is the custom anywhere to have a definite day set apart for this annual Mass, then it seems that in the contingency of any liturgical impediment on this day the Mass may be postponed to, or anticipated on, the first vacant day.

2. Selection of Mass: The Mass suitable for this occasion

is that entitled *In Anniversario Defunctorum*, the third of the four given in the Roman Missal. This Mass should be celebrated *per modum duplicitis* with only one prayer. Should the Office for the dead be recited in this connexion, it, too, should be said after the double rite, and where only one nocturn is said this should always be the first irrespective of the day of the week.

3. Prayer : The prayer given at the Mass above referred to—that is the *Deus indulgentiarum*, etc.—should not be taken for an Anniversary of this kind, as it is only proper to those of the strict order and would not be verified in class that is being considered. The proper prayer, then, is that one from among the *Orationes diversae pro defunctis* which best corresponds to the intention for which the Mass is offered. The prayer for a deceased priest is the same as for a deceased bishop with the few changes indicated in the Missal. The plural forms should be used *pro pluribus*. If the suffrages are meant for both deceased bishops and priests then the most appropriate prayer is the first of the three given in the older Missals under the *Missa Quotidiana, scil. Deus qui inter Apostolicos*, etc. If the intention is of wider application and embraces deceased friends and benefactors as well, then the *Deus Veniae largitor*, etc., should be employed, and so on.

P. MORRISROE.

DOCUMENTS

**LETTER OF HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS X TO THE MOST REV.
DR. O'DWYER, BISHOP OF LIMERICK**

His Lordship the Bishop of Limerick has received, through Cardinal Merry del Val, the following letter from the Pope:—

DAL VATICANO, *March 16th, 1908.*

Segretario di Stato di Sua Santita.

MY LORD BISHOP,—I have much pleasure in transmitting herewith to you an autograph letter of the Holy Father commanding your recent article on Cardinal Newman and the Modernists.

I am, my Lord Bishop,

Your devoted Servant,

✠ R. CARD. MERRY DEL VAL.

THE RIGHT REV. EDWARD O'DWYER,

Bishop of Limerick.

VENERABILI FRATRI, EDVARDO THOMAE, EPISCOPO
LIMERICIENSI,
PIUS PP. X.

Venerabilis Frater, salutem et Apostolicam benedictionem. Tuum illud opusculum, in quo scripta Cardinalis Newman tantum abesse ostendis ut Encyclicis nostris litteris Pascendi sint dissentanea ut valde cum iisdem congruant, vehementer Nobis probari scito; melius enim cum veritati servire, tum hominis dignitati non poteras. Apparet, inter eos, quorum errores per eas litteras damnavimus, quasi quoddam constitutum esse factum, ut quae ipsi commenti sint, hisce e preclarissimi viri nomine commendationem petant. Ita contendunt passim, se ex illo fonte et capite praecipua quaedam sumpsisse, ob eamque causam non potuisse a Nobis suas ipsorum improbari doctrinas, quin simul atque adeo prius improbabimus quae talis tantusque auctor docuisset. Quod, nisi cognitum sit, elati animi tumor quantum ad obruendam mentem valeat, incredibile videatur inveniri, qui sese putent atque ostentent catholicos, quum in ipsa intima religionis disciplina auctoritatem privati doctoris, quamvis insignis, magisterio Apostolicae Sedis anteponant. Quorum non modo tu contumaciam coarguis, sed fallaciam.

Nam, si in iis, quae hic ante catholicam professionem scripserat, licet fortasse aliquid deprehendere quod similitudinem quamdam habeat cum certis Modernistarum formulis, jure id negas istis suffragari: propterea quod et longe alia ibidem est subjecta vocibus sententia, aliudque scribentis est propositum, et ipse auctor, in aditu ad Ecclesiam Catholicam, omnia sua scripta Catholicae Ecclesiae ipsius auctoritati detulit, utique emendanda, si viderentur. Quod autem ad libros attinet, quos magno vel numero vel pondere confecit catholicus, vix opus est cognitionem cum hac haeresi ab eis repellere. Etenim in luce Angliae, quod nemo ignorat, sic Henricus Newman perpetuo causam catholicae fidei scribendo egit, ut ejus opera simul civibus suis maxime esset salutaris, simul a decessoribus Nostris maximi fieret: itaque dignus est habitus, quem Leo XIII., aestimator certe sagax hominum atque rerum, Cardinalem diceret; cui quidem in omni deinceps vita merito fuit carissimus. Profecto in tanta lucubrationum ejus copia quidpiam reperiri potest, quod ab usitata theologorum ratione alienum videatur: nihil potest, quod de ipsius fide suspicionem afferat. Recteque affirmas, mirum non esse si, quum indicia haeresis novae nulla apparerent, certis quibusdam in locis non ita cautum adhibuit loquendi genus: sed perperam doloseque Modernistas facere, qui illa verba, invito totius orationis contextu, ad suam ipsorum sententiam detorquent. Nos igitur gratulamur tibi, quod memoriam optimi et sapientissimi viri, pro tua scriptorum ejus omnium notitia egregie ab injuria vindicaris: simulque, quantum in te fuit, effeceris, ut inter populares tuos, Anglos praesertim, jam desinant qui hoc nomine abuti consueverunt, imperitos decipere. Atque utinam illi auctorem rite sequantur Newman, non ita nempe ut, praejudicatis opinionibus addicti scrutentur ejus volumina ex hisque dolo malo eliciant aliquid, quo illas confirmari contendant; verum ut sincera et integra ejusdem principia, documenta spiritusque percipient. Multa e tali magistro discent praeclara: in primis autem sanctum habere magisterium Ecclesiae, inviolate tueri traditam a Patribus doctrinam, et, quod caput est ad custodiam catholicae veritatis, Successori Beati Petri summa cum fide obsequi et obedire.

Tibi praeterea, Venerabilis Frater, tuoque clero et populo, quod missa communi stipe tenuitati Nostrae subvenire pie studiis, grates agimus, ex animo; atque ad concilianda vobis primumque omnium tibi, divinae benignitatis munera, itemque ad testandam benevolentiam Nostram, peramanter Apostolicam benedictionem impertimus.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum die X. Martii, anno MCMVIII,
Pontificatus Nostri quinto. PIUS PP. X.

NOTICES OF BOOKS

THE PRIEST'S STUDIES. By T. B. Scannell, D.D. London : Longmans, Green & Co. 1908. Price 3s. 6d. net.

THERE are many things to recommend this volume to us, apart from its contents, and to make us wish for its success. In the first place it is written by an old and valued contributor to the I. E. RECORD. In the second place it is dedicated to the memory of Thomas Canon Lalor, the late Rector of Petworth, in Sussex, a man who reflected credit on his *Alma Mater*, Maynooth, on his native diocese of Kerry, which thought him 'most worthy' to be its Bishop, and on the Diocese of Southwark, in which he spent his career as a priest. And in the third place it is the first volume of a series which is to be entitled, 'The Westminster Library,' the object of which is to present to ecclesiastical readers a series of manuals on subjects that lie more or less outside the ordinary curriculum of the seminary.

The needs and tastes of countries differ as well as those of individuals, and what Dr. Scannell has to say in this volume is particularly suited and evidently intended to be suited to England. Dr. Scannell is a well-read man who takes in the full scope of ecclesiastical needs and goes far to meet them. There are many works mentioned in his chapters which we would not recommend otherwise than as sources of information useful to the student. Perhaps the most instructive and valuable chapter in the volume is that on Moral Theology and Canon Law, not for any elaborate discussion of principles but for the valuable references that it gives. Any student or young priest who wants a guide to the general requirements of his profession will find very considerable help in this volume.

J. F. H.

WATERS THAT GO SOFTLY. By Joseph Rickaby, S.J. London : Burns and Oates.


THE alternative title which Father Rickaby has given on the title page, 'Thoughts for Time of Retreat,' makes the scope of the book more intelligible, and that, too, perhaps to students of Isaias from whom the principal title is taken. This book, then, with such an imaginative and poetic title, is a collection of thoughts suggested in private retreats made by the author or

expounded in public ones given by him. We would be greatly surprised to find Father Rickaby's name over anything commonplace ; and indeed every sentence of the present work bears the impress of the author's religious individuality. The characteristic of the book is its vividness. By a few bold touches the spiritual idea is made to stand before you, definite and clear. There is no haze of words to obscure your spiritual vision. Doctrines that have ceased to impress from their familiarity are put forward under new lights and regain their old influence. We will quote just one example to give an idea of the vivid style and expression found in every line of the book. Speaking of the dangers of honour he says: ' Honour is Hell junction, and there are many through trains. If ever you travel on that line, be sure that you get out at the junction, and take the first train back to your native obscurity.'

Though we admire the directness and simplicity of the expression, sometimes we would be better pleased had the author selected more dignified language. We are doubtful whether the following be becoming dress for the idea put forward: ' Whatever else God may have intended in creation, He must have intended this, *to make a show* of His own excellence outside Himself.' The expression we have italicized doubtlessly conveys the idea the author intended but not without arousing in the mind of the reader a temptation to advert to the slang signification of the words.

The author shares his wide reading with the reader. We have for our companion not merely Father Rickaby himself, but also Plato, Bunyan, St. Ignatius, St. Teresa, and a host of others. Father Rickaby, near the end of the book, tells the following story: ' I once showed a man of taste a newly-erected altar. He eyed it for some moments in silence, and then said quietly, " I'll come back and look at that again." ' No greater tribute could be paid to architectural merit.' We venture to predict that many a reader, after his first draught of the *Waters That Go Softly*, will lay the book down saying to himself, ' I'll come back and read that book again,' a tribute denied to many spiritual books.

P. B.



A DINNER PARTY WITH SOCRATES

I HAD just finished reading Plato's *Republic*. I could not but feel the indefinable charm of that bright Athenian intellect, radiant as its own white marbles, playful and sparkling as the dancing surface of the broad Ægean, kindly and tolerant as the Attic sun himself, bathing temple and villa, olive grove and harbour, in a flood of yellow light. But above all was I moved by Plato in whose religious mind the attractive natural qualities of his race took a deeper tone, a tone in which a note of the supernatural seemed to blend. And then I thought of the Master, Socrates, from whom he drew his inspiration, and I mused upon the hidden ways of Divine Providence. How greatly gifted was Socrates, I thought, how humble he seemed, and how reverent, how fitted as we should think to be a prophet of the truth. And yet he died outside the Promised Land, and where he is we know not. And again, how persuasive he is, how he makes the dry bones of doctrine live—and I looked at my text books of theology, and sighed. And then I thought of God's knowledge of future conditioned events, dark and mysterious, and almost incomprehensible to us, and yet real knowledge. And my imagination wandered in fancy, not in presumption, to a scene in the Agora, like those with which my mind was full, in which a Christian Socrates used his gifts in the cause in which we may think above all he would have prized.

The fire burned low in the grate, the lamp was not yet lighted nor the curtains drawn, though the last faint glow of sunset was fading from the winter sky. There was nothing to break the stillness save the quiet ticking of the clock, and an occasional rustle of the dying embers, till, as I sat, window and fire and room vanished from my sight, and I was in an altogether different scene.

Could I believe my eyes? Was I awake? It was no longer midwinter, but a bright spring day; round me were olive trees and porticoes, and Ionic columns. Tall men, clad in the graceful Greek dress I knew from pictures, passed me but seemed to see me not. Their language was Greek, and their pronunciation not ours, but strange to say I could understand all that was said. It was Athens, I felt sure, for high aloft rose the Parthenon in all its beauty, a ruin no more. But though it was ancient Athens it was not pagan, for near me was a statue of the Virgin Mother, and high above more than one temple gleamed the Cross. At my side was a group that instantly attracted me attention. The central figure one could easily see was no ordinary man. His features were plain, even ugly in themselves, but the light in the eye, the intelligence of the whole face, and the sweetness of his smile, gave him an interest and attractiveness far beyond anything mere beauty could bestow. Could it be Socrates, but Socrates spiritualized and transformed? He alone of all the group seemed to see me, he smiled at me, and beckoned me to go up into an empty balcony overlooking the scene, that I might hear the dialogue which was going on.

'Well,' said Socrates, for it indeed was he, 'tell me, Crito, what is Demas' latest form of belief?'

'To believe in nothing,' answered the young man addressed.

'Except in Socrates.' said the disciple referred to, with a smile, as he came forward to meet the Master.

'Demas, you are incorrigible,' said Socrates. 'If I did not believe in Demas more than he does in Socrates, or even in himself, I should have given him up long ago.'

'Socrates' tender heart would never let him do that.'

said Demas. 'Besides,' he added slyly, 'he is a religious man.'

'And why are you not a religious man, my Demas?' replied the Master.

'Because, dear Socrates, I have made up my mind once for all to believe in nothing.'

'Not even in what our ancients call the First Principles?' said Socrates.

'Not even in them,' replied Demas, with heroic gravity.

'Demas,' said Socrates, 'you are a humbug.'

'He believes in the principle of contradiction,' said Crito, 'or he would not argue so much.'

'No, I do not,' said Demas, solemnly. 'I am able by long and severe study to think away the principle of contradiction. It is only that which makes me able to dispute with the great Socrates. We contradict one another, but we are both right.'

'Demas,' said Socrates, 'you *are* a humbug.'

'I am a humbug,' said Demas, with mock humility. 'At the same time,' he added, 'I am not.'

'Come now, Demas,' said Socrates—and the others closed round to see what sort of stand their companion would make—'do you really deny the principle of contradiction?'

'Alas,' he sighed, 'I feel compelled to do so.'

'Crito,' said Socrates, 'let us be quite clear. What is it that Demas denies?'

'He denies, most noble Socrates, or says he does, that a thing cannot both be and not be at the same time, under the same respects.'

'Perhaps, Demas,' said Socrates, 'you are struck by the fact that the conditions for a perfect contradiction rarely exist in the physical world, so that nearly everything which is can at the same time not be, only of course under a different aspect.'

'Yes,' said Crito, 'and it is a good thing for Demas that it is so, or he could not make such fine distinctions.'

'Socrates,' said Demas impressively, 'I cannot accept your compromise. In the cases you have mentioned the

principle of contradiction, as you say, does not come in, so I can't deny it there. But it is the principle I deny, physically, yes and, as they say now, metaphysically.'

' You deny it,' said Socrates, ' and at the same time you do not deny it.'

' Well put, Socrates,' said Crito. ' Which leg is he going to stand on ? '

' Both legs, my good sir,' said Demas with dignity, ' I am not a philosophic pelican.'

' Yes, Socrates,' he continued, ' I deny it, and at the same time perhaps do not deny it. For I have not affirmed a thing must be and not be at the same time; I only say it may be.'

' You have not affirmed it,' said Socrates, ' and yet perhaps you have.'

' Yes, perhaps I have,' said Demas, reflectively.

' Upon which supposition are we to argue ? ' said the Master.

' Upon which you please, my dear Socrates.'

' Well, then,' said Socrates, ' let us take both, for both are open.'

' I am quite ready,' replied Demas.

' Demas,' said Socrates, ' why did you say a little while ago that you could not deny the principle in the cases I mentioned, because it did not come in ? '

' No more it did,' said Demas. ' There was nothing to deny.'

' And yet there may have been something.'

' Yes, I suppose there may.'

' In which case you did not deny that something, and so answered loosely, Demas.'

' Well, Socrates, what then ? '

' Or,' returned his questioner, ' shall we say that in denying that which did not exist, you at the same time may have not been denying that which may have existed ? '

' Be careful, Socrates,' said Crito, ' you will make Demas' head go round.'

' Come, Demas,' said Socrates, ' like so many lawyers, you are a mathematician. Let us take numbers under the single aspect of quantity.'

‘Very good, Socrates.’

‘I pay a hundred drachmas into the Treasury, Demas.’

‘Yes.’

‘But at the same time there is nothing to prevent these hundred drachmas not being a hundred.’

‘Nothing at all, Socrates, so far as I know.’

‘Let us consider them as not a hundred,’ said Socrates.

‘Not a hundred is very wide, it covers the whole field of possible number, and includes even zero, does it not?’

‘Yes,’ said Demas. ‘Not a hundred may be anything in the wide world except a hundred.’

‘And may even be a hundred,’ said Socrates.

‘Yes,’ said Demas.

‘So that not a hundred is very wide indeed.’

‘Socrates, it is.’

‘Well then, Demas. I pay a hundred drachmas into the Treasury. These are a hundred.’

‘They are,’ said Demas.

‘They are also, let us suppose, nothing.’

‘Very well, Socrates.’

‘That is bad for the Treasury, Demas.’

‘It is, Socrates—in that respect.’

‘Or again,’ said Socrates, ‘the hundred may be ten thousand.’

‘They may,’ said Demas.

‘That is good for the Treasury, Demas.’

‘It is.’

‘And,’ said Socrates, ‘not bad for me if I only paid in a hundred.’

‘Not bad at all for anybody,’ said Demas.

‘Now supposing,’ continued Socrates, ‘I had paid in a hundred, and the tax was a thousand, would the judges hear me if I argued that while the hundred was a hundred, it might be a thousand, or even ten thousand for all I knew?’

‘I fear they would not,’ said Demas.

‘And if I had paid the thousand should I think it just if I were compelled to pay again, because that thousand might be nothing?’

‘Perhaps, Socrates,’ said Crito, ‘the judges are not philosophers.’

‘Yes, Crito,’ said Demas, ‘I should explain it thus.’

‘But, my dear Demas,’ said Socrates, ‘have we not agreed to avoid in our philosophy all obscure thinking and long phrases, and tricks in argument, and to proceed by plain speaking and everyday instances, and ordinary common sense, and not like the Sophists?’

‘We have, Socrates.’

‘Are not my instances, then, in point?’ urged the Master.

‘Yes,’ replied Demas. ‘As far as they go I cannot object to them.’

‘Well, then,’ said Socrates, ‘let us return to the judges. Suppose, Demas, which God forbid, you had killed Crito, and I saw the act, and was obliged to give evidence against you. Would it be admitted as a defence that while undoubtedly you had done this deed, yet there was nothing to disprove your contention that at the same time you had not done it?’

‘I fear it would not,’ said Demas—‘by an unphilosophic court.’

‘And if,’ rejoined Socrates, ‘the judge was a philosopher, could you object if he sentenced the *you* that had done the deed, to drink the hemlock, saying that the *you* who perhaps had not done it would perhaps get off?’

‘If he put it in that way,’ said Demas, ‘I suppose I should have to accept it.’

‘In which case,’ said the Master, ‘after all was over, I fear, my dear Demas, we should not see you here any more.’

‘Unless,’ said Crito, ‘the part that was nothing kept up the discussion.’

‘Demas,’ said Socrates, ‘if when we go home with you to-day, you find the dinner to which you have invited us is not there, what will you say if the cook argues that what is undoubtedly no dinner may be a dinner after all?’

‘I should say, Socrates, that the fellow was nothing of a cook.’

' And would you accept his distinction ? '

' In an unphilosophic sense I should not.'

' Demas, to speak seriously, is not all argument, all science, all daily life, founded upon the assumption that what is cannot at the same time not be ? '

' It is, Socrates ; but is the assumption true ? '

' And,' continued Socrates, ' if a thing may be not itself, we have seen that for all we know it may be anything of all the things that are not itself, that is anything else whatever, and even nothing at all ? '

' Well,' said Demas, ' and if I admit that ? '

' Then,' said Socrates, ' in any enquiry after truth, we should have to take every term we used as having possibly the meaning of every other term in the world.'

' Well ? '

' In which case every syllogism would have an indefinite number of conclusions, all contradicting one another.'

' What, then ? '

' And argument would be useless if not impossible.'

' Oh, Socrates,' said Demas, in a voice of concern, ' I hope not.'

' And not only argument,' Socrates continued, ' but even conversation, since words would cease to have any meaning.'

' I don't see that,' said Demas. ' I admit words must have a meaning.'

' Have words a distinct meaning,' the Master replied, ' unless they correspond to distinct ideas in the mind ? '

' I suppose not,' said Demas.

' And can there be a distinct idea which has no distinct thing considered as corresponding to it ? '

' I should say not, Socrates.'

' And can anything be distinct, when anything may be any other thing, or even nothing ? '

' Things would not be very distinct, I admit,' said Demas.

' Is there distinction in absolute identity, Demas,' said Socrates, ' in so far as it is identity ? '

' No.'

‘And is there distinctness in our mind, as to what appears to us to be identity?’

‘No,’ said Demas, ‘I suppose not.’

‘And if,’ continued Socrates, ‘each thing can be both itself and everything except itself, and even nothing, each thing then must, as far as we can see, be identical with every other, and nothing at all is distinct.’

‘Socrates,’ said Demas, ‘you always put your opponent into a corner, from which there is no escape. It is for this reason that I seem to myself to doubt the principle of contradiction, for I feel bound to admit your conclusions, and yet I cannot willingly give up my own which are opposed to them.’

‘I know,’ replied Socrates, ‘that Demas in his serious moods has too just a view of the dignity of reason, not to submit his inclinations to his intellect, and his intellect to truth.’

‘Yes,’ said Demas, ‘I admit that such submission is right and reasonable.’

‘And honourable, too, Demas.’

‘Yes.’

‘And the contrary,’ said Socrates, ‘which would be against right reason, would be a reproach.’

‘Socrates, I suppose it would.’

‘Well then, Demas, can we say a theory is true which contradicts all experience, which would make science and social life impossible, which puts an end to reason by taking all meaning out of words?’

‘I suppose not, Socrates.’

‘Well, Demas, it is not true, then, that we can deny in thought the principle of contradiction?’

‘Well,’ said Demas, ‘you force me to admit it is not.’

‘Shall we then,’ continued Socrates, ‘in making this denial affirm, as indeed we must, the principle itself, in affirming the contradictory of what we have just denied?’

‘Very well, Socrates.’

‘Very well, then, Demas, we agree that it is untrue to deny the principle of contradiction. That is, we say it is true to affirm the same principle?’

' I agree, then,' said Demas.

' What is it then, Crito' said Socrates, ' that Demas affirms ? '

' He affirms, most noble Socrates, that a thing cannot both be and not be at the same time, that is to say, under the same respects.'

' You admit this, Demas ? ' said the Master.

' I do,' he replied.

' And do you also admit that words have a meaning, and that we can arrive at definite truth by reasoning ? '

' Yes,' said Demas. ' If by truth you mean logical truth, I admit that we can see a conclusion truly follows from its premises, but I don't admit any more.'

' What is the next thing he denies, Crito ? ' here interposed Aristarchus.

' Oh, the other laws of thought he considers unproved assumptions,' replied Crito, ' and he says he sees no reason to believe in God.'

' No conclusive reason, Crito,' said Demas, ' for indeed I always pray to Him, and teach my children to do so. But I say you can't prove His existence.'—' But my dear Crito,' he suddenly said, breaking off, ' and Socrates, and all of you, remember that you are dining with me to-day, and that it is time to be making our way to the house.'

' Demas,' said Socrates, ' I have a friend here, a stranger from the Western Isles. May I bring him ? '

' With all my heart,' said Demas, ' any friend of Socrates is most welcome.'

When Socrates said this I felt impelled to descend the steps, and was now among them. All received me cordially, and to my surprise I was able to talk to them in their own language with ease. We then moved off to the house, Demas in his frank and engaging way pointing out the buildings and the principal citizens to me as we passed along the busy streets. After walking for some distance we turned into the portico of a house of somewhat larger and more distinguished appearance than the rest. Servants met us in the entrance, and after we had washed, led us to a small dining-room adorned with some fine

pictures, and separated by heavy curtains from the open hall. Demas placed me next to him on his divan, my neighbour on the other side was Socrates; Aristarchus, Crito, and two other guests, Glaucus and Ion, were ranged round the table. 'We are all at the mercy of the cook,' said Demas, 'as my wife and the rest of the family are away enjoying the sea breezes.'

'We are in good hands, then, at any rate,' Aristarchus answered, as a servant poured water over his fingers. 'I know that from experience.'

The first part of the dinner, which began with a course of fish prepared with taste, was then served. In the meantime, on a word from our host to an attendant, strains of music were heard coming from the hall. The sounds seemed to be from some stringed instruments which were new to me, but which were beautifully played. There was a pathos in the melody, and something of originality in the irregular time which reminded me of Chopin.

I heard afterwards that this was given expressly in my honour, the Athenian taste on the whole being against music during dinner. However, when the next dishes, a slice of ham stewed in wine, followed by poultry and vegetables, were being handed round, Socrates, with the familiarity of an old friend said to Demas, that he was sure their guest would rather talk.

'I agree with you,' said Demas, and he directed the orchestra to play one more piece, and then retire. I praised their execution and the beauty of the music, which I could do from my heart.

'I am glad you like it,' said Demas, who seemed pleased. 'Many do. But,' he added slyly in a tone which he knew would reach my neighbour's ear, 'Socrates feels ill at ease when he cannot hear himself speak.'

'No secrets, Demas,' said Socrates, taking him to task. 'What bad things are you saying of me?'

'I am only paying you in advance for all the bad things you are planning against me.'

'And what bad things are those?'

'Trying to prove me a Sophist, destroying my most

cherished convictions, and tearing into shreds my deepest theories of philosophy, the hard work of many a sleepless night,' replied Demas.

'Poor Demas,' said Crito, 'he is much to be pitied. Socrates,' he continued, 'we all wish you would begin. You mustn't mind our host,' he went on to me. 'As for his convictions, if you judged by what he says, they may be all comprised in one dogma of universal scepticism; but he doesn't mean a bit of it, and he enjoys hearing his theories overthrown.'

'Socrates destroys my peace of mind,' said Demas, 'but it is left to my old friend Crito to take away my moral character, the thing an honest man prizes most of all.'

'Crito,' said Socrates, taking no notice of this protest, 'what was the next one of Demas' denials which you were relating to us in the market-place, for we have brought him to admit the law of contradiction, and he never denied the possibility of drawing conclusions?'

'Oh, Socrates, he denies everything, the laws of thought, his own existence, the soul, God, everything.'

'I say you can't prove them,' said Demas.

'Why not?' asked the Master.

'Because you can't,' said Demas.

'Is that your only reason?' enquired Socrates. 'I mean you have no reason, have you, from the nature of things, by which it *must* be impossible to prove all that Crito has named?'

'Oh, no,' said Demas, 'I have no reason from the nature of things. There are no things, and no nature, and therefore nothing to prove, and nothing to prove it with.'

'How do you know that?' said Socrates. 'You seem to speak authoritatively. Do you lay it down as a principle that nothing exists, and nothing can be known or proved?'

'No,' replied Demas, 'I have no principles.'

'Abominable man!' said Aristarchus.

'I don't make it a principle,' continued Demas, 'that nothing exists, or can be known, for I don't know that.'

As to proof, I have admitted the validity of proof, if proof be given, but I am not going to admit anything without proof.'

' Demas,' said Socrates, ' in any system of proof, if we are to arrive at any conclusion, and you admit we may, must we not begin somewhere ? '

' I don't see why, Socrates.'

' If in any argument,' said Socrates, ' each premise that we use requires another argument for its proof, and each of the premises of this argument another argument for *its* proof, and each of *its* premises again, shall we not go on in an endless chain, without ever finding a valid premise at all ? '

' Well, Socrates, what then ? '

' In which case, what becomes of the validity of the conclusion, since we know that it can be, as a conclusion, no stronger than the force of its premises ? '

' Well, then,' said Demas, ' I suppose you must stop somewhere, and take some premises for granted.'

' Blindly,' said Socrates, ' whether they be true or not ? '

' I suppose so.'

' And what will your conclusion be worth then ? '

' Not much, I admit,' said Demas; ' and that is one reason why I have made up my mind to affirm nothing.'

' Tell me,' said Socrates, ' though we cannot directly prove the truth of first principles, what is your objection to our accepting them as true, not on blind faith, but because they *are* true ? In fact so true that their truth is self-evident, and neither requires nor admits of strict proof.'

' My objection,' said Demas, ' is, that I don't see how anything can be so self-evident as to require no proof; and, if it be not self-evident, to assume its truth without proof is an act of blind faith.'

' Do you say,' Socrates went on, ' that nothing is true, or that, though there is truth, we cannot see it ? '

' I say,' replied Demas, ' that we know nothing whatever about it.'

' But surely,' urged Socrates, ' we see some truth at any rate? '

' Indirectly, Socrates, by reasoning, I grant; directly, no.'

' What sort of truth do you want? ' said Socrates.

' Proof that would satisfy a law court,' said Demas.

' There is too much loose thought nowadays. Thought is useless unless it be exact.'

' Very well, Demas, let us take a lesson from the courts.'

' Socrates, I think we might with advantage. There things must be *proved*; they are not admitted as self-evident.'

' Always? ' said Socrates. ' You are a lawyer, and I am only a layman, but I thought, for example, that certain documents proved themselves.'

' That is only a way of speaking,' replied Demas; ' the proof is in their coming from the proper quarter.'

' Well then, Demas, let us take another instance. If a magistrate see an offence committed in court under his very eyes, does he need witnesses to make him certain it took place? '

' No, Socrates.'

' Or, if a witness be guilty of contempt, or if a prisoner plead guilty to a crime, does the judge require further proof before punishing the contempt or registering the plea? '

' No,' said Demas, ' in these cases his eyes and ears give proof enough.'

' So that here, at any rate,' said Socrates, ' truth is perceived directly, not indirectly.'

' Yes, Socrates, I suppose it is.'

' And is not that what we mean by self-evident? ' continued the Master.

' Well, perhaps it is,' said Demas reflectively.

' Demas,' Socrates went on, ' you said just now that we could only see truth indirectly by reasoning, but what about the validity of the reasoning process itself—is not that directly perceived, since it enters into every argument and yet is never proved? '

'I suppose, Socrates,' said Demas, 'I must admit that we do directly perceive the truth of reasoning.'

'So that after all, Demas, some truth is directly evident without further proof, both to our senses, as we saw in the case of things which might happen in the law courts, and to our intellect, as in the case of the validity of reasoning.'

'Yes, Socrates, you force me to admit as much.'

'Now, Demas,' the Master continued, 'is this truth which we perceive in the mind true only in the mind, or is it true in itself ?'

'I don't know, Socrates. For all I know it is true only in the mind.'

'Let us see,' said Socrates. 'Let us take truth of reasoning. Does a conclusion truly follow because we see it, or do we see it because it truly follows ?'

'I suppose,' said Demas, 'we see it because it truly follows, for otherwise the false conclusions of those who cannot reason would be true, since they seem true to them.'

'Then this truth at any rate is true in itself.'

'Yes, Socrates, I suppose it is.'

'What then,' said Socrates, 'is to prevent other truths, as, for example, the principle of contradiction, from being true in themselves ?'

'Because,' said Demas, 'I do not admit that anything is real, and therefore I find it hard to admit the reality of truth.'

'Is that your only objection to truth being real ?' said Socrates, 'that you doubt whether any *being* is real ?'

'It is my chief one, at any rate,' Demas replied.

'But,' said Socrates, 'is not some being real ?'

'I don't know,' said Demas, 'whether things exist in themselves outside the mind.'

'Well,' said Socrates, 'at least they exist in the mind. For ourselves, this world and all our surroundings at least *seem* existent to each one of us.'

'Yes, but, Socrates, do they exist in reality ? You cannot argue from the ideal order to the real.'

'Demas,' said Socrates, 'is not that which seems

existent to our minds, at least possible in reality, whether it actually exist outside our minds or not ? '

' How do I know that ? ' said Demas.

' Because,' replied Socrates, ' if we are to trust our minds at all, and not give up all thinking and all argument, what appears to us as actual and involving no contradiction in our minds might be really actual, if a being with a mind similar to ours, and infinite power, chose to make it really actual.'

' Very well, Socrates.'

' So that, Demas, what is mentally actual, is really at any rate, *possible*.'

' Yes, but Socrates,' said Demas, ' suppose that such things are outside our minds, merely possible, and in no way actual, can you class them as Being ? '

' Yes, Demas,' said Socrates, ' we must do so, for we cannot say that the possible is nothing.'

' How do you prove that, Socrates ? '

' In this way. We have only to add existence to purely possible things to make them actual. Let us imagine two possible things, a man and an arm-chair. If we add to each of these the factor of existence, they become actual. What distinguishes the man from the arm-chair ? It is not existence which is common to both. It must, then, be essence, or that which each was when it was purely possible. But if this essence be nothing at all then the man and the arm-chair cannot be distinguished, and would be identical.'

' And Demas would be sat upon all day long,' interposed Crito.

' I know you would be glad to do so, my dear Crito,' said Demas, ' but you would be an arm-chair, too.'

' It is said that a true companion ought to be an arm-chair to his friends,' said Aristarchus, sententiously.

' Do you admit, Demas,' said Socrates, ' that the purely possible is not nothing, but has, as they say, being of essence, though not of existence ? '

' Very well, Socrates,' said Demas. ' Anything to avoid being an arm-chair to Aristarchus.'

' So that, Demas,' Socrates continued, ' as something

is real, the chief obstacle to your believing that some truth is real, and that the foundations of our thought which seem self-evident are really self-evident, are gone.'

'The chief obstacle,' said Demas, 'but I did not say the only one.'—'But come,' he exclaimed, breaking off, 'we have been sitting here for some time at an empty table, I am sure you will be glad to adjourn to the wine and dessert which are waiting for us in the next room.' He then touched a gong, and silver finger-bowls with scented water were handed round to each guest. A loving-cup of unmixed wine was then brought in, and placed upon the table. '*τὸ δὲ εὖ νικάτω*, God save Athens,' said Demas gravely, as all rose to their feet. He put it to his lips, and each guest in turn followed his example, saying the same words.

This ceremony over, we followed our host in silence along the hall, over Persian carpets which left no sound to our footsteps, into a room somewhat similar to the one we had left. Here, on small polished tables of dark grained wood were placed dishes of fruit and cakes, while a large cup of embossed silver, filled with wine and water, stood in the middle. As we took our places once more, I could not help feeling a little disappointed at the ending of the last discussion. The reality of truth appeared to me to be a vital point, and it did not seem as if Socrates had pushed his conclusions home. When the wine had gone round, being ladled into silver goblets for each guest by the host himself, Socrates, as if divining my thoughts, said to Demas: 'We have not yet got to the bottom of the question as to the reality of truth, but I think we have had enough philosophy for the present. I know our guest would like to hear something of our Athenian art, on which there is no greater authority than yourself.'

An interesting discussion on realism in art then followed. Here again Demas proclaimed himself an idealist. 'I cannot understand,' he said to me, 'the contrary school which I hear is so strong in Western Europe.'

I said I thought it was a reaction from an artificial state into which art and literature had fallen by continuing

to copy ideal models from which the originality had departed, without ever going back to nature to test the truth of the picture. Hence the mere faithful copying of nature came upon the world with all the surprise and relief which a draught of fresh air gives to those who have long breathed the heavy atmosphere of a crowded room.

‘Many explain the popularity of our own Euripides in the same way,’ said Glaucus, who had spoken but little so far.

‘I quite agree,’ said Demas, ‘that fidelity to nature, in the sense of avoiding all that is exaggerated, ridiculous, and unreal, is certainly one of the chief elements in that good taste without which art cannot live. But to make mere faithful copying the essence and the end of art is, to my mind, to lower its dignity, and misunderstand its aim. Copy as faithfully as you may, you will never in this respect equal nature, but art should improve on nature. Nature is rarely artistic—she seldom forms a perfect picture. She gives the material, but the composition, the form, and the life must bear the impress of the artist’s soul. I do not want a mirror, but a picture,’ he said. ‘I want to have my mind raised above myself by the great, the noble, and the terrible. If I want everyday surroundings I can go and see them for myself.’

‘You can go and see them,’ said Ion, ‘because you can appreciate the beautiful, but everyone cannot. An untrained eye sees no loveliness in nature. He needs the artist who calls his attention in a picture to what he would not have discovered for himself. Then he says, “How life-like,” and is pleased.’

‘To show men what they would not see for themselves is one part of an artist’s work, no doubt,’ said Demas, ‘but not the chief one. Train all men to appreciate, and they would soon want something more than that.’

‘Demas said nature was not artistic. What a heresy !’ said Crito.

‘Perhaps that is too strong,’ Demas answered, ‘since the artist cannot go beyond the materials which nature supplies to his imagination. But a true work of art, to my mind, is the subordination of every accessory, in perfect

harmony, to one central theme, and this you do not often get in nature. But this is art, whether the theme be developed in the Epics of Homer or Herodotus, or in a great speech to the assembly, or a picture of Zeuxis, or a symphony in music, or one of Pheidias' friezes, or in some beautiful temple in which every line and ornament converges on God's altar as a central point.'

'In the quarter of the world from which I come,' I remarked, 'there is another style of art in sacred building, which even more strikingly illustrates what you say. For there, in our great churches, every line carries the eye to the groined roof soaring high above our heads, and the pointed roof leads up to the tapering spire, and that loses itself far aloft in a dizzy point, as if it would exhaust its whole being in straining upwards towards God.'

'That is a beautiful idea,' said Aristarchus, 'and I should like to see how it is carried out.'

'But,' he continued, 'I don't know what our severe professors would say of Demas' putting Herodotus with Homer. It does not seem altogether complimentary to the historian, whose duty is, above all, truth, to class his work with the fictions of the poet. What do you think, Socrates?'

'I am inclined to suspect,' he replied, 'that Demas undervalues the less brilliant, but certainly more important side of a historian's task, the faithful narration of facts. But I agree with him in blaming that modern view of a historian's duties, imported, I think, from abroad, which makes him a mere compiler of facts, not differing in kind but only in degree, as to the dignity and scope of his work, from the reporter in the law courts or the assembly.'

'Yes,' exclaimed Ion impulsively, 'such work is not art, nor history, nor anything else worth reading. It is often not even good reporting. And the last stage in the travesty is reached when even the chronological order, the lingering trace of form which was left to the shapeless mass is abandoned; and the facts are divided into compartments all duly labelled, like the specimens in the Marine Museum at Peiræus.'

'Then, Socrates,' said Demas, smiling at Ion's earnestness, 'you agree with me that history should be an epic.'

'Yes,' he said, 'I am inclined to do so, provided it be an epic of fact and not of fiction.'

'Do you then approve, Socrates,' said Glaucus, 'of what they call nowadays the philosophy of history?'

'No,' he said. 'That seems to err as much by excess as Ion's reporting and cataloguing does by defect. History is to be a work of art, but not a work of mere imagination.'

'How is history to be a work of art,' said Crito, 'if it be bound to take its facts from nature, and nature, according to Demas, is not artistic? The poet in his epic can create his surroundings, but the historian cannot.'

'He cannot create his facts, Crito,' said Socrates, 'but he can arrange them. And it is in this arrangement, which we seldom find in nature, of materials which we always find in nature, that every artist's work consists, whether his instrument be brush, or chisel, or pen, or tongue.'

'Socrates,' said Demas, 'you are right, and this absence of all arrangement, of all perspective and grouping, and light and shade, and subordination of accessories to the central theme, makes the histories which are written nowadays, to my mind, simply lamentable. And it is most lamentable of all in the histories which are written for schools.'

'Surely,' said Aristarchus, 'you don't want art in school-books, Demas? I think our school histories are excellent. They give all the facts—I don't think one is left out—and in a short and easy form.'

'Aristarchus,' said Demas, 'I am going to imitate Socrates, and ask questions. What is the object of abridging a large history?'

'I suppose,' said Aristarchus, 'that the reader may gain all the essential information given in the large history more quickly, and more easily carry it away.'

'While at the same time,' his host continued, 'the history itself must not suffer in any serious point?'

'Exactly,' said Aristarchus.

'Well then,' said Demas, 'suppose your boy was going

on a journey into the wild part of Trace, and he did not want to take any luggage which would be too heavy for him to carry himself, since he would not find anyone there to carry it for him.'

'Very well,' said Aristarchus.

'Now let us suppose,' Demas continued, 'that his servant had packed a large trunk so full of things that no two men could carry it, much less a boy?'

'Yes,' said Aristarchus. 'The very thing happened to myself the other day.'

'Well then, Aristarchus, you go to the servant, and say, "No, give him a hand-bag, and take these things out."

'Yes, that is what I certainly should, and did say,' remarked Aristarchus.

'But what would you think, Aristarchus, if the man insisted on putting everything he had taken out of the large trunk into the small bag, saying that by rolling up all the contents, and compressing them very tight, he was sure he could get them in?'

'I should think, my dear Demas, he was a fool, and probably say so.'

'Because you see, Aristarchus, the weight would be very little diminished, and some of the things by being rolled up so tight would probably be spoilt.'

'Yes,' said Aristarchus, 'I expect they would.'

'Well, then, Aristarchus,' said Demas, 'would not any man of commonsense say to his servant—if his servant was so foolish as to need being told so simple a thing—that he should only put what was really necessary into the bag, leaving out what was less important, and giving everything sufficient room to lie properly in its place?'

'Yes, certainly,' said Aristarchus, 'that would be the sensible thing to do.'

'Demas is right,' interposed Ion. 'I ask any unprejudiced person if he is not. What are we to say of these compendiums, which give every fact and name and date which you would find in any foolish history of ten times the size, and far more than you would find in any wise

history whatever its size? They do this, and at the same time they take away all the setting, all the explanation, which alone will make so many facts intelligible or capable of being remembered. Is not their unhappy reader like a man who agrees to buy a horse, and is given a hide, and a pile of dead bones thrown together in a heap.'

'I believe Ion is writing a history himself on a new plan which is to eclipse everything that has every appeared,' said Glaucus maliciously.

'I admit that there is too much strain on the memory in some of our school books,' said Aristarchus, 'but as to their being dry, I don't think Ion you can object to that. Facts must be dry, but they have to be learned. After all,' he continued, 'it is solid food which nourishes.'

'And it is wine which cheers the heart,' said Demas. 'Let me fill your cup. It is true,' he continued, as he replaced the ladle in the bowl, 'the chief food of the mind, as of the body, must be solid; but would it not be foolish as well as harsh to refuse a little drink to the man whose throat was so dry that he could not swallow meat?'

'Besides,' added Ion, 'even solid food amongst civilized men is cooked and prepared, not served up in raw heaps.'

'At any rate, Demas,' said Aristarchus, 'if we are to introduce art into scientific works, you surely would not do it in books for beginners?'

'I would do it then most of all,' exclaimed Ion.

'And why not?' said Demas. 'It is nature herself who points the way. To every effort which nature requires us to make, a natural pleasure is attached. The love of exercise urges children to use their limbs. Curiosity invites to study. Trees invite birds to build their nests, birds attract their mates, and flowers entice the pollen-carrying bees, all by putting on their loveliest clothing in the spring time.'

'Demas, you contradict your own argument,' said Aristarchus. 'Nature herself you say, impels us to learn. Is not this natural attraction enough to overcome the natural dryness of the task?'

'Natural!' cried Ion, in despairing tones, which made

everyone laugh. 'It is preternatural! I apologise for speaking strongly, but I can't help it. Dryness is not the word for it—it is the horror of the sandy desert, without water and without hope. I appeal to Socrates.'

'I agree with what Ion means,' said the Master, 'though not with all he says. And I think we have a higher example for making the way easy to children even than that of nature which Demas gave us. For God Himself nearly always leads those whom He calls to extra toil and extra service by sweetness of devotion in the beginning.'

'Exactly,' said Ion. 'I have two little boys who pray in church like angels. Demas knows them.'

'Yes,' said Demas, 'I wish mine were as good. In this matter at any rate, as you all know,' he continued, 'I quite agree with Ion. Art is always in place, but most in place for children. I wonder Aristarchus, with his taste for ritual, can call it in question.'

'Demas is a devotee to educating children to appreciate the beautiful,' said Crito to me. 'His nursery spelling-books are on toned paper, his bells all sound in harmony, and are tuned every week, and the very baby's rattle must be in graceful curves.'

There was a general laugh at this, and Demas said: 'You are all worse heretics in art than I am in philosophy, and as I do not feel equal to the strain of being orthodox any longer, I think we had better go back to that subject. Unless,' he continued to me, 'you are tired of it.'

'Oh no,' I replied, 'everything you have discussed to-night has been most interesting to me, but the philosophy most of all. It is a favourite subject of mine, but I can find very few who care to talk about it in my own country.'

'Very well, then,' said Demas, 'we will ring for another bowl of wine, and Crito shall propose the next problem, for I can see that for a long time he has had something on his mind.'

'Socrates,' said Crito, as the wine was brought in, 'when we were discussing philosophy⁷ before, you put forward as an argument that everything must be either

possible or impossible using the figure which the lecturers on logic call "excluded middle." Demas admitted the argument at the time, but all the same it is one of the laws of thought he professes to deny.'

'To be able to deny,' said Demas, 'for I don't say necessarily that I do deny it.'

'Come, Demas,' said Socrates, 'can you deny that everything is either possible or impossible?'

'I don't know, Socrates. Why should there not be something neither the one nor the other?'

'What do we mean by impossible?' said Socrates. 'Is it not that which is not possible?'

'Yes,' said Demas, 'I suppose that is the meaning of it.'

'And you have admitted the principle of contradiction that we cannot both affirm and deny anything of anything at the same time under the same respects?'

'Yes,' said Demas.

'And this holds good,' Socrates continued, 'whether what we affirm be existence, or possibility, or impossibility, or anything whatever.'

'Very well,' said Demas, 'I admit all that.'

'Well then, Demas, suppose for the sake of argument that something, say a theory of your own, is neither possible nor impossible. First it is not possible. But the not possible is by our definition impossible. Therefore, your theory is impossible. But we supposed that it is not impossible. It is, then, both impossible and not impossible. That is to say our supposition involves a contradiction.'

'Socrates, I give in,' said Demas. 'You show clearly that the principle of excluded middle holds good—which was more than Crito was able to do the other day,' he added mischievously, 'in spite of all his efforts.'

'Never mind, Crito,' said Aristarchus. 'This is a great day's work. Demas believes in two laws of thought. Can't you bring him, Socrates, to admit the rest?'

'He can hardly deny the principle of identity,' said Glaucon. 'That a thing is itself, that what a thing is can be affirmed of the thing, that a whole contains its parts,

and a class its individuals. He can't deny this, because he admits that words have a meaning.'

'Well, Glaucus,' our host replied, 'I am most anxious to oblige you, and not to appear captious in any way, but in this matter I don't know whether I can. I know most argumentation is founded on this so-called principle of identity, but as I am very suspicious of most argumentation you can hardly expect me to believe it on that account. But if it be a mere question of words I will admit it if you like.'

'It is not a mere question of words, my dear Demas,' said Aristarchus, 'but of words having a meaning, without which all discussion is impossible.'

'Very well then, I will admit this principle, that A is A, Socrates is Socrates. That seems to me a self-evident assertion. Still in spite of the great name which occurs twice in it, I cannot think it a very fruitful proposition for an argument.'

'But suppose you say,' remarked Ion, 'that Socrates is a man?'

'That requires proof,' said Demas. 'He may be an angel in disguise.'

'But suppose,' Ion continued, 'that it is proved and absolutely certain that he is a man, may you not then say, "Socrates is a man"? And this will be a true proposition, and at the same time one from which conclusions may be drawn.'

'But Ion,' said Demas, 'this is hardly an identical proposition. Identical things can be put instead of one another in a statement without changing the sense. But if we say Socrates is a man, Ion is a man, Ion is Socrates, it does not seem to be true.'

'Demas is right there,' said Aristarchus. 'But suppose Ion had said,' he continued, '"Socrates is the man on Crito's left who is going to overthrow all Demas' arguments," you would have had an identical proposition, which is something more than a tautology.'

'But suppose that I don't admit that the proposition is true?' said Demas.

‘It is true,’ rejoined Aristarchus, ‘but that hardly seems the real question. The point is, if it be true must it not be self-evident?’

‘Must not what be self-evident?’ said Demas.

‘That A is A, whether you express it in this rather barren form, or whether, instead of repeating the name A, you put in its place some equivalent description, telling the mind of something explicit which the mere name A perhaps did not. For instance, I may say a triangle is a triangle, or I may say a triangle is a figure bounded by three straight lines. The second statement tells us more truth expressly than the first, and gives a foundation for argument which the first does not. But will you not admit each is equally and necessarily true?’

‘Well,’ said Demas, ‘I am inclined to admit it, if only for fear that the excitement of making such a long speech may be too much for Aristarchus.’

‘Now, Socrates,’ said Crito, ‘he has only to believe in causation, and he will have admitted all the laws of thought.’

‘What do you mean by causation?’ said Demas. ‘That everything must have a cause, I don’t admit that, but even if I did, it would only prove an endless series of causes; and you will tell me that is impossible.’

‘No,’ said Crito, ‘I do not say that everything must have a cause, but that everything is either caused or uncaused.’

‘What do you mean by caused?’ said Demas.

‘That which gets its being from something else,’ Crito answered.

‘Then you say, everything either gets its being from something else, or does not. Very well, I admit that.’

‘And further,’ Crito went on, ‘I say that everything which begins to exist gets its being from something else, and that which does not get its being from something else never began to exist, but always existed.’

‘Well,’ said Demas, ‘and how are you going to prove all that? For, my dear Crito, I have made up my mind, once for all, as I have told you, to be logical, and admit nothing without proof.’

‘I think it can be proved in this way,’ said Crito. ‘Everything which begins to exist must get its being from somewhere. It can’t get it from itself, for it does not yet exist, nor from nothing, for nothing has nothing to give. Therefore, it gets it from something else, that is, is caused.’

‘That is what I call an attempt to take in a poor enquirer after truth,’ said Demas. ‘You are going to prove cause, and you begin by saying everything must get its being from somewhere. That is, you assume causation in your premises, and so of course you find it in your conclusion. But I don’t admit that everything which begins to exist must get its being from somewhere. That is just what you have to prove. I don’t see why a thing should not spring up spontaneously. It seems to me that I can perfectly well conceive its doing so.’

‘Socrates, you must come to the rescue again,’ said Aristarchus.

‘I will do Socrates the justice,’ said Demas politely, ‘to admit that he does not beg the question so often as Crito.’

‘I am sure Crito is able to defend himself,’ Demas, said Socrates, ‘but suppose we put it in this way. Let us imagine that nothing whatever exists, but something is going to exist. That something is at least possible.’

‘Why?’ said Demas.

‘It must be either possible or impossible,’ said Socrates, ‘but if it were impossible, it could not be going to exist.’

‘Very well, then, it is possible.’

‘But for the possible to become actual,’ said Socrates, ‘something must be added to its possibility, namely, actuality.’

‘Why is that?’ said Demas.

‘Because,’ the Master continued, ‘if the possible be actual without anything being added to it, the possible is the actual, and everything which may happen—let us say that Demas be converted to sound philosophy—actually has happened, which is absurd.’

'Very well, then, Socrates,' said our host, 'we must add something to the possible to make it actual.'

'But, Demas,' he replied, 'there is nothing to add, for nothing whatever exists.'

'Then, said Demas, 'the possible will not become actual.'

'That is what Crito said,' remarked Socrates drily.

'But I think,' said Demas, 'the original assumption was at fault, for if nothing whatever exists I don't see how anything is even possible.'

'That again is true,' said Socrates, 'and as some things are possible now, and, given their surroundings which are also possible—were possible always, we must say that something has always existed.'

'Socrates,' said Demas, 'your reasoning is strong, and yet it seems to me that I can conceive being spontaneously arising, without conceiving a cause; for instance, that an apple should spontaneously appear on this table, say by a miracle.'

'What is a miracle, Demas?' said Socrates.

'Well,' he answered, 'I am not prepared to give a definition in matters of religion, on the spur of the moment, but I should say that it was something unusual but still possible.'

'But,' said Socrates, 'if everything could spring up spontaneously as you say, there is no reason why it should be even unusual.'

'No,' said Demas, reflectively, 'I suppose not.'

'And yet,' said Socrates, 'all mankind consider such a thing unusual, and call it a miracle.'

'But still,' replied Demas, 'they think it possible.'

'But, Demas,' said Socrates, 'do they call what happens a miracle, because they ascribe it to no cause, or because they ascribe it to some unusual cause, to magic, or Divine power?'

'I must admit,' said Demas, 'that those who speculate on such things usually do ascribe them to powers beyond nature, very illogically to my mind. Still I suppose they do consider such powers as the cause of what takes place.'

'So that the case of what are called miracles,' said Socrates, 'does not help you much.'

'I don't know, Socrates. The generality of men may have recourse to such causes in things they know nothing whatever about, but for my part—and I know others agree with me—I can very well conceive an event happening without conceiving a cause.'

'You can perhaps *imagine* its happening,' said Socrates, 'without imagining its cause. But is it not one thing to think of an event without considering its cause, and a very different thing to consider deliberately that it has no cause, and need not have.'

'Perhaps, Socrates,' our host answered, 'you are right, and I notice that our conversation is the cause of your beakers being empty.'

While Demas replenished the drinking vessels of his guests from the large bowl of iced cup which stood in the centre of the table, and Ion passed round a silver basket containing a kind of bread, or cake, Aristarchus began: 'Socrates, it is getting late, but if you could make our host admit that God's existence can be logically proved, you would have done a great work before we part.'

'Aristarchus is what they call a ritualist,' said Demas to me. 'He will not allow any people to worship God, unless they do it in the same way as himself, and he will not allow himself to worship Him in the same way for two weeks together.'

'And how do you worship God, I should like to know,' said Aristarchus, 'when you say there is no proof of His existence?'

'Some things are beyond proof,' said Demas. 'We must exercise our faith.'

'But is not faith founded on reason?' said Socrates.

'That seems to me to be rationalistic,' answered Demas. 'I might have expected it from a literary man like Ion—'

'What a calumny!' exclaimed the guest referred to.

'To say you are literary? Oh, no!' said Demas, innocently. 'Again,' he continued, 'I might have expected it from a man of business like Crito, who professes

to follow his own judgment in religion, or from Glaucus here, but not from you, Socrates, who take your creed from authority. Are not faith and reason opposed ?'

' What is faith ? ' said Socrates.

' A trust in the merciful promises of God,' Crito interposed.

' A natural instinct which puts us into relation with God,' said Aristarchus.

' I should call it,' said Demas, ' an assent of the mind to that which we cannot prove.'

' Demas,' said Socrates, gravely, ' although you pretend to be a sceptic, your definition is the nearest to the truth. Crito's trust is hope not faith, while true faith is neither an instinct, nor yet natural, as Aristarchus says.'

' Well, my dear Socrates,' said Aristarchus, ' give us the true definition of faith.'

' Belief on the authority of God,' was the reply.

' To that which we cannot prove—I mean by our own reason ? ' Demas asked.

' It is a point disputed in the schools,' said Socrates, ' whether we can have faith strictly so called in what we otherwise know by reason or the senses.'

' Well, Socrates,' said Demas, ' if you take the view that such things do not come under faith, why should you object to my saying faith and reason are opposed ? '

' What is to be the value of our faith, Demas ? ' said Socrates. ' Is it to be mere sentiment or opinion, or is it to be the deepest of human convictions, a thing colouring the whole of our lives, for which we must be even ready to die ? '

' I admit,' said Demas, ' that the exalted view of faith you put forward has been taken by some, and certainly with surprisingly great results both morally and intellectually.'

' And is it not the true view of faith, Demas ? If we are to have it at all, must it not be a reality and no mere pretence ? '

' Well,' said Demas, ' I feel inclined to agree with you there.'

' But,' said Socrates, ' if faith be a blind assent not

founded on reason, how can we have a solid foundation for building up the results you spoke of ? '

' It does not seem strong enough, Socrates,' he replied, ' and that is what makes me sceptical.'

' But can it not be made strong enough ? ' rejoined the Master.

' I don't see how,' said Demas.

' Demas,' said Socrates, ' is not our reason the highest natural thing we have ? '

' I suppose it is,' said our host.

' And may we not say,' his questioner continued, ' that anything of which we are fully and certainly assured by our reason, gives us certainty sufficient to act on ? '

' I don't know that,' said Demas. ' Not everything can be proved. We often act on probability.'

' Is there not some confusion in our minds ? ' said Socrates. ' I did not say that all action must begin in certainty, but that all certainty gives us sufficient ground for action.'

' Yes, Socrates,' Demas answered, ' I spoke inaccurately. Still, can true certainty ever be found, since you seem to reduce all principles to that of contradiction, which you admit cannot strictly be proved.'

' But,' said Socrates, ' did you not also admit that we accepted this first principle, not because we blindly assumed it to be true, but because we saw its truth so clearly that no other proof was necessary ? And this was shown by the absurdities which would follow from the contrary view.'

' Yes, Socrates, I agree that we did get to that point. But how does this help your faith, which you admit is mainly if not altogether about matters which cannot be proved from reason ? '

' Yes, Demas, *what* we believe is so. But *why* we believe, cannot that be proved from reason ? '

' Can it ? ' said Demas. ' Why *do* you believe ? '

' On the authority of God,' said Socrates, ' since faith is belief on the authority of God.'

' But how do you know that God exists,' asked Demas, ' except by faith ? '

'That is the very point,' said Socrates, 'that Aristarchus wanted us to settle before starting.'

'And surely,' Aristarchus interposed, 'it is a point which requires settling, if faith is to be all in a man's life which its advocates claim it should be, and which Demas admitted it is to so many.'

'I said some, not many,' remarked Demas. 'Still I agree that it would strengthen the foundations of faith, if you first proved that God, who is its authority, exists.'

'Ought he not to say, "lay the foundations," rather than "strengthen the foundations"?' said Glaucus. 'For belief on the word of a God about whose existence you are doubtful, seems to me to be a building in the air.'

'Yes, faith must rest on reason,' said Ion. 'We must all agree to that.'

'I am not so sure,' said Critc.

'I call such views rationalism,' said Demas virtuously.

'No,' said Socrates, 'rationalism is reason out of place, but reason in its place is necessary to Divine things, and the true religion carefully guards both.'

'Well, Socrates,' said Demas, 'I should be glad if you could prove to me that God's existence can be certainly known by reason. I am not very well satisfied on the point at present, and the proofs I have read do not seem to me to be at all convincing.'

'Shall we say first,' said Socrates, 'that by God we mean a being infinitely wise, good, and powerful, who if He exist, and if He speak to us, can neither deceive us nor Himself, and whose word then must be believed?'

'Very well,' said Demas. 'Of course if God exist, and if He speak to us, what you have said must follow; but those *ifs* require a great deal of proof.'

'Not very much,' said Socrates. 'Something exists, does it not?'

'I don't know that,' said Demas.

'At least you exist?'

'I am not so sure.'

'Do you doubt it, Demas?'

'I don't know that I do doubt it, but I may if I like.'

I may be in a dream. My thought may have no subject in which it dwells. My idea of my personality may be a delusion.'

'A doubt requires a doubter; there must be a dreamer for there to be a dream,' said Socrates. 'Suppose your personality is a delusion, and there is no subject for your thought—at least the delusion is there and the thought.'

'Well,' said Demas, 'I will make you a present of the delusion if you like.'

'What is a delusion, Demas?' said Socrates.

'I suppose, an erroneous thought,' was the reply.

'At least,' said Socrates, 'it is a thought, and that is not nothing. So something, some being exists.'

'Very well,' said Demas.

'Now,' continued Socrates, 'let us take any being, say your present thought—this being has either always existed, or not. If not, let us go back to the time before it existed.'

'Very well,' said Demas.

'We shall find something existing before it, Demas. Otherwise we shall have universal nothing, and from that we agreed before nothing could begin.'

'Socrates,' said Demas, impressively, 'if you are merely going to give me that old argument about a first cause, of which we hear so much, I am willing to listen; but I warn you it carries little conviction to my mind. I admit that we expect to see one thing preceded by another, but I see no reason why this should not be mere succession. In fact it is quite possible that it is our mind which puts the idea of cause and effect into what really is only succession.'

'Demas,' said Socrates, 'you are going back on what you agreed to before, that a cause is that which gives being to something else, and that such causes exist, and are therefore of course distinguished from mere antecedents. At any rate you must admit that there is an idea of causation in our mind as distinct from that of mere priority, or we could not compare the two things together, and say that perhaps the one is the other. Things in no way

distinguishable from one another are identical, and cannot be compared.'

'I should like you to prove that,' Demas interposed.

'Not now,' said Socrates. 'I was not going to give you precisely the proof from causation you do not care for, and so it does not matter to me for the present, whether you call causes mere antecedents or not. At anyrate you can't deny that being which begins to exist must have being preceding it, and not absolute nothing.'

'Yes,' said Demas, 'I admitted that some time ago.'

'But,' said Socrates, 'this preceding being either began to exist, or did not. If it did, let us go back still further to the time when it, too, had not begun.'

'Very good,' said Demas.

'We shall still find other being existent,' Socrates said.

'I suppose so,' said Demas.

'And we can apply the same principle of logical division to this,' the Master continued. 'It, too, either began to exist or did not.'

'Very well, Socrates

'Until at last we come to a time when all which begins to exist has not yet begun, and still there is being existent.'

'Well, Socrates, what then?'

'This, Demas. That as all which begins has not yet begun, that which is even then existing has never begun, but has always existed.'

'Stop a minute, Socrates,' said Demas. 'Is there not a fallacy here? Why should you assume that we may ever come to a point where all that has beginning has not yet begun? Why should you not go back for ever through a series of beings all dependent on one another, and yet all beginning?'

'Without there being anything at all which has had no beginning?' said Socrates.

'Quite so,' replied Demas.

'But,' said Socrates, 'have you not admitted that no being can come into existence, if absolute nothing preceded it?'

‘Yes, I admitted that.’

‘So that all which begins to exist is dependent.’

‘Very well, Socrates.’

‘And dependent on something outside itself,’ the Master continued; ‘for that is what we mean by dependent.’

‘Of course,’ said Demas.

‘But,’ said Socrates, ‘if we take five numbers, and we can affirm the same thing of number one, and number two, and number three, and number four, and number five, cannot we also affirm it of the whole five, as well as of each individual?’

‘I don’t know, Socrates,’ said Demas. ‘You might say soldier number one, and number two, and number three, and so on, could not stand against a crowd, but it would not be true to say a hundred could not.’

‘Demas,’ said Socrates, ‘that is a fallacy. When you say a soldier could not stand against a crowd, do you mean, alone or in company?’

‘Alone, of course,’ said Demas.

‘But,’ continued his questioner, ‘if it be true that each soldier in a hundred could not stand by himself against a crowd, is it not true of the whole hundred that none of them could stand by themselves? While if it be true that the hundred could put down a riot in company, is it not true of each individual that he could overcome rioters in company?’

‘Yes,’ said Demas, ‘I admit your reason is just, here.’

‘So that,’ added Socrates, ‘what is affirmed of each member of a total *individually*, is true also of the total considered individually.’

‘Very well,’ said Demas.

‘And if what is affirmed of each member have no meaning unless it refer to him individually, then when affirmed of the whole number it must be considered to be spoken of them individually.’

‘I suppose it must, Socrates.’

‘And in our case, Demas, each member of the series is dependent on something outside itself, and preceding it in priority of duration. Therefore the whole number are

dependent on something outside themselves, and preceding them in priority of duration ? '

' It seems so,' said Demas, ' though I am loth to admit it.'

' And,' continued Socrates, ' this holds good whether the series be five, or ten, or a thousand, or an indefinite multitude.'

' Well, Socrates, what then ? '

' Then, my dear Demas, your never-ending series, even if not an impossible supposition, is still dependent on something prior to itself, since all its members are so. But to be dependent so as not to be able to stand alone, and at the same time independent because standing alone and depending on nothing, is a contradiction.'

' But, Socrates,' said Demas, ' is it not a fact that soldiers pile arms by resting them one against another, whereas a single weapon will not stand on end by itself ? '

' Is it when alone,' said Socrates, ' that the pike will not stand upright, or when it is in a pile ? '

' When it is alone, of course,' Demas answered, ' for leaning against others, as I said, it will stand up.'

' In that case,' said Socrates, ' it is not surprising that when piled it does not fall down.'

' Not a bit surprising,' said Demas.

' But,' continued Socrates, ' if it be true of each weapon resting against the others that it cannot stand *alone*, is it not true of the whole number that they cannot stand alone ? '

' It is,' said Demas, ' but still it is a fact that they do as a pile what they cannot do alone. Why, then, should not a series, as a series, be self-sufficing, though each member of the series be dependent ? '

' Demas,' said Socrates, ' is there not this difference between space and time, that a series of objects in space are all present together, and so their totality has a real existence, independent of the existence of its members ; whereas a series of things succeeding one another in time, are never all present together, and their totality as a *simultaneous* whole has only a logical existence in the mind ? '

‘Yes,’ said Demas, ‘there is certainly this great difference between them. But if you do not like my instance, will you give me a better one?’

‘Well,’ said Socrates, ‘shall we suppose a king who lived alone on an island with his servants? There was not another inhabitant.

‘Now every single servant owed his master money, and the king suspecting this, ordered them to give in their accounts in order, saying that he would punish the whole household if any single one made default. Let us suppose that none of them had any spare money to make good his own deficit, much less his neighbour’s. We will suppose that all being very good-natured, though not very business-like, the first before going in borrowed what was wanting to him from the second, and so got through. You see all were interested in each one getting clear, as all would be punished if he failed. And so though they had no hope of escaping in the end they put off the evil day as long as possible.

‘Now, it is evident that after number one had paid the sum he had borrowed into the treasury he would have nothing with which to repay his fellow-servants, since as we have supposed he had given up all he had. The one who had befriended him was then called in, and he had to borrow in haste from a third. We may suppose this third calling on a fourth, and the fourth on a fifth. At length it came to the turn of the last, who having given to his neighbour what was not even enough for himself, and having, as we agreed, no one else to borrow from, would be obliged to make default. But the king had said that if anyone failed he should ascribe the fault to all, and all would be punished. Is there any way by which the punishment could be avoided?’

‘I confess I see none,’ said Demas, who had listened politely to this long argument. ‘Unless some independent person with money to spare could be called in.’

‘And, Demas, such a person was expressly excluded in our supposition.’

‘Yes, Socrates, he was’

' Does the number of the servants affect the reasoning in any way ? ' said Socrates.

' It would not seem to,' said Demas.

' So that, however great were the number,' Socrates went on ' even if supposing it were possible, we consider it as being without any limit, it is still true that the whole are insolvent. For there will always be a deficiency, which none of them by borrowing from one another can really take away.'

' I suppose,' said Demas, ' there is no way out of it.'

' Then,' said Socrates, ' will you still say that a series, every member of which is dependent, can itself be anything but dependent, even if it be indefinitely prolonged ? '

' No,' said Demas, ' I must admit it cannot.'

' So that,' the Master continued, ' as we see all round us, and even in our own thoughts, being which begins, and is therefore dependent, we must come at last to being which is independent ; which has no need to go outside itself for its existence, and which never had a beginning.'

' Very well, Socrates.'

' Now, Demas, consider this independent being as existing before any dependent being had come into existence. It has nothing outside itself ? '

' That is so,' said Demas. ' But why do you speak of being in the singular ? There may be many such independent beings for all we know.'

' May there ? ' said Socrates. ' However,' he continued, ' I was using being in the abstract, to mean the totality of independent being, whether belonging to one only existence, or shared by many.'

' Very good, Socrates,' said Demas.

' At anyrate,' Socrates went on, ' this totality of independent being has no limits, since it has nothing outside itself to limit it, and it cannot limit itself.'

' Can it not, Socrates ? ' said Ion, joining in the discussion. ' That is an old difficulty of mine. Why cannot a being limit itself ? I feel as if it could not, and yet I do not see how to prove that it is so.'

' Would it not be better to put the question in this

way,' said Crito; 'can a being without external limits limit itself?'

'I think we had better say being, rather than a being,' said Socrates. 'For we are speaking of the totality of independent being, and as Demas reminded us we do not yet know whether it is one and indivisible.'

'Well, then,' said Ion, 'can being externally unlimited limit itself?'

'Why not?' said Demas. 'It might bite off its own finger.'

'Surely a finger means a body, and a body implies limit,' said Glaucus.

'Why so?' replied Demas. 'Might there not be an infinite body?'

'An infinite body,' Glaucus answered, 'even if not a contradiction, would have no shape and no parts, and therefore no finger to lose.'

'Besides,' said Ion, 'if the independent or necessary being be one, it is easy to prove that it has no parts, and is indivisible. But if necessary being be divided among several existent beings, the separation of a part from one of them would not affect the totality of the whole.'

'You say,' observed Demas, 'it is easy to prove the independent being to be one and indivisible? Prove it.'

'Later on,' said Socrates.

'Well, at anyrate,' Demas continued, 'you will say that unlimited and independent being is intellectual. But a thinking being can limit its own thought. I am a thinking being, and I can certainly limit mine.'

'You are limited already,' said Crito.

'What a compliment!' Demas remarked. 'Apart from my natural limitations,' he continued, 'of which Crito so feelingly reminds me, I can limit myself further by my will. And I see no reason why I could not do this if I were a being otherwise unlimited, provided I still had a will.'

'When you say you can limit yourself you mean limit your thought, I suppose,' said Aristarchus.

'Yes,' said Demas. 'Why not?'

'That is my difficulty, too,' said Ion. 'It seems as if in fact one could do as Demas says, and yet such a thing appears contradictory.'

'Well,' said Socrates, 'for my part I should be glad to be shown how Demas freely puts a limit to his thought, which nature has not placed already.'

'Certainly,' said Demas. 'I am able to think at the present moment of anything I please, let us say of the prospect of this year's currant crop in Corinth.'

'And a very gloomy one it is,' Glaucus interposed.

'I knew he had been thinking of that all the evening,' said Demas. 'I have the power to think of this,' he continued, 'and yet—unlike Glaucus—I may refrain from doing so. Is not this to limit my thought?'

'Do you limit your power of thinking of currants or anything else you please,' said Socrates, 'or only the act of thinking of them?'

'The act, of course,' said Demas, 'since the power is not taken away. Still, to be actually thinking is something more than to be merely able to think, and so, by refraining from the act I am limiting my thought.'

'Is the nature of your thought such,' said Socrates, 'as to be always in act, or does it require some other circumstances to put it into act? For instance, your will, or a train of memory, or an external influence such as the words of a book or a friend.'

'I admit,' said Demas, 'that my thought on any particular point is, as a rule, in reserve rather than in act. Still, by deliberately not putting it into act I so far limit it.'

'But, Demas,' said Socrates, 'would the act always follow from the power, if you did not prevent it?'

'Not always,' said Demas, 'but sometimes.'

'And even in the case where it would follow,' Socrates continued, 'would it follow necessarily from the nature of the mind itself, or would it be called into existence by something external to the nature of the mind?'

'I think,' said Demas, 'that sometimes at anyrate, it would follow necessarily from the mind itself, unless I

prevented it. Thereby,' he added, with great satisfaction, 'limiting my mind by an act of my will.'

'Socrates,' said Crito, 'do stop Demas. 'He has made the same remark about ten times in the last five minutes.'

'What an exaggeration?' said Demas. 'My dear friend,' he added earnestly, 'I must ask you to weigh your words more. You will never be able to think accurately if you speak so inexactly.'

'Glaucus,' said Ion, 'give Crito a biscuit to console him.'

'Let us see, then,' said Socrates, 'where we are. Some acts of thought follow essentially from the nature of the mind. What acts are these?'

'I don't know, I'm sure,' said Demas.

'Are they some determined acts in particular?' asked his questioner.

'I don't know that they are,' said Demas.

'Then shall we say that they are indeterminate acts in general?' continued Socrates.

'If you like,' said Demas.

'Well,' said Socrates, 'let us take an instance. We will suppose that Glaucus is actually thinking of his currant crop, and that this thought follows inevitably from the nature of his mind, and is independent of external cause. In this case for him deliberately not to think of currants is to deprive his mind of something essential, and so to really limit himself.'

'Exactly what I say. You could not have put it better,' exclaimed Demas.

'You could not have put it better, Demas says, than by putting it exactly as he does,' languidly observed Crito.

'Ion,' said Demas, 'throw something at Crito, his mind is getting weak.'

'Socrates,' said Glaucus, solemnly, 'so far as I am concerned all that Demas has said about me is a calumny, for I am thinking of nothing but your agreeable conversation.'

'Glaucus,' said Demas, 'you should not excuse yourself. It shows an uneasy conscience. Besides you will spoil

Socrates' argument. Go on, Socrates,' he continued. ' I agree with all you have said so far.'

' How happy Socrates must feel,' said Crito.

' Demas,' continued Socrates, ' if, as we supposed, it is essential to Glaucus to be thinking of the Isthmian fruit trade quite apart from external circumstances, this must hold good even if those circumstances were absent. Let us suppose that Glaucus, instead of being a model Athenian citizen, had been a captain of Scythian bowmen, with a mind in every other respect the same.'

' Good gracious ! ' said Crito.

' A very proper supposition,' said Demas.

' I always thought there was something martial about his step,' observed Ion, in a tone of conviction.

' However this may be,' said Socrates, ' such a change of accidental surroundings could not affect the essential nature of his intellect, in which case he would still be thinking of currants, unlikely as it may appear.'

' Does that follow logically from the principle laid down,' said Demas, ' for I admit the conclusion is absurd.'

' It indeed follows,' said Socrates. ' At least I see no flaw.'

' But let us,' said Demas, ' take another and more likely instance. I say it follows essentially from a mind not warped by disease, that a child should not only potentially but actually love its mother.'

' Even if she died in its infancy ? ' said Socrates.

' In that case it has not got a mother,' said Demas.
' But I am supposing it has.'

' That is supposing a great deal,' said Socrates. ' But let us imagine that its mother is cruel and inhuman, and not only beats and starves the child, but never teaches it any principle of natural duty, or even the very name of mother, would the child be certain to love its persecutor in this case ? '

' Perhaps not,' said Demas.

' It seems, then,' said Socrates, ' as if external circumstances after all had their share in putting the powers of the mind into act.'

‘But how is it then,’ said Demas, ‘that subjects of thought rise in the mind unbidden, so that at times all the force of the will is hardly strong enough to prevent us thinking of them?’

‘Is not such a subject,’ said Socrates, ‘generally some fact stored up in the memory, whether pleasant or the reverse?’

‘It often is something we remember,’ Demas answered, ‘but sometimes something we look forward to in the future.’

‘Which takes its shape and colour,’ said Socrates, ‘from something that happened in the past.’

‘That is so, Socrates, as a rule, I admit.’

‘I think,’ said Socrates, ‘you might say always.’

‘Still,’ said Demas, ‘the fact remains that these trains of thought often arise unbidden, and independent of the will.’

‘Yes,’ said Socrates, ‘that is true.’

‘On what then,’ continued Demas, ‘do they depend? Is it on anything external?’

‘It does not seem so. You admit that they do not come from the will. They must come, then, from the nature of the mind.’

‘I admit, Demas,’ said Socrates, ‘that the causes external to the mind which start a train of thought are often very obscure. Still that does not prove that they do not exist. In fact if we examine our own mind carefully—and this is almost all we have to go on—we shall find such external motives oftener than we think.’

‘But I am inclined to believe,’ he continued, ‘that we can prove that it is external circumstances—that is, external to the nature of the mind—which determine our actual thought in a simpler way. Let us suppose that your mind finds itself, without your will, thinking of some subject agreeable or the reverse—the visit, let us say, you paid last autumn to Crito’s country house, or the lawsuit of your own which is coming on. If you had not spent that fortnight among the olive groves, or been summoned to appear, would your mind be able to look back upon the one fact, or look forward to the other?’

'No,' said Demas, 'I suppose not.'

'So that your mind,' said Socrates, 'is determined by something external to itself after all.'

'I suppose it is,' Demas replied.

'Socrates,' said Crito, 'I am afraid in this instance you put the agreeable and disagreeable things in the wrong order, for Demas loves a lawsuit, even if the cause be his own, while I am afraid his last stay with us was very dull.'

'Crito wants me to compliment him,' said Demas, 'but I am not going to all the same. Ion and I don't at all dislike staying with him, but as for liking to be party to an action no lawyer is such a fool. Have some more wine, Crito,' he continued. 'And please go on, Socrates.'

'So that,' observed Socrates, 'it comes to this. If it be—as it is—a limitation for power not to become act, that limitation was in our mind already. For the thought was, as they say, only in potency, until circumstances external to the nature of the mind brought it into act.'

'Yes, Socrates,' said Demas, 'but my point is this. I being in some particular case so determined—by external circumstances if you like—come now and by an internal act of the mind, that is of my will, so to speak counter-determine my thought not to act. And this I say is limitation of myself by myself.'

'Demas,' said Socrates, 'if you are already actually thinking of a shooting party at Crito's, can you at the same time not be thinking of it?'

'No, Socrates, that would be a contradiction, which, as you know, I abhor.'

'So that,' said Socrates, 'what your act of limitation amounts to is this: that when you might have been actually thinking of the day you had, through your own internal act of will you as a fact are not.'

'That is so,' said Demas.

'And this,' continued Socrates, 'is a limitation, because power in act is something higher and more perfect than power in reserve.'

'It is,' said Demas.

'And, therefore,' the Master went on, 'a being whose

natural condition is power in reserve, and not in act, is limited in comparison with a being whose natural condition is power always in act ? '

' That is so,' said Demas, ' just as a mill in motion is something more perfect than a mill at rest.'

' But is not our natural condition, Demas,' said Socrates, ' to be mills at rest ? '

' Yes,' replied our host, ' I admit it is.'

' So much so,' said Ion, ' that I believe Aristarchus is asleep.'

' A mere calumny, my dear Ion,' said Aristarchus, looking rather guilty.

' In which case,' said Socrates, with a glance at Aristarchus to make sure, ' *even when awake*, we are already limited by our very nature.'

' Ion,' said Aristarchus, pathetically, ' my character is ruined. Socrates believes he has sent me to sleep, and he will never forgive me.'

' We should always forgive our enemies,' said Ion, solemnly. ' Socrates knows his duty.'

' I assure you, dear Socrates,' said Aristarchus, ' that I heard every word, and am seriously thinking of repeating it to-morrow to my boys, who are beginning philosophy.'

' It is wrong to be cruel to children,' said Demas.

' Aristarchus couldn't be cruel to children,' said Glaucus. ' He would leave Demas' part of the discussion out.'

' Go on, Socrates,' said Demas, with dignity. ' What is the conclusion of the matter ? '

' This, Demas,' was the reply. ' That as we did not make ourselves, neither do we limit ourselves.'

' But then, Socrates,' Demas urged, ' is my will nothing ? When I prevent my thought I prevent my nature attaining a perfection of which it is capable. Surely this is to limit it. Just as when I prevent the water turning the mill I limit that.'

' It is true, Demas,' said Socrates, ' your will is not nothing. It determines the limitation, it does not make it. The mill is limited already. It requires an external power to put it in motion. You prevent that power ; that is, you

determine what direction the limitation shall take. But the limitation was there already, for take away both the water and the miller directing the water, and the mill remains silent. It has the power to grind the corn, but of itself it will never pass into act.'

' And does the spiritual Socrates,' said Demas, ' compare the mind to a mere machine like a mill ? '

' It was your own comparison, my dear Demas, and is true as far as it goes. Both have the power of performing their own functions, both require some external motive force for power to pass into act ;—in the one case the stream, in the other the outer world made known through the senses. And in each case there is an artificer who made the machinery, and a miller to direct it.'

' And what, then,' said Demas, ' is the difference between the two, for your language strikes me as being very materialistic ? '

' Wake up, Aristarchus ! ' said Ion, ' and look at Demas getting shocked.'

' The illustration is not materialism,' said Socrates, ' for in our case the miller forms one being with the mill, not merely inhabiting it, as I once thought, but informing it, and making it what it is. Just as the genius of Homer gives life to his pages, and makes what would be a series of black marks on the paper into an immortal poem, so is the soul the life and informing principle of the body.'

' Then,' said Demas, ' if I understand you, Socrates, you will not admit that my will limits my intellect, because I cannot take away its power of thinking, while to need something outside it to determine its act of thinking is a limitation it has already.'

' Yes, Demas,' said Socrates, ' that was the conclusion we came to.'

' But,' said Demas, ' is an intellectual being free, as you say it is, which needs, in this way, external determination for every act ? '

' I do not say,' rejoined Socrates, ' that the *intellectual being* requires external determination for every act, but the intellect.'

‘ Well,’ said Demas, ‘ is it not the same thing ? ’

‘ No,’ Socrates answered. ‘ If by intellectual being you mean the soul, it consists of will as well as intellect. One of the chief forces which determines the intellect is the will ; and the will is free.’

‘ Is it, Socrates ? ’ said Demas, innocently. ‘ That is one of the very points I should like you to prove.’

‘ Demas,’ replied the Master, ‘ one of the chief limitations of our intellect is the being able only to attend to one thing properly at a time. Let us leave free-will for the present, and return to consider whether after all a being with no limits outside itself, can limit itself from within.’

‘ Well, Socrates,’ said Demas, ‘ it would appear as if it could not. But your throat must be dry,’ he added. ‘ Glaucus, fill Socrates’ cup, for his mind, being limited to attend to only one thing at a time, I am afraid is neglecting his body.’

‘ Thank you,’ said Socrates. ‘ Do you see, Demas,’ he continued, ‘ another important conclusion we can draw from our discussion ? ’

‘ No,’ said Demas. ‘ What is it ? ’

‘ We are essentially limited,’ replied Socrates, ‘ because our mind cannot exercise itself without passing from power in reserve to power in action. But this limit at all events it would not have if it were always in action.’

‘ Well, what then ? ’ said Demas.

‘ Then,’ said Socrates, ‘ the independent being, which is essentially unlimited, cannot be subject to this restriction, is therefore always in action.’

‘ You mean,’ said Aristarchus, ‘ that God is one eternal act of thinking all that can be thought.’

‘ Do you mean to say,’ exclaimed Demas, ‘ that God cannot think of what He likes ? Is not that an imperfection ? ’

‘ God cannot contradict Himself,’ said Socrates. ‘ That would be an impossible thing, and impossibility is not perfection. God’s essence is to be one pure act of infinite thought. He cannot think and at the same time not think. His thought is Himself. What He is He loves.

What He loves He wills. And what He wills He cannot at the same time not will.'

' How, then, is He free ? ' said Demas.

' Demas,' Socrates replied, ' let us discuss the whole subject of free-will some other night.'

' Very well,' said Demas, ' but you will find it hard to satisfy me there.'

' At anyrate,' said Socrates, ' you will admit now that the totality of independent being is not only unlimited externally, but cannot limit itself.'

' Very well,' replied Demas. ' What then ? '

' Then,' said Socrates, ' this totality of necessary being is infinite— infinite in every way, not only in duration and spatial presence, but in perfection ; since to be finite in any perfection implies limit.'

' And what follows then ? ' said Demas.

' That being infinite,' Socrates continued, ' it is also one and indivisible, and therefore incorporeal, since body implies extension, and that which is extended can, of its nature, be divided.'

' How do you prove all that ? ' said Demas.

' Do you admit,' asked Socrates, ' that if it is indivisible it cannot be extended, or corporeal, and therefore could have no finger to cut off, as you supposed ? '

' Yes,' said Demas, ' the extended is of course divisible ; but why the necessary being is not divisible I don't at all see.'

' Because it would involve a contradiction,' said Socrates. ' For, let us suppose that infinite being is divisible. We may then divide it into parts. Now these parts are not infinite, because if they were the part would be equal to the whole. Therefore, they are finite.'

' Why may they not be infinite ? ' said Demas. ' Are there not infinities of various orders ? '

' Mathematicians, I know, Demas,' said Socrates, ' distinguish infinities in this way. But these are not the true infinity of which we are speaking. For that means absolute perfection without any conceivable limit whatever, and such infinity is only one. Anything less than that, even

though called infinity, is finite, at least in some respects, just as we may consider what is called an infinite line to be without assignable limits in length, though in breadth it is not at all infinite.'

'Very well,' said Demas. 'Let us agree if you like that the parts into which we divided the infinite would be finite in some respects.'

'Then, Demas,' rejoined Socrates, 'their sum will also be finite in some respects.'

'Why is that?' said Demas.

'Since the addition of a definite number of finites must be finite,' was the reply.

'Let us suppose,' Socrates continued, 'that we can divide infinity into four equal parts, each, as we have seen, in some respects finite. The sum of these parts is an amount which is four times a thing finite in some respects, and is therefore certainly itself finite in some respects. But the same sum is also infinite being which is finite in no respects. Now for infinite being to be in some respects both finite and infinite is a contradiction.'

'But,' said Demas, 'why do you take the supposition of four parts? Supposing that infinite being were divided into an infinite number of parts, would your reasoning still hold good?'

'Socrates,' said Aristarchus, 'it is getting very late, we must really be making a move.'

'At least,' said Demas, 'you will take another cup of wine before you go.'

'Demas,' said Socrates, as he rose to take his leave, 'infinite number is an impossibility, but if I were to take another cup I should almost be proving it a reality.'

'Good-night, my dear Demas,' he continued, 'you have treated us royally. Our western guest is going to stay with me, and I invite you all to dine with me to-morrow night, to meet him.'

Demas and the rest said they would be very glad to come, and Socrates, refusing any further refreshment, then took his leave. With a last hearty good-night to our agreeable host, we followed him into the open air. The

street was silent, save for the far-off murmur of the sea upon the beach, and the occasional signal of some vessel moving down the distant harbour of Peiræus. The others turned off in an opposite direction. Socrates and I walked in silence towards his house.

The orb of night was at her full. Half the street lay in black shadow ; on the other side pillar and portico and tower stood out with those softened outlines which give such an indefinable charm and touch of vague melancholy to a city sleeping in the moonlight. A shower had fallen earlier in the evening, for the roadway glistened, and the air blew cool with the freshness after rain.

‘How lovely it is,’ said Socrates. ‘Would it were as good as it is beautiful.’ He said no more. It was a time for reflection more than words. Pleasant memories of the agreeable evening I had spent rested gently in my mind, and mingled with the beauty of the scene before me. I recalled the different points of the dialogue, and the vivacity and humour of the guests. ‘I wonder what Demas really believes,’ I said to myself. But my mind refused to discuss any more problems, and contented itself with lazily turning over the leaves of the picture book which memory held up before it.

At length we stopped before a low-roofed house standing a little back from the street. Socrates entered and I followed. Now that the excitement of the evening was over I felt tired and somewhat bewildered, and assented to my new host’s arrangements for my reception, like a man in a dream. In a few minutes, without my taking any great notice of the how or the where, I was safely ensconced in a comfortable bed, and was soon, no doubt, fast asleep.

H. CASTLE, C.S.S.R.

SUBJECT AND OBJECT IN KNOWLEDGE AND CONSCIOUSNESS—III

I

In a former article¹ the question was raised whether the intellect, whose proper object is the abstract and universal, can nevertheless acquire some sort of a conscious representation of the concrete self, over and above our sense knowledge of the latter; and the question, though not without its difficulties, was answered in the affirmative.

The intellectual concept which I thus acquire about the nature of my own *individual self*—whether by an accumulation of abstract attributes from the data of sense experience or by the process of introspection and inference indicated by St. Thomas²—has an origin in no essential respect different from that of my intellectual knowledge of *other* individuals: it is the outcome of a long-continued process of intellectual abstraction and inference exercised on the data furnished by internal and external sense knowledge and *sense-memory* of all those vital acts and states of mine which ever fell within the sphere of my consciousness. It involves convictions which cannot spring from consciousness alone—even from reflex consciousness—apart from memory and inference: (a) the conviction, for example, that I am a *substantial* agent or subject of all my conscious mental activities; and (b) the conviction that I am not merely a substantial being but that I *abide* or *persist*, identical *permanently* with myself throughout all my changing and transient conscious states.³

¹ I. E. RECORD, May, p. 492.

² Ib., pp. 493-5.

³ Not to mention the many other convictions reached by further psychological analysis of mental operations and embodied in such judgments as: *I am composed of matter and spirit.* *I am endowed with reason.* *I possess a spiritual soul.* *I possess an immortal soul.* *I am free.* *I am responsible for my acts.* *I am a creature, finite, dependent on a Supreme Being, etc.* All these propositions have for logical subject an 'I.' It is into the nature, genesis, and extent of his immediate, intuitive knowledge—both sensible and intellectual—of this 'I' in his own case, that the reader is invited to inquire.

The latter conviction involves *memory* and is not a direct intuition of any consciousness, for it seems to be universally admitted and accepted that consciousness of whatsoever kind reveals directly *only present acts, operations or states* of the conscious subject: these and these alone form the *direct* and *immediate* object of the self-conscious energy of the mind.¹

'Apart from memory,' writes Fr. Maher, '*self-consciousness*, strictly understood, discloses to me only the *present existence of the Ego* in my various operations. It does not reveal my past history nor assure me of the identity of the man sitting here with the boy who was at a certain school many years ago.'²

II

But does the former of the two convictions just referred to—that *I am a substance*—the *intellectual* conception of myself *as a substance*—fall within the immediate scope of the higher reflex or *self-consciousness*? This is not so easy to decide. When, by means of our sense faculties we become aware of our own organic states and acts, the intellect forms, as has been already indicated, abstract concepts of each and all of these, and thus becomes directly cognizant or aware of a *united group or series of vital, conscious activities*, of *vital, mental, conscious existence*,—*vita in actu secundo*, as the scholastics call it,—all of which it necessarily and naturally and spontaneously refers to a *substantial living agent* thought of by it as 'self.'

¹ Mercier (*Psychologie*, vol. ii., pp. 108-110), answering Mill's objection that 'we cannot be conscious of free-will, or of a *power* to choose,' writes: 'The expression "when a man acts he is conscious that he might have remained inactive," does not mean that the power of acting, as such, falls directly within the field of consciousness. Not to act is a negation; and a power could not have a *non-ens* for its term. The expression means that while I am acting I am conscious that my act is caused by my own choice.' Neither substance nor power, then, but only *action* is the immediate object of consciousness.

² *Psychology*, p. 466. This is the teaching of St. Thomas: The mind apprehends itself, and perceives its existence *in its own acts*: 'Quantum igitur ad actualem cognitionem qua aliquis considerat se in actu animam habere, sic dico quod anima cognoscitur per actus suos. In hoc enim aliquis percipit se animam habere et vivere, et esse, quod percipit se sentire et intelligere et alia hujusmodi vitae opera exercere.'—(*De Veritate* q. 10, a. 8, apud Maher, *op. cit.*, p. 364.)

Kant would express this by saying that the intellect is compelled to think this current of sense phenomena by means of these concepts through a necessity of thought. I admit the necessity ; but I maintain that what is thus directly and immediately revealed to the intellect (the *objectum intelligibile*, the *noumenon*—in this case a vital, active, conscious energy), is no mere fictitious, unreal creation of thought, no mere logical or formal or regulative entity, but is just as real, is indeed the same reality as is revealed to the sense faculties (the *phenomenon*) : it is the immediate intellectual judgment or 'interpretation' of sense experience.

But now to go one step further, does the intellect, by a like process of immediate interpretation, become directly aware, not merely of the whole, unified, continuous series of those vital energies (which reveal themselves concretely in sense knowledge) as energies, operations, activities, but also of a something, a substance, a subject, an agent, of which the former are activities ; or is the intellectual knowledge of self as a substance or agent rather a necessary and immediate inference from the former knowledge ? My belief is that the intellect does reach this knowledge of self—not merely as an existing activity or energy—but as an existing substance and subject of this energy, by a necessity of thought : a necessity which forces it to think that if an activity exists it must be the activity of some agent, if an energy exists it must exist in, and be exerted by, some subject. But again I insist that this agent, subject, substance, thus necessarily brought under the ken of intellect (as a 'noumenon,' an '*objectum intelligibile*'), is no mere logical or formal entity—in the sense of being unreal—but is in fact the reality, the ENS REALE, which reveals itself in another way—as a 'phenomenon'—to the senses.

III

Whether, however, besides this intellectual apprehension of self as an abiding substance, identical with itself throughout changing states—an apprehension reached, as we have just seen, by *memory* and *inference*—there is any

more immediate and intimate *intellectual* knowledge of the self as an abiding substance, given in consciousness—does not appear to have been definitely decided by psychologists. It suggests the question proposed already : what does intellectual, as distinct from sense, consciousness reveal to us about the *Ego* ?

Scholastic writers have taught consistently that consciousness does not instruct us or give us any direct information concerning the *nature* of the soul or mind : whether it is a *substance*, for instance, or a mere *succession of conscious states*, whether *material* or *spiritual*, etc. Consciousness, they say, reveals to us only the *existence* of the Self or *Ego*, and it does so in every single conscious state. This, however, needs some little elucidation ; for, what, it may be asked, does this ' *existence* ' embrace or comprehend, whether for the senses or for the intellect ? Or does this apprehension of the ' *existence* ' of the Self ' in its acts ' appertain to sense exclusively, or to intellect exclusively, or to both ?

As regards the ' contents ' of this ' *existence* ' Fr. Maher says¹ that ' the mind thus ascertains directly that it *exists*, that it is a *unity*, that it *abides*, and that it is *different from its states*. But it cannot in this way learn *what is its inner constitution*—whether, for instance, it is material or spiritual.' And as regards the faculty to which such knowledge is to be attributed he writes² :—

This perception [of the Self *in its acts*] is of a concrete reality. In becoming conscious of a mental state I become aware of the Self as the *cause* or *subject* of the state, and of the state as a *modification* of the Self. Such self-consciousness may appear either as an *implicit concomitant awareness* of self during a mental process ; or it may be the result of a *formal reflective act*, in which the mind deliberately turns back on itself.

The first of these extracts shows that he has here in mind the knowledge of self which we gather not merely in any present conscious act but by the aid of memory and of rational interpretation of, and inference from, the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 364 (*italics* partly mine).

² *Ibid.* (*italics* partly mine).

phenomena of sense ; and that he calls the knowledge got even by these latter means 'direct' (and elsewhere, I think, 'immediate') knowledge. It is important to note both the fact of this usage of the words and also that it is in keeping with the common scholastic usage.

The second extract shows that he refers such knowledge of self to both the higher or intellectual and the lower or sense faculties ; without, however, indicating what it is exactly that intellectual self-consciousness reveals to us over and above the sense knowledge we possess of those vital functions which come within its sphere. About the function or functions of this mysterious reflex-consciousness we have, therefore, yet to inquire. It may not be so easy to see where or how it comes in, or why it should come in, as an essential factor in building up the actual knowledge each possesses of his own individual personality.

IV

We have seen that by the faculties of sense knowledge, we, in common with the lower animals, have a direct perception or awareness (which is commonly called consciousness) of those functions of ours which constitute our sentient life. We have seen, moreover, that, endowed as we are with intellect which seizes on each sense *datum* in an abstract state, we form an abstract idea of the individual self, and that aided by memory we thus build up an abstract historical, quasi-objective conception of our own abiding personality.¹

Now, this I believe to be the concept which forms the logical subject of all our intellectual judgments about ourselves, such as : *I think, I exist, I live, I write*, etc. It is not got *exclusively* through the external senses and memory, but involves internal sensation as well, and is given both in intellectual and sense cognition in all those mental acts in which there is any inner or subjective reference. In every such act there is a tacit identification of the *present* 'phenomenal' *Ego*, revealed by the internal and external

¹ Cf. Maher, *op. cit.*, p. 365.

senses (the sum total of present 'self' sensations) with the present 'noumenal' *Ego* (the same sum-total apprehended in the abstract by the intellect as a group of energies, a life, an existence) and with the permanent, abiding, active, substantial *Ego*, which is in the fuller sense the 'noumenal' or real Self. This tacit identification is the recognition of what we call *unity of consciousness*. This unity of consciousness is a psychological fact in the sense-life of the animal though the animal can have no abstract notion of unity or of its own self as a unity :¹ it is a psychological fact in the intellectual life of man, and one from which he, being endowed with reason, is impelled, by a necessity of thought, to infer that he is one, single, abiding substance or agent : nor—be it observed against the Kantian assumption—is the reality embodied in that inference any less real or any less *knowable* because it is reached by a necessity of thought. Neither is there the slightest reason for distinguishing—as Kant does—between *it*, the felt, revealed, inferred, known self, the self-object, and the feeling, inferring, knowing self, to which the revelation is made, the self-subject, or for calling the latter alone real and concluding that it is 'transcendental' and 'unknowable'.²

v

When the intellect abstracts its ideas from the sense knowledge of self, the intellect has *self* for *object*—but only the organic or sentient side of self. It undoubtedly becomes aware, however, not merely of sentient, but also of higher, intellectual, spiritual, activities, and of a corresponding higher side of self. But how? Is it by way of inference from sentient states, using analogical concepts borrowed from sense life and applying them—'via affirmationis, negationis et eminentiae'—to its own activities: the only way in which we have any knowledge of the nature of any suprasensible or immaterial thing whatever: *nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu?* Or is the intellect conscious of its own activities, *independently of sense*,

¹ Cf. Maher, *op. cit.*, pp. 361-2.

² Maher, *op. cit.*, p. 474; cf. *infra*, p. 620.

thereby revealing to us at least the *actual existence* of its own activities according as they take place: 'nihil est in intellectu, etc. . . . nisi intellectus ipse'?

It is certainly in the former way alone that it reaches any knowledge of its own *nature*; though psychologists often speak as if it reached, in this direct way, a great deal more than it does about its own nature and constitution. Several rational convictions are *immediately* forced in upon me as soon as I concentrate the energy of my senses and intellect upon the flow of my own mental life.

That I am a real being [writes Father Maher¹] subsisting in myself; that I am immediately aware of myself as *subject* of sensations, feelings, and thoughts, but not any one of them; that I am the cause of my own volitions; that I am distinct from other beings; that there is in me a Self—that I am an *Ego* which is the centre and source of my acts and states, the ultimate ground and *subject* of my thoughts and affections, is forced upon me by constant, intimate, immediate self-experience, with the most irresistible evidence.

These things are so; but they are not all immediate data of self-consciousness unless this latter be understood to embrace immediate interpretation of, and inference from, what is directly and through memory revealed to us in our sentient and intellectual cognitions. And the knowledge of self which we reach through these channels is, as a matter of fact, commonly described as 'direct' and 'immediate' knowledge, and as a product of intellectual or reflex consciousness. Nor do I see anything to object to in this usage; for the *objectum intelligibile*, the 'noumenon' of which we are thus made aware, is just as real and just as knowable as the sense 'phenomenon,' being simply the intellectual interpretation or view of the latter.

In my own belief, *all* the *intellectual* knowledge I have of my 'self' is in the nature of an *interpretation* of sense-experience: even that contained in the predicates of such 'self' affirmation as *I exist*, *I think*, *I live*, *I am I*:² so that my *intellectual* knowledge (as distinct from my *sense* know-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 463.

² Cf. Maher, *op. cit.*, p. 363.

ledge) even of my own existence, life, activity, etc.—i.e., the knowledge of myself in and through those abstract concepts and as verifying or realizing them—comes by abstraction and inference from the data of sense.

VI

But, then, do I deny the existence or the possibility of self-consciousness in the stricter sense? Do I deny that by my higher cognitive faculty I have the power of *reflecting* on my own act and, by this new, reflex effort, apprehending the direct act while I am eliciting it?

Well, I have already pointed out¹ that even in sense-knowledge, there is a peculiar conscious quality or tone or colour—a something for which I know no name—in *one* great section of sense data not to be found in *the other* section: a difference which intellect next apprehends in the abstract as that between two abstract qualities of consciousness, namely, 'selfness' and 'otherness.' I have also admitted that both sense and intellect can thus apprehend both present and remembered activities as *objects* by distinct acts of internal sensation, sense memory and intellectual abstraction. And I now further note what is indeed an undeniable fact of consciousness, that the exercise of cognitive activity at any instant is not necessarily confined to any one object, but rather takes in an ever changing field of vision where many objects are simultaneously apprehended, compared, united; where some one or few are perceived clearly and vividly, the others more vaguely. I quite recognize, moreover, that those objects of present attention and scrutiny may be some of my own present or remembered mental activities: that my cognitive energy can branch and spread itself out so that I can *think* and *watch myself thinking*, so that I can doubt, compare, infer, resolve, etc., and *watch*—mentally—*all these processes of mine take place within me*. I admit that all this can and does take place, though I do not know *how*. I feel it to be a fact, even although I feel this

¹ *Vide* I. E. RECORD, May, 1908, p. 491.

to be a fact too, that the more intense the direct thought or judgment is, the weaker and less reliable will the reflex act of watching be.

It is curious how some philosophers have allowed themselves to be so influenced by certain theories or conceptions of mental activity as to attempt to prove the impossibility of some palpable *data* of consciousness. Against the evident fact that we *do* actually *watch* our own mental activities as they go on, Dr. Maudsley argues thus: 'In order to observe its own action it is necessary that the mind pause from activity, yet it is the train of activity that is to be observed.'¹ This simply assumes that the mind cannot exert its cognitive energy in *more than one channel at the same time*,—against the patent fact that it does!

VII

Difficulties of this kind arise, I think, from conceiving mental energy after the analogy of the transitive energies of the physical universe. For my part I see little utility in trying to make out points of similarly or dissimilarity between things belonging to such different spheres of being.² What I know of mechanical motion, of sound, light, electricity, etc., does not help me in any appreciable way to answer the question: is any act of *sense perception* 'implicitly and concomitantly aware' of itself or of its organ or faculty when it becomes directly aware of its proper object? Perhaps it is; but I see no cogent reason for thinking so; and I am utterly unable so to isolate from my total consciousness any act of sense perception as to question it directly.³ Nor am I in any better position to decide whether any or every act of *intellectual cognition* is 'implicitly and concomitantly aware of itself,' or of the intellect or Self as *its subject*, while it directly cognizes something as *object*. Such concomitant awareness of self may be an essential characteristic of every single cognitive

¹ *The Psychology of the Mind*, apud Maher, p. 41.

² Cf. I. E. RECORD, April, 1908, pp. 400-1.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 412-13.

act of whatsoever kind ; but I see no adequate reason to suppose it to be so.

And again, while I admit that I can 'watch myself thinking' I am not at all sure whether any one *single* act of intellectual cognition—any more than a single act of sense cognition,—is capable of 'bending back' or 'reflecting' on itself, thus establishing 'a species of perfect identity between agent and patient which is utterly incompatible with any form of action that pertains to a corporeal organ.'¹ The broad, complex fact of introspection, of watching and analyzing our own mental activities, is one which, though most intimate to all of us, 'has often been recognized by thoughtful minds to be the most wonderful fact in the universe ;'² but whether my mental life even in its higher manifestations, wonderful and mysterious as these undoubtedly are, implies that in any *single, isolated intellectual act*, 'I recognize an absolute identity between myself thinking about something, and myself reflecting on that thinking Self '³—I should be slow to say. I cannot isolate any intellectual act sufficiently to determine. When, for example, I form the intellectual judgment that 'I am a free agent,' does this one single act of comparison which reveals (as its proper object) the relation of the logical predicate to the logical subject, also reveal—and make me concomitantly aware of—the psychological subject or agent eliciting the said act of judgment ? No doubt I may be keenly conscious all the time—perfectly alive to the fact, especially when my attention is called to it—that it is *I* who am forming the judgment, that *I* am the judging *agent*. But this may be in virtue of a distinct, concomitant act of

¹ Maher, *op. cit.*, p. 240 ; cf. p. 472. In the latter context the argument for the spirituality of the intellect, drawn from the 'reflex' character of intellectual cognition as opposed to the exclusive 'directness' of sense cognition, seems necessarily to imply that by one *single act* the intellectual agent can *directly* cognize some object, and *reflexly* himself the knowing subject. If two or more distinct acts be supposed to be necessary, does not the opposition to organic *sentient* action break down, seeing that even in *vegetative life* there is action and interaction between the different parts of the organism,—vital activity being at least in this wide sense *immanent*, not *transitive* ?

² *Ibid.*, p. 472.

³ *Ibid.*

advertence, accompanying the direct judgment, rather than to any 'reflex' quality of the direct act itself.

VIII

This whole question—*how* do we become aware or conscious of a present mental act, sentient or intellectual: by that same act reflecting somehow on itself, or by a distinct, concomitant act?—appears to me to be of minor importance compared with another question which I may call the Kantian question: whether, in our judgments about the 'first person singular'—in that complete judgment made famous by Descartes, for example: *I think; I exist*—the (logical) subject of the judgment, the '*I*' that is revealed to me in consciousness, and which Kant calls the 'phenomenal' or 'empirical' *Ego*—is *identical with the Ego* eliciting the act of judgment, the *Ego* that is the (psychological) *subject* and *agent* of the mental act, the judging *Ego*,—which Kant regards as the sole and only **REAL EGO**;—or whether on the contrary, this latter does not of necessity *transcend* every effort of mine to know it, and hide itself away as the underlying psychological *subject* of every conscious act so that it can never by any possibility become an *object* of an act of cognition, remaining thus for ever *in itself unknowable*: seeing that in the attempt to reveal itself it is inevitably metamorphosed, if I may so express it, by that subjective form or groove or category of the phenomenal '*Ego*' or 'unity of consciousness' into which all knowable experience must run?¹

I see not the slightest reason to doubt that it is the *real Ego*, the known subject; even though I fail to see clearly *how* that process of self-cognition is effected. And while I admit that I cannot know the *real Ego* unless in so far as it reveals itself to me by becoming an *object* of my thought, I see no reason whatever for supposing that in thus revealing itself it becomes so disfigured and transmuted that I can never be sure the appearance it presents

¹ Cf. I. E. RECORD, May, pp. 483; 487, Maher, *op. cit.*, pp. 474, 475.

to me represents it truly as it is in itself. In fact, the imaginary comparison of the reality 'as known' with the reality 'as it is in itself' is an absurdity which springs from the fundamentally false assumption that lies at the bottom of all idealism: that we can know nothing directly except our own mental states. The examination of that assumption and of the other questions raised around it¹ would carry us too far at present. Nowhere, however, is the assumption so gratuitous, or the distinction between the *phenomenon* or 'thing known' and the *noumenon* or 'thing-in-itself' so flagrantly opposed to obvious fact as in the case of the mental states which constitute the 'phenomenal Ego,' for their very *esse* is *percipi*.² At all events it is only about the *Ego* that is revealed in and through my conscious states that I can be reasonably expected to have any concern. For *me* that is the *real Ego*. The conception of some inscrutable 'transcendental Ego,' some naked 'pure Ego' stripped of all modes of revealing itself, and lying eternally "screened from my ken by this self-asserting 'empirical Ego,'"³—I regard as a mere fiction, a nightmare of deranged philosophical speculation, and very far indeed from reality. '*The only soul about which I care is that which immediately presents itself in its acts, which thinks, wills, remembers, believes, loves, repents, and hopes.*'⁴

P. COFFEY.

[*To be continued.*]

¹I. E. RECORD, May, pp. 484, 487.

² Maher, *loc. cit.*; also p. 120.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

THE STRUCTURE OF THE ROMAN CANON—III¹

VIII

IN the oldest type² of fully developed Mass Canon which we possess, there comes after the *Epiclesis* what liturgists call the great intercession, i.e., a prayer and offering of the Victim for various intentions. Its tenor and form are very fully described by St. Cyril of Jerusalem in his *Catechesis Mystagogica*, v. :—

But after the completion of the spiritual sacrifice, the unbloody offering, we implore God, over that host of propitiation, for the general peace of the Church, for the well-being of the world, for rulers, for soldiers and fellow-citizens, for the infirm, for the oppressed ; in brief we pray and offer this Victim for all who are in distress. Afterwards we also remember the dead, in the first place patriarchs, prophets, apostles, martyrs, that God through their prayers and embassy³ may receive our prayer. We then pray for deceased holy fathers and bishops, and in general for departed brethren, believing that prayer offered for them over the holy and most dread Victim will be a very great benefit to their souls.

The two prayers that follow the *Supplices te rogamus*, viz., the *Memento* for the dead and the *Nobis quoque*, are obviously the remains of an analogous long prayer of intercession that existed in the oldest form of the Roman Canon. What, it will be asked, became of the rest of it ? Well, I think, there can be no doubt that it is to be found⁴ in the *Te igitur*, *Memento* of the living, and *Communicantes*, which now follow the *Sanctus*. Those constitute one prayer as shown by their connexion, and their having one conclusion, viz., *Per eundem Christum Dominum nostrum*,

¹ See I. E. RECORD, June, 1907, March, 1908.

² I refer to the fourth-century Syrian Mass described by St. Cyril of Jerusalem, and also to the Canon contained in the Apostolic Constitutions.

³ πρεσβείας. ' This sense arose from the elders being usually chosen as ambassadors.'—Liddell and Scott.

⁴ This is Dr. Baumstark's main thesis.

Amen. The words *infra actionem* which seem to separate the *Communicantes* from the *Memento* have been copied into the Canon with the *Communicantes*, and connect us with a time when there were several forms of this prayer placed apart, and the heading *infra actionem* was a rubric directing that one of them should be said within the Canon.

This rubric connects us [says Dom Cabrol] with a time when the Canon was more generally called *Action* and when, the formulæ of the *Communicantes*, almost as numerous as Collects, secrets, post communions, or prefaces, being like those situated without the Canon, it was necessary to remind the celebrant to recite them at their proper place, viz., *infra actionem*.¹

It is the presence of this heading that probably accounts for the full stop after *vero*, which should be at most a colon,² for the prayer *Communicantes* to make sense must be connected either with *rogamus* in the *Te igitur* (Le Brun) or with *offerimus vel tibi offerunt* of the *Memento* (Wapelhurst and M'Carthy). Taking, then, the *Te igitur*, *Memento*, and *Communicantes* as one prayer, we recognize in it the modern equivalent of the first part of the prayer of intercession which comes after the *Epiclesis* in the Syrian liturgies. The *etiam* alone of the *Memento* for the dead (*Memento etiam Domine*) makes it clear that it was, in its original position, preceded by a *Memento* of the living. The questions at once arise, why and when and by whose authority was this prayer of intercession in the Roman Canon split up and a part of it left and the greater part of it taken and placed between the *Sanctus* and the Words of Institution?

IX

Those are of the questions which it is easier to ask than to answer. To begin with, this type of multiple prayer sometimes called the diptychs, occupies different positions in different liturgies. In the Gallican liturgy it comes before the Preface, in the Alexandrian it is em-

¹ *Dictionnaire d'archéologie et de liturgie*, col. 447.

² See the *Stowe Missal* (M'Carthy), p. 209.

bodied in the Preface, in the Syrian it occupies the place assigned to it by St. Cyril of Jerusalem, while in the Roman Canon (post-Gregorian) it is, as I have said, split up, a part of it coming immediately after the *Sanctus* (an arrangement which has, I think, no actual parallel in any other liturgy), and another part coming before the *Pater Noster* (the Syrian position).

It has been suggested [writes Albert Fortescue in an article on the Alexandrian Liturgy in the *New Catholic Encyclopædia*] that the explanation of these differences (between the Alexandrian and the Roman) is that originally everywhere the deacon began to read out the clauses of the supplication as soon as the priest had begun the Eucharistic prayer. They would then go on saying their parts together, the deacon being interrupted by the words said aloud by the priest. The point at which the supplication ends would then depend on its length; and if eventually that point (at which the priest sums up its clauses in a collect) were taken as its place in the liturgy, it might occur before the Consecration (as at Alexandria) or after it (as at Antioch), or the supplication might still be said partly before and partly after (as at Rome). The Roman use would then represent an intermediate stage of development. (Cf. A. Gastoué in Cabrol, *Dict. d'arch. Chret. et de liturgie.*)

I have consulted Gastoué's article,¹ and have not found myself able to accept his suggestion that the key² to the problem why the prayers of intercession occupy different places in different liturgies is to be found in the old rubric,

¹ 'La clef générale, c'est la séparation des prières du prêtre et des formules du diacre, leur juxtaposition, leur restitution dans la liturgie qui a perdu l'un quelconque de ces éléments,' (*opus cit.*, col. 1193). His line of argument is that the oldest position of the diptychs was the Gallican position before the Preface, and that it was the unequal pace at which the celebrant and deacon proceeded with their respective parts that is responsible for their final transfer to positions after the Preface and even after the Consecration.

² 'A supposer donc que le célébrant et le diacre aient commencé ensemble leurs formules, l'un continuant ses orations secrètes, l'autre les invocations allongées . . . il sera arrivé ceci ; le prêtre sera déjà parvenu à la consécration et au delà, si des *diaconica* sont longues, quand le diacre n'aura pas terminé "les noms," interrompu seulement par les *ekphonèses* du Célébrant. Au moment de la fixation des liturgies romaine et byzantine, la clôture des diaconales a amené les prières correspondantes du prêtre aux environs de la Consécration, et l'usage des diaconales traditionnelles étant tombé, la liturgie écrite ne conserva que les formules presbytérales' (*opus cit.* col. 1191).

according to which the deacon read aloud the names and litanies, while the priest, with intervals of accentuation, prayed in secret. I think it is clear from the words of St. Cyril above quoted¹ that the place of the intercession was fixed in the Syrian liturgies, not by such an accident as is suggested, but by intrinsic considerations. It is not less clear, as pointed out by Baumstark, that the order of ideas is practically the same in the Roman and the Syrian Intercession. If, as is quite certain, Gregory the Great made changes in the Roman Canon, we can point at least to the probable author of the transfer of a part of the prayer of intercession in the Roman Canon from its original position after the Consecration to its present position after the *Sanctus*. I cannot agree with Duchesne² that the famous letter of Innocent I proves that the prayers of intercession occupied their present position in the Roman Canon at the beginning of the fifth century. If a letter which has been cited to prove three³ different theories about the position of the Roman diptychs at this epoch proves anything, it proves, I think, that their position was after the Consecration.⁴

I am not aware that any liturgist has offered anything like a satisfactory answer to the question why the original prayer of intercession in the Roman Canon was dismembered in this way. Assuming the Leonine Canon⁵ to have been in use before the time of Gregory, there was no lack of reasons why this Pope should simplify it; but the existence of the Leonine Canon is little more than a pure hypothesis, and even in the assumption that it existed and

¹ 'Believing that prayer offered for them over the holy and most dread Victim will be a very great benefit to their souls.'

² *Origines, etc.*, p. 181.

³ See *Paléographie Musicale*, p. 75; Baumstark, p. 70. While D. Cagin finds in this letter a proof of his view that the Roman practice in A.D. 411 was conformable to the Gallican, i.e., to have the diptychs read after the Offertory and before the Preface, Baumstark finds in the same letter a confirmation of his thesis that the Roman practice at that date was to have the equivalent of the Gallican diptychs and prayers of intercession after the Consecration.

⁴ See article by Fr. Lucas, S.J., in the *Dublin Review*, Jan., 1904, p. 119, who had anticipated Baumstark in this view.

⁵ See I. E. RECORD, June, 1907, p. 588.

required simplification, that might be done without breaking up the old Roman prayer of intercession. It is quite possible that it was theological considerations which prompted the transfer. In the mind of St. Cyril the Sacrifice was not completed by the Words of Institution ; the *Epiclesis* was required to perfect it, and he thought, as we have seen, that this was the most suitable place (immediately after the *Epiclesis*) to pray for various intentions. But the Canon of St. Gregory shows quite a different conception of the theology of the Mass. Whatever *Epiclesis* it contains comes before the Words of Institution, and if in his mind these words effected the Sacrifice, would he not consider it most fitting to have the intentions which were to be prayed for arrayed,¹ so to speak, on the altar just before the dread moment of Sacrifice ?

X

No liturgist, as far as I know, has thrown a clear light on the genesis of the *Nobis quoque peccatoribus* with its catalogue of fifteen saints. In pursuance of a theory that this catalogue is in part an additional Ravenna element which Leo the Great incorporated in the Roman Canon, Baumstark would have us believe, contrary to the more common opinion,² that the John mentioned in it is St. John the Evangelist, and not St. John the Baptist.

In the series of male saints [he writes³], the name alone of St. Ignatius transports us far from Rome, since the great Bishop of Antioch did not, in ancient times, enjoy a veneration at the theatre of his martyrdom, of which proofs are to hand. But then the *John* which heads the list is of decisive importance. There can only be question of the Apostle because for the ancient Church the Baptist was considered *Patriarch* rather than *Martyr*, hence the title, 'apostolis et martyribus,' excludes the sup-

¹ If one should ask why he left the *Memento* for the dead undisturbed, it may be answered that this is not clear, for it is wanting in its present position in some of the oldest manuscripts.

² See Benedict XIV, *De Sacrificio Missae*, vol. i., p. 372 (Louvain edition, 1762).

³ *Liturgia Romana, etc.*, p. 144.

position that he is referred to. It¹ must then be that John of Zebedee was named here originally either as the representative of the Apostolic College or, and this would seem more probable, his name is the only survivor of a complete list of the Apostles which is conceivable only in the case that it was first on this list as in the catalogue of the Apostles of the so-called 'Ordinamento,' etc., or of the first part of the *Didaché* and in the list contained in a Milanese prayer formula for the *litania major*. Either hypothesis excludes a Roman origin of this second catalogue of saints, since a Roman list of the Apostles could only commence with the name of Peter, and of this name also there could only be question at Rome if it were desired to represent the whole Apostolic College by one name.

It is against² this interpretation that the list of saints in the *Communicantes* of the Mozarabic Mass opens with mention of John the Baptist.³ But setting aside this particular question, it has been, I think, demonstrated by Baumstark, that this catalogue was in the main borrowed from another liturgy, and welded into the concluding petition of the old Roman prayer of intercession. There is a respectable tradition⁴ that the names of SS. Agatha Lucia, Agnes, Caecilia, and Anastasia were embodied in the prayer by St. Gregory, but whence came the names preceding those still awaits, I think, a final answer.⁵ D. Cagin⁶ argues with some show of reason that the *Nobis*

¹ 'Perciò o fin dall'antichità Giovanni di Zebedeo fu qui nominato come rappresentante del collegio apostolico, oppure, e questo dovrebbe essere più probabile, il suo nome él'unico superstite di una lista completa degli Apostoli, la qual cosa é concepibile solamente nel caso che esso fosse il primo nella predetta lista come nel catalogo apostolico del così detto Ordinamento Ecclesiastico apostolico o del testo speciale della prima parte della *Didaché* ed in quella di un formulario milanese di preghiere per la *litania major*. Nell' uno e nell'altro caso non é lecito pensare ad origine romana di questo secondo catalogo di santi, poiché una lista romana degli Apostoli non puo cominciare che col nome di S. Pietro, questi soltanto puo essere stato in questione a Roma se si volle rappresentato da un solo membro tutto il collegio apostolico.'

² See *Revue Bénédictine*, October, 1904, which contains an able criticism of Baumstark's theory from the pen of D. Germain Morin.

³ 'Facientes commemorationem beatissimorum Apostolorum et Martyrum : gloriose Sancte Marie Virginis, Zacharie, Joannis, Infantum, Petri Pauli, Johannis.'—(*Missale Mixtum*, by Lesley, S.J., vol. i., p. 4.)

⁴ Baumstark, p. 144.

⁵ The list in the *Stowe Missal* is 'cum Petro, Paulo, Patricio, cum Joanne,' etc.

⁶ *Paleographie Musicale*, p. 81.

quoque, etc., may be a transferred form¹ of the *Libera*, etc., which follows the *Pater Noster*, and that the transfer was among the re-adjustments which Gregory the Great made in the Roman Canon. It is to be noted as bearing upon this view that our present *Libera* contains the remnant of a list of saints which, it appears, it was at one time the privilege² of the officiant to add to at will. But then there are the words *Nobis quoque*, etc., which, while they could not be suggested by the closing petition of the *Pater Noster* mark an obvious connexion, both grammatically and liturgically, with the *Memento* for the dead. The grammatical connexion is obvious. As to the liturgical connexion, Baumstark informs us at page 142:—

The Greek text of the Anaphora of St. James, which here certainly contains the oldest form of the Syraic, returns, after the prayer for the dead, rather suddenly ('con una voltata di pensiero apparentemente assai brusca,') to the collective members of the living community. And following the Syriac, it prays that they may be received after a holy death into the ranks of the blessed in Heaven (compare 'intra quorum nos consortium admitte' of the Roman Canon).

xi

It now remains to discuss briefly a difficulty which presents itself at the close of the *Nobis quoque*, etc., viz., the connexion and significance of the words, *Per Christum Dominum nostrum, per quem haec omnia Domine semper bona creas . . . et praestas nobis*. As Duchesne points out there is an evident hiatus between those words and the words (*largitor admitte*) which immediately precede them. Two such eminent liturgists as Dom Cagin and Duchesne offer different solutions of this difficulty. The former³ admits the hiatus and contends that these words *Per Christum*, etc., were originally the conclusion of the *Suppllices te rogamus*, and that *creas, sanctificas*, etc., refer to

¹ 'Rien n'empêche même de considerer, si l'on veut, le *Nobis quoque peccatoribus* comme un second embolism. une variante du *Libera*, bref une pièce de rechange.'

² See Benedict XIV, *op. cit.*, p. 391.

³ *Paléographie Musicale*, pp. 81-83.

the Sacred Species. This falls in with his view that the *Nobis quoque*, etc., and the *Memento* for the dead do not now occupy their original position in the Roman Mass, but for those who feel themselves bound to hold a different view, the following *Oratio post Mysterium* (prayer after the Consecration), quoted¹ from the *Missale Gothicum*, must, I think, make it seem highly probable that the words in question were originally connected with a form of *Epiclesis*.

Haec nos Domine instituta et praecepta retinentes, suppliciter oramus uti hoc Sacrificium suscipere et benedicere et sanctificare digneris, ut fiat nobis Eucharistia legitima in tuo Filiique nomine et Spiritus Sancti, in transformationem corporis et Sanguinis D. Dei N.J.C., per quem omnia creas, creata benedicis, benedicta sanctificas, et sanctificata largiris, Deus, qui in Trinitate perfecta vivis et regnas in saecula saeculorum.

Duchesne, following some old writers referred to by Benedict XIV,² would prefer to connect those words with the blessing of certain material goods which took place on certain occasions at this part of the Mass.

It is clear [he writes] that the words *haec omnia bona* have no reference to what immediately precedes ; nor can they refer to the consecrated offerings which are now the body and blood of Christ, and as such could not be the subject of *creas sanctificas*, *vivificas*. The simplest explanation is that formerly there was mention here of some earth products such as corn, wine, oil, etc. This view is confirmed by the fact that on certain days there was a blessing of such things at this part of the Mass ; for example, of the mixture of water, milk and honey given to the neophytes at Easter and Pentecost . . . It was also at this moment that the new beans were blessed on Ascension Day, and the new grapes on the sixth of August . . . Finally it is at this moment that the holy oils are still blessed on Holy Thursday. There is then no doubt that the formula *per quem haec omnia*, was originally preceded, even outside extraordinary circumstances, by a prayer for the fruits of the earth. This adds to the resemblance between the Roman Canon and the corresponding part in the Greek and Oriental liturgies.³

¹ *Paléographie Musicale*, p. 83.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 375.

³ *Origines du Culte Chrétien*, 3^{me} ed., p. 183. (English Edition has the same pagination.)

While, then, Dom Cagin would account for the hiatus by the introduction of the *Memento* and *Nobis quoque* after the *Supplices te rogamus*, Duchesne feels certain that a prayer for the blessing of the fruits of the earth to which the *per quem haec omnia* was the appropriate conclusion, has been dropped from this part of the Canon. Duchesne seems to argue from the existence of such a prayer on a few occasions, to its original position as a permanent part of the Canon, because the *per quem haec omnia*, etc., could never have reference to the Sacred Species. Now such eminent scholars as Benedict XIV,¹ Lesley,² and Dom Cagin see no difficulty in connecting those words with the Sacred Species. There is a corresponding formula in the Mozarabic Missal in which the words clearly refer to the *oblata* after the Consecration. It runs as follows : "Te praestante Sancte Domine : quia tu haec omnia nobis indignis servis tuis valde bona creas ; sancti~~+~~ificas vivificas~~+~~ benede~~+~~cis ~~+~~ ac praestas nobis ; ut sit benedicta a te Deo nostro in secula seculorum."³

The prayer is simply an acknowledgment that as God the Father has given us all things through Christ, so it is through Him that He created bread and wine, sanctified them when they were placed on the altar at the Offertory, and vivified them, i.e., changed them into the Body and Blood of Christ at the Consecration. Besides, do not the crosses which the priest is directed to make over the Sacred Species while he is pronouncing those words, clearly connect the words in the mind of the Church with the consecrated elements. I think Duchesne has been simply led to adopt a plausible theory merely to meet an imaginary difficulty, and that his arguing from a few particular instances of a prayer being inserted here for the fruits of the earth (Ascension Day, August 6, and Holy Thursday) to the supposition that at one time some such prayer was always said, is an example of a fault in logic from which even the most cultured minds are not always exempt. Whether

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 377.

² *Missale Mixtum*, p. 542 (quoted in *Paléographie Musicale*, p. 83).

³ *Op. cit.* (Lesley), vol. i., p. 5.

the words in question were or were not at one time the conclusion of the *Supplices te rogamus* can be at present only a matter of conjecture, but notwithstanding the hiatus they are perfectly intelligible as they stand. Notice that the words are immediately connected with *per Christum Dominum Nostrum*, and that the words following *per ipsum . . . omnis honor et Gloria per omnia secula seculorum, Amen*, were the close of the Canon before St. Gregory added to it the *Pater Noster*. Now assuming that in the early ages the Canon, or *prex*, was one consecratory prayer, at the end of which the Real Presence was solemnly acknowledged by an elevation, a relic of which still remains at this part of the Mass, and by a solemn *Amen*, we need have no difficulty about an *Epiclesis* or any kindred prayer coming within this *prex* or Canon.

XII

If one were now to ask me what is the main impression I have carried away from the perusal of the books quoted in the preceding papers, I should, I think, have to answer that, notwithstanding the undoubted gains to our knowledge achieved by recent researches, the structure of the Roman Canon still remains a problem. Was the primitive Roman Canon after the Syrian type consisting of Preface, *Post Sanctus*, recital of the words of Institution, *Anamnesis*, *Epiclesis*, Prayers of Intercession, and *Pater Noster*, and did this simple logical Canon become so complicated by additions made to it by Leo the Great, that another Pope, also styled the Great, felt himself obliged to reduce and re-arrange its component parts? This is Dr. Baumstark's thesis, and if the reader of his book on this subject is not absolutely convinced of its truth, he cannot fail to be struck by the author's profound learning, and cannot help, I think, feeling it a pity that a case made out with such ingenuity, patient toil, wealth of illustration, and enthusiasm, is still not proved. Even those who do not accept all his conclusions will, I think, admit that his researches represent the high-water mark of our knowledge about the

development of the Roman Canon, and that if he has not fully solved the problem of its structure, he has done more than any other writer on the subject to show what the materials were from which it was composed, and what were the stages in its evolution. Its present form, which dates from the time of St. Gregory, is obviously a contraction of an antecedent form, and the language¹ used by John the Deacon is his *Life of St. Gregory*, to describe the Pope's revision of the Missal, fits in exactly with Dr. Baumstark's theory concerning the changes Gregory is supposed to have made in the Leonine Canon. But neither John the Deacon nor Walafrid Strabo, who refers in much the same terms to Gregory's work on the Missal, speaks of a Leonine Canon ; they speak of a Gelasian document the identity of which is not clearly ascertained. What seems to be quite certain is that Gregory was the last Pope who reset more or less the pre-Gregorian form of Canon, and that the materials he worked upon were an accumulation of formulæ derived from various sources, and brought together, it may be now, by episcopal authority, and again by Papal authority, for it is accepted² that up to A.D. 400 bishops enjoyed considerable latitude in composing and arranging the prayers of the liturgy.

While, then, with the exception of course of its nucleus, i.e., the Words of Institution, we are unable to trace with certainty its various parts to their literary beginnings, we may not doubt that it is a venerable document which connects³ us at latest with the time of Pope Damasus (A.D. 366-384). That the ideas contained in the formulæ of which it is composed are an echo of the Apostolic liturgy, has been shown⁴ almost to demonstration by Dr. Ferdinand Probst, who deserves to be reckoned one of the leading pioneers in the recent revival of liturgical studies. It would be possible to improve, from a literary

¹ 'Gelasianum codicem de missarum solemnis, multa subtrahens, pauca convertens, nonnulla vero superadiciens pro evangelicis lectionibus, in unius libri volumine coartavit.' (See Duchesne, p. 126.)

² See Duchesne, p. 119 (note).

³ *Idem*, p. 177.

⁴ See *Liturgie des vierten Jahrhunderts und deren Reform*, p. 17.

point of view, our present Canon, but to do so would be like substituting, in some ancient edifice, modern fittings for the peculiar remnants of antiquity. It remains with us an evidence of the faith of the first ages ; of faith in the Real Presence, in the Sacrifice of the Eucharist, in the intercession of the Saints, in the efficacy of prayers for the dead, and any irregularities that critics have found in its composition (such as the *Hanc igitur* being a duplicate of the *Te igitur*, and that it contains two catalogues of saints—one in the *Communicantes* and another in the *Nobis quoque*, etc.), are only further evidence of the unity of faith and worship, in different parts of the early Church, for those seeming incongruities are due to the embodiment in the Roman Canon of analogous formulæ taken from different liturgies. That much is certainly made clear by Dr. Baumstark, to whose brilliant essay I refer any reader who wishes to become *au courant* with the latest contributions to the solution of an old liturgical problem.

T. P. GILMARTIN.

Notes and Queries

THEOLOGY

SOME RECENT DECISIONS CONCERNING THE DECREE 'NE TEMERE'

THE Sacred Congregation of the Council has recently published some important decisions¹ on the new matrimonial legislation, about which a few words of explanation will not be out of place.

I.

I. *Utrum validum sit matrimonium contractum a Catholico ritus latini cum Catholico ritus orientalis, non servata forma a decreto *Ne Temere* statuta.*

R. Ad I.: Negative.

II. *An in art. xi., § 2 ejusdem decreti sub nomine acatholicon comprehendantur etiam schismatici et haeretici rituum orientalium.*

R. Ad II.: Affirmative.

These two decisions have reference to the celebration of marriage between persons of whom one belongs to the Latin rite, and the other belongs to an Oriental rite. On a previous occasion the S. Congregation decided that Catholics of the Oriental rite are not bound by the decree *Ne Temere*. A doubt at once arose as to whether a Catholic of the Latin rite marrying either a Catholic of an Oriental rite or a schismatic or heretic of one of the Oriental Churches is bound by the new matrimonial regulations. The reason of the doubt is the principle which was formerly accepted in regard to clandestinity that the party free from the impediment communicated his freedom to the other party. In the case of mixed marriages in the Western Church, the decree *Ne Temere* certainly abolished this principle, except in those places for which the Holy See should otherwise arrange as it has already done for Germany

¹ Cf. *Analecta Ecclesiastica*, April, 1908, p. 114.

by the Constitution *Provida*. The decisions above quoted declare that the principle is equally abolished in the case of a Catholic of the Western Church marrying a person belonging to one of the united or the separated Eastern Churches, so that for a valid marriage between such persons the formalities of the decree *Ne Temere* must be observed.

2.

III. Num exceptio, per Const. *Provida* in Germania inducta, censenda sit uti mere localis, aut etiam personalis.

R. Ad III.; Exceptionem valere tantummodo pro natis in Germania ibidem matrimonium contrahentibus, facto verbo cum SSMo.

When the Sacred Congregation of the Council brought the Constitution *Provida* under the excepting clause of the decree *Ne Temere*, it added the phrase 'Ad Mentem,' showing clearly that it intended to impose restrictions which were not contained in the Constitution as it was originally granted. The present decision indicates what these restrictions are. Only those who have been born in Germany and who contract marriage there can avail of the exception. Hence if both parties contracting a mixed marriage were born in Germany but contract marriage elsewhere, their marriage is not valid unless the formalities of the decree *Ne Temere* are observed. If both were born outside Germany but contract marriage in Germany, their marriage is invalid except the law of clandestinity is observed. If one was born in Germany and the other outside Germany, the same rule holds no matter where the marriage is contracted—the mixed marriage is not valid unless it is celebrated in the presence of the parish priest of the place.

If any other countries should be brought under the excepting clause, we may take it for granted that these restrictions will be imposed.

3.

IV. An Ordinarii et parochi nedum explicite sed etiam implicite 'invitati et rogati' dummodo tamen 'neque vi neque

metu gravi constricti requirant excipiantque contrahentium consensum' valide matrimonii assistere possint.

R. Ad IV.: Affirmative.

Hence it is not necessary that the contracting parties should formally and expressly invite and ask the parish priest to assist at the marriage; any act on their part which implies this request suffices. Consequently if the parish priest freely assists at the marriage and receives the consent of the contracting parties, there need be no scruple about the validity of the marriage from this point of view; the necessary request is contained in the fact that the parties present themselves for marriage.

4.

V. An ad licitam matrimonii celebrationem habenda sit ratio dumtaxat menstruae commorationis, non autem quasi-domicillii.

R. Ad V.: Affirmative ad primam partem, negative ad secundam.

From this decision it follows that account is to be taken only of the month's residence, so that if one of the contracting parties has resided during a month in a parish, no matter what his intention was or is, the parish priest of the place can lawfully assist at the marriage. Of course if the bride is not the party thus residing in the parish—if she is a subject of a different parish—there must be a just cause to warrant the parish priest of the place of residence of the bridegroom to assist at the marriage, and according to many commentators, a just cause need not be grave in this connexion—an opinion which is safe in practice unless a contrary decision be given by the Holy See. Speculatively the matter is doubtful.

5.

VI. Utrum sponsalia, praeterquam coram Ordinario aut parocho, celebrari valeant etiam coram alterutro delegato?

R. Ad VI.: Negative.

VII. Utrum sponsalia celebrari debeant dumtaxat coram

Ordinario vel parocho domicilii aut menstruae commorationis, an possint etiam celebrari coram quolibet Ordinario aut parocho.

R. Ad VII. : Posse celebrari coram quolibet Ordinario aut parocho, dummodo intra limites territorii ejusdem Ordinarii vel parochi.

The first of these decisions declares that an Ordinary or a parish priest cannot delegate another priest to act in his place as official witness of betrothals. Many commentators held that inasmuch as a parish priest can delegate another priest to assist at marriage *a pari* he can delegate another priest to sign the document of betrothals. According to the present decision this argument is not valid, the disparity between the two cases being that it is expressly mentioned in connexion with assistance at marriage that the parish priest can give delegation but no such power of delegation is mentioned in connexion with sponsalia.

The second decision indicates that betrothals can be validly contracted before any Ordinary or parish priest, but only within his own territory, so that the valid and lawful official witness of sponsalia is the parish priest of the place where the contract is effected. In case of marriage the parish priest of the place is the valid but not always the lawful authoritative witness ; in case of espousals no restriction about lawful assistance is imposed by the decree *Ne Temere*.

These decisions about sponsalia raise an interesting and practical question as to whether the espousals must be contracted in the presence of the Ordinary or parish priest in the sense that he must be present when the contracting parties sign the document. While some¹ hold that this is not necessary, others² hold that such presence is required for validity. The replies already quoted suggest that the parish priest or Ordinary must be present when the parties sign the document since the S. Congregation says 'celebrari coram quolibet Ordinario aut parocho.' Moreover, the decree *Ne Temere* speaks of 'witnesses,'

¹ Boudinhon, 'Le Mariage et Les Fiançailles,' n. 39.

² Vermeersch, 'De Forma Sponsalium ac Matrimonii,' n. 26.

and it is contended that no one is a witness in the strict sense who is not present at the signing of the document.

On the other hand the decree *Ne Temere* merely says of the Ordinary or parish priest that the document must be signed by him ('per scripturam subsignatam a partibus et vel a parocho, aut a loci Ordinario, vel saltem a duobus testibus'), and it is maintained that to verify this condition presence when the parties sign the document is not required since nothing about such presence is mentioned. If this opinion be correct it is sufficient if the parties personally acknowledge their signatures in the presence of the parish priest or Ordinary, if by means of an agent or procurator they make this acknowledgment to the parish priest or Ordinary, if by letter they announce to him that the accompanying document and signatures are genuine, or even if by a reliable messenger they make the same acknowledgment. The parish priest or Ordinary must, of course, in all cases sign the document within his own territory. To the first argument above mentioned those who hold this opinion would reply that inasmuch as the contract is completed only when the signature of the parish priest or Ordinary is affixed, the espousals are of necessity contracted in his presence even though the parties do not sign the document in his presence. To the second argument they would reply that the use of the word 'witnesses' proves nothing conclusively since it is not stated that they must be *immediate* witnesses of the act of signing the document, and that they would be reliable witnesses if the genuineness of the signatures is known to them in any of the ways already indicated.

Obviously the matter is speculatively doubtful, and until an authentic reply is given by the Holy See it is advisable that the contracting parties should sign the document of betrothals in the presence of the witnesses.

J. M. HARTY.

CANON LAW

RESIGNATION OF PARISH AND CONCESSION OF PENSION

REV. DEAR SIR,—I shall feel greatly obliged to you for an answer to the following case. I am already advanced in years and in failing condition of health, and am desirous to retire and resign my parish, in which I have laboured for a long span of years. Can I send in my resignation of the parish, and reserve, at the same time, a pension to be paid to me out of the parochial revenues? And in the negative, can the diocesan Superior, after my unconditional resignation, order my successor to pay a pension to me for my maintenance?

PAROCHUS.

The case proposed by 'Parochus' is certainly a practical one, and by no means a rare or unusual case. It calls for a proper solution, the necessity of which is enhanced by the fact that the ecclesiastical discipline seems rather uncertain on this point, and that well-known authorities in answering these questions put forward many and different theories.

We hope our venerable correspondent will not be disappointed when we tell him at once that both the resignation of a parish with the reservation of a pension, and the imposition of a pension on a parish, made by the diocesan superior, for the benefit of a Parish Priest who has resigned his parochial office, are expressly forbidden by ecclesiastical law. The prohibition was made by Innocent XII, on November 11, 1692, in order to put an end to the abuses which had been introduced in this respect as a result of frequently transgressing the limits fixed by law and especially by the Council of Trent in the matter of assigning and imposing pensions. This decree says:—

Praecipimus et statuimus ne in posterum graventur Parochiales, etiam jurispatronatus laici, pensionibus, atque hoc etiam observetur ab ipsis locorum Ordinariis in provisionibus ad ipsos spectantibus. Praeterea ne admittantur resignationes aut permutationes Parochialium cum reservatione pensionum ad cuiuscumque favorem et sub quocumque titulo etiam praestationis alimentorum.¹

¹ This decree was originally published in Italian, but we have quoted it according to the Latin translation given by Reiffenstuel, iii., tit. 12 n. 100.

This law, it is true, was made only for Italy, and it was there for some time faithfully observed; but when, after the pontificate of Innocent XII, the old inconveniences and abuses became again prevalent, and were in vogue not only in Italy but also in other countries, Benedict XIII, by the decree *Quanta Pastoribus*, of September 6, 1724, confirmed the prohibition of Innocent XII, and extended it to the whole world. Now, let us consider this law, and see how far it is consistent with the present discipline of the Church.

I. In the first place, the prohibition of resigning a parish on condition of receiving an annuity from the income of the benefice resigned is based on several dispositions of ecclesiastical law, whose violation called for the enactment of the decrees of Innocent XII and Benedict XIII. All conditional resignations of benefices are strictly forbidden by law, not only in case that resignations are made in favour of third persons by designating, for instance, the candidate on whom the vacant benefice must be conferred, on the ground that such a procedure would cause benefices to be transferred like hereditary objects; but also in case that resignations are made in favour of the resigning clergymen, whether the condition be that, under well defined circumstances, they will be allowed to take back their former benefice by what is called in law *ingressus regressus accessus*, or that they reserve to themselves a pension to be paid out of the parochial income and for their decent support. Such a transaction would be simony, as it would in practice amount to a change of a benefice for a purely temporal thing, that is for a portion of the fruits of a benefice separated from the benefice itself.¹

Again, it is only just and reasonable that ecclesiastics who, in virtue of their appointments to spiritual offices, are bound to fulfil all obligations connected with them, be likewise entitled to the enjoyment of all temporal emoluments apportioned to their benefices. Hence a two-fold

¹ Cf. Benedict XIV, Const. *In Sublimi*; Pius V, Const. *Quanta Ecclesiae Dei*; St. Alphonsus, iii., 88 sqq.; Gennari, *Consul. Mor.*, p. 534; Reiff., i., c., n. 98.

rule was introduced into the Church law, one laid down that benefices cannot be divided, the other, that ecclesiastical benefices be conferred without diminution in their temporalities.¹ Now a reservation of pension on the occasion of the resignation of a parish would divide and curtail parochial revenues, and, thus altered, they would be conferred together with the parish on the next occupant of that benefice. From this law, which is a general law of the Church, diocesan superiors cannot give a dispensation and accept, under those circumstances, resignations of parishes without permission of the Holy See.

We have to remark, however, that although it is illegal to reserve a pension and put it as a real condition for the resignation, in the sense that the superior be afterwards bound to assign the pension thus reserved, yet it is not acting in contravention of the law only to petition the superior for a pension even before the act of resignation takes place. Similarly, the resigning clergyman and his successor may come to a private understanding as to the payment of a pension not absolutely, but only subject to the consent of the superior; so that, eventually, the resignation will remain unconditional and the imposition of the pension will be made by the competent authority.²

All these ecclesiastical prescriptions with regard to conditional resignations of offices have not hitherto, to our knowledge, suffered any relaxation or alteration of any kind, and they are, up to the present, in full force with the exception, perhaps, of resignations in favour of third persons which, as Father Wernz tells us on the authority of Riganti, have been approved by the Holy See wherever introduced and practised by custom in order to avert the danger of having many a resignation invalid on the score of simony.³

¹ Tit. 12, lib. iii., Decret. *Ut beneficia ecclesiastica sine diminutione conferantur*; C. 8, *De Praebendis*, lib. iii. (x. v.)

² Cf. C. 34, *De Simonia*; Abbas in C. Quaesitum, *De Rer. Permut.* n. 10; Ferraris, v. Pensio n. 25 sqq.; Tonduti, *De Pensionibus*, c. 1, n. 16.

³ 'Ad vitandum vero illud periculum simoniae et ad tollendas pactiones simoniacas Romani Pontifices proxim resignationum conditionatarum in favorem tertiae personae approbarunt et, non obstantibus exceptionibus, retinuerunt.'—Wernz, ii., n. n. 97; Riganti, Reg. 45, *Canc. Apost.*, n. 2, sq.

II. But should a parish priest unconditionally resign his parish, can his Ordinary give him afterwards a pension for his maintenance, a pension which is to be paid out of the parochial revenues? The old Canons of the Church were in this matter very strict, absolutely denying diocesan superiors the power of imposing any sort of pensions on benefices generally, and on parishes in particular; for besides that, incumbents of benefices who fulfil all obligations, are in justice entitled to all emoluments, local pastors are always in need of all parochial revenues as they have to help the poor as well as the pious and charitable institutions existing in their parishes, and committed to their jurisdiction and care. However, notwithstanding the rigour of the old legislation a practice was gradually introduced in the Church to the effect that diocesan authorities could assign pensions principally in favour of those pastors who, well deserving of the Church for their long years of work spent in her service, were bound to retire on account of advanced age or impaired condition of health. In process of time this power of Ordinaries was extended also to the case of those who were removed from their offices in consequence of punishment for their crimes. 'Nimium impium est,' says St. Gregory the Great, 'si alimentorum necessitati post vindictam subiaceant.'¹

The Council of Trent, while tacitly approving of the prevailing custom, found it necessary to put some restrictions to it in order to prevent parishes from being overburdened with pensions and deprived of the necessary means for the support of the titular of the benefice; hence it enacted that pensions should not be imposed on parishes whose income does not exceed the sum of a hundred ducats. 'Ecclesiae paroeciales quae summam ducatorum centum secundum verum annum valorem non excedunt nullis pensionibus aut reservationibus graventur.'²

¹ Cf. St. Greg. M., in epist. 53 ad Max. Syrac.; *Conc. Calced.*, p. ii., art. 10, Can. *Quamvis*.

² Sess. XXIV., c. 13, *De Ref.*

In order to know how the ducats mentioned by the Council of Trent are to be computed, the following decree must be attended to:—

'IV. An et in qua moneta intelligi debeat valor centum ducatorum?

It must be remembered, however, that the custom referred to and the power thereby acquired by Ordinaries was only to the effect that they could assign pensions which would last during the lifetime of the incumbent of the benefice; pensions which are called temporary as distinct from perpetual ones which last during the lifetime of the pensioner and weigh on the benefice rather than on its occupant.

This usage was allowed to continue because it was proved not to be contrary to the prohibitive decree of Innocent XII, who, as observes Reiffenstuel,¹ speaks only of perpetual pensions, 'Seu quibus graventur *Ecclesiae Parochiales*', and who enacted this decree to serve its purpose during his pontificate in order to eliminate abuses at that time existing especially in some Italian dioceses. Nor was this practice contrary to the canonical rules that benefices must be conferred undivided and undiminished, for, as Fagnano says,² a temporary pension does not affect the benefice itself, and its temporalities remain undivided and are received in full by its occupant, although he remains under a personal obligation of paying a pension during his lifetime.

Innocent III tolerated that practice in the celebrated chapter 'Cum esset,' *De Praebendis*, when in the case submitted to him he noticed that not the dignity but only the person of the Prior was burdened with a pension.³ And, finally, the Congregation of the Council has consistently approved of all temporary pensions assigned by diocesan superiors;⁴ and if on one occasion, in the

¹ Resp. ad IV. : Ad effectum de quo in decreto citato, si desit expressa designatio monetae specialis in actu impositionis pensionis, intelligenda est de scutatis Romanis Juliorum decem, respondentibus libellis quinque et centesimis 37, 500.—S. C. EE. et RR., 30 Maii, 1873, Decr. *Amantissimi*.

² Cf. Reiffenstuel, tit. 12, lib. iii., n. 103.

³ Cf. Fagn. in tit. v., *De Praeb.*, c. 21 n. 89; Pax Jordanus, *De benef.* ii., p. 498.

⁴ 'Toleramus ut praestantia 40 librarum non dignitas Prioratus sed persona Prioris maneat onerata,' c. 21, tit. v., lib. iii.

⁴ 'An et quomodo confirmando vel revocanda decreta Episcopalia quae imponunt annuas pensiones ad vitam gravati supra beneficia curata. Resp. : Aff. ad 1^{am} partem; Neg. ad 2^{am} et amplius'—S.C.C. 25 Martii 1898; 23 Aug., 1834; 25 Jun., 1836; 29 Jul., 1861.

year 1883, it refused to acknowledge that power of diocesan authorities, the reason was either because, as Cardinal Gennari states, the pension in that case was assigned without just motive, or because, according to Avanzini, it was a perpetual pension as it was assigned for an uncertain object.¹

However, for the proper use of that power Ordinaries must observe the following rules. First, a just and reasonable motive is of necessity in the imposition of a pension and under penalty of invalidity of the provision.² Sufficient motives may be to provide for the support of the clergyman who resigned his benefice, to settle some question about a benefice, to come to the assistance of some poor church, or charitable institution and the like.³ In the second place, pensions must be moderate to prevent the incumbent of the benefice from being deprived of the means necessary for his decent support. 'Non debet unum altare discooperiri ut cooperiatur et aliud,' says Schmalzgrueber.⁴ But the amount requisite for that decent support is differently computed according to different benefices, countries, and circumstances, and it is always a safe principle to follow in that respect the usage of the place.⁵ A pension is moderate if it does not exceed the third of the fruits of the benefice, and if it exceeds half of them is both immoderate and invalid.⁶ Again, the payment of a temporary pension being a personal obligation must be freely accepted by the occupant of the benefice either in taking possession of it or afterwards; consequently, during

¹ Card. Gennari, ii., p. 243; Avanzini in *Act. S.S.*, vol. v., p. 178, and in vol. iv., p. 78, he writes: 'Episcopi ex iamdiu invecta consuetudine pensiones imponunt in collatione beneficiorum. Huiusmodi autem pensiones quae ab Episcopis imponuntur non possunt considerari tanquam onera realia beneficio imposita sed considerari debent tanquam onera personalia imposita beneficiario.' Also Genn., l.c., p. 24; Moccheggiani, vol. i., p. 729; Vecchiotti, lib. iii., c. iii., p. 39, etc.

² 'Ut recte imponatur pensio necesse est iusta causa, ita quidem ut si Episcopi sine hac pensionem imponeret invalida asset huiusmodi impositio.'—Gargias, *De benef.*, p. i., c. 5, n. 226.

³ Barbosa, *De off. et Potest Ep.*, alleg. 83, n. 11; Laurentius, p. 198.

⁴ Comm. in tit. 12, lib. iii., n. 4 sq.

⁵ Icard, ii., p. 566.

⁶ Craisson, n. 5461; Schmalz., *ibid.* Manacorda, ii., p. 396; Rota, *decis* 444.

the vacancy of the benefice no pension can be imposed or paid.¹

So far about temporary pensions. But a more complicated question still remains. Can diocesan authorities impose on benefices perpetual pensions, whether they be absolutely perpetual if conceded to a moral body which never ceases or relatively perpetual if assigned in favour of a clergyman during *his* lifetime? Canonists in their endeavour to solve this question arrive at different conclusions; however, the opinion seems more probable and common which denies diocesan superiors the power of assigning perpetual pensions; and in the present discipline of the Church such a doctrine appears to be an almost certain one. It is contended, in fact, that if Innocent III, in the chapter 'Cum esset,' tolerated the imposition of a temporary pension, he positively prohibited that a pension be imposed on the benefice perpetually; hence after having said that the burden of the pension must weigh on the person of the Prior rather than on his dignity, he carefully added, 'Ita quod ipso Priore defuncto successor ipsius ad praestationem 40 librarium minime teneatur.'

Moreover, if the principle of law, 'Beneficia ecclesiastica sine diminutione conferantur,' is not violated in the case of a temporary pension, it is, on the contrary, disregarded by the imposition of a perpetual pension, for the obligation of paying it will be transmitted to all occupants of the benefice as long as the pensioner lives, and the benefice thus divided will be transferred with diminution. This is forbidden in all sorts of benefices and it is with more reason prohibited in parochial benefices, of which Innocent XII expressly ordered, 'Ne in posterum graventur *Parochiales*, etiam iuris Patronatus, pensionibus.' Hence, the Congregation of the Council which always approved of temporary pensions assigned by Ordinaries on various occasions, positively refused to sanction a perpetual pension imposed on a parish by the Bishop of Modigliana in favour of a chaplain and two administrators.

¹ Cf. *Act. S.S.*, vol. x., p. 225; Aichner, p. 273; Fagnanus, l.c.; Pihring, l.c., n. 14.

Finally, the great majority of both old and modern canonists hold this doctrine;¹ while, on the other hand the comparatively few authorities who maintain the opposite opinion fail to prove their contention in a satisfactory manner.² No wonder, therefore, if recent writers on canonical legislation when dealing with this matter, absolutely state that diocesan superiors are not allowed to grant perpetual pensions. 'Quae permissio,' writes Wernz, 'ad impositionem pensionis ipsis beneficiis faciendam neque ad vitam pensionarii neque in perpetuum Episcopis est concessa.'³

However, quite a number of canonists of high standing agree in holding that whatever might be said of the strict written law on this question, if in some places a practice has been introduced in favour of bishops to impose perpetual pensions on benefices, and if such a practice is either centenary or so long as to constitute a well-established custom, it may be safely retained and lawfully continued. Father Wernz tells us, moreover, that the Holy See has already tolerated a practice of that kind.⁴

As to Ireland, if cases occur in which priests, and especially parish priests, want to retire from their offices when, owing to their advanced age or ill-health, they are no longer capable of efficiently discharging their important duties, diocesan superiors instead of accepting resignations of benefices adopt, as a rule, the quite legal course of appointing coadjutors or assistants, assigning to them, at the same time, portion of the temporalities of the

¹ A few of those Canonists are, Navarro, Parisio, Azorio, Sanchez, Lessio, De Luca, Fagnano, all quoted by Reiff, l.c., n. 92; Leurenio, l.c., quest. 444; Ball, Palmieri, iv., p. 246; Gonzalez, ad Reg. 8 Canc., n. 27; Ferraris v. Pensio, n. 20; Barbosa, *De off. et Pot. Ep.*, alleg. 85, n. 11; Schmalz., l.c., n. 6; Aichner, sec. 79; Laurentius, p. 199; Santi, iii., 150; Craisson, n. 5468; De Angelis, i., 177, etc.

² 'Plures,' says Icard, 'aliter sentiunt et textus iuris invocant in sui opinionis defensionem, qui thesim certo non probant.'—Vol. ii., p. 603.

³ Lib. ii., n. 321.

⁴ Schmalz. writes: 'Dicendum saltem *vi consuetudinis* Episcopos posse imponere pensiones ad pensionarii vitam se extenderentes,' l.c., n. 8. And Wernz says: 'At quoad pensiones ab Episcopis ad vitam pensionarii imponendas praxis quaedam tolerata est interdum mitior,' ii., n. 321. Also Pirhing, h.t., n. 18; Icard, ii., 604; Suarez, tom. i.; *De Relig.*, lib. iv. c. 51, n. 18, etc.

offices they take charge of. Or, sometimes, resignations of benefices are accepted and some other less onerous and responsible offices are conferred on the resigning priests.

We are told, also, that instances of resignations of parochial offices and concessions of perpetual pensions by diocesan authorities are likewise on record in this country; but, apart from the probability that those perpetual pensions might have been conceded with the express sanction of the Holy See, they seem to be so few and far between that they can scarcely be said to constitute a well-established and legitimate custom. For the rest, this is only a question of fact, of which *videant Consules*.

WHETHER ADMINISTRATORS CAN DELEGATE ALL THEIR POWERS

REV. DEAR SIR,—An administrator has to leave the parish for a few days and wants to delegate all his powers to a priest who has kindly consented to take his place. Can he—the administrator—do so on his own authority and without special faculties from the Bishop?

P. B.

This same question, a good many years ago, was asked of the Sacred Congregation of the Council with the view to have another question decided on which the first one depends, that is, whether administrators enjoy ordinary or delegated jurisdiction.

The Congregation answered by stating that an administrator may delegate all his powers to others provided the Bishop raises no objection to this kind of delegation. The decree is as follows: 'An Oeconomus curatus ab Episcopo constitutus vacante paroecia in vim dispositionis Conc. Trid., Sess. XXIV., c. 18, possit alium Sacerdotem delegare ad omnia vel ad aliquos actus tantum. Resp. Affirmative ad primam partem, nisi obstet voluntas Episcopi.'¹

This response, as it stands, does not settle the main case as to the quality of an administrator's jurisdiction, but it certainly indicates the line of practice which may be safely followed by administrators when desirous to delegate all their powers.

BLESSING OF PRIVATE ORATORIES

REV. DEAR SIR,—A priest has obtained from the Holy See the Indult of a private oratory, and he has erected an altar in a room which he intends to devote exclusively to that purpose and not to any other profane or domestic use. Now, I want to ask you whether it is necessary to bless that room, seeing that it will be entirely devoted to sacred use ; and, if so, what kind of blessing is to be given ? Some say that Mass cannot be permanently celebrated in a profane place. How far is that true ?

PRESBYTER.

Seeing that canonical legislation when laying down the rules about the blessing of places to be devoted to divine worship speaks only of public oratories, and considering that there is no rite assigned in the Roman Ritual for the blessing of private oratories, it is to be concluded that, absolutely speaking, there is no necessity of having them blessed before being used for the celebration of Mass.¹

On the contrary, it is positively forbidden to bless private oratories, with the solemn form prescribed in the Roman Ritual. The reason is, says Gattico, that solemn blessing converts a profane place into a sacred one, which always remains, and must remain, dedicated to God for sacred uses and cannot be turned into a profane place ; whereas private oratories belonging to private individuals or families may in any time be diverted from their sacred use, and made to serve again a profane purpose, either because an indult expires with the death of the person who enjoys it, or because a privileged person may voluntarily discontinue the use of a private oratory.²

This doctrine received confirmation from the Sacred Congregation of Rites on March 11, 1820, in a response given to the Archbishop of Compostella ; and more recently in the decree of the same Congregation issued on June 5, 1899, where we read : ' S. R. Congregatio mandat ut nullum ex Oratoriis privatis consecretur aut benedictione donetur solemnni, quae in Rituali Romano legitur.' However, as

¹ Cf. Caus. i., Dist. i., *De Consecr.*

² Cf. Gattico, *De Orat. Dom.*, c. 12, n. 20.

the prohibition regards only solemn blessing, the rite of which is found in the Roman Ritual; it is not forbidden to bless private oratories with a private blessing, and in such a case the formula and the prayers to be used are those given in the Ritual for the blessing of a new house or place. In fact, the Congregation of Rites in the above-quoted decree states: 'Sed ea tantum formula benedicitur quae pro domo nova aut loco in eodem Rituali habetur.' By that blessing a private oratory does not cease to be a profane place, and, consequently, it may be devoted to some other profane or domestic purpose without the permission of higher authority. Nor is it a difficulty against this theory that Mass, according to the sacred canons, cannot be celebrated in profane places, because the Holy See by giving an indult of a private oratory makes, at the same time, a derogation to the common law of the Church, and permits that the Holy Sacrifice be celebrated in places never consecrated or solemnly blessed. 'Remanet locus privatus,' remarks Many, 'imo profanus in quo contra ius commune ex R. P. indulto datur facultas celebrandi Missam.' Hence, in a private oratory and without permission of the Holy See, no other ecclesiastical function can take place except the celebration of Mass, the indult of a private oratory being a privilege against the common law and of strict interpretation.¹

Those, therefore, who have obtained the indult of a private oratory are at liberty to bless the room where the altar is erected and if they do bless it the private blessing is to be given in the manner stated above; furthermore there is no doubt that it is always advisable for them to have it blessed, notably in cases where a special room, has been destined exclusively and in a permanent way to serve the purpose of private oratory. Icard writes: 'Decet tamen haec sacella aliqua benedictione sanctificari si debeat sacris mysteriis modo permanenti inservire.'²

S. LUZIO.

¹ Cf. Many, *De Sac. Sacr.*, p. 174; Berardi, *Theol. Mor.*, v., pp. 668, Scavini, lib. iv., app. 12, n. 75.

² Vol. ii., p. 150.

LITURGY

THE BLESSING AT DISTRIBUTION OF COMMUNION IMMEDIATELY BEFORE OR AFTER MASS.

REV. DEAR SIR,—Kindly say what is the proper thing to do in regard to the giving of the blessing when Holy Communion is distributed by a priest immediately before saying Mass, or immediately after finishing Mass. I am accustomed to give the blessing in both these cases, myself, but some of my clerical friends tell me that I am not acting in accordance with the Rubrics. A word or two for future guidance will be gratefully received by yours truly,

JUNIOR CLERICUS.

In regard to this query there are some things which are clear, and others that are more or less obscure. There is question of course of a blessing with the hand, the formula being *Benedictio Dei omnipotentis*, etc.

1. Though the ordinary time for administering Holy Communion is during Mass, still any reasonable cause, such as the convenience of the priest or communicants, is sufficient to justify its distribution 'immediate ante vel immediate post Missam celebratam.' The words of the decree¹ run: 'Non est prohibitum Sanctissimam Euchristiam fidelibus, justa de causa, immediate ante vel post Missam distribuere.'

2. When Communion is given directly before or after a *Requiem* Mass—so that the celebrant has not changed the vestments—the blessing is to be omitted. That has been also decided by the Congregation of Rites.² Here, too, it may be noted that when Communion is given in these circumstances in black vestments the *Alleluia*, usually added to the Versicle and Response, *Panem de coelo*, etc., during Pascal time, should be similarly omitted.³

3. What has been said so far rests on undoubted authority. The real point at issue, however, as to the propriety of giving the blessing at the end of the distribution of Communion which takes place immediately before or

¹ S.R.C., n. 3832, ad. iii.

² n. 3177.

³ S.R.C. n. 3465.

immediately after the celebration of Mass said in other than black vestments, does not admit such an easy solution. Rubricists not having the sure guidance of any determinate decree are not quite of one mind in the matter. De Herdt¹ says that the blessing should be given ' nisi, si fiat (distribution) ante Missam, constaret omnes usque ad finem missae in Ecclesia esse mansuros.' Van der Stappen, on the other hand, who is the best representative of modern liturgists, is quite emphatic about giving the blessing. ' Notandum est,' he says, ' quod sacerdos non debet omittere benedictionem post S. Communionis distributionem ante, vel etiam post Missam; nisi sit in paramentis nigris. . . . Praxis Romana et spiritui Ritualis Romani et Decretorum conformis est quod in casu detur Benedictio.'² In favour of his opinion he cites the *Ephemerides Liturgicae*,³ the editor of which is an authority on practical rubrics. This opinion seems to be entitled to the greatest respect. In the first place it is more in harmony with the spirit of the decrees of the Congregation which insist on the blessing being always given with the solitary exception when Communion is distributed in black vestments.⁴

Again, De Herdt's view is practically an admission of the greater correctness of giving the blessing. For he does not say that it ought not to be given after Mass. He insinuates the contrary. And as to not giving it when Communion is administered before Mass if it is certain that all will wait for the blessing of the Mass, who can say whether all the communicants will or can be present up to the conclusion of Mass? Then, and this seems to be the strongest argument from the affirmative point of view, the blessing *Benedictio Dei*, etc., being peculiar to the distribution of Communion is evidently intended for the communicants. Therefore, these should not be ordinarily deprived of it, whether or not they get the blessing of the Mass which is meant for the body of the faithful who assist at the Holy Sacrifice.

¹ *Praxis Lit. Sac.*, i, n. 275.

² *Sacra Liturgia*, iv, q. 200.

³ 1896, p. 57.

⁴ Cf. *Decr.*, n. 3792, ad x.; 3177, etc.

The conclusion, therefore, appears to be that while it cannot be said that it is a matter of strict obligation to give the blessing in the circumstances contemplated, a priest in giving it is not only perfectly within his right but also acts more in harmony with the spirit of the rubrics so far as that spirit is reflected in the teaching of certain rubricists of authority and indicated in the decisions of the Sacred Congregation of Rites.

REVERENCE TOWARDS BLESSED SACRAMENT IN SCHISMATIC CHURCH: RECEPTION OF COMMUNION FROM PRIEST OF DIFFERENT RITE

REV. DEAR SIR,—As you invite queries of correspondents I am led to submit the two following in the hope that you may not judge them unworthy of an answer:—

1. Should a Catholic on his travels enter a schismatic Greek church, is it lawful while passing before the Blessed Sacrament to genuflect?
2. Should a priest of an Eastern rite be saying Mass in a church of the Latin rite, is it lawful for a local Catholic hearing his Mass to receive Holy Communion at his hands?—Yours sincerely,

F. B. H.

A question similar to the former of the two proposed was submitted in 1672 to the Holy Office. It was asked: 'An Eucharistiae Sacramentum delatum ad infirmos a presbytero graeco schismatico adorari debet a viro catholico?' and the answer was: 'Scribatur quod occasione qua non possit evitare delationem Sacramenti, illud adoret sed non prosequatur deferentem, nec ingrediatur ecclesiam grae corum.' Analogy would prompt the reply in the present instance that a Catholic ought not to enter a schismatrical church,—except, it may be, when there is no danger of violating a positive ecclesiastical precept, or any provision of the natural law such as that forbidding us to give scandal—but, should he find himself in the presence of the Blessed Sacrament in a Greek church, that, then, he ought to acknowledge by some outward act of adoration the Real Presence which there abides.

In regard to the second question, the chief difficulty

arises from the fact that the priest of the Eastern rite presumably uses *leavened* bread in the Holy Sacrifice. May, then, a Catholic of the Latin rite receive Communion under this form? For this is what the question comes to. The case of necessity does not enter here as the person is present at Mass said in the church. Several Constitutions and Decrees have emanated from the Holy See from time to time regulating, with scrupulous exactness, the extent and limits of mutual intercourse in religious worship permitted to persons of different rites. Of these the most important are the Constitutions *Romani Pontifices* of Pius V and *Etsi Pastoralis* of Benedict XIV, and the comparatively recent decree of the Congregation of the Propaganda.¹ Now in these Instructions priests of the Greek rite are prohibited under very severe penalties from celebrating the Divine Mysteries after the manner of the Latin rite, and *vice versa*. The faithful also of the Latin rite are forbidden to receive Holy Communion at the hands of Greek priests, that is under the species of unfermented bread, except in a case of extreme necessity. But persons of the Greek rite who have not an opportunity of receiving Communion in their own churches may receive it according to the Latin rite.

To answer, therefore, in brief the question as to whether a person of the Latin rite may receive Communion from the hands of a priest who celebrates Mass in accordance with the Greek rite, and who, consequently, consecrates unfermented bread, the reply must be in the negative.

**PRIVATE ADORATION OF THE BLESSED SACRAMENT ON
HOLY THURSDAY**

REV. DEAR SIR,—Would you kindly give a reply to the following question: in the public church on Maundy Thursday adoration at the Altar of Repose ceases at 8.30 p.m., and the church is closed. The nuns of an adjoining convent have Communion—not Mass—in their own chapel, attend the Mass in the public church and join in the adoration before the Altar of Repose during the day. During the night they keep watch

in their own convent chapel before the Tabernacle. May they decorate the Altar with flowers and lights, or have a separate Altar of Repose thus decorated ?

X.

There is no warrant, as far as can be seen, for the course pursued in the circumstances described by my esteemed correspondent. The case appears to be that there is a kind of Exposition of the Blessed Sacrament held on Holy Thursday night in a chapel where the Devotions of the Triduum of Holy Week are not carried out. Now this has been expressly forbidden by the Congregation of Rites by a decree dated November 18, 1899.¹ It is true that in the case before us the Blessed Sacrament does not seem to be taken out of the Tabernacle. But, then, why the lights or floral decorations ? At all events it looks like an attempt to continue in a different chapel the Devotions of the Triduum which have been commenced in the public church, and there can be no sanction for the proceeding. The functions of these three days are very closely related *inter se*, and, as a rule, the ceremonies of any one day of the three cannot be performed unless those of the remaining days also take place.

P. MORRISROE.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE ASSOCIATION OF PRIEST-ADORERS

REV. DEAR SIR,—The Association of Priest-Adorers have received a new privilege from our Holy Father Pius X, viz., the power to attach to beads, by a simple sign of the Cross, the Crozier Indulgences,—500 days' indulgence for each *Pater* or *Ave*. In addition to many other advantages, the members are allowed to anticipate Matins and Lauds at 1 p.m. every day. To enjoy these useful privileges all that is necessary is to have one's name entered on the register of the Association, to make one hour's adoration before the Blessed Sacrament once a week, and to return at the end of every month, the ticket of adoration. This ticket or libellum is found in the monthly publications of the Association, viz., *Les Annales des Prêtres-Adorateurs*, and, the English publication, *Emmanuel*. The yearly subscription, 2s. 6d., entitles the members to a copy of one of these publications.

The members may gain a plenary indulgence each time they make one hour of adoration. Each time they visit the Blessed Sacrament, and recite six *Pater*, *Ave*, and *Gloria Patris* they may gain once a day, the innumerable indulgences, 'Della Stazione del Sanctissimo Sacramento.'

This Association has appealed to priests all over the world. Its object is to bring priests to our Blessed Lord in the Sacrament of His Love—to bring them, for a time, away from the hurry and rush of life, into the vivifying sanctifying Presence of Jesus. No wonder priests throughout the world are entering into the Association. During the past two months, the following new members entered : in Germany, 89 ; France, 119 ; China, 5 ; Austria, 81 ; United States, 180 ; Portugal, 2 ; Ireland, 2 ; Poland, 13 ; Mexico, 6 ; Switzerland, 26 ; Russia, 2 ; Egypt, 1 ; Belgium, 158 ; Greece, 1 ; Italy, 704 ; Lorraine, 2 ; England, 1 ; Syria, 2 ; Jerusalem, 1 ; Spain, 8.

This is an Association specially suited for the present times—the Eucharistic day—and it brings countless blessings on priests and on their works. It invites priests to enter its ranks, 'to watch one hour with Me.' The Rev. Director will be glad to receive new members into the Association. Priests wishing to join will kindly send their names for the present to the Rev. Director, Priest-Adorers' Association, Maynooth College.

THE DIRECTOR.

DOCUMENTS

THE following letter has been addressed by His Grace the Archbishop of Dublin to the parish priests of his Diocese:—

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE SOCIETY

ARCHBISHOP'S HOUSE,

DUBLIN, 4th March, 1908.

VERY REV. AND DEAR FATHER,—Amongst the duties imposed upon the Bishops of the Church by the Encyclical *De Doctrina Christiana tradenda*, is that of canonically establishing Sodalities for the teaching of the Christian Doctrine in the various parishes of their respective dioceses.¹

By a Pontifical Brief published soon after the issuing of the Encyclical, the Holy Father re-constituted the Archsodality of the Christian Doctrine which has existed in Rome from the Pontificate of Paul V.² The object of the modifications thus made in the constitution of that venerable Archsodality was two-fold: to bring its working arrangements into a form better suited to the conditions of modern times, and to provide for the aggregation to it of all the Christian Doctrine Sodalities established throughout the world, thus extending to each of them the benefits of the numerous grants of Indulgences and other spiritual privileges and favours which the Archsodality has from time to time obtained by direct grant from successive Sovereign Pontiffs.

The preliminary arrangements requisite for the carrying out of the directions of the Holy Father in this diocese are now complete, and it only remains to bring the organization into working order.

The following points have, so far, been settled:—

1. By a Decree of this date, a copy of which I enclose, a Central Diocesan Sodality of the Christian Doctrine has been established in Dublin, which will have the general direction of the work of the local Sodalities in the various parishes throughout the diocese.

2. By the aggregation of this Diocesan Sodality to the Archsodality in Rome, all the local Christian Doctrine Sodalities canonically established throughout the diocese become *ipso facto* aggregated to the Archsodality.

3. This privilege of aggregation to the Archsodality will

¹ See the Appendix to the Acts and Decrees of the Maynooth Synod of 1900, page 224.

² See ib. pp. 226-229.

apply equally to any Christian Doctrine Sodalities that may afterwards be canonically established in the diocese.

4. As a necessary preliminary to the canonical erection of a Christian Doctrine Sodality in any Church in the diocese, a petition is to be presented to the Ordinary, asking that a Decree establishing the Sodality may be issued. A copy of an approved Formula for this purpose is enclosed, but it need not be sent in until after the first meeting of the Central Sodality has been held, when, doubtless, various points as to which further information may be needed will be cleared up.

5. The first meeting of the Central Diocesan Sodality will be held in St. Kevin's Chapel, at the Pro-Cathedral, at 12 o'clock, on Wednesday, the 11th of March. It will be presided over by the Bishop of Canea, who, with his usual kindness, has undertaken for me the guidance and direction of this important work, and to whom, until a Secretary to the Sodality has been appointed, at its first meeting, you will kindly address any communication you may wish to make on the subject.

6. Those members of the Secular Clergy of the diocese who are mentioned in the enclosed Decree, as members of the Central Sodality will please regard this letter as an invitation to attend the meeting on the 11th of March.

7. As regards the Religious Orders and Congregations in the City or its Suburbs, having public Churches in which the Catechism is taught, the Superior of each Church in which it is desired to have a local Sodality established, will kindly either himself become a member of the Central Sodality, or arrange with one of the Fathers of his community to do so.—I remain, Very Rev. and Dear Father, your faithful Servant in Christ,

✠ WILLIAM,
Archbishop of Dublin, &c., &c.

DECRETUM

ERECTIONIS CANONICAE SODALITATIS BEATAE MARIAE VIRGINIS
SINE LABE CONCEPTAE, AD DOCTRINAM CHRISTIANAM IN
DIOECESI DUBLINENSI TRADENDAM JUXTA NORMAM EPIS-
TOLAE ENCYCLICAE QUAE INCIPIT 'ACERBO NIMIS' DIE XV
MENSIS APRILIS ANNI MDCCCCV A SS. DOM. NOSTRO PIO PAPA X
EVULGATAE.

Desiderio impulsi institutionem religiosam promovendi, prae-
sertim inter juniores et rudiores dilecti gregis Nobis a Divina
VOL. XXIII.

Providentia commissi, simulque obtemperandi, uti fas est, mandatis Summi Nostri Pontificis Pii Papae X in Encyclicis Litteris *Acerbo Nimirum* diei xv Aprilis MDCCCCV expressis, in hac Nostra Dioecesi Dublinensi his praesentibus erigimus et instituimus, et erectam et institutam declaramus, Sodalitatem Doctrinae Christianae Dioecesanam, cui tanquam Centro aliae Dioeceseos Sodalitates aggregentur. Haec vero constabit ecclesiasticis viris e Clero Nostro selectis uti sequitur :—

- a) Revmis Vicariis Generalibus :
- b) Revmis Vicariis Foraneis ;
- c) Iis qui constituant Commissionem Dioecesanam ad examina in Catechismo habenda ;
- d) Parochis et Administratoribus qui Collationes adeunt Theologicas in Civitate habitas ;
- e) Sacerdote aliquo una a proprio Superiore designando, ex unaquaque virorum Religiosorum Communitate quae Ecclesiam publicam in Civitate aut in suburbii administrat ;
- f) Iis qui a Nobis ad examina in Catechismo instituenda in hujus Dioeceseos scholis pro tempore designantur.

Cui Sodalitati ita erectae et institutae facultates impertimur :

- a) Officiales e numero sociorum ad triennium seligendi, viz., Praesidem, Thesaurarium, Secretarium ;
- b) Aggregandi Sodalitates in hujus Dioeceseos Ecclesiis, Collegiis, Scholis, Coenobiis, jam formatas vel formandas, eisdemque invigilandi ;
- c) Componendi etiam Constitutiones ad sodalitatem regendam, easdemque amplificandi, vel in quantum opus sit reformandi, quae vim suam habituerae sint postquam a Nobis fuerint approbatae ;
- d) Ea omnia insuper faciendi quae vel necessaria vel opportuna a Nobis judicentur ad hoc pium opus promovendum.

Sodalitatis hujus Dioecesanae officium erit aggregationem cum Archisodalitate in Urbe constituta exposcere, ita ut, illa aggregata, aliae omnes Dioeceseos Sodalitates ipso facto eidem Archisodalitati Urbis aggregentur, juxta tenorem Apostolicae Brevis die v Decembris MDCCCCV emissae, quo facto Sodales omnes cuiusvis Sodalitatis in Dioecesi rite institutae habiles reddantur ad Indulgentias omnes lucrandas huic pio operi a S. Sede adnexas.

Datum Dublini, die 4 Martii, 1908.

✠ GULIELMUS,
Archiep. Dublinen., &c., &c.

MARRIAGE AND BETROTHALS: INTERPRETATION OF THE DECREE 'NE TEMERE'

ROMANA ET ALIARUM.—DUBIORUM CIRCA DECRETUM DE SPONSALIBUS ET MATRIMONIO.

Vix ac decretum 'Ne temere' de sponsalibus et matrimonio ab hac S. C. promulgatum fuerit, plures ubique excitatae sunt disputationes de aliquibus illius articulis interpretandis.

Quare sequentia dubia in comitiis subsignata die habitis Emissis Patribus subiecta fuerunt:

I. *An decreto Ne temere adstringantur etiam catholici ritus orientalis.*—Et quatenus negative:

II. *Utrum ad eosdem decretum extendere expediat.*—Et quatenus saltem pro aliquo loco decretum non fuerit extensum:

III. *Utrum validum sit matrimonium contractum a catholico ritus latini cum catholico ritus orientalis, non servata forma ab eodem decreto statuta.*

IV. *An sub art. XI, § 2, in exceptione enunciata illis verbis 'nisi pro aliquo particulari loco aut regione aliter a S. Sede sit statutum' comprehendatur tantummodo Constitutio Benedictina et cetera eiusmodi indulta impedimentum clandestinitatis respicientia.*

V. *Num in imperio Germaniae catholici, qui ad sectam haereticam vel schismaticam transierunt, vel conversi ad fidem catholicam ab ea postea defecerunt, etiam in iuvenili vel infantili aetate, ad valide cum persona catholica contrahendum adhibere debeant formam in decreto Ne temere statutam, ita scilicet ut contrahere debeant coram parocho et duobus saltem testibus.*—Et quatenus affirmative:

VI. *An, attentis peculiaribus circumstantiis in imperio Germaniae existentibus, opportuna dispensatione provideri oporteat.*

VII. *Ubinam et quomodo cappellani castrenses, vel parochi nullum absolute territorium nec cumulative cum alio parocho habentes, at iurisdictionem directe exercentes in personas aut familias, adeo ut has personas sequantur quocumque se conferant, valide matrimoniis suorum subditorum adsistere valeant.*

VIII. *Ubinam et quomodo parochi qui, territorium esclusive proprium non habentes, cumulative territorium cum alio vel aliis parochis retinent, matrimoniis adsistere valeant.*

IX. *Ubinam et quomodo parochus, qui in territorio aliis parochis assignato nonnullis personas vel familias sibi subditas habet, matrimoniis adsistere valeat.*

X. *Num cappellani seu rectores piorum cuiusvis generis locorum, a parochiali iurisdictione exemptorum, adsistere valide possint matrimoniis absque parocho vel Ordinarii delegatione.*

XI. *An a decreto Ne temere abolita sit lex vel consuetudo in nonnullis dioecesibus vigens, vi cuius a Curia episcopali pera-*

genda sunt acta, quibus constet de statu libero contrahentium, et dein venia fiat parochis adsistendi matrimonii.

XII. *An et quoisque expediatur prorogare executionem decreti Ne temere pro nonnullis locis iuxta Ordinariorum petitiones.*

Quibus vero dubiis Emi Patres responderunt :

Ad I. 'Quoad catholicos ritus orientalis nihil esse immutatum.'

Ad II. 'Ad S. Congregationem de Propaganda Fide.'

Ad III. 'Dilata et exquiratur votum duorum Consultorum, qui p[re] oculis habeant leges hac de re vigentes quoad Orientales.'

Ad IV. 'Comprehendi tantummodo Constitutionem PROVIDA,¹ non autem comprehendendi alia quaecumque decreta, facto verbo cum SSMo; et ad mentem.'

Ad V. 'Affirmative.'

Ad VI. 'Negative, ideoque servetur decretum NE TEMERE.'

Ad VII. 'Quoad capellanos castrenses aliosque parochos, de quibus in dubio, nihil esse immutatum.'²

Ad VIII. 'Affirmative in territorio cumulativo habito.'³

Ad IX. 'Affirmative quoad suos subditos tantum ubique in dicto territorio, facto verbo cum SSMo.'

Ad X. 'Affirmative pro personis sibi creditis, in loco tamen ubi iurisdictionem exercent, dummodo constet ipsi commissam fuisse plenam potestatem parochiale.'

Ad XI. 'Servetur solitum.'

Ad XII. 'Ad Emum. Praefectum cum SSMo.'

PROVISION FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC WORSHIP IN FRANCE

EPISTOLA

AD ARCHIEPISCOPOS ET EPISCOPOS GALLIAE DE TAXA PRO SACRO
CULTU

Monseigneur,

Je m'empresse de porter à la connaissance de Votre Grandeur

¹ Hac decisione coarctatur valor Constitutionis *Provida* (Cfr. *Acta Pontificia*, Vol. iv, pag. 161) quae adhuc vigebit: 1º. quoad matrimonia mixta in Germania iam contracta vel contrahenda usque ad Pascha currentis anni, cum decretum *Ne temere* executionem obtinebit. 2º. quoad matrimonia mixta a catholicis cum acatholicis contrahenda, non servata forma in praesenti decreto praescripta, nam sub nomine *catholicorum* per decretum *Ne temere* comprehenduntur omnes in *Ecclesia* dum-taxat *catholica baptizati* etiamsi ex haeresi aut schismate conversi fuerint, vel a fide catholica ad haeresim vel schisma transierint.

² Cappellani castrenses et parochi de quibus in casu potestatem territoriale, prout ipsa sancitur a decreto *Ne temere*, non habent, cum eorum subdit non commorantur in territorio fixo vel aliis parochis assignato, quare dicti cappellani et parochi potestatem personalem iuxta Tridentinum retinent relate ad sponsalia et matrimonia suorum tantum subditorum.

³ Et hoc quia parochi de quibus in dubio aequiparantur aliis parochi territorium separatum habentibus.

les nouvelles instructions que Sa Sainteté a jugé opportun de donner aux évêques français, au sujet du denier du culte.

Le Saint-Père reconnaît la nécessité de cette organisation, en vue de subvenir à l'entretien du culte et aux besoins de ses ministres, privés de leurs ressources par l'injuste loi de séparation. Toutefois, il tient à ce qu'on procède, dans une matière pareille, avec le plus grande délicatesse, en évitant absolument tout ce qui pourrait avoir même l'apparence de vexation ou de fiscalité : principe qui d'ailleurs a été approuvé avec tant de sagesse dans l'assemblée plénière des évêques de Paris.

Conformément à ce principe, le Saint-Père désire vivement, en premier lieu, que toute taxation fixe obligatoire (tant personnelle que paroissiale) soit écartée, pour deux principales raisons : d'abord le système des taxes semble mettre, en quelque sorte officiellement, le ministère spirituel à prix d'argent ; ensuite il expose nécessairement à l'arbitraire dans la définition du chiffre de la taxe, car il est moralement impossible de tenir compte de tous les éléments qui netrent dans l'appréciation de la capacité contributive de chaque individu ou de chaque paroisse. Les évêques devraient donc se borner à en appeler à la foi et à la charité de leurs diocésains. Ils devraient inculquer la grave obligation qu'il y a, pour eux, de contribuer, dans la mesure de leurs ressources, à l'entretien du culte et de ses ministres, tout en faisant comprendre ce devoir par les seules voies de la persuasion.

Quant aux sanctions, qui sont une conséquence presque inévitable du système des taxes, il faudrait exclure toute sanction pécuniaire, qui est odieuse de sa nature, et plus encore la sanction qui consisterait soit à supprimer le service religieux dans les paroisses, soit à refuser aux individus le saint ministère.

Cependant il est certain que l'opinion des bons réclame qu'il y ait quelque différence dans la manière de traiter ceux qui participent et ceux qui refusent par mauvais voulon de participer au denier du culte. En vue de donner satisfaction à cette exigence, le Saint-Père ne s'oppose pas à ce que pour les cérémonies des funérailles et des mariages on réserve aux seuls paroissiens participants de l'œuvre du denier les honneurs de surcroît, c'est-à-dire la pompe qui classe ces cérémonies : par exemple la présence d'un nombreux clergé, la décoration de l'église la solennité du chant. Cette sanction n'aurait rien d'odieux ; l'opinion des bons obtiendrait ainsi satisfaction, en même temps que les autres seraient avertis que l'Eglise n'accorde des honneurs exceptionnels qu'à ses plus dévoués enfants.

Sa Sainteté espère qu'en agissant ainsi par voie d'amour et de persuasion, les évêques trouveront dans la générosité des

catholiques français une digne réponse à leur appel ; et par conséquent, ils ne seront pas obligés, afin de pourvoir aux besoins de l'Eglise de recourir à des desures qui sembleraient amoindrir la spontanéité et la religion des fidèles, dans l'accomplissement de cette grave obligation.

Je prie Votre Grandeur de vouloir bien porter ces instructions du Saint-Père à la connaissance de ses suffragants.

Agréez, Monseigneur, l'expression de mes sentiments dévoués en Notre-Seigneur.

Rome, 8 Octobre 1907.

R. Card. MERRY DEL VAL.

**ATTENDANCE OF CLERICS AT STATE UNIVERSITIES IN
FRANCE**

EPISTOLA

**DE FREQUENTIA CIVILUM UNIVERSITATUM CLERICIS PERMITTENDA
TANTUM IN CASU NECESSITATIS**

Monseigneur,

Le Saint-Siège a reçu des réclamations contre le procédé de certains ecclésiastiques français, qui, pour être plus rapidement et plus facilement munis de grades universitaires, s'inscrivent aux Facultés de l'Etat, renonçant à suivre les cours des Facultés catholiques.

Votre Grandeur comprend aisément que, si on en venait à généraliser cet usage, la saine doctrine, chez les ecclésiastiques, ainsi que l'avenir des Universités catholiques, pourraient être sérieusement compromis. En effet, il ne peut pas échapper à la pénétration de Votre Grandeur que l'intégrité de la foi des jeunes étudiants, même s'ils sont clercs, ou prêtres, est exposée dans les Facultés civiles à de bien graves dangers.

Pourtant, d'ordre de Sa Sainteté, je m'empresse de vous rappeler que, sauf de très rares exceptions, la préférence doit être *toujours* donnée aux Universités catholiques. Les évêques sont autorisés, conformément au décret de 1896 visé par l'Encyclique, à permettre à leurs ecclésiastiques de suivre les cours des Facultés de l'Etat, seulement *en cas de nécessité* et, en tant que cette nécessité l'exige, en prenant d'autre part toutes les précautions requises. Les évêques se montreront *particulièrement difficiles* à donner cette autorisation pour les cours les plus sujets à devenir dangereux, comme ceux d'histoire, de philosophie et des matières similaires, et les recteurs des Universités catholiques ne permettront pas, de leur côté, que les ecclésiastiques, inscrits dans l'Institut dirigé par eux, qui ne sont pas

munis, à cet effet, d'une autorisation expresse et spéciale de leurs évêques, suivent ces cours les dans les Universités civiles.

Je prie Votre Grandeur de vouloir bien porter ces instructions du Saint-Père à la connaissance de ses suffragants.

Agréez, Monseigneur, l'expression de mes sentiments dévoués en Notre-Seigneur.

Rome, 10 Octobre 1907.

R. Card. MERRY DEL VAL.

ELECTRIC LIGHT AND SINGING OF WOMEN IN CHURCHES

ANGELOPOLITANA

**DUBIA CIRCA LUCEM ELECTRICAM ET CANTUM MULIERUM IN
ECCLESIIS**

Rmus. Dñus Raymundus Ibarra et Gonzalez, Archiepiscopus Angelopolitanus in republica Mexicana, a S. Rituum Congregatione sequentium dubiorum solutionem reverentem exposcit :

I. Per decretum S.R.C. n. 3859 die 4 Iunii 1895 declaratum fuit 'lucem electricam adhiberi posse in templis non ad cultum sed ad tenebras depellendas, seclusa omni theatrali specie.' Iamvero cum a nonnullis tale decretum nimis late interpretari videatur, ad controversias dirimendas, quaeritur in particulari :

1. Licebitne apponere in altari in quo SS. Sacramentum publicae fidelium patet venerationi electricas lampades, sive tabernaculum circa, sive in vasis florigeris quae inter candelabra locantur ?

2. Fasne erit imagines SS. Cordis Iesu, vel B. Mariae Virginis iisdem electricis circumcingere luminibus, ad instar scilicet fulgidae coronae circa caput, lunae sub pedibus, vel ad modum solarium radiorum ad latera ; et in capitibus duodecim Apostolorum linguas igneas effingere rubeis lampadibus ?

3. Permittine demum poterit quod in lampadibus quae ex ecclesiae fornicibus pendent, candelae ex cera, fictis candelis electri cis substituantur ?

II. Per decretum n. 3964 *De Truxillo* die 17 Septembris 1897 prohibitum fuit ut 'mulieres ac puellae intra vel extra ambitum chori canant in missis solemnibus,' idemque confirmatum est die 19 Februarii 1903. Attamen cum in *Motu proprio* SS. D. N. Pii PP. X *Inter pastoralis officii* de musica sacra d. d. 22 Novembris 1903 praecipiatur ut 'cantus gregorianus in populi usus restituendus curetur, quo ad divinas Laudes mysteriaque celebra magis agentium partem, antiquorum more, fideles conferant,' quaeritur : Licebitne permettere ut puellae ac mulieres in scannis sedentes, ipsis in ecclesia assignatis separatim a viris,

partes invariabiles missae cantent; vel saltem extra functiones stricte liturgicas, hymnos aut cantilenas vernaculae concinant?

Et Sacra Rituum Congregatio, ad relationem subscripti Secretarii, exquisitis votis utriusque Commissionis tum Liturgicae tum de musica et cantu sacro, omnibusque sedulo persensis, ita prescribendum censuit:

Ad I. *'Pro tribus quaestionibus particularibus dentur et serventur decreta iuxta alias similes resolutiones.'*

Ad II. *'Affirmative ad utrumque, et ad mentem. Mens est: (1) ut intra christifides viri et pueri, quantum fieri potest, suam partem divinis Laudibus concelebrandis conferant, haud exclusis, tamen maxime ipsorum defectu, mulieribus et puellis; et (2) ut ubi officiatura choralis habetur, cantus exclusivus mulierum, praesertim in cathedralibus ecclesiis non admittatur, nisi ex gravi causa ab ordinario agnoscenda; et canto semper ut quaevis inordinatio vitetur.'*

Atque ita rescripsit, die 17 Ianuarii 1908.

S. Card. CRETONI, *Praefectus.*

L.  S.

 D. PANICI, *Archiep. Laodicen., Secretarius.*

**FEAST OF THE APPARITION OF OUR LADY OF LOURDES
RAISED TO DOUBLE MAJOR AND EXTENDED TO THE
WHOLE CHURCH**

URBIS ET ORBIS

**DECRETUM QUO FESTUM APPARITIONIS B. V. M. IMMACULATAE
VULGO DE LOURDES AD UNIVERSAM ECCLESIAM SUB RITU
DUPLICI MAIORI EXTENDITUR CELEBRANDUM QUOTANNIS
DIE II FEBRUARII.**

Immaculatae Mariae Virginis vulgatum nomen *da Lourdes*, e celeberrimis ipsius Deiparae apparitionibus quae prope Lapurdum, Tarbiensis Dioecesis oppidum, anno quarto a dogmatica definitione de Immaculato Conceptu eiusdem Virginis evenerunt, quum in dies magis magisque inclaruerit, simulque Fidelium pietas et cultus ob innumera exinde accepta beneficia, saepissime additis prodigiis, ubique terrarum mirifice adactus sit; multi Romanae Ecclesiae Patres Purpurati, ac plurimi sacrorum Antistites et Praesules e cunctis orbis regionibus, praeeunte Episcopo Tarbiensium, Sanctissimo Domino Nostro Pio Papae X supplicia vota enixe porrixerunt rogantes, ut festum Apparitionis B.M.V. Immaculatae, vulgo *de Lourdes*, a fe. re. Leone XIII potenter tantummodo Ecclesiis et Religiosis Familias concessum, ad universam Catholici Orbis Ecclesiam suprema Auctoritate Sua benigne extendere dignaretur.

Quare Sanctitas Sua, exceptis libertissime eiusmodi precibus

Praedecessorum suorum vestigiis inhaerens, qui Lapurdense Sanctuarium permultis attributis privilegiis coherestarunt: innumeris quoque peregrinationibus permotus, quae, mira sane Fidei professione, frequentissimo Fidelium turmarum concursu nunquam intermisso ad memoratum Sanctuarium peraguntur: maxime vero pro Suamet erga Dei Genitricem primaeva labe expertem constanti pietate, ac spe fretus ob ampliorem Immaculatae Virginis cultum, rebus in arctis Christi Ecclesiae adiunctum iri potens Ipsius opiferae auxilium; festum Apparitionis B. M. V. Immaculatae, quod a plurimis Dioecesibus et Regularibus Familiis iamdiu celebratur, inde ab anno insequenti, qui a Deiparae Virginis ad Gavi Fluminis oram apparitionibus quinquagesimus erit, vel a nongentesimonono supra millesimum in universalis Ecclesia sub ritu duplii maiori, cum Officio et Missa iamdiu approbatis, undecima die Februarii quotannis recolendum iussit: servatis Rubricis et Decretis. Praesens vero Decretum per me infrascriptum Cardinalem Sacrorum Rituum Congregationi Praefectum expediri mandavit. Contrariis non ostentibus quibuscumque. Die 13 Novembris, 1907.

S. Card. CRETONI, *Praefectus.*

L.  S.

 D. PANICI, *Archiep. Laodicen., Secretarius.*

ADDICTIO AD CALCEN VI LECTIONIS OFFICII APPARITIONIS B.M.V.

IMMACULATAE.

Die 11 Februarii.

IN FESTO

APPARITIONIS B.M.V. IMMACULATAE

DUPLEX MAIUS.

Officium et Missa propria, a S.R.C. approbata, die 11 Iulii, 1890, cum sequenti additione ad calcem VI. Lectionis: 'Tandem Pius X Pontifex Maximus, pro sua erga Deiparam pietate, ac plurimorum votis annuens sacerdotum Antistitum, idem festum ad Ecclesiam universam extendit.'

Sanctissimus Dominus Noster Pius Papa X, referente me infrascripto Cardinali sacerdotum Rituum Congregationi Praefecto, suprascriptam additionem inserendam Officio proprio de Apparitione B.M.V. Immaculatae, benigne approbare dignatus est. Die 27 Novembris, 1907.

S. Card. CRETONI, *Praefectus.*

L.  S.

 D. PANICI, *Archiep. Laodicen., Secretarius.*

NOTICES OF BOOKS

THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA. An International Work of Reference on the Constitution, Doctrine, Discipline, and History of the Catholic Church. In Fifteen vols. Vols. I. and II. London: Caxton Publishing Co., Surrey Street, Strand; New York: Robert Appleton.

WE have before us the first two volumes of the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, and we are glad to acknowledge its great merits and to recommend it to the clergy. When complete this work will be a splendid *treasury* of Catholic learning, and will be almost indispensable in the priest's library. It will, however, find a place, we trust, in many private secular libraries, and we hope that priests will see to it that it is placed in all public libraries in the furnishing of which they have any voice.

Taking it all in all, it has been carefully and skilfully compiled and reflects the highest credit on the Catholic Church of America. It was a huge undertaking, and only those who have a hand in it can know what vast labour, thought, and reflection it entailed. In face of the courage, determination, and we are happy to say, success, of the editors, it is scarcely fair to say anything that would look like fault-finding, and if the few things we have to say were to deter a single individual from becoming a subscriber we would leave them unsaid. Some of the articles appear to us rather overladen and diffuse. The writers are wordy. Their phrase is not a short cut to their sense as it should be. The references also are rather meagre in many cases, and nothing gives value to an encyclopædia so much as a full and reliable list of references.

Nothing is easier than to get up a cry either against the orthodoxy or the scholarship of a work of this kind. Nothing substantial that we have noticed in the two volumes before us would justify it in either case. The editors, on the whole, have been vigilant and careful, and any small comment we might make on individual articles would be out of all proportion to the great merits of the work as a whole. We can only hope that still more care will be exercised in future. On that condition the editors will have done a noble work for the Catholic Church, and will deserve the gratitude in particular of all English-speaking priests.

J. F. H.

SAINTE AGNÈS VIÈRGE ET MARTYRE DE LA VOIE NOMENTANE,
d'après de nouvelles recherches par R. J. Florian
Jubaru, S.J. Paris : Dumoulin, 1907.

THIS is a large quarto volume of nearly 400 closely-printed pages. It is enriched with 173 engravings, and is dedicated 'to His Holiness Pius X, who has deigned to take under his protection the publication of these researches, which were begun under the distinguished encouragement of his predecessor, Leo XIII.'

The book is divided into three parts. The first contains the narrative concerning St. Agnes anterior to the fifth century, and which the author calls the two distinct traditions. The second part contains the narratives of the first twenty years of the fifth century—namely, the gradual fusion of the two traditions. The third part is a historical review of the entire subject.

The book is stamped with 'the character of investigation' as Father Jubaru himself says, and it is the investigation of a most competent scholar and highly reverent critic, who has at heart the honour of the saint. He points out the substantial facts regarding St. Agnes, to be learned from St. Ambrose's sermon, namely, that she was (a) twelve years old, (b) a virgin, and had to struggle for the preservation of her virginity, (c) that she died pierced by the sword, and that (d) she went freely to martyrdom. He proves that the Hymn of St. Ambrose agrees with *de Virginibus*—the sermon on the Virgin-martyr—in the main narrative and even in its expressions. He then takes up the inscription composed by Pope St. Damasus, and shows that this agrees with the tradition handed on by St. Ambrose, and implies that she was martyred during the last persecution.

But it is when he comes to the examination of the Greek Texts of the *Passion* that Father Jubaru, so to say, opens our eyes. From his studies he reaches the conclusion that the Greek *Passion* refers to a grown-up Agnes, who was arrested for proselytism, condemned to outrage, and to be burned alive. Indeed, all this is stated by the text itself of the *Passion* in express words, as everyone who has read the late Cardinal Bartolini's *Gli atti di S. Agnese* well knows. Father Jubaru further shows that these *data* cannot possibly be reconciled with the Damaso-Ambrosian tradition, that they however correspond with Roman memories of an Agnes on the Via Salaria, whom he calls the 'ancient,' and who is mentioned in the Martyrology of St. Jerome, and whose *Passion* was in possession of the Greeks before the last persecution.

The Poet Prudentius attributes to St. Agnes of the Nomentan Way, a local Roman tradition concerning St. Agnes the 'ancient,' and thus partially united the two traditions, before the year 405. This union was completed by the pseudo-Ambrosian *Gesta Sanctæ Agnes*, which were written before A.D. 423, and in which there is much that is fictitious and legendary, though it possesses also a certain value. Every portion of the *Gesta* is subjected to a strict examination, and much of it that has passed into the legend has been rejected as devoid of historical foundation.

'The history of the young twelve years' old martyr,' says Father Jubaru, 'reduced to its primitive component parts is neither long nor complicated. But neither the beauty nor the grandeur of a history are in proportion with the number of facts. . . . The victory of the young Roman sent a thrill of holy pride through the Western Churches . . . Whilst admiring and praising Agnes we learn to better appreciate and relish what is the very marrow of the Gospel, namely, the joy of sacrifice which is made through love.'

No correct life of St. Agnes can be written until the contents of this volume have been read and mastered. The position occupied by the writer is a sufficient guarantee that he has advanced no view without most solid reasons for it; indeed, a glance at the footnotes, with which the book is filled, would entitle him to a respectful claim on our attention, even though he did not sit in the chair of a Professor in the Leonine Pontifical College at Anagni.

It is Father Jubaru's intention to bring out a smaller edition of his volume besides the *édition de luxe*, and a popular edition, which, it is to be hoped, may be translated for English-speaking readers.

T. S.

THE BECKONING OF THE WAND. Sketches of a Lesser Known Ireland. By Alice Dease. London: Sands & Co.

MISS DEASE has undertaken the rather difficult task of revealing Ireland to a person who, though living in this country, cannot or will not see it. We all know such people and the task of enlightening and converting them is not always either easy or profitable. Miss Dease, at all events, sets about her business in earnest. Her letters—for she adopts the epistolary method—are full of kindly sympathy for the poor, and are also remarkable for their fine descriptions of scenery, and of the homely surroundings of peasant life. Our national defects she does not seek to minimize or conceal; but her chief aim is

to bring to the notice of her friend our redeeming qualities. This she does for the most part with great skill and success, and a vast amount of gentle and well-bred feeling.

The only objection I have to find is that the tone which Miss Dease adopts towards this superior critic is rather too apologetic. After all, there is nothing like having a good conceit of ourselves. A great deal of the dirt complained of by Joan is elegance itself in comparison with that which abounds in the country she affects. Even the poorest and most squalid of our countrymen and women have some moral spring-board left to them which is more than can be said of the hardened lower classes in other countries. I am certainly no apologist for dirt: but there is no more objectionable product of any country than the sons and daughters who have no love for their mother and no excuse for her failings. Lend a hand to correct them by all means, remembering that old habits are not eradicated easily nor all at once; but the reforming spirit that is not founded on love is worthless and doomed to failure.

On the whole this book of Miss Dease is one of the best of its kind. There are 'Irish Idylls' which I have seen highly praised and have tried to read, but could not. These 'Idylls' of Miss Dease I have read and enjoyed. I would like to see many things modified in them: but they are eminently readable and enjoyable, and as might be expected, thoroughly Catholic in tone. The gratitude of Miss Dease's peasants for favours received is touching: but the most striking example of this that I have met with in Irish books is that which I came across in Mr. Lefanu's *Seventy Years of Irish Life*. A gentleman resident in Dublin befriended a poor countryman of his who lived in a Munster county, which I need not name. The grateful one wrote up to his benefactor: 'If ever it comes in my way to serve you, I will be only too glad to do so. If there be anyone down in these parts you would like to have anything done to, be sure to let me know.' The gratitude of Miss Dease's people manifests itself differently, but perhaps not more naturally.

J. F. H.

REGINA POETARUM. Our Lady's Anthology. Selected and arranged by the Hon. Alison Stourton. London: R. & T. Washbourne. 1907.

FROM a Dease to a Stourton the passage is easy and natural; for the same high purpose animates this handsome

volume as the one that precedes. Miss Stourton has had her eyes about her in the course of her reading, and has turned it to good account in this admirable anthology of poems in honour of our Lady. They range from the Blessed Jacopone da Todi, in the thirteenth century to Father John Bannister Tabb in the twentieth, and represent styles and metres almost as varied as the authors. There are odes, sonnets, carols, triolets, hymns, lays,—perhaps the most musical collection of poems ever brought together in honour of the Blessed Virgin. Nothing for this volume but praise.

J. F. H.

ALGEBRA FOR BEGINNERS. Including Elementary Graphs.
By James J. O'Dea, M.A. London : Longmans, Green & Co.

THE author of the well-known popular *Explicit Algebra* and *Explicit Arithmetic* has put teachers and students under another obligation by the publication of an *Algebra for Beginners*, which, needless to say, is characterised by all the qualities that have won for his earlier books their phenomenal success. In his latest work, Professor O'Dea caters for the wants of Preparatory Grade Intermediate students, Junior Grade Pass, Candidates for King's Scholarship Examinations, the Entrance and Junior Freshmen Examinations, Trinity College, Dublin, the Matriculation (Pass) Examinations of the Royal University, and of the Universities of London, Oxford, and Cambridge. His arrangement and treatment of the ordinary subjects within this course leave nothing to be desired, while his chapter on Elementary Graphs is a most welcome addition in an elementary text-book on Algebra. Another, and not the least merit of the work is that almost all the exercises have been selected from recent Examination Papers. It is gratifying to find an Irishman doing such splendid work in this branch of study, and it is a great pleasure as well as a duty to bring Professor O'Dea's latest book under the notice of our schools and colleges.

T. P. G.

THE FATHER MATHEW UNION. Seventh Annual Report, 1907. Dublin : Browne & Nolan, Ltd.

UNDER the able management of Father Gallaher, of Ballymote, the Father Mathew Union is making steady progress. The experiment of holding the annual meeting in the different pro-

vinces in turn—a thing which the Catholic Truth Society has, for unfortunate reasons, been unable to accomplish—has been a great success, the Society gaining new members every year. Father Gallaher was able to announce in Armagh last summer the effect of the meeting held in Sligo the previous year. The 'Record' of the yearly meeting is deeply interesting, and a perusal of it could not fail to have a salutary influence even on those who have not joined the Union. The papers of Monsignor Kelly and Father Aloysius make as strong an appeal as could be made to the clergy, and cannot fail to have far-reaching effects. With close on 600 priests already enrolled in the Union the cause is evidently making rapid strides. We have no doubt that the numbers will increase as time goes on until the toper is left on 'the bleak shore alone' an interesting relic of the days of persecution. Six hundred total abstainers is already a fine register, exclusive of those—and there are a good many—who, though observing total abstinence, have not yet joined the Union. There are many others on the verge of total abstinence who may yet be induced to get rid of the technicality that excludes them. Father Gallaher and his confrères are doing a noble work for the Irish Church and the Irish people, and we fancy they are enjoying life much more thoroughly and happily than those who are still muddling their brains and drugging their veins with alcohol.

CURSUS BREVIS PHILOSOPHIAE. Volumen I. Auctore Gustavo Pécsi, Phil. et SS. Theol. Doctore. London Burns and Oates. Price 5s.

THIS is the first volume of a course of Philosophy, and deals with Logic and Metaphysics. The course is meant to give aid to those who would not have time to pour over the longer and more ancient tomes. As to the necessity or need for a new *cursus* to serve up the old knowledge doctors may differ. At any rate from the Scholastic view-point the book is clear and concise. The syllogistic style of argumentation is observed throughout. The author never forgets those for whom he is writing, and no pains are spared to make the student's work as light and easy as possible.

There is a remarkable freshness about the volume, considering that it traverses ground so often trodden, and where one could hardly expect a fresh flower to appear. The traditional dicta of Scholastic Philosophy are rehearsed in all their ortho-

doxy, but the native originality of the author gives them a philosophic glow which we seldom find in Scholastic commentaries.

The faults under which this volume labours are those common to all text-books of its kind. Modern Philosophy has a just complaint against the species. These books set out to teach us our Philosophy, and yet they hide from us whatever truth Modern Philosophy possesses and presents us with its errors alone. A fair presentation of the truth, as well as a fair presentation of the errors, of Modern Philosophy would enhance the value of many Scholastic treatises.


Two reasons are adduced in the Preface why the work is written in Latin, first because Latin is the tongue which God has prepared for His Church, through which her ecclesiastical life may receive its nourishment, and second, because of the special 'perspicuity' of the Latin language in philosophic and scientific discussion. There is just the suggestion of a contradiction between the first reason and another of the author's statements, namely, that true Philosophy is neither Christian nor pagan. If it is neither Christian nor pagan, why should its expression be ecclesiastical? Just one remark about the second reason. The author pays a poor compliment to Hungarian patriotism when he insinuates that the aspiring philosophers of that land require their Philosophy written in a foreign tongue.

Perhaps after all, we should congratulate ourselves on the fact that it is written in Latin, at least any of us who do not understand the language of Hungary. Apart from the fact that at present things Hungarian are 'in the air,' this Hungarian *Cursus* will, on its own merits, find a ready welcome among Irish students.

P. B.

POLITICAL ECONOMY. By Charles S. Devas. London : Longmans, Green, & Co. Price 7s. 6d.

THE scientific world is already well acquainted with Mr. Devas' great work on Political Economy, and has accorded it a high place among the standard books on the subject. The present work is a carefully revised edition with some additions. Later figures are substituted for earlier, and a brief Appendix is added with several explanatory notes.



P. B.

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